Vigilantism is an underdeveloped concept in scholarly discourse, particularly within the field of philosophy. My definition of vigilantism is: private citizens who engage in illegal coercive activity, against alleged transgressors of some normative code. Vigilantes seek to fulfill some conception of justice, and in doing so, they presume upon the state's authority. This definition excludes similar activities, like police brutality or terrorism. It also improves upon earlier definitions from other scholars. There are many potential objections to the practice of vigilantism as a whole, and there are many examples of unjustified, immoral vigilantism. However, vigilantism can be morally justified under the following circumstances: a breakdown of the legal system, protection of vulnerable individuals, proportional punishments, fair treatment, attempts to mend the larger social issues, and the advancement of justice. Depending on the particular circumstances, vigilantism can be morally justified, morally optimal, or unjustified. Since I can only provide a cursory examination of vigilantism, these ideas need more rigorous investigation and development. Further discussion on this subject is very important, given our volatile political climate. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA) / Vigilantism requires more careful discussion in scholarly discourse, particularly given recent political developments in Canada and the United States. Although there is some earlier material on the subject, it is inconsistent and scattered across academic fields. Within this thesis, I develop a philosophical definition of vigilantism, and discuss how it differs things like terrorism or police brutality. I also develop a preliminary account of the morality of vigilantism, exploring several reasonable concerns with the practice as a whole. In spite of these issues, vigilantism can be morally justified under a particular set of circumstances, which are difficult but not impossible to fulfill. However, there is much more work to be done on the subject, in order to develop a robust understanding of vigilantism.

This thesis is about the legal and moral status of abortion. It is primarily concerned with the metaphysical status of the foetus, with particular attention to the question whether the foetus is properly characterised as a person in the philosophical sense. The argument of the thesis proceeds in two parts. The first part surveys certain lines of argument to the effect that the question of prenatal personhood is immaterial to the moral and legal permissibility of abortion. Against these claims, it argues that the personhood status of the foetus is indeed central to the moral and legal appraisal of abortion practice. The second part focuses on the metaphysical question in its own right. The thesis proposes a theoretical underpinning for the ‘gradualist’ view of human life before birth, according to which the human foetus is a fuller instantiation of a person the more biologically developed it is. It sets out to defend the kernel of the gradualist thesis against a cluster of criticisms, commonly advanced by those who endorse the belief that the personhood of human beings begins at conception. One notable challenge of this sort, which the thesis aims to address, asserts that any graduated account of personhood before birth is logically inconsistent with basic human equality. Finally, the thesis considers a few practical implications for the legal regulation of abortion stemming from the gradualist thesis, and the rule of law standards by which a regulatory framework must abide.

Although the patent systems of the United States and Europe have become continuously more similar their underlying legal philosophy continues to be different. This study examines how the two patent philosophies emerged out of different social situations and why and how patent systems can develop similar formal arrangements without experiencing a similar harmonization of underlying philosophy. As patent laws are historically unique to western culture it provides a lens through which to observe its relative social appreciation of industry, technology, commerce, and the role of the law. This study argues that the two separate 'patent philosophies' emerged as results of unique historical situations and that the reason as to why they have been able to maintain their distinct natures is that a similar ideological pressure has not been present since. The patent law of the United States, which is based on an 'inventor philosophy', was the product of the ideological currents of the movement toward American independence. This philosophy is friendly to inventors and entrust them with all responsibility over their inventions. Its individualistic and democratic character resonated well with the country's anti-colonial and anti-monarchical political campaign. A similar ideological pressure to revise fundamental opinions on technology and law has not emerged since. Virtually all European nations are today part of the European Patent Organization which administers the world's only true regional patent office. This European system is based on an 'invention philosophy' which was designed in the late 19th century by German industrialists. This philosophy is anti-monopoly and sees the State as a guardian of the public benefits which arise from technological novelties. Due to German industrial efficiency, it was used to model European patent law. Although both philosophies have proved viable, the case of patent law suggests that the role of legal philosophy must be reduced. Apart from being crucial in the creation of a new legal system, this study argues for the need to drastically reconsider the relationship between substantive and formal law. Both patent philosophies have consistently lost importance over time to the point where they today support two formally very similar systems.

The TaRYaG count, that is the traditional enumeration of the 613 commandments contained in the five Mosaic books (Torah), has gained a prominent place in Judaism. The count is based on a dictum found in the Babylonian Talmud and attributed to R. Simlai, a Palestinian rabbi of the late third century. No one did more to see this count achieve the importance it has than Moses Maimonides, the prominent 12th-century Jewish philosopher and perhaps the most important post-talmudic jurist of all times. M. offered an impressive methodology, made up of rules of individuation, identification and interpretation - in all, fourteen rules - to support his proposed enumerative scheme and used it to critique all previous such attempts. By his own account, Maimonides undertook this project with the sole aim to provide a comprehensive outline for his upcoming Code of Jewish Law. This thesis demonstrates the enormous difficulties inherent in such a project - difficulties that could not have passed unnoticed by such an accomplished author - and seeks to uncover any other reason or reasons that may have prompted him to adopt such a constraining count. The thesis concludes by speculating that Maimonides may have found it convenient to use the TaRYaG scheme in order to introduce into the list of commandments the beliefs in the existence of God and in His unity - beliefs that had previously not been considered commandments. An ancillary product of the dissertation is the discovery that many of the commandment designations proposed in the enumerative scheme are abandoned in the Halakhot, a discovery that was noted, albeit only partially, by less than a handful of scholars over the past eight hundred and fifty years. The dissertation examines the proposed solutions and rejects them on a number of counts. A systematic analysis of these occurrences suggests a more consistent solution and reveals an aspect of Maimonides that has not been sufficiently appreciated, Maimonides the exegete and legal philosopher. The agenda-oriented research also examines some of the important innovations contained in M’s list of positive commandments, the hermeneutics behind them and the politico-philosophical ideas that may have informed them.

An important question for general jurisprudence concerns method: what is the right way to form a philosophical understanding of law? Exploration of this question has, in one form or another, featured as a constant part of the work of those within the discipline, and many different answers have been given. The aim of this thesis is to argue that a controversial conception of philosophical method – as an investigation into our rule-bound conceptual practices and uses of language – is the appropriate means of understanding the nature of law. The first three chapters establish the initial connection between conceptual or linguistic analysis and the ability to gain insight into the social reality of law. I argue, in chapter one, that institutional concepts have a linguistic basis and, in chapters two and three, that legal systems are borne out of the shared use of certain basic concepts on the part of those who make up their law applying institutions, i.e. the courts. To understand the rules according to which such concepts are deployed, I suggest, is to understand the essential structure of legal practice. An assumption of that argument is tested in chapter four by considering Ronald Dworkin’s famous claim that certain forms of disagreement between lawyers and judges are incompatible with a picture of law dependent upon their agreement in the use of basic legal concepts. Chapter five takes up the question of whether the account of social ontology contained in the thesis is compatible with the fact of philosophical disagreement about the nature of law. Finally, chapters six and seven discuss alternate models of theoretical success in general jurisprudence, the first inspired by externalist views of linguistic and mental contents, and the second dependent upon a naturalistic conception of philosophy.

Abstract: In this dissertation, I propose a solution to Ronald Dworkin’s challenge from hard cases. Hard cases are cases in which the judges agree on the facts of the case and on what the posited law requires, but they disagree on what the law on the matter is. It is commonly thought that hard cases are decided on moral grounds, and that this problem raises the problem of explaining how the law can include unposited moral considerations. Dworkin argues that this problem generalizes, and that a theory of law must explain how all attempts to determine what the law is must make appeal to moral considerations. I argue that existing attempts to solve this problem fail. On the one hand, Dworkin argues that every attempt to determine what the law is must include an appeal to all moral considerations. This overstates the role of morality in law. Legal positivists, on the other hand, hold that moral considerations can be legally binding only when they are anticipated by the posited law. This understates the role of morality in law. By making the validity of moral considerations depend on the posited rules, inclusive positivists remain vulnerable to the possibility that a new hard case will arise that is not anticipated by the posited rules, but that the law can resolve nonetheless. And by excluding all moral considerations from law, exclusive positivists fail to explain law as we know it. Instead, I propose an alternative positivist solution to Dworkin’s challenge. First, legal positivists need not accept Dworkin’s understanding of source-based considerations as excluding all appeals to morality in their applications By econfiguring this problematic distinction, positivists can explain who the law can require frequent appeal to morality in the application of its rules. Secondly, I argue, the problem of hard cases is best understood as in instance of the prior problem of distinguishing legal rules from all other rules to which people are subject. And, I hold that Hart’s solution to this prior problem solves this problem as well. I thus conclude that the problem of hard cases poses no special threat to legal positivism.

Abstract: In this dissertation, I propose a solution to Ronald Dworkin’s challenge from hard cases. Hard cases are cases in which the judges agree on the facts of the case and on what the posited law requires, but they disagree on what the law on the matter is. It is commonly thought that hard cases are decided on moral grounds, and that this problem raises the problem of explaining how the law can include unposited moral considerations. Dworkin argues that this problem generalizes, and that a theory of law must explain how all attempts to determine what the law is must make appeal to moral considerations. I argue that existing attempts to solve this problem fail. On the one hand, Dworkin argues that every attempt to determine what the law is must include an appeal to all moral considerations. This overstates the role of morality in law. Legal positivists, on the other hand, hold that moral considerations can be legally binding only when they are anticipated by the posited law. This understates the role of morality in law. By making the validity of moral considerations depend on the posited rules, inclusive positivists remain vulnerable to the possibility that a new hard case will arise that is not anticipated by the posited rules, but that the law can resolve nonetheless. And by excluding all moral considerations from law, exclusive positivists fail to explain law as we know it. Instead, I propose an alternative positivist solution to Dworkin’s challenge. First, legal positivists need not accept Dworkin’s understanding of source-based considerations as excluding all appeals to morality in their applications By econfiguring this problematic distinction, positivists can explain who the law can require frequent appeal to morality in the application of its rules. Secondly, I argue, the problem of hard cases is best understood as in instance of the prior problem of distinguishing legal rules from all other rules to which people are subject. And, I hold that Hart’s solution to this prior problem solves this problem as well. I thus conclude that the problem of hard cases poses no special threat to legal positivism.

An examination of Barack Obama's Legal Philosophy and the extent to which that is reflected in the decisions of his judicial appointees.

This study analyses the way that legal positivists from HLA Hart onwards have responded to Lon L Fuller’s challenge to positivism from the idea of the rule of law. The main thesis is that Hart and contemporary legal positivists working in the Hartian tradition have yet to adequately respond to Fuller’s Challenge. I argue that the reason for this is the approach they take to dealing with Fuller’s principles of the rule of law, which either (i) proceeds on the basis of the positivist perspective without engaging with Fuller’s wider anti-positivist arguments, or else (ii) accepts Fuller’s claim that the rule of law is part of our concept of law but does not acknowledge any effect of this on what determines legal validity (the content of legal norms). In both cases, I argue that tensions and problems result from a lack of engagement with Fuller’s anti-positivism. On the one hand, positivists have failed to show why their account of the nature of law better reflects our understanding of law than Fuller’s. On the other, the concessions that positivists have made to Fuller’s arguments are often detached from other elements in their theories, raising the question of whether the positivist response to Fuller is coherent. In addition, by closely analysing the major positivist accounts of the rule of law, this study challenges a number of orthodox interpretations that confuse our understanding of the positivist response to Fuller. I show that most positivists accept that there is something morally valuable about a legal system’s conformity to the principles of the rule of law, and that there is always some kind of at least minimal conformity to those principles in any legal system. By noticing what concessions positivists have made to Fuller’s understanding of the rule of law, I aim to both (i) shift the debate to the remaining disputes with the Hartian positivists, particularly on issues such as the ‘derivative approach’ and the ‘validity Social thesis’, and (ii) identify areas of fruitful engagement with Fuller, such as the question of judges’ moral obligations to law.

This study analyses the way that legal positivists from HLA Hart onwards have responded to Lon L Fuller’s challenge to positivism from the idea of the rule of law. The main thesis is that Hart and contemporary legal positivists working in the Hartian tradition have yet to adequately respond to Fuller’s Challenge. I argue that the reason for this is the approach they take to dealing with Fuller’s principles of the rule of law, which either (i) proceeds on the basis of the positivist perspective without engaging with Fuller’s wider anti-positivist arguments, or else (ii) accepts Fuller’s claim that the rule of law is part of our concept of law but does not acknowledge any effect of this on what determines legal validity (the content of legal norms). In both cases, I argue that tensions and problems result from a lack of engagement with Fuller’s anti-positivism. On the one hand, positivists have failed to show why their account of the nature of law better reflects our understanding of law than Fuller’s. On the other, the concessions that positivists have made to Fuller’s arguments are often detached from other elements in their theories, raising the question of whether the positivist response to Fuller is coherent. In addition, by closely analysing the major positivist accounts of the rule of law, this study challenges a number of orthodox interpretations that confuse our understanding of the positivist response to Fuller. I show that most positivists accept that there is something morally valuable about a legal system’s conformity to the principles of the rule of law, and that there is always some kind of at least minimal conformity to those principles in any legal system. By noticing what concessions positivists have made to Fuller’s understanding of the rule of law, I aim to both (i) shift the debate to the remaining disputes with the Hartian positivists, particularly on issues such as the ‘derivative approach’ and the ‘validity Social thesis’, and (ii) identify areas of fruitful engagement with Fuller, such as the question of judges’ moral obligations to law.