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The logic of scientific language: the determination of the cognitive status of expressions in empirical science through the rational reconstruction of the scientific language.January 1981 (has links)
by Chan Kwok Hung. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1981. / Bibliography: leaves 90-94.
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The arbitrary in logic: Russell, Wittgenstein, CarnapJohnson, Clark B., 1943- January 1967 (has links)
No description available.
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The effects of linguistic and psychosocial factors on children's logical performance /Kwock, Myunghi Synn January 1984 (has links)
No description available.
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Rhetoric, logic, and language in early Greek thoughtMcCutchen, B. Dennis January 2010 (has links)
Typescript (photocopy). / Digitized by Kansas Correctional Industries
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Young children's deontic and epistemic reasoning.Ain, Lisa Robin, January 2004 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--University of Toronto, 2004. / Adviser: Janet Astington.
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Without language adult false belief reasoning with verbal interference /Lin, Yi. January 2009 (has links)
Honors Project--Smith College, Northampton, Mass., 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 66-69).
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Dynamics of plurality in quantification and anaphoraWang, Linton I-chi 28 August 2008 (has links)
Not available / text
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Tacit-knowledge of linguistic theoriesBarber, Alexander. January 1996 (has links)
What is the best way to understand 'applies to' when it is said of a linguistic theory that it applies to a particular language-user? We can answer by saying that a linguistic theory is applicable to an individual language-user just in case that individual tacitly-knows the theory. But this is an uninformative answer until we are told how to understand 'tacit-knowledge'. The end goal of this thesis is to defend the claim that we should take tacit-knowledge to be, simply, knowledge. Towards this end I argue against the satisfactoriness of competing ways of understanding 'tacit-knowledge'. For example, the instrumentalist position is neutral on whether linguistic theories are actually known by the ordinary language-users who tacitly-know them; instead, linguistic theories are to be such that knowing them would enable someone to do whatever it is that the tacit-knower can do. Other competing positions hold that, though tacit-knowledge is a psychological relation of some sort, it is not genuine knowledge. I also attempt to meet specific objections to the claim that a typical language-user (as opposed to a linguistic theorist) could plausibly be said to know a linguistic theory. An objection on which I focus is based on the claim that typical language-users do not possess the requisite concepts for having genuine knowledge of a linguistic theory. The aim in attempting to meet these objections is to open up the way for the linguistic theorist to exploit a paradigm of explanation: explanation of behaviour by knowledge attribution. Attributing knowledge of linguistic theories would be potentially explanatory of linguistic behaviour in exactly the same way that attributions of knowledge in non-linguistic spheres are potentially explanatory of behaviour. Finally, because my emphasis is specifically on semantic theories, I attempt to explicate and defend the claim that a semantic theory could and should have the form of a theory of truth.
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On diagonal argument, Russell absurdities and an uncountable notion of lingua charactericaKing, James Douglass, University of Lethbridge. Faculty of Arts and Science January 2004 (has links)
There is an interesting connection between cardinality of language and the distinction of lingua characterica from calculus rationator. Calculus-type languages have only a countable number of sentences, and only a single semantic valuation per sentence. By contrast, some of the sentences, and only a single semantic valuation per sentence. By contrast, some of the sentences of a lingua have available an uncountable number of semantic valuations. Thus, the lingua-type of language appears to have a greater degree of semantic universality than that of a calculus. It is suggested that the present notion of lingua provides a platform for a theory of ambiguity, whereby single sentences may have multiply - indeed, uncountably - many semantic valuations. It is further suggested that this might lead to a pacification of paradox. This thesis involves Peter Aczel's notion of a universal syntax, Russell's question, Keith Simmons' theory of diagonal argument, Curry's paradox, and a 'Leibnizian' notion of language. / vii, 111 leaves ; 29 cm.
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The best imperative approach to deontic discourseSuzuki, Makoto, January 2007 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2007. / Full text release at OhioLINK's ETD Center delayed at author's request
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