Thèse (Ph.D.)--Université Laval, 2002. / Bibliogr.: f. [223]-231. Publié aussi en version électronique.

Thesis (M. Div.)--Grace Theological Seminary, 1986. / Abstract. Bibliography: leaves 51-54.

Diss. : Philosophische Fakultät : Saarbrücken : 1984. - Bibliogr. p. 283-285. -

Thesis (M.A.)--Baylor University, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 119-131).

Texte remanié de: Habilitationsschrift--Fachbereich Gesellschafts- und Geschichtswissenschaften--Darmstadt--Technische Universität, 1999. / Bibliogr. p. 473-526. Index.

Akademisk avhandling--Uppsala, 1996. / Résumé en anglais. Bibliogr. p. 229-236.

In this essay I discuss conscience as analyzed by Heidegger in his magnum opus Being and Time from 1927. In Heidegger´s phenomenological ontology conscience is an uncanny call that comes from ourselves and is directed to ourselves; an inner foreign voice that suddenly strikes us in our everydayness and summons us to face our own being, that is: our own uncanniness. According to Heidegger to face one´s being is to face the human existence itself as essentially free, finite and historical, which in its extension means to face oneself as the conscious being one is. My question focuses on the who: who is the one that calls inside of us – who is it that we listen to? Or, to put it differently: what in our existence makes it possible for us to simultaneously be the caller and the one that is being called on? Whereas Heidegger answers by referring to the distinction between Being and being(s), which is essential in his philosophy, I choose another and extended direction of interpretation, namely one that points precisely at the uncanny – demonic – character of existence. This interpretation is developed specifically in relation to some of Heidegger´s later writings, his readings of Sophocles´ Antigone as well as his Letter on Humanism. It is my intention to show that Heidegger through his analysis on the uncanny and historical human being implicitly makes room for a demonic understanding of conscience as an ethical phenomenon that relates it not only to being and death, but also to the dead.

Linha de pesquisa: Linguagem, Filosofia e Cultura. / O orientador do trabalho n?o mencionado na lista da Folha de Aprova??o. / Submitted by Jos? Henrique Henrique (jose.neves@ufvjm.edu.br) on 2018-03-09T19:59:06Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) frederico_fernandes_castro.pdf: 783682 bytes, checksum: a56f6fa64634bb8691bbf97f5113d1f0 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Rodrigo Martins Cruz (rodrigo.cruz@ufvjm.edu.br) on 2018-03-09T20:23:30Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) frederico_fernandes_castro.pdf: 783682 bytes, checksum: a56f6fa64634bb8691bbf97f5113d1f0 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-03-09T20:23:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) frederico_fernandes_castro.pdf: 783682 bytes, checksum: a56f6fa64634bb8691bbf97f5113d1f0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017 / Cr?tico dos modelos propostos para a Filosofia da Mente, John R. Searle, baseado na tradi??o da Filosofia Anal?tica Contempor?nea e na Filosofia da Linguagem, inicia sua pesquisa sobre o problema da consci?ncia dialogando com as Neuroci?ncias, com a Intelig?ncia Artificial e com as Ci?ncias Cognitivas. Searle defende que a mente ? uma propriedade emergente do sistema nervoso. Com o naturalismo biol?gico ele prop?e respostas acerca do problema mente-corpo aceitas e criticadas por muitos, al?m de apontar algumas falhas recorrentes em outras propostas. Objetiva-se nesta disserta??o, tendo como ponto de partida o conceito de consci?ncia, apontar contribui??es das reflex?es emergentistas sobre o problema da corporeidade da mente baseadas na teoria proposta por Searle. O presente procede pelo estudo de um renomado livro do autor intitulado A redescoberta da Mente. Para an?lise tamb?m foram utilizados alguns interlocutores que lhe s?o contempor?neos e comentadores, dando espa?o para di?logos que se mostram pertinentes ?s elabora??es conceituais de Searle. Metodologicamente esta pesquisa est? fundamentada na an?lise conceitual a qual foi delineada pela Filosofia Anal?tica dos s?c. XIX e XX. Sobre a organiza??o da disserta??o, o no primeiro momento do texto prop?e expor uma breve s?ntese do autor e suas obras, bem como a an?lise do conceito de emerg?ncia. Neste cap?tulo destacam o di?logo entre Searle e Thompson quanto ao termo emerg?ncia. No segundo momento tratamos do problema da consci?ncia e seu lugar no universo atrav?s da exposi??o de teorias sobre a rela??o mente e corpo. Destacaremos as cr?ticas de Searle ?s abordagens que postulam tentativas de solucionar tal problema partindo de princ?pios reducionistas e dualistas. Analisaremos como que a partir destas cr?ticas ele efetua um modo peculiar de conceitualizar a mente. Searle constr?i um aparato te?rico diferente de muitas tradi??es vistas at? ent?o. Analisa-se no terceiro e ?ltimo momento a irredutibilidade da mente. O naturalismo biol?gico refuta argumentos reducionistas, defendendo que a mente n?o pode ser reduzida ? sua estrutura, ao sistema nervoso. Searle refuta tamb?m qualquer possiblidade de compreens?o da mente a partir de preceitos dualistas ou metaf?sicos que buscam a exist?ncia da mente para l? das rela??es causais dos elementos constituintes do enc?falo. De modo geral, do ponto de vista emergentista defendemos que o naturalismo biol?gico n?o perde sua for?a argumentativa, pelo contr?rio, ele se torna ainda mais consistente e abrangente. Destacamos que Searle definindo a mente como uma propriedade emergente do sistema nervoso foge do escopo epifenomenista, mas entende que, a exemplo da rela??o est?mago/digest?o, o c?rebro em sua organiza??o ? capaz da emerg?ncia da consci?ncia. Isto ?, dado os elementos x em uma organiza??o y, ? poss?vel predicar sobre uma propriedade a qual podemos chamar de consci?ncia que emerge da rela??o entre x e y. Este ? um dos pontos mais caros para nosso trabalho, ou seja, entender o naturalismo biol?gico a partir desta possibilidade emergentista. De modo conclusivo, Searle se apresenta bastante crente na possibilidade de definir a mente como uma propriedade ordin?ria de um sistema biol?gico aprofundando-se em uma vis?o naturalista em Filosofia da Mente e, mesmo que n?o tenha tido a vontade de ser descrito como um emergentista, mostramos que seus postulados est?o alinhados com esta abordagem, herdando tanto de seus avan?os quanto de suas limita??es. / Disserta??o (Mestrado Profissional) ? Programa de P?s-Gradua??o em Ci?ncias Humanas, Universidade Federal dos Vales do Jequitinhonha e Mucuri, 2017. / Critical of proposed models for the Philosophy of Mind, John R. Searle, based in the tradition of analytic philosophy and the philosophy of language, start his research on the problem of consciousness dialoguing with the Neurosciences, with Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Sciences. Searle argues that mind is an emerging property of the nervous system. With the biological naturalism, he proposes answers to mind-body problem accepted and criticized by many, as well as pointing out some flaws applicants in other proposals. The objective of this dissertation is, taking as starting point the concept of consciousness, pointing contributions of emergence reflections on the problem of embodiment of mind based on the theory proposed by Searle. This makes the study of renowned book by the author entitled Rediscovery of Mind. For the analysis we have also used some contemporary interlocutors and reviewers, giving some place for pertinent conversations on the main conceptual elaborations of Searle. Methodologically this study is based on the conceptual analysis, which was delineated by the analytic philosophy of the 19th century and 20th century. About the organization of the dissertation, the first moment of the text proposes to present a brief summary of the author and his works, as well as the analysis of the concept of emergency. In this chapter they emphasize the dialogue between Searle and Thompson regarding the emergence term. In the second moment we deal with to expose the problem of consciousness and its place in the universe through exposure to theories about the mind-body relationship. We stress the criticism of Searle to approaches that postulate attempts to solve this problem based on reductionist and dualist principles. We propose to analyze here how, from these criticisms, he performs a peculiar way to conceptualize the mind. Searle builds a theoretical apparatus, different from many traditional ones. It is analyzed in the third moment, the irreducibility of mind. The biological naturalism rejects reductionist arguments, arguing that the mind cannot be reduced to its structure, to the nervous system. Searle refutes any possibility of understanding mind from dualistic precepts or metaphysicians seeking the existence of mind beyond the causal relations of the constituent elements of the brain. In the third session the focus will be one of the problems most applicants of philosophy of mind that is the concept of intentionality. In general, from the emergentist point of view we argue that the biological naturalism does not lose its strength of argument, on the contrary, it becomes even more consistent and comprehensive. We emphasize that Searle definition of mind as an emerging property of the nervous system is out of scope for epiphenomenalism. Following the example of the relation stomach/digestion, the brain in its organization is capable of emergence of consciousness. This is because the elements x in an organization y, it is possible to preach on a property which we call consciousness that emerges from the relationship between x and y. This is one of the most important points for this work, i.e., to understand the biological naturalism from the emergence. In conclusive terms, Searle presents itself quite a believer in the ability to set the mind as an ordinary property of a biological system by drilling down a naturalist vision in philosophy of mind and, even if they did not have the desire to be described as an emergentist, we show that its postulates are aligned with this approach, inheriting both of their advances and their limitations.

A presente dissertação consiste em uma pesquisa descritiva, em forma de um estudo de caso, que tem como questão norteadora a representação social que os alunos da Escola de Administração (EA) da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) fazem de quem é o administrador, considerando os fundamentos da ação ética, implicando na distinção necessária, no que tange aos fins, entre práxis e atividade. Para tanto, foi realizado um estudo sobre os principais conceitos da Teoria das Representações Sociais, delineado o contexto do surgimento do profissional e do Curso de Graduação em Administração no Brasil, para, então, se deter na reflexão sobre a conduta ética, existencialmente fundada na práxis e no exercício da consciência crítica. Os elementos para a análise foram obtidos através de observação, da formulação e distribuição de questionários para alunos da EA/UFRGS, assim como a realização de um Grupo Focal com alunos pertencentes a grupos de liderança da instituição supracitada. Para a análise dos dados, a metodologia escolhida foi a análise de conteúdo. Os resultados da pesquisa são divididos em dois quadros - um quadro destinado à análise dos questionários e outro para a análise do Grupo Focal - com categorizações. O quadro de categorias derivadas da análise dos questionários é apresentado em três partes: treze categorias iniciais, posteriormente reagrupadas em seis categorias intermediárias e, por último, sintetizadas em duas categorias finais. Em relação ao Grupo Focal, a análise é mostrada em duas partes: seis categorias iniciais e duas finais. Os resultados da análise permitiram mostrar os desafios para o futuro administrador, e a relação entre o desempenho de sua atividade profissional com a sua formação universitária. / The present work consists in a descriptive research, as a case study, and has as main purpose the social representation of the administrator (business person) to students from the School of Administration (EA) of the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), regarding such aspects as ethical action, the praxis and activity. Thus, it has been done a presentation of the Social Representation Theory, from the context of the emergence of the professional together with the Business Administration course in Brazil, and finally, from the ethical conduct, praxis, and the critical awareness. The elements for the analysis were collected through the formulation and distribution of questionnaires to students in the EA/UFRGS, and holding a Focus Group along with students that belong to leadership groups of the institution said. For data analysis, the chosen methodology was the analysis of content. The results obtained from the survey are divided into two charts - one chart assigned to questionnaire analysis and the other one to the Focus Group analysis - with categorization. The chart created from the questionnaire analysis is presented in three parts: thirteen starting categories, later on reorganized in six intermediate categories and, finally, summarized into two final categories. Regarding the Focus Group, the analysis is shown in two parts: six starting categories and two final categories. The results from the analysis allowed to show the challenges for the future administrator, and the relationship between the performance of his career along with his university knowledge.

Despite its ubiquity in debate over the justifiability of civil disobedience and conscientious objection, “conscience” remains an opaque concept. The attempt to define and employ it properly is not a purely academic exercise. The political language and behavior we associate with conscientiousness are empty to the point of being vulnerable to co-option by manifestly non-conscientious, violent, and reactionary movements. My argument is that the ease with which political actors adopt the language of conscience is due, not poor public understanding of the concept of “conscience,” but to the concept itself. In modern philosophical interpretations of conscience, such as that of Martin Luther and John Locke, the conscience is reified as a moral faculty or interior conversation of the individual. This is a departure from classical views of conscientiousness (for instance, Augustine’s), which emphasize the shared, fragile and habitual nature of conscience. Once “conscientiousness” is reified as “conscience,” it becomes difficult to characterize, except in negative terms, as an inner space free from tradition and force. My thesis is that the co-option of the language of conscience stems, in part, from the empty and conflicted characterization of philosophy in modern contract theory. One example of this conflicted characterization of conscience is the abortive project of distinguishing civil disobedience and conscientious objection. In law, politics, and philosophy, it is difficult to offer sound reasons for distinguishing these latter categories, despite frequent attempts to do so. The attempt fails on conceptual as well as practical grounds. I criticize two prominent treatments of civil disobedience and conscientious objection in evidence of this claim (John Rawls and Michael Walzer). When it comes to the language of conscience, modern American culture has committed the philosophic fallacy (John Dewey). We have substituted the clear divisions and images created by conscientious movements for the process that created them. I argue that “conscience” is best seen as a quality of healthy debate between adversaries—debates over problems so fundamental that they will be carried on in extra-legal and even illegal spheres. Conscience is a not a language that just any political actor can speak at will. It is a series of decisions that indicate to a public that we are not political enemies but political adversaries, seeking a political future together (Chantal Mouffe).