Humans readily infer the meanings of novel symbols in communicative contexts of varying complexity, and several researchers in the field of language evolution have explicitly acknowledged that inference plays a key role in accounting for the evolution of symbolic communication. However, in this field at least, there has been very little investigation into the nature of inference in this regard. That is, evolutionary linguists have yet to address the following questions if we are to have a fuller picture of how humans came to communicate symbolically: 1. What kinds of inference are there? Specifically, i Diachronically, what forms of inference are comparatively simpler in evolutionary terms, and thus shared with a wider range of species? What forms of inference are more complex, and limited to humans or to us and our closest relatives? ii Synchronically, if humans are capable of several kinds of complex inference, how do we know which particular kind of inference is being applied in solving a given problem? 2. How do symbol-learning problems vary? Specifically, i What makes a particular symbol-learning problem more or less complex in terms of the kind of inference needed to solve it? ii How would the communicative context of our pre-linguistic ancestors have been different from that of a human child learning words from its linguistic parent? This dissertation takes a step towards answering these questions by investigating a little-known form of inference called `abduction' (or insightful hypothesis generation), which has thus far been wholly overshadowed in language evolution by a much better understood form called `induction' (or probabilistic hypothesis evaluation). I will argue that abduction and induction are both comparatively complex in the diachronic terms expressed above in 1.i, and while induction is useful in accounting for how modern children learn words from linguistic adults, abduction is more important in situations like those that would have faced our pre-lingistic ancestors as they first began to use symbols. That is, I will argue on both theoretical and empirical grounds that abductive inference was an evolutionary milestone as our ancestors crossed what Deacon (1997) calls the symbolic threshold.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:24:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Raquel Domingues do Amaral.pdf: 1299397 bytes, checksum: b28b4150c988ca0651c06f147655ac25 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-02-18 / Based on the epistemological premise of the Logical Semantic Constructivism (CARVALHO, 2010), the present study proposes to reflect about the incidence of the constitutional rule which restrain the demarcation of indigenous lands. It seeks for the meaning of the signs: Indian, Indigenous Community and Indigenous Lands, in the statements of art. 231 caput, §§§ 1, 2 and 3 and art. 20, XI, from the Federal Constitution, considering the connotation of these signs in the social, cultural and historical context of Indians. The study also handles the matter of demarcation of indigenous lands in the current state of the art, being strongly influenced by the theory of John Mendes Jr. (1912) on indigenato, as well as making a counterpoint with Ferraz Jr. s (2007; 2012) discussion, which contemplates indigenato as a title that explains the Indians originating status of the right to permanent possession, although not limited to this. It discusses the relevance of the legal precedent of the Supreme Court, as a pragmatic dimension of linguistic semiosis on the fixed rules of the statements in art. 231 caput, §§§ 1, 2 and 3 and art. 20 XI, in the Federal Constitution, that is, as a text not written in the physical support of prescriptive statements, but that cannot have its meaning ignored as real technical legitimacy. From the perspective of the epistemology proposed by Paulo de Barros Carvalho (2010) on the incidence of general and abstract tax norm, it proposes a hermeneutics of the incidence of the rule, which is constructed through the interpretation of the statements of the art. 231 caput, §§§ 1, 2 and 3 and art. 20 XI, from the Federal Constitution. The demarcation of indigenous lands is denoted in the present research as a procedure and as a sole and specific rule that enables the incidence of general and abstract rule laid down in art. 231 caput, §§§ 1, 2 and 3 and art. 20 XI, from the Federal Constitution. One may conclude that the individual and solid rule that documents the demarcation has a legal effect on subjective and originating rights of the Indians of permanent possession of the lands they traditionally occupy. It has been defined The existence of two legal systems in relation to the land known as traditionally occupied by demarcation: the regulatory legal framework of the legal relationship between "non-Indians", which precedes the advent of sole and specific rule documented in the demarcation, and the legal regime subsequent to the formation of subjective originating rights of "Indians", in the subsequent individual and solid rule. Individual and solid rules that make up the property right of "non-Indians" are repealed before the advent of individual and solid rules documented in the demarcation, therefore, the extinction of these legal relations has ex nunc effects and shall be harmonized with the rules of items XXII, XXIV of art. 5 of the Federal Constitution. After the advent of individual and solid rule of demarcation, the legal framework is set out in § 6 of art. 231 of the Federal Constitution, as a means of protecting the Indians original right to possession / Propõe-se uma reflexão sobre a incidência da norma constitucional que disciplina a demarcação de terras indígenas, com base na premissa epistemológica do Constructivismo Lógico Semântico de Paulo de Barros Carvalho. Buscamos o sentido dos signos índio, comunidade indígena e terras indígenas nos enunciados do art. 231 caput, §§§ 1º, 2º e 3º e art. 20, XI, da CF, levando em consideração o sentido destes signos no contexto social, cultural e histórico do índio. Abordamos a problemática da demarcação de terras indígenas no estado atual da arte, fortemente influenciado pela teoria do indigenato de João Mendes Jr., fazendo um contraponto com o entendimento esposado por Tércio Sampaio Ferraz Jr., que compreende o indigenato como um título que explica o caráter originário do direito à posse permanente dos índios, mas que não se reduz a este. Discorremos sobre a relevância do precedente jurisprudencial do Supremo Tribunal Federal, como dimensão pragmática da semiose linguística da norma construída a partir dos enunciados do art. 231 caput, §§§ 1º, 2º e 3º e art. 20 XI da CF, ou seja, como texto não escrito no suporte físico dos enunciados prescritivos, mas que não pode ser ignorado, na busca de sentido, como verdadeira técnica de legitimação. Propomos uma hermenêutica sobre a incidência da norma, que se constrói pela interpretação dos enunciados do art. 231 caput, §§§ 1º, 2º e 3º e art. 20 XI da CF, sob a perspectiva da epistemologia proposta por Paulo de Barros Carvalho para a incidência da norma geral e abstrata tributária. Abordamos a demarcação de terras indígenas, como procedimento e como norma individual e concreta que viabiliza a incidência da norma geral e abstrata prevista no art. 231 caput, §§§ 1º, 2º e 3º e art. 20 XI da CF. Concluímos que a norma individual e concreta que documenta a demarcação tem o efeito constitutivo do direito subjetivo originário dos índios à posse permanente das terras que tradicionalmente ocupam. Delimitamos a existência de dois regimes jurídicos em relação às terras que são reconhecidas como ocupação tradicional pela demarcação: o regime jurídico regulador das relações jurídicas, entre não índios , anteriores ao advento da norma individual e concreta documentada na demarcação e o regime jurídico posterior à constituição do direito subjetivo originário dos índios no consequente da norma individual e concreta. Anteriormente ao advento da norma individual e concreta documentada na demarcação, as normas individuais e concretas que constituem o direito de propriedade de não índios são revogadas, de modo que a extinção dessas relações jurídicas tem efeitos ex nunc e devem ser harmonizadas com as normas dos incisos XXII, XXIV do art. 5º, da CF.Após o advento da norma individual e concreta da demarcação, o regime jurídico a incidir é o previsto no § 6º, do art. 231, da CF, como um meio de proteger o direito originário à posse dos índios