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This thesis is concerned with tracing out the manifold connections between personhood and morality to argue that morality is based on fundamental properties of the person, and therefore a moral philosophy that ignores or truncates the person is one that fails to understand the central function of morality in our social practices and understanding of the self. It is at the same time to argue that morality is integral to personhood and enters the construct of the person at the most basic level. My method is to exploit our sense that our concept of the person exists to capture that which makes us more than natural beings. First, persons must self-define. What it is to be a person is not given. Persons, and each person, must create an ideal of the person to act, and through action try to realize that ideal and through that process in fact realize themselves. Second, the human psyche has its own needs and drives unrelated to those of the physical being that propel the being towards personhood. Third, persons have depth. When we recognize a being to be a person, it is evidence of depth that we recognize. Without depth persons would not be. We have evolved a specialized vocabulary -- a moral vocabulary -- that both recognizes that depth and facilitates its creation. Together these entail that the person cannot be constructed without that construct being eventually set in moral terms, and that sociality is a basic unit of analysis of the person: persons exist as beings who recognize each other and exist in a matrix of recognition within which persons come to be. In as much as existing as a person is the proper form of existence for our kind and personhood is dependent on the voluntary activity of other persons, existence as a person must as far as possible be guaranteed. This is the foundational task of morality and the source of its basic requirements. / text

Adolescents largely cannot legally make their own medical decisions, and in some cases, the debate around whether this is right or wrong is an ethical dilemma. Researchers, philosophers, social justice workers, child rights advocates, and healthcare providers have long debated how much say, if any, adolescents should have in making medical decisions about their own health. This decision generally involves two contrasting approaches: (1) a paternalistic approach, where decisions are made for the adolescent, and (2) an autonomous approach, where the adolescent is granted the authority to make their own choices. These decisions are inherently moral in nature, as they involve judgments about what is morally right or wrong (Rozin, 1999). The present research examines how two key moral theories—Theory of Dyadic Morality (TDM) and Moral Foundations Theory (MFT)—apply to the issue of supporting adolescent autonomy in medical decision-making, specifically regarding transgender youth. Dyadic Morality posits that moral decisions are made through a cognitive process involving perceptions of norm violations, negative affect, and perceived harm (Schein & Gray, 2018b), whereas Moral Foundations Theory suggests that moral judgments rely on cognitive heuristics, or "foundations," such as harm/care, fairness/cheating, and purity/degradation (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Graham et al., 2009). Despite extensive research on moral judgments, little work has applied these theories to the context of transgender adolescents’ healthcare decisions.In the present research, 507 participants were recruited via Prolific to complete a survey assessing their moral judgments about transgender adolescents' autonomy in hormone replacement therapy (HRT) decisions. Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was employed to test several hypotheses and address four research questions regarding the role of both morality theories on support for adolescent autonomy. The results provide mixed support for Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) and challenge the applicability of the Theory of Dyadic Morality (TDM) within the context of transgender healthcare, indicating that these moral frameworks may not fully capture the complexities involved in medical decision-making for transgender adolescents. While both MFT and TDM offer valuable insights into the cognitive processes underlying moral judgments, they may fall short in accounting for the deeper ideological and cultural factors that shape support for or opposition to transgender healthcare. This study did not provide strong theoretical support for morality research, but policy and medical implications are worth noting. To effectively advance transgender rights, particularly adolescent autonomy in medical decisions, it is essential to engage with the broader sociocultural and ideological frameworks that influence public opinion. Both healthcare providers and advocates must address these beliefs in ways that respect the values of individuals and communities while simultaneously promoting inclusive and supportive environments for transgender individuals.

Most philosophers believe that morality gives us reasons, and that those reasons apply necessarily and universally. I refer to this rather general view as the Normativity Thesis. My dissertation is (1) a defense of the Normativity Thesis, and (2) an inquiry into what form the Normativity Thesis should take. I defend the Normativity Thesis on the grounds that morally wrong action always provides sufficient reason for criticism of the wrongdoer. I then argue that sufficient reason to criticize always involve the failure on the part of the criticizable person to respond to her own reasons. Thus, morally wrong action involves the failure to respond to reasons. It is commonplace to capture the relationship between reasons and morality as follows: Necessarily, for all A, x: if A’s doing x was morally wrong, then when A did x, there was a reason for A not to do x. This thesis, however, is in tension with a prominent theory about reasons for action, Humeanism: Necessarily, for all A, x: if A has a reason to do x, then A has some desire that will be served by doing x. The tension results from the fact that it appears to be possible that someone lacks any desire that is served by ii refraining from immoral action. I provide a novel argument for Humeanism, inspired by Bernard Williams’ famous argument for that thesis. Thus, I argue, since we have very good reason to accept Humeanism, the standard way of specifying the Normativity Thesis is problematic. I suggest that given Humeanism, we are compelled towards a specification of the Normativity Thesis that gives a central role to what I call moral sentiments: compassion and respect. On my view, the normativity of morality derives from reasons to have those sentiments, rather than reasons for action. Finally, I suggest that this view of the normativity of morality provides strong but non-conclusive reason to adopt a particular view about the nature of the property of moral wrongness, or what it fundamentally is to be morally wrong -- a view that again places moral sentiments at center stage. / text

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