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No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

As the level of integrated circuit (IC) complexity continues to increase, the post-silicon validation stage is becoming a large component of the overall development cost. To address this, we propose a reconfigurable post-silicon debug infrastructure that enhances the post-silicon validation process by enabling the observation and control of signals that are internal to the manufactured device. The infrastructure is composed of dedicated programmable logic and programmable access networks. Our reconfigurable infrastructure enables not only the diagnoses of bugs; it also allows the detection and potential correction of errors in normal operation. In this thesis we describe the architecture, implementation and operation of our new infrastructure. Furthermore, we identify and address three key challenges arising from the implementation of this infrastructure. Our results demonstrate that it is possible to implement an effective reconfigurable post-silicon infrastructure that is able to observe and control circuits operating at full speed, with an area overhead of between 5% and 10% for many of our target ICs. / Applied Science, Faculty of / Electrical and Computer Engineering, Department of / Graduate

A generalized inclusion (g.i.) frame consists of a set of points (or "worlds") W and an assignment of a binary relation Rw on W to each point w in W. generalized inclusion frames whose Rw are partial orders are called comparison frames. Conditional logics of various comparative notions, for example, Lewis's V-logic of comparative possibility and utilitarian accounts of conditional obligation, model the dyadic modal operator > on comparison frames according to (what amounts to) the following truth condition: oc>13"holds at w" if every point in the truth set of a bears Rw to some point where holds. In this essay I provide a relational frame theory which embraces both accessibility semantics and g.i. semantics as special cases. This goal is achieved via a philosophically significant generalization of universal strict implication which does not assume accessibility as a primitive. Within this very general setting, I provide the first axiomatization of the dyadic modal logic corresponding to the class of all g.i. frames. Various correspondences between dyadic logics and first order definable subclasses of the class of g.i. frames are established. Finally, some general model constructions are developed which allow uniform completeness proofs for important sublogics of Lewis' V. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

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The structure of our world is given in the grammar of our native tongue. If so people whose native tongue has quite a different grammar must be living in a quite different world. A logic such as Aristotle's may seem universal to the speakers of Greek, in fact it may seem universal to speakers of any Indo-European tongue, but the logic will hold good only for the 'universe' of the language or language-family in question. This implies a relationship between logic and grammar rather like the one Russell and Whitehead -claimed for mathematics and logic. Their Principia Mathematica tried to show that the mathematical notion of number rests on, or arises out of, the logical notion of class, that is, we come to understand what a number is through our grasp of what a class is. This thesis is a kind of Principia Logica: it suggests that the whole framework of common sense logic rests on, or arises out of, the grammatical structure of the language the logic was conceived in or took shape in terms of. And if so logical criteria come into being and take shape inside a language or language-family, and are dependent for their validity and even for their meaning on the structure of the language in question. To test, or to try to test, a mode of thought or an argument form against a logical system would be to put the cart before the horse: the logic only makes sense because the form of argument or mode of thought was there already. If so philosophers and logicians ought to think of the words 'world', 'universe' and 'universal' with tongue in cheek. In so far as a judgment seems to us universally true it is unlikely to hold good for the world of an alien language family. If our world is not the only world anybody writing logic or philosophy down ought to make it clear whose world he has in mind - and to do this it may be enough to make sure it is addressed to somebody in particular. Western philosophers seem to have addressed themselves to the whole world, or to mankind, or God. This thesis shows, if nothing else, how hard it can be to address even one other human being. To sum up with another analogy; it seems to me, as a single man, that the difference between one and two is greater than the difference between any other two numbers. There may be a world of difference between zero and one, but between one and two there's all the difference in the world - and that's the difference that matters. Perhaps the only way 1,000 differs from 1,001, as Frege puts it, is in the expression on its face. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

This study was designed to determine the effectiveness of teaching symbolic logic in the high school. Three hundred eighty-seven students enrolled on the University Programme in grades nine to thirteen at Como Lake High School, in School District No. 43 (Coquitlam), took part in the investigation. The students were grouped according to the mathematics course they were studying. Answers were sought to two specific questions. Do significant differences exist between the means of the final test scores of the students in each of the groups? At which grade levels can this material be effectively mastered? As a criterion for determining this, 75 per cent of the students at a particular level were required to obtain a score of 50 per cent or better on the final test. In order to answer the first question, the results were studied by analysis of covariance with scholastic aptitude being the variable controlled. The answer to the second question was obtained by comparing the performance of each group with the standard outlined. On the basis of this information, decisions were made regarding the suitability of the material for the various grade levels. All of the differences between the means were found to be significant at the one per cent level. The highest mean score was obtained by the students in Mathematics 101, followed in order by those of Mathematics 91, 30, 20, and 10. The students of Mathematics 101, 91 and 30 satisfied the requirement that 75 per cent should obtain a score of 50 per cent or better on the final test. The students of Mathematics 20 and 10 failed to satisfy this requirement. / Education, Faculty of / Graduate

The aim in this thesis is to investigate the logical status of meta-ethical theories which attempt to analyse ethical sentences in terms of other types of sentences or other types of human activity. That is, an investigation of the logic of statements like "Value judgements are simply expressions of emotion", "Value judgements are (disguised) commands", "Ethical statements are (peculiar) descriptions" is presented. To do this, one such theory, the Emotive Theory, is considered in some detail. This theory was chosen above the others for more detailed treatment as it has proved the most influential in the development of contemporary philosophy since the 1930s when it was first presented. It is here shown that in its historically important presentation, the Emotive Theory is literally false, although it can be made true by suitable re-definition. It can then be seen that the process of making the theory true by re-definition removes it from the type of theory which it is the aim of this thesis to investigate for the theory then ceases to analyse ethical sentences in terms of other types of sentences or other types of human activity. Thus there is no lengthy investigation of the theory when it involves new definition for this falls outside the scope of the thesis. Having presented a detailed refutation of the Emotive Theory as an attempt to analyse ethical sentences in terms of other types of sentences or other types of human activity, a general refutation of all such attempts is developed. It is shown that such statements as "Value judgements are simply expressions of emotion", "Value judgements are (disguised) commands", "Ethical statements are (peculiar) descriptions" are all literally false however much they may point up important facts. This is followed by a short discussion of the implications of the thesis in respect to philosophical investigations of the logic of ethical statements. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate