The TaRYaG count, that is the traditional enumeration of the 613 commandments contained in the five Mosaic books (Torah), has gained a prominent place in Judaism. The count is based on a dictum found in the Babylonian Talmud and attributed to R. Simlai, a Palestinian rabbi of the late third century. No one did more to see this count achieve the importance it has than Moses Maimonides, the prominent 12th-century Jewish philosopher and perhaps the most important post-talmudic jurist of all times. M. offered an impressive methodology, made up of rules of individuation, identification and interpretation - in all, fourteen rules - to support his proposed enumerative scheme and used it to critique all previous such attempts. By his own account, Maimonides undertook this project with the sole aim to provide a comprehensive outline for his upcoming Code of Jewish Law. This thesis demonstrates the enormous difficulties inherent in such a project - difficulties that could not have passed unnoticed by such an accomplished author - and seeks to uncover any other reason or reasons that may have prompted him to adopt such a constraining count. The thesis concludes by speculating that Maimonides may have found it convenient to use the TaRYaG scheme in order to introduce into the list of commandments the beliefs in the existence of God and in His unity - beliefs that had previously not been considered commandments. An ancillary product of the dissertation is the discovery that many of the commandment designations proposed in the enumerative scheme are abandoned in the Halakhot, a discovery that was noted, albeit only partially, by less than a handful of scholars over the past eight hundred and fifty years. The dissertation examines the proposed solutions and rejects them on a number of counts. A systematic analysis of these occurrences suggests a more consistent solution and reveals an aspect of Maimonides that has not been sufficiently appreciated, Maimonides the exegete and legal philosopher. The agenda-oriented research also examines some of the important innovations contained in M’s list of positive commandments, the hermeneutics behind them and the politico-philosophical ideas that may have informed them.

This thesis concerns the various concepts of rights and philosophical accounts of them. Chapter 1 addresses some methodological issues affecting analytic legal philosophy and the philosophy of rights. Chapter 2 distinguishes between two kinds of philosophical accounts of rights: models and theories. Models outline the 'conceptually basic' types of rights, their differences, and their relationships with other kinds of 'normative positions' (e.g., duties, liabilities, etc.). Theories of rights serve two roles: first, to posit a supposed ultimate purpose for all rights; second, to provide criteria for determining what counts as 'a right' in the first place. The chapter also criticises both monistic models (ones positing only a single basic kind) for being under-inclusive and a subset of pluralistic ones (those positing several basic kinds) as over-inclusive. Chapter 3 clarifies the concepts of rights exercise, enforcement, remedying, and vindication. Chapter 4 explains the Interest-Will Theories of rights debate, while Chapter 5 argues that its constituents are irredeemably flawed, unnecessary, and under-inclusive. Chapter 6 further analyses the concept of rights enforceability, showing why legal rights are not invariably enforceable by legal powers. It then explains why wholly unenforceable legal rights nonetheless constitute 'imperfect' or defective cases. Chapter 7 argues there are more ways to enforce legal rights than just via powers, elucidating two such modes: legal rights can generally be claimed or invoked using legal liberties in private and social circumstances. While Chapter 8 shows why it might not always be possible to make liberty-based claims or invocations of right, it also provides reasons for thinking that legal rights that cannot be enforced in these ways are also imperfect.

Legally Philosophical Aspects of Searching for Truth in Civil Procedure DIPLOMA THESIS Viktor Gazda Abstract The aim of this thesis is to discuss certain legally philosophical aspects of fact- findings in civil procedure. In a simplified way, this work is focused on exploring the possibility of determining the value of truthfulness of quaestio facti when applying law. The six chapters of the work include three basic themes. The first one examines the reflection of the philosophical concepts of truth in the process of determining the facts of a case, the second one clarifies the nature of the ideological aims of fact-findings in the form of principles of formal and substantive legal truth and the third topic deals with the nature of a judge's beliefs in the truthfulness of factual claims and the role of probability in the judge's belief At first I briefly present the phenomenon of truth in a wider philosophical context so that I can then proceed to outline the selected theories of truth. After explaining the basic essence of the legal procedural principles which have the greatest impact on the process of finding the facts, I pass, in another part of the thesis, to the very analysis of these principles through the prism of selected theories of truth. The reflection of the philosophical concepts of...

<p>In this thesis, I will examine the consequences of applying the legal philosophy of Joseph Raz in real world situations. I will argue that if most legal systems actually attempted to adhere to, and accept his theory in all its parts, the legal systems in question would have serious problems. In particular, the legal authorities and officials which represent the legal systems in question would be confused about the extent of their authority. After I prove my claim, I will offer a solution to the problem.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

This thesis is an investigation of a doctrine generally known as ‘failure of consideration’, but which I term ‘failure of condition’. I have two principal aims. First, to clarify quite what the doctrine of failure of condition is. Secondly, to explain why it has the effects it does – in particular, why it justifies the response of restitution. The doctrine, at core, concerns conditional transfers: when a transfer is made conditionally, and the condition fails, the transfer can be recovered. For this reason, I term the doctrine ‘failure of condition.’ I investigate the nature of this relationship and argue that the reason why the transfer is conditional is that the agent’s intention to make the transfer was itself conditional. The justification of restitution is a more complex affair than is customarily accepted – but there is a valid justification lurking not far from the surface of orthodoxy. A secondary concern of the thesis is to re-examine an old theory in the field of common mistake, frustration and termination following a breach of contract. It used to be thought that these doctrines could be explained by failure of condition. That theory has fallen out of favour – it seems that no one accepts it today. This rejection rests upon a confusion over the nature of the doctrine of failure of condition. Once the nature of this doctrine has been clarified, we can see how closely the various doctrines align with one another; we can also see where the true difficulty with the failure of condition explanation lies.

This thesis argues that corporations have outgrown the theoretical frameworks that were devised to explain their dynamics at the turn of the 20th century. Contemporary conditions result in crises of legitimacy between corporations and their public contexts. With their amplified scales of operation and wide-reaching physical, economic, political, and social consequences, corporations of the 21st century demand revised theoretical, legal, and pragmatic interpretations that are better suited to grappling with present-day dynamics and to addressing critical challenges. This research examines contemporary controversies between corporations and publics from a critical legal perspective. Analysis of corporate dynamics is informed by geographically oriented themes of space and scale, contingency and attribution, and materiality and risk as they bear relevance to theoretical and real enactments of the corporation. This thesis grounds its claims with reference to the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) discourse; taking advantage of its reach and popularity while maintaining enough distance to note its limitations and internal contradictions. This thesis finds that the present-day account of CSR is originated and advanced by an ideological orientation that is universalizing, materialist, positivist, formalist and rationalist. Such an orientation is confronted and contested in this work by a more critical rationality that is concerned with power dynamics, as well as questions of agency and self-determination. This rationality is elaborated through four empirical chapters which find that: 1) appeals to a CSR agenda as an effective mechanism for addressing the corporation’s public impacts assumes the existence of a modern, liberal political context; 2) community ‘materiality’ presents an opportunity to bridge the notional public/private divide that is a core tenet of liberal theory; 3) the global corporation extends into plural territorialities and legal jurisdictions, and its public identity as interpreted through legal text sets the parameters for the accountability regimes devised to manage its impacts 4) pragmatist and aspirational legal agendas might be coordinated to advance issue-focused as well as case-based corporate liability reform. This work advances an account of the corporate-public relationship that carries relevance to a range of actors; corporations, public communities, policy makers and legal scholars. Each group has an integral part to play in addressing the challenges presented by the modern corporate arrangement and devising regimes that contain its public implications.

One way to prompt people to act is to claim that one’s commands impose duties upon some persons to act and subsequently to command those persons. This is the approach of practical authority. The claim of practical authority is ingredient to a predominant conception of the state. This thesis argues that the state’s claim to practical authority is both unjustified and morally wrong; it defends philosophical anarchism. The philosophical anarchist argument advanced here begins with a defence of a presumption against practical authority. It then argues that no argument for the practical authority of the state overcomes that presumption. Thus the state’s claim to practical authority is unjustified. The philosophical anarchist’s position suggests that we rethink both the normative claim ingredient to the concept of the state and the relationship between states and persons. This thesis suggests that states claim legitimacy – that is, states claim that the potentially coercive legal directives that they enact are all-things-considered morally permissible. The thesis outlines the ideal of legitimacy in political philosophy, an ideal distinct from authority. An analysis of legitimacy requires an analysis of coercion. The thesis develops a specific account of the pro tanto wrongfulness of coercion that locates the wrongfulness of coercion not with the badness of the outcomes that the coercee faces but rather with the beliefs and intentions of the coercer. Two upshots emerge from that account. The first is that legal directives are not necessarily coercive. The second is that the conditions which render coercion pro tanto wrongful also render the state’s claim to practical authority wrongful. However, whereas coercion is justifiable by an appeal to reasons that defeat its pro tanto wrongfulness, the philosophical anarchist shows that the state’s claim to practical authority is not so justifiable. Therefore, the state’s claim to practical authority is decisively wrongful.

Deference in international human rights law has provoked animated discussion, particularly the margin of appreciation doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights. Many commentators describe the practice of deference but do not explain how it affects judicial reasoning. Some approve characteristics of deference but do not provide a justification to defend the practice against criticism. Others regard deference as a danger to human rights because it betrays the universality of human rights or involves tribunals either failing to consider a case properly or missing an opportunity to set human rights standards. This thesis employs a different approach by focussing on deference as the practice of assigning weight to reasons for a decision on the basis of external factors. This approach draws on theories of second-order reasoning from the philosophy of practical reasoning. The thesis offers a conceptual account of deference that accords with the practice not only of the European Court of Human Rights, but also the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee. Additionally the thesis presents a normative account of deference, that the role of these tribunals entails permitting a measure of diversity as states implement international human rights standards. Deference in international human rights law then is the judicial practice of assigning weight to the respondent states’ reasoning in a case on the basis of three factors: democratic legitimacy, the common practice of states and expertise. This affects judicial reasoning by impacting the balance of reasons in the proportionality assessment. The account defended in this thesis dispels concerns that deference is a danger to human rights, whilst providing a theory that justifies the practice of the tribunals. The thesis thus provides the contours of a doctrine of deference in each of the three international human rights systems.

While the United Kingdom has a general commitment to religious freedom, there is currently very little written on what this commitment ought to mean for religious organizations. This thesis contributes to religious freedom literature by considering when United Kingdom law ought to apply to religious organizations. It answers this question by exploring certain potential conflicts between United Kingdom law and religious organizations paying particular attention to those that are under-examined and where the possibility of differential treatment is strongest. The thesis is divided into three parts. Part One consists of Chapter One and sets out the doctrinal and theoretical foundations of religious freedom. Here the thesis accepts that autonomy is the liberal normative justification for religious freedom. Part Two consists of Chapters Two to Chapter Seven and examines the interaction between United Kingdom law and religious organizations in six contexts: employment; the provision of goods and services; membership admission; internal discipline, internal property disputes; and family matters. Each chapter in Part Two is divided into two parts. The first part considers the legal doctrine that applies to religious organizations in that context. It then considers whether that approach can be justified in light of the commitment to religious freedom and autonomy identified in Part One. Part Three consists of the final chapter, Chapter Eight. This chapter uses the conclusions from the preceding doctrinal chapters to suggest a general approach for determining when law should apply to religious organizations. The thesis concludes that a contextual approach, that considers the often competing interests involved, is the best way of determining when law should apply to religious organizations. Such consideration ought to pay special attention to the importance of the particular activity to ensuring that the option of a religious way of life is available.

1 Material Tensions between Natural Law and Positive Law and Approaches to its Solution Jakub Kříž Abstract The title of my dissertation - "Material Tensions between Natural Law and Positive Law and Approaches to its Solution" - refers to everlasting contrapositions of two different approaches to law: (i) natural law tradition which is concerned with a necessary continuity between law and the requirements of practical reasonableness and that describes law as "rational standard for conduct"1 and (ii) tradition of legal positivism, which understands law only as a social fact. Actually, in the world of jurisprudence, there is no single natural law theory on one side2 and unique legal positivism on the other side.3 It is 1 MURPHY, Mark C. Natural Law Jurisprudence. Legal Theory. 2003, No. 9, p. 244, MURPHY, Mark C. Natural Law Theory. In: GOLDING , Martin P., EDMUNSON, William A. (eds.). The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. s.l. : Blackwell Publishing, 2006, p. 15. 2 For many of them we can mention classical natural law theory of the thomistic philosophy, new natural law theory of G. Grisez and J. Finnes, legal realism of J. Hervada, "modern" natural law theories such as L. Fuller's concept of the Rule of Law and the inner morality of law or R. Dworkin's theory of the unique right...