The use of Private Military Companies (PMCs) has become an increasingly common feature of contemporary armed conflict. Because of their autonomous contractual status, PMCs have presented governments with problems of accountability on several levels, including violations of international human rights and humanitarian law (IHL) standards. This thesis argues that PMCs should be considered to be non-state actors (NSAs), subject to international law from both an International Relations Theory and a Legal Theory perspective. This conclusion is linked to the issue of whether individual PMC employees can be treated as legitimate combatants according to IHL. State practice has not led to a clear understanding of the definition of combatant, a problem which has been compounded by a lack of government policy on the use of PMCs. Using Canadian experience as a case study, the thesis concludes that IHL suggests two options for regularizing the status of PMCs which would both strengthen accountability and uphold the rule of law.

In the performance of law enforcement tasks, military forces frequently use expanding bullets. Such bullets are prohibited in international armed conflicts (IAC:s) by treaty, but in non-international armed conflicts (NIAC:s), the matter is regulated by the principle prohibiting means and methods of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering (SIrUS), and possibly by an independent rule of customary international humanitarian law. This essay looks first to a proposed solution in which the law enforcement legal paradigm takes precedence, and finds such a solution incomplete and its application limited. It proceeds to look at the prohibition of expanding bullets in NIAC:s as an independent rule,exploring the formation of customary law, the evidence value of military manuals, expanding bullets as a war crime, and the ICTY Tadíc ruling. It finds the evidence of the existence of such a rule unconvincing. It then looks to principle of SIrUS and explores the best approaches for its interpretation and application. Ultimately, it argues that the military utility, in the form of stopping power and decreased risk of collateral injury, provided by expanding bullets is of such a scale and nature that the use of such bullets could reasonably be argued to pass the assessment as required by the principle. In light of this, the essay emphasises the need for treaty-based rules in order create effective weapons prohibitions, and that armed forces are still obliged to properly assess which set of rules govern the use of force.

Lorsqu’il a fallu moderniser les instruments du droit international humanitaire le conflit armé non international n’était qu’un épiphénomène et son avènement a toujours été considéré comme un élément perturbateur d’une scène internationale profondément étatisé. Néanmoins l’importance croissante de ce type de conflit a permis de mettre en exergue le rôle sans cesse croissant d’un nouveau type d’acteurs à savoir les groupes armés non étatiques. Désormais, ils sont les acteurs majeurs de conflits largement majoritaires. Pour cette raison, nous pensons qu’il est temps de changer d’approche et de revoir les solutions proposées dans les instruments internationaux applicables. Pour toutes ces raisons et pour adapter le droit aux réalités des conflits actuels, une approche dépouillée de toute charge idéologique et péjorative doit primer par rapport à celle actuelle. De même, il est fondamentalement nécessaire de faire assumer à ces groupes les conséquences de leurs agissements en engageant leur responsabilité internationale. / When the instruments of international humanitarian law had to be modernized, the non-international armed conflict was an epiphenomenon and its advent has always been considered a disruptive element of a deeply internationalized international scene. Nevertheless, the growing importance of this type of conflict has highlighted the ever-increasing role of a new type of actors, namely non-State armed groups. From now on, they are the major actors of conflicts largely majority. For this reason, we believe that it is time to change the approach and review the solutions proposed in the applicable international instruments. For all these reasons and to adapt the law to the realities of current conflicts, an approach stripped of any ideological and pejorative burden must take precedence over the current one. Similarly, it is fundamentally necessary to make these groups bear the consequences of their actions by committing their international responsibility.

L’autorisation de recourir à la force est une pratique par laquelle le Conseil de sécurité permet à des États membres des Nations Unies ou à des accords ou organismes régionaux, voire au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies de recourir à la coercition militaire. Elle est l’une des circonstances excluant l’illicéité face à l’interdiction de recourir à la force dans les relations internationales dont la règle est posée à l’article 2,§ 4 de la Charte des Nations Unies. Il est évident que cette pratique ne correspond pas clairement à la lettre de la Charte mais elle tire sa légitimité du fait qu’elle permet au Conseil de sécurité de s’acquitter de sa mission principale de maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales, étant donné que le système de coercition militaire prévu par la Charte s’avère inapplicable dans la pratique. Il reste que cette pratique est empreinte d’ambiguïté : elle apparaît tantôt comme une intervention des Nations Unies, tantôt comme une action unilatérale au profit de certaines puissances capables de mener des opérations de grande envergure. Cette ambiguïté est encore exacerbée par le problème de l’autorisation présumée que certainsÉtats pourraient déduire des actes du Conseil de sécurité, pour intervenir dans divers conflits. Dans les faits, la pratique de l’autorisation de recourir à la force semble actualiser une tendance belliciste qui caractérisait les époques antérieures. Elle peut, si l’on n’y prend garde, refondre, par pans entiers, les legs du droit contre la guerre (jus contra bellum) issu du XXème siècle, droit qui a été le fruit de longues tribulations dans l’histoire des relations internationales. Le danger le plus grave est que des acquis chèrement négociés risquent d’être jetés par-dessus bord avec trop de facilité et sans délai, pour servir des visées à court terme. / Authorization to use force is a practice whereby the Security Council allows member States of the United Nations or regional arrangements or agencies or the Secretary General of the United Nations to use military coercion. Such authorization circumvents the wrongfulness of using force in international relations as prohibited by article 2, § 4 of the UN Charter. It is obvious that this practice does not match the letter of the Charter, but it derives its legitimacy from the fact that it allows the Security Council to fulfill its primary mission of maintaining peace and security, since the system of military coercion under the Charter is inapplicable in practice. Nonetheless, this practice is marked by ambiguity: sometimes it appears as a UN intervention, and yet sometimes as a unilateral action of certain powers capable of conducting major operations. This ambiguity is exacerbated by the issue of presumed consent to intervene in various conflicts that some States attribute to the Security Council. In fact, the practice of authorization reinforces a hawkish tendency that characterized earlier periods. It can, if unchecked, undo the legacy of the law against war (jus contra bellum) of the twentieth century, which was the fruit of much effort in the history of international relations. The most serious danger is that hard-won negotiated achievements be thrown easily overboard and without delay, in order to serve short term goals.

Plus de vingt-six ans après la publication de l’Agenda pour la paix par les Nations-unies, les opérations de stabilisation et de reconstruction menées en Afghanistan et en Iraq marquent une plus grande implication des forces armées dans les opérations de consolidation de la paix. De la conduite des hostilités au maintien de l’ordre dans le cadre de la stabilisation, à la fourniture de projets d’assistance et de développement à la population et de reconstruction de l’État, le rôle des armées s’est avéré central. Dans des situations, où l’État souverain connaît une transformation et une reconstruction de ses institutions, les forces intervenantes endossent un double rôle de « belligérant » face à des insurrections contestant la légitimité du nouvel ordre politique établit après les interventions, et de « souverain » prenant en charge les prérogatives souveraines tant sécuritaires que providentielles des États hôtes. À travers une étude des doctrines et pratiques américaine, britannique et française de ces opérations en Afghanistan et en Iraq, cette thèse a pour objet de définir les défis au droit international créé par ce double rôle des armées lors de situations transitionnelles entre guerre et paix. Face au constat d'’incertitude tant opérationnelle que juridique caractérisant ces opérations, la thèse propose de construire un cadre juridique régulant les activités des forces armées sur ces terrains, fondé sur le droit des droits de l’homme comme lex favorabilis. A partir de cette proposition, des lignes de conduite sont déduites pour traduire les obligations juridiques découlant de l’application des droits de l’homme en règles opérationnelles / More than twenty-six years after the United Nations' released the "Agenda for peace", stabilisation and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq have been marked by a greater involvement of armed forces in peace enforcement and peace building operations. From the conduct of hostilities to law enforcement operations to stabilise the country, to the provision of assistance and development to the population as well as State reconstruction, the role of the military became central. In situations where the sovereign state is undergoing a transformation and a reconstruction of its institutions, the intervening forces assume a dual role of “belligerent” in the face of insurrections challenging the legitimacy of the new political order established by the interventions on one hand, and of “sovereign” role taking over the host States' responsibilities in both its security and welfare functions. Based on a study of “post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction” doctrines as interpreted and implemented by the armies of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France in Afghanistan and Iraq, this thesis aims to define the challenges to international law created by this dual role of the military in transitional situations between war and peace. Faced with the operational and legal uncertainty characterising these operations, this thesis proposes a human-rights based legal framework to regulate armed forces activities, using human rights law as a lex favorabilis. On the basis of this proposal, guidelines are drawn to translate into operational rules the legal obligations arising from the application of human rights

L’autorisation de recourir à la force est une pratique par laquelle le Conseil de sécurité permet à des États membres des Nations Unies ou à des accords ou organismes régionaux, voire au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies de recourir à la coercition militaire. Elle est l’une des circonstances excluant l’illicéité face à l’interdiction de recourir à la force dans les relations internationales dont la règle est posée à l’article 2,§ 4 de la Charte des Nations Unies. Il est évident que cette pratique ne correspond pas clairement à la lettre de la Charte mais elle tire sa légitimité du fait qu’elle permet au Conseil de sécurité de s’acquitter de sa mission principale de maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales, étant donné que le système de coercition militaire prévu par la Charte s’avère inapplicable dans la pratique. Il reste que cette pratique est empreinte d’ambiguïté : elle apparaît tantôt comme une intervention des Nations Unies, tantôt comme une action unilatérale au profit de certaines puissances capables de mener des opérations de grande envergure. Cette ambiguïté est encore exacerbée par le problème de l’autorisation présumée que certainsÉtats pourraient déduire des actes du Conseil de sécurité, pour intervenir dans divers conflits. Dans les faits, la pratique de l’autorisation de recourir à la force semble actualiser une tendance belliciste qui caractérisait les époques antérieures. Elle peut, si l’on n’y prend garde, refondre, par pans entiers, les legs du droit contre la guerre (jus contra bellum) issu du XXème siècle, droit qui a été le fruit de longues tribulations dans l’histoire des relations internationales. Le danger le plus grave est que des acquis chèrement négociés risquent d’être jetés par-dessus bord avec trop de facilité et sans délai, pour servir des visées à court terme. / Authorization to use force is a practice whereby the Security Council allows member States of the United Nations or regional arrangements or agencies or the Secretary General of the United Nations to use military coercion. Such authorization circumvents the wrongfulness of using force in international relations as prohibited by article 2, § 4 of the UN Charter. It is obvious that this practice does not match the letter of the Charter, but it derives its legitimacy from the fact that it allows the Security Council to fulfill its primary mission of maintaining peace and security, since the system of military coercion under the Charter is inapplicable in practice. Nonetheless, this practice is marked by ambiguity: sometimes it appears as a UN intervention, and yet sometimes as a unilateral action of certain powers capable of conducting major operations. This ambiguity is exacerbated by the issue of presumed consent to intervene in various conflicts that some States attribute to the Security Council. In fact, the practice of authorization reinforces a hawkish tendency that characterized earlier periods. It can, if unchecked, undo the legacy of the law against war (jus contra bellum) of the twentieth century, which was the fruit of much effort in the history of international relations. The most serious danger is that hard-won negotiated achievements be thrown easily overboard and without delay, in order to serve short term goals.

Water has been used for military purposes in the past and still continues today, i.e. poisoning of enemy water, attacking enemy water installations, etc. This conduct denies access to water, affects the supply of water, health, supply of electricity, etc. Public international law, such as treaties (e.g. The 1949 Geneva Conventions), customary international law, etc, regulate the protection of water during armed conflict. Chapter I of the dissertation analizes the public international law ire the abovementioned. The application of public inteniational law, depends on the municipal law of the state concerned. This municipal law is, in the case of South Africa, found in the 1996 Constitution. The 1996 Constitution contains specific provisions regarding inter alia the legal obligations of the South African security services, the legal status of international agreements, as well as the application of customary international law and international law. Chapter II of the dissertation analizes the abovementioned wrt the legal obligations of the SA National Defence Force ire the subject matter. / Constitutional, International & Indigenous Law / LL.M. (Public International Law)

Water has been used for military purposes in the past and still continues today, i.e. poisoning of enemy water, attacking enemy water installations, etc. This conduct denies access to water, affects the supply of water, health, supply of electricity, etc. Public international law, such as treaties (e.g. The 1949 Geneva Conventions), customary international law, etc, regulate the protection of water during armed conflict. Chapter I of the dissertation analizes the public international law ire the abovementioned. The application of public inteniational law, depends on the municipal law of the state concerned. This municipal law is, in the case of South Africa, found in the 1996 Constitution. The 1996 Constitution contains specific provisions regarding inter alia the legal obligations of the South African security services, the legal status of international agreements, as well as the application of customary international law and international law. Chapter II of the dissertation analizes the abovementioned wrt the legal obligations of the SA National Defence Force ire the subject matter. / Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law / LL.M. (Public International Law)