This thesis consists of four essays and an introduction dedicated to two main topics: indexicality and presupposition. The first essay is concerned with an alleged problem for the standard treatment of indexicals on which their linguistic meanings are functions from context to content (so-called characters). Since most indexicals have their content settled, on an occasion of use, by the speaker’s intentions, some authors have argued that this standard picture is inadequate. By demonstrating that intentions can be seen as a parameter of the kind of context that characters operate on, these arguments are rejected. In addition, it is argued that a more recent, variable-based framework is naturally interpreted as an intention-sensitive semantics. The second essay is devoted to the phenomenon of descriptive uses of indexicals on which such an expression seems to contribute, not its standard reference as determined by its character, but a property to the interpretation. An argument that singular readings of the cases in question are incoherent is shown to be incorrect, and an approach to descriptive readings is developed on which they arise from e-type uses akin to other well known cases. Further, descriptive readings of the relevant kind are seen to arise only in the presence of adverbs of quantification, and all sentences in which such an adverb takes scope over an indexical are claimed to be ambiguous between a referential and an e-type (descriptive) reading. The third essay discusses a version of the variable analysis of pronouns on which their descriptive meanings are relegated to the so-called phi-features – person, gender and number. In turn, the phi-features are here seen as triggering semantic presuppositions that place constraints on the definedness of pronouns, and ultimately of sentences in which they appear. It is argued that the descriptive information contributed by the phi-features diverges radically from presuppositional information of both semantic and pragmatic varieties on several dimensions of comparison, and instead the main role of the phi-features is seen to be that of guiding hearers’ attempts to ascertain the speaker’s intentions. The fourth essay addresses an issue concerning the treatment of presuppositions in dynamic semantics. Representing a semantic treatment of pragmatic presuppositions, the dynamic framework is shown to incorrectly regard conversational infelicity as sufficient for semantic undefinedness, given the standard way of defining truth in terms of context change. Further, it is shown that a proposal for a solution fail to make correct predictions for epistemic modals. A novel framework is developed on which context change potentials act on contexts that have more structure than the contexts usually countenanced by dynamic semantics, and it is shown that this framework derives truth from context change while making correct predictions for both presuppositions and modals.

The Best PhD Thesis in the Faculties of Architecture, Arts, Business & Economics, Education, Law and Social Sciences (University of Hong Kong), Li Ka Shing Prize, 1997-1999. / published_or_final_version / Philosophy / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

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In response to assertions championing the absence of meaning and significance in language originating from Jacques Derrida's linguistic concepts of deconstruction, George Steiner and John Sheriff provide analyses of language that assert the opposite. Through an emphasis on subjectivities and subjective experience in the world, both find meaning to be bonded to subjective volition and the connectivities between subjects and language systems. For Steiner, this emphasis comes in the form of asserting the presence of others and the responsibilities we have to them, while Sheriff depicts how the semiotics of Charles Peirce make meaning-making subjective and communal. I argue, therefore, that in contrast to conceptions of language that challenge the presence of meaning in language, a structure of language as conceived through Charles Peirce's semiotics and George Steiner's vision of language asserts a dependability of language and the presence of meaning based on principles of connection and communion. / by Elliot Shaw. / Thesis (M.A.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2013. / Includes bibliography. / Mode of access: World Wide Web. / System requirements: Adobe Reader.

何啟志. / "2004年7月". / 論文(哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2004. / 參考文獻(leaves 99-101). / "2004 nian 7 yue". / Abstracts in Chinese and English. / He Qizhi. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2004. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 99-101). / 引言：魏晉玄學的「言意之辨」 --- p.1 / Chapter 第一章、 --- 語言哲學硏究角度的檢討 --- p.4 / Chapter 一、 --- 許抗生：借「言意之辨」說明唯物論語言觀 --- p.4 / Chapter 二、 --- 牟宗三：通過兩種真理觀解釋「言意之辨」 --- p.7 / Chapter 三、 --- 檢討 --- p.8 / Chapter 第二章、 --- 學術史硏究角度的檢討 --- p.13 / Chapter 一、 --- 湯用彤：確立「言意之辨」學術史硏究的框架 --- p.13 / Chapter 二、 --- 林麗真、余敦康：通過「言意之辨」探討魏晉人注經之方法 --- p.15 / Chapter 三、 --- 王葆玹：通過「言意之辨」探討魏晉人認識本體的方法 --- p.18 / Chapter 四、 --- 王曉毅：通過「言意之辨」探討魏晉人會通儒道之方法 --- p.20 / Chapter 五、 --- 檢討 --- p.23 / Chapter 第三章、 --- 哲學硏究角度的檢討 --- p.25 / Chapter 一、 --- 湯用彤：「言意之辨」對名士之立身行事亦有影響 --- p.25 / Chapter 二、 --- 近來之轉向：關於魏晉玄學的人生哲學硏究 --- p.27 / Chapter 三、 --- 人生哲學硏究角度的意義和困難 --- p.30 / Chapter 四、 --- 蔡振豐、沈順福與郭其才的嘗試 --- p.32 / Chapter 五、 --- 檢討 --- p.36 / Chapter 第四章、 --- 「言意之辨」與人生哲學的關係 --- p.39 / Chapter 一、 --- 「言意之辨」的討論背景 --- p.39 / Chapter 二、 --- 「言意之辨」的文獻解讀 --- p.45 / Chapter I. --- 「言意之辨」的重要槪念及主要問題 --- p.45 / Chapter II. --- 「言不盡意論」與「言盡意論」 --- p.50 / Chapter III. --- 「得意忘言論」 --- p.53 / Chapter 三、 --- 「言意之辨」與人生哲學的關係 --- p.55 / Chapter I. --- 由「聖人之意」的追尋說明人生哲學的關懷 --- p.55 / Chapter II. --- 魏晉「言意之辨」隱含理想生命的關懷 --- p.57 / Chapter 第五章、 --- 從「自我轉化」說「言意之辨」的人生哲學意義 --- p.60 / Chapter 一、 --- 中國哲學的主題是「自我轉化」 --- p.60 / Chapter 二、 --- 「言意之辨」隱含「自我轉化」的意思：境界的超昇 --- p.62 / Chapter I. --- 「玄遠」的追尋反映理想生命的構想 --- p.63 / Chapter II. --- 「忘言以得意」反映一種境界的超昇 --- p.68 / Chapter III. --- 由境界的超昇說明「自我轉化」的意義 --- p.73 / Chapter 第六章、 --- 從時代背景說「得意忘言」與「自我轉化」的關係 --- p.75 / Chapter 一、 --- 魏晉人所追尋的「自我轉化」及其所面對的困難 --- p.76 / Chapter I. --- 魏晉玄學以道家的理想作爲「自我轉化」的方向 --- p.76 / Chapter II. --- 追尋「道」所面對的困難：「言」與「道」難以相容的關係 --- p.80 / Chapter 二、 --- 「得意忘言」之提出與困難之克服 --- p.84 / Chapter I. --- 確立言說作爲工具的角色 --- p.84 / Chapter II. --- 指出「體悟」才是追尋「道」的途徑 --- p.86 / Chapter 三、 --- 「得意忘言」對魏晉名士的人生觀之影響 --- p.89 / Chapter I. --- 「得意忘言」在人生觀之體現：「得意忘形骸」 --- p.89 / Chapter II. --- 後人的評價及回應 --- p.91 / 餘論：「言意之辨」與佛教的傳入 --- p.96 / 參考書目 --- p.99 / 鳴謝 --- p.102

This thesis concerns the nature of knowledge-how, in particular the question of how we ought to combine philosophical and linguistic considerations to understand what it is to know how to do something. Part 1 concerns the significance of linguistic evidence. In chapter 1, I consider the range of linguistic arguments that have been used in favour of the Intellectualist claim that knowledge-how is a species of propositional knowledge. Chapter 2 considers the idea that sentences of the form ‘S knows how to V' involve a free relative complement, and the relation between this claim and the Objectualist claim that knowledge-how is a kind of objectual knowledge. Chapter 3 argues that Intellectualism about knowledge-how faces a problem of generality in accounting for the kinds of propositions that are known in knowledge-how, which is analogous to the generality problem for Reliabilism. Part 2 turns to philosophical considerations, offering an extended inquiry into the point of thinking and talking about knowledge-how. Chapter 4 considers why we should want to work with a concept of knowledge, isolating two hypotheses: i) that thinking and talking about knowledge-how helps us to pool skills, and ii) that thinking and talking about knowledge-how helps us to engage in responsible practices of co-operation. Chapter 5 criticises the former hypothesis by arguing against the suggestion that there is a knowledge-how norm on teaching. Chapter 6 offers an indirect argument for the latter hypothesis, arguing for a knowledge-how norm on intending. Part 3, which consists of chapter 7, offers a positive account of knowledge-how which takes into account both philosophical and linguistic considerations. According to what I will call the Interrogative Capacity view, knowing how to do something consists in a certain kind of ability to answer the question of how to do it.

Kwok Wai Man. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 74-78). / Preface --- p.3 / Chapter 1. --- Underlying Linguistic Reality --- p.6 / Chapter 1.1 --- Syntactics --- p.7 / Chapter 1.1.1 --- Superficial & Underlying Phrase Markers / Chapter 1.1.2 --- Rewriting & Transformational Rules / Chapter 1.2 --- Semantics --- p.21 / Chapter 1.2.1 --- Semantic Markers， Readings & Projection Rules / Chapter 1.2.2 --- Selection Restrictions / Chapter 1.2.3 --- Definition of Semantic Properties & Relations / Chapter 1.3 --- Status --- p.31 / Chapter 1.3.1 --- Appearance-Reality Distinction / Chapter 1.3.2 --- Linguistic Competence / Chapter 1.3.3 --- Idealization / Chapter 1.3.4 --- Linguistic Description / Chapter 1.3.5 --- Evidence / Chapter 2. --- Atomic Physics --- p.48 / Chapter 2.1 --- Line Spectra of Hydrogen Atom --- p.48 / Chapter 2.2 --- Bohr's Theory of Hydrogen Atom --- p.50 / Chapter 3. --- Criticisms of Katzian Semantics as Compared with Atomic Physics --- p.55 / Chapter 3.1 --- Distinction between Linguistic Theory & Linguistic Descriptions --- p.57 / Chapter 3.2 --- Theoretical Constructs in Katz' Theory --- p.58 / Chapter 3.3 --- Theoretical Concepts & Correspondence Rules --- p.62 / Chapter 3.4 --- Bohr vs Katz: the Weakness of the Latter --- p.64 / Notes --- p.67 / References --- p.74

No description available.

The rule-following problem can be condensed into the paradox that a rule cannot determine any course of action because every course of action can be made to accord with that rule. In his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke sees this paradox as potentially leading to a radical semantic scepticism that renders meaning itself meaningless, and attributes a sceptical solution of the problem to Wittgenstein. After a critical examination of Kripke's work, I conclude that this solution fails on account of allowing neither for a normativity beyond the subjection of the individual to correction by others in her community, nor for a non-interpretive conception of the understanding. Finally, I propose an alternative solution that incorporates the notion of communal background understanding into that of a form of life and thus preserves the normativity of rule-following and of language.

The thesis presents a development of J. L. Austin's analysis of truth and its accompanying analysis of sentence structure. This involves a discussion and refinement of Austin's notions of the demonstrative and descriptive conventions of language and of the demonstrative and descriptive devices of sentences. The main point of the thesis is that ordinary language must be treated as an historical phenomenon: one that has evolved its more complex features through a long series of variations upon a small number of rudimentary conventions and locutions. The utility of Austin's analysis is shown to lie in the description that it provides of the functions of these rudimentary conventions and locutions. The analysis is used to illuminate a number of problematic sentences and expressions of ordinary language, including identity sentences, definite descriptions, existential sentences, and conditionals.