Thesis advisor: Robert C. Bartlett / This study examines Dante Alighieri's presentation of the relation between Church and State and of their foundations in either the Christian faith or philosophic reason. It seeks to demonstrate how Dante's unmodern acceptance of a teleological understanding of the world and man’s place in it allows him to distinguish the two while also showing how both work together even as they understand differently the role that reason should play in human life. It is because of this distinction that Dante's Monarchia shares in the political principle of “separation” that underlies the secular regimes of the West, thereby making his work immediately accessible to modern-day readers. It is because of the way reason and faith also work together in his political treatise, however, that Dante does not endorse, as readers today would, the further separation of his State from Society. This is because for Dante the very ideas of Church and State not only presuppose the existence of the highest goods of man -namely, that terrestrial good that pertains to man insofar as he is a natural being, and that spiritual good that pertains to man insofar as he is a creature capable of being transfigured by the divine grace of God. They also are intended to embody and publicly promote these two goods. Thus for Dante the Church is meant to help man attain his immortal end, which consists in the supernatural act of seeing God "face to face," while the State is meant to help man attain his mortal end, which consists in grasping philosophic truths. And so it is for these teleological and illiberal reasons that Dante's work remains as inaccessible as it does familiar to readers today. Yet it is by virtue of his refusal to forge our distinctively modern course, and so because of his acceptance of an "outdated" Aristotelian principle of teleology, that Dante's philosophic politics establishes a clearer demarcation between Church and State or reason and faith than modern political philosophies do. His Monarchia is therefore an invaluable guide for all those who wish to acquire a better understanding of the nature and limit of each. This latter claim can prove to be true, however, only if the end of his treatise is understood in light of what many scholars have either ignored or denied in their reading of the Monarchia, and that is Dante’s "Latin Averroism." / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2015. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

Heterodox master of liberal arts and theirs discussions with Thomas Aquinas Mgr. Miroslav Severa Summary: The proposed thesis deals with two important issues discussed by Tomas Aquinas in connection with the averroistic controversy that occurred in the second half of the thirteenth century in Paris. The topics are On the eternity of the world and On the unity of intellect. Its author defends the position that concerning the problem On the eternity of the Word is the solution proposed by Thomas Aquinas closer to the position of heterodox masters of liberal arts then to the attitude of some orthodox theologians. The heterodox teaching On the unity of intellect is by Thomas sufficiently disproven. The doctrine of Thomas Aquinas doesn't need to always constitute an irreconcilable antithesis against the attitude of heterodox masters as it is described by some authors. The thesis also deals the two topics on the historical background of the condemnations issued by the Parisian bishop Stephan Tempier in the years 1270 and 1277. Although the heterodox masters of liberal arts are in their philosophizing strongly influenced by the Arab philosopher Averroes theirs position concerning the relationship between fides and ratio is different. Averroes says that when the conflict between reason and revelation occurs than...

Hervé de Nédellec o.p. joua un rôle de premier plan dans la défense du patrimoine doctrinal de Thomas d’Aquin contre les effets des condamnations de la fin du XIIIe siècle et du début du XIVe siècle. Il a néanmoins défendu une position sur la distinction entre l’être et l’essence divergeant sensiblement de la distinction thomasienne, alors que cet élément se présente comme central à la pensée de l’illustre dominicain. Cette étude vérifie cette divergence et en rend compte, considérant le contexte historique et le rôle assumé par Hervé dans la défense de la pensée de son confrère. Allen (1958) caractérise la perspective hervéenne par son essentialisme et son approche sémantique, ainsi que par le rejet de la distinction réelle (Gilles de Rome et Thomas d’Aquin) et de la distinction intentionnelle (Henri de Gand). Il évoque par ailleurs l’influence de Godefroid de Fontaines, de Siger de Brabant et d’Averroès au regard de la distinction entre l’être et l’essence selon le mode de signifier retenue par Hervé. Ces observations se voient ici confirmées par l’exposé et la comparaison des principes ontologiques assumés par les différentes positions. Il est par le fait même rendu manifeste que Siger de Brabant, Godefroid de Fontaines, Hervé de Nédellec et encore Dietrich de Freiberg, tenants de la distinction sémantique, rejettent les positions adverses en raison de mêmes éléments qu’ils critiquent de celles-ci. La communauté doctrinale entre la distinction selon le mode de signifier et la théorie modiste ainsi que leur source commune dans le Commentaire à la Métaphysique d’Averroès sont par ailleurs mises au jour. Les modistes distinguent le signifié principal et les propriétés concernant (circa) le signifié principal. Dans la perspective sémantique, l’essence, l’étant et l’être sont conçus comme des propriétés concernant le signifié principal à la manière des propriétés circa de la grammaire spéculative. À l’instar des propriétés circa, « essence », « étant » et « être » diffèrent non parce qu’ils signifient différentes déterminations, mais au sens où ils signifient une même chose de différentes façons. L’analyse des objections soulevées par les tenants de la distinction sémantique et des éléments constitutifs de leur position fournit des outils nouveaux pour apprécier la distinction entre l’être et l’essence chez Thomas d’Aquin. Celle-ci se révèle procéder d’un cadre théorique inconciliable avec celui adopté par Hervé de Nédellec. Nous faisons ici valoir que cette liberté doctrinale d’Hervé de Nédellec s’explique par cela que la distinction entre l’être et l’essence n’était pas constitutive du fonds thomasien concerné par les ordonnances d’enseignement dominicaines de la fin du XIIIe siècle et du début du XIVe siècle, notamment puisqu’elle n’a pas été ciblée par les condamnations doctrinales ecclésiales ni par le correctoire de Guillaume de la Mare. / Hervaeus Natalis o.p. played a leading role in defending the doctrinal heritage of Thomas Aquinas against the effects of the condemnations of the end of the 13th and beginning of the 14th centuries. Nevertheless, he would have supported a position on the distinction between being and essence which is irreconcilable with the Thomasian distinction, even though this element is central to the thought of the illustrious Dominican. The present study verifies this discrepancy and give an account of it, considering the historical context and the role assumed by Hervaeus in the defence of the thought of his confrere. Allen (1958) characterizes the Hervean perspective by its essentialism and its semantic approach, as well as by the rejection of the real distinction (Giles of Rome and Aquinas) and the intentional distinction (Henri of Ghent). He also evokes the influence of Godfrey of Fontaines, Siger of Brabant and Averroes with regard to the distinction between being (esse) and essence according to the mode of signifying adopted by Hervaeus. These claims are here confirmed by the exposition and comparison of the ontological principles assumed by the different stances. By the same token, it is made clear that Siger of Brabant, Godefroid of Fontaines, Hervaeus Natalis and also Dietrich of Freiberg, the proponents of the semantic distinction, reject the opposing positions on the basis of the same elements that they criticize in them. The doctrinal community between the distinction according to the mode of signifying and the Modist theory, as well as their common source in the Commentary on the Metaphysics of Averroes are also brought to light. The Modists distinguish between the object signified and the properties concerning (circa) the object signified. In the semantic perspective, essence, ens and esse are conceived as properties concerning the object signified in the manner of the circa properties of speculative grammar. Like the circa properties, “essence”, “ens” and “esse” do not differ because they signify different determinations, but they differ in the sense that they signify the same thing in different ways. The analysis of the objections raised by the proponents of the semantic distinction and of the constitutive elements of their position provides new tools for appreciating the distinction between being (esse) and essence in Aquinas. It proves to proceed from a theoretical framework that is irreconcilable with that adopted by Hervaeus. We argue here that this doctrinal freedom of Hervaeus is explained by the fact that the distinction between being (esse) and essence was not constitutive of the Thomasian fund concerned by the Dominican teaching ordinances of the end of the 13th and beginning of the 14th centuries, especially since it was not targeted by the ecclesial doctrinal condemnations nor by the correctory of William de la Mare.