När den amerikanska investmentbanken Lehman Brothers ansökte om konkurs den 15 september 2008 ökade oron på den globala finansiella marknaden. Detta ledde till svårigheter för finansiella aktörer i Sverige att finansiera sin verksamhet eftersom det blev dyrare att ta upp lån internationellt samtidigt som misstänksamheten gentemot andra aktörer pressade upp riskpremierna. Vid denna tidpunkt var inflationsnivån i Sverige den högsta på 15 år vilket fick Riksbanken att höja styrräntan dagarna innan konkursansökan. När den amerikanska investmentbanken Lehman Brothers ansökte om konkurs den 15 september 2008 ökade oron på den globala finansiella marknaden. Detta ledde till svårigheter för finansiella aktörer i Sverige att finansiera sin verksamhet eftersom det blev dyrare att ta upp lån internationellt samtidigt som misstänksamheten gentemot andra aktörer pressade upp riskpremierna. Vid denna tidpunkt var inflationsnivån i Sverige den högsta på 15 år vilket fick Riksbanken att höja styrräntan dagarna innan konkursansökan. Uppsatsens undersökning har till stor del bestått av en litteraturstudie. Utöver detta har även en intervju genomförts med riksbankschefen Stefan Ingves. Materialet som har använts har främst tagits från Riksbanken. Riksbanken vidtog ett flertal åtgärder för att stärka den svenska finansmarknadens motståndskraft. Åtgärderna var under krisens gång en kombination av penningpolitik och finansiella stabiliseringsåtgärder. Utöver räntejusteringar erbjöds bland annat obegränsade lånemöjligheter till Riksbankens motparter, vilket enligt Stefan Ingves även var den viktigaste åtgärden. Detta syftade främst till att sänka den allmänna räntenivån och återskapa förtroendet på den svenska finansiella marknaden. Till följd av Riksbankens åtgärder föll den allmänna räntenivån. Vilka effekter Riksbankens åtgärder hade på inflations och BNP utvecklingen är dock svårt att fastställa då utvecklingen av dessa berodde på flera olika faktorer. Riksbankens agerande under finanskrisen stämmer väl överens med vad teorierna förespråkar. Problemet med de penningpolitiska teorierna är att handlingsutrymmet begränsas när styrräntan närmar sig nollgränsen samtidigt som konjunkturnedgången är ihållande. Trots att Riksbanken agerade i enlighet med de penningpolitiska teorierna kan händelseförloppet inte enbart förklaras av dessa. Riksbanken agerande som en Lender of Last Resort är teorienlig förutom att en alldeles för låg straffränta togs ut.

Legal and economic aspects of the institute of the lender of last resort Abstract The master thesis deals with the legal and economic aspects of the institute of the lender of last resort, as a key institute that helps ensure the stability of financial markets. The thesis is divided into four parts. The first part is focused on the economic aspects of this institute, especially deals with the general definition of the term lender of last resort and its historical genesis, as well as the principles and forms of assistance of the lender of last resort. The key knowledge of this part is the Thornton-Bagehot doctrine of the lender of last resort. The second part of the thesis deals with the legal regulation of the lender of last resort in the Czech Republic. The third part is aimed at relevant European legislation and provides a summary of the relevant case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, namely the cases Pringle, Gauweiler and Weiss. The fourth and final part of the thesis outlines the legal framework of this institute in the USA. The second to fourth part of the thesis also analyzes the behavior of 3 central banks (CNB, ECB and FED) in fulfilling the role of lender of last resort during the global financial crisis of 2008, the European debt crisis and the current coronavirus crisis,...

This dissertation analyzes the emergence of the Austro-Hungarian Bank (OeUB) as a modern lender of last resort (LLR) between 1868 and 1914. In order to evaluate policy responses to specific periods of financial distress, an in-depth knowledge of the context and dynamics at hand is indispensable. Chapter I sets the groundwork for this dissertation. It shows that bank failures during the Austro-Hungarian crisis of 1873 followed mainly from the break-down of a large repo market on the Viennese stock exchange. Credit institutions granted repo loans against securities that turned into highly illiquid and depreciated collateral. Banks that were forced to sell repossessed collateral in response to heavy funding withdrawals had to write-off substantial portions of their repo portfolios and thus incurred heavy losses. This chapter reinterprets the Austro-Hungarian crisis of 1873 as a historical "run on repo". It is the first study to examine a historical repo market crisis using microdata. I use semi-parametric survival analysis as well as stratification techniques new to the literature on bank distress to identify the causes of bank failures. Bank failures in 1873 did not spring from a pure liquidity problem, nor did they derive from a simple solvency shock. The complex roots of bank distress in 1873 posed difficult questions for policy-makers who needed to decide whether and how to intervene. Although central banks may be first-best candidates for the role of a LLR, they can also face constraints which obviate an elastic supply of liquidity during crises. Some of these constraints may be ideational, institutional or technical. Others are driven by market characteristics: quantity rationing can be the result of asymmetric information problems in financial markets. In Chapter II, I study a historical experiment implemented to overcome the specter of a credit rationing LLR during the Austro-Hungarian crisis of 1873. I explore bank-level information on treatment by a LLR mechanism designed as a public-private partnership between the central bank and market players. Drawing on inverse probability weighted regression adjustment (IPWRA) to tease out the causal effect of liquidity support, I show that this unconventional LLR was effective in mitigating bank distress: it worked as a remedy for the under-provision of a good particularly desirable in times of crises central bank liquidity. No matter how successful it is in calming financial distress and independently of the concrete form it takes, the LLR always comes at a cost. Moral hazard is a central issue in the literature on last resort lending. In Chapter III, I provide a new explanation for how central banks dealt with moral hazard historically. I focus on one specific component of central banks' risk frameworks: credit limits for discount window customers. I argue that credit limits as operationalized by the Austro-Hungarian Bank (OeUB) after 1878 constituted the backbone of an early form of microprudential regulation that was designed to check moral hazard in normal times. Credit limits empowered the Austro-Hungarian Bank to enforce minimum liquidity and capital standards for its counterparties at the discount window. Rather than contradicting the tenet of free lending in times of distress, credit limits functioned as "contingent rules": enforced in normal times, limits were increased or lifted during liquidity crises perceived as exogenous. Moreover, even during crises, the Bank did not simply relax limits for all credit institutions: it differentiated between banks depending on their fundamentals prior to the crisis. Chapter III provides the first economic interpretation and empirical analysis of the credit limit frameworks employed by central banks in the past.

I likhet med i andra länder har det i Sverige under vissa högkonjunkturer uppstått ett så betydande kapitalöverskott, att den finansiella marknaden fått problem att bemästra flödena. Konsekvensen har blivit att den aggregerade risknivån ökat i takt med stigande tillgångspriser. När väl en kontraktion uppstått, har det saknats kapital för att i ordnade former bemästra de nya ekonomiska förutsättningarna. Det är den utvecklingen som föregått kriserna 1878/79, 1921/22 och 1991/92. Temporära insatser har då måst ske vid sidan av det befintliga institutionella systemet. Forskningen ger för Sveriges del en kriskronologi för det finansiella området med krisåren 1763, 1817/18, 1857/58, 1878/79, 1907/08, 1921/22, 1932/33 och 1991/92. Det har vid kriserna 1878/79, 1921/22 och 1991/92 förelegat ett betydande hot om kollaps av det finansiella systemet. Vid dessa tre tillfällen har det efter förhandlingar mellan bankerna och staten kommit att skapas temporära krishanteringsorganisationer – Järnvägshypoteksfonden 1879, AB Kreditkassan 1922 samt Securum AB 1992 – vid sidan om den svenska Riksbanken. Kriserna har hävts med hjälp av de temporärt skapade krisorganisationerna, vilka samtliga har haft en Lender of Last Resort-funktion. Krishanteringstekniken vid krisen 1921/22 kan ses som en vidareutveckling av den som kommit till användning 1878/79. Även om bakgrunden till krisen 1991/92 skiljer sig åt från de två här tidigare nämnda tillfällena, kom tekniken med överflyttandet av tyngande engagemang till ett nytt bolag att likna den teknik som användes redan av AB Kreditkassan. Trots detta betydde tidigare svenska erfarenheter mindre för krisen 1991/92 i detta fall. Idéerna till Securum hämtades istället från senare tids bankkrishantering i USA med inrättandet av så kallade ”bad banks”. Syftet med denna avhandling är att med en institutionell ansats klarlägga och analysera hur de två första av dessa tre finansiella kriser har hanterats. Avhandlingen belyser i detalj det förhandlingsdrama mellan statens och marknadens aktörer som föregått inrättandet av respektive krisorganisation.

The topic of the final thesis is The Lender of Last Resort. Author of the final thesis has dealt with the issue through the analysis of the European current legislation, available Czech or foreign literature or other relevant sources. The function of the national banks, or other institutions, as a lender of last resort is very complex the final thesis examines from the legal and economical perspective. This matter even has obvious global societal dimension when the adequate performance of the lender of last resort has positive effect on the prosperity of the society. On the other hand when the performance is defective the opposite effect arises. The final thesis is divided into five chapters. First two chapters present and clarify the term of lender of last resort and provide us definitions. Second chapter, which builds upon the first two, is providing the reader with the historical context of the lender of last resort, whose development started on the British Islands at the end of the 18th century. The fourth chapter of the final thesis is dedicated to the criteria for granting financial aid by the lender of last resort and the means of the provision of the financial aid. The author has especially focused on the danger of the systemic risk and the too-big-to-fail doctrine. Last fifth chapter...

La thèse se propose, dans une première partie, de décrire l'origine des débats sur la nécessité d'une banque centrale jusqu'aux formulations actuelles. Sont examinés les éléments qui ont posé les bases d'un prêteur ultime et favorisé la maturation de ce métier, de même que sont mis en relief les résultats accumulés depuis deux siècles. Notre attention porte sur la Réserve Fédérale des Etats-Unis. Les économistes sont en quête de solutions afin de prévenir les crises financières. Ainsi a été proposé un élargissement du tableau de bord de manière à contenir les prix d'actif dans une approche macro et micro-prudentielle. Parallèlement, sont analysés les canaux par lesquels la politique monétaire influence les variables réelles et financières de l'économie, et qui attestent alors du rôle pouvant être théoriquement assumé par la banque centrale sur les marchés financiers. La deuxième partie concentre le propos sur les ressorts des crises financières. Nous nous intéressons au paradoxe de la surliquidité et du surendettement, en insistant sur les particularités des marchés financiers devenant plus vulnérables. La contribution de la thèse dans cette étape consiste à vérifier si la banque centrale contribue à la manifestation de comportements abusifs et excessifs sur les marchés financiers par l'abondante création de liquidité. Notre étude empirique devrait permettre de répondre à cette question à travers une modélisation économétrique et des tests statistiques (dont le test de Chow) appliqués à une politique monétaire active (type règle de Taylor). En ce sens, cette recherche sur les actions de la Fed vise à forger une opinion sur le métier de banquier central et sur son devenir. / The thesis proposes, in a first part, to describe the origin of the debate on the need for a central bank up until the recent formulations. They were examined the elements which have posed the bases of an "ultimate lender" and promoted the maturation of this function, as were highlighted the results accumulated over two centuries. Our attention is drawn to the Federal Reserve of the United States. The economists are always in search for solutions to prevent financial crises. It has thus been proposed to extend the dashboard of central banks as to contain asset prices in a macro and micro-prudential approach. In parallel, in order to support this debate, we analyze the mechanisms by which the monetary policy affects the real and financial variables of the economy, which also affirm the role that can be assumed in theory by a central bank on financial markets. The second part focuses on the recurrence and intensity of financial crises. We consider the paradox of excess liquidity and over-indebtedness, with an emphasis on properties of financial markets becoming more vulnerable and their recent development. The contribution of the thesis in this stage consists of checking whether the central bank is responsible of abusive and excessive behavior on the financial markets by the abundant creation of liquidity. Our empirical study should help to answer this question through an econometric modeling and statistical tests (including the Chow test) applied to an active monetary policy (type Taylor rule). In this way, our research on the actions of the Fed aims to forge an opinion on the profession of modern central bankers, and perhaps on the future of central banks themselves.

Cette thèse analyse les opérations de crédit et d’émission de billets de la Banque de France, entre 1870 et 1897 et les relations entre l’État républicain et l’institution financière. Elle suppose que la Guerre franco-prussienne (1870-1871) et l’arrivée de Joseph Magnin, républicain, sous la Troisième République (mandat 1881-1897), ont influé sur la politique de la Banque de France. Après la Guerre et alors que l’Europe vit une période de stagnation économique, l’Allemagne et les États-Unis connaissent un développement rapide qui intensifie la concurrence entre les pays. La nomination d’un Gouverneur républicain à la tête de la Banque permet à l’État d’intervenir dans la politique de l’institution, pour permettre l’extension de l’offre de crédit. Néanmoins, beaucoup de dirigeants de la Banque insistent sur le fait qu’elle est encore une société anonyme, au nom de son indépendance. Cette opposition s’observe principalement dans la discussion sur le crédit agricole et l’extension du réseau de la Banque. L’intervention de l’État a aussi joué un rôle important pour le contrôle du désordre du marché résultant de l’échec du Comptoir d’escompte de Paris en 1889. Sous l’initiative du Gouverneur Magnin, l’accumulation de l’or à la Banque et l’augmentation de la monnaie fiduciaire se sont établies. En 1897, l’extension de l’offre de crédit est institutionnalisée lors de la discussion sur le renouvellement du privilège de l’émission des billets au Gouvernement et au Parlement et dans les années qui suivent, le Gouverneur Pallain permet le développement de l’accumulation de l’or. / This thesis analyses operations of credit and of issue of banknotes of the Bank of France between 1870 and 1897, and relations between the State and the financial institution. It supposes that the French-Prussian War (1870-1871) and the arrival of Joseph Magnin, republican (term 1881-1897), influenced the policy of the Bank under the Third Republic. After the war, and during a protracted recession in Europe, Germany and US achieved drastic economic growth and competition between countries escalated. The French government intervened the policies of the Bank of France by a republican assuming the post of the Governor of the Bank, and expanded credit facility. However, many executives of the Bank claimed the fact that it was still a private bank based on its independency. This conflict could be seen mainly in the discussion on expansion of agricultural credit and the base network of the Bank. The intervention of the State fulfilled an important role as well for the control of the confusion of the domestic market resulting from the collapse of the Comptoir d’escompte de Paris in 1889. Under the initiative of the Governor, Mr. Magnin, accumulation of gold was implemented and issuance of banknotes increased in the Bank. In 1897, expansion of credit facility was institutionalized in the discussion between the government and parliament on the renewal of the privilege to issue banknotes for the Bank, and after that, the next Governor Pallain further promoted accumulation of gold.

Cette thèse constitue une analyse historique évolutionniste de la fonction de prêteur en dernier ressort à travers les mutations du cadre institutionnel et opérationnel des Banques Centrales. L’enjeu de ce travail de recherche est de se pencher sur les origines de l’apparition de cette théorie d'un point de vue historique comme outil d’analyse des problématiques de gestion des crises modernes. Il convient de démontrer que le dévoiement de la doctrine du PDR entraîne une incompatibilité avec le cadre institutionnel de la politique monétaire de la Banque Centrale. Ainsi, les interventions « non conventionnelles » des Banques Centrales confirment qu’il est nécessaire de sortir du cadre institutionnel censé assurer une gestion efficiente de la politique monétaire. Par conséquent, ce cadre institutionnel qui garantit notamment l’indépendance de la Banque Centrale parait inadéquat à la nouvelle pratique du prêteur en dernier ressort. L’étude historique de cette fonction permet de mettre en perspective l’évolution du rôle de prêteur en dernier ressort en tant qu’outil de prédation monétaire pour les gouvernements. En définitive, les évolutions divergentes du cadre institutionnel et opérationnel de la Banque Centrale constituent l’un des principaux signes d’une déliquescence du système bancaire centralisé (Central Banking). L’exercice de la fonction de prêteur en dernier ressort par la BCE au sein de la zone euro représente un cadre d’analyse pertinent afin d’étudier les difficultés de cette fonction dans la gouvernance d'une zone économique hétérogène et politiquement inaboutie. / This paper offers an historical analysis of the evolution of lenders of last resort (LOLR) through the institutional and operational mutations of Central Banks framework. The aim of this research is to examine the origins of the appearance of this theory from a historical perspective. It should demonstrate that the perversion of the doctrine of LOLR causes incompatibility with the institutional framework of the Central Bank’s monetary policy. Thus, the "unconventional" interventions of central banks confirm the need to exit the institutional framework meant to ensure the efficient management of monetary policy. Therefore, this institutional framework which guarantees the independence of the Central Bank seems inadequate in the context of the new practice of the lender of last resort. Ultimately, diverging trends of the institutional and operational framework of the Central Bank is a major sign of demise of Central Banking. Last resort lending by the ECB in the euro zone provides a useful analytical framework to study the difficulties of the function of LOLR in the governance of a heterogeneous and politically unfulfilled economic zone.

The empirical results reached in this thesis contradict the traditional theoretical view of money as being exogenously introduced into an economy as a medium of exchange intended to reduce the transactions costs associated with barter. Instead money was endogenously created in the form of credit. Thus, the long run neutrality of money also is called into question. The varying quality of different kinds of money reflects the demand for them. If legal tender was of higher quality than private promissary notes, it was because the former were in greater demand. Concisely put, the market determines the value, and therefore the quality, of various kinds of money. The principal problem addressed in this thesis is how, during the expansive nineteenth century, it was possible to satisfy the ever growing need for credit and means of payment without sacrificing the fixed exchange rate. Particular attention is paid to the private note issuing banks, the so called Enskilda banks, that dominated the Swedish banking system throughout the nineteenth century. In addition to their note issuing, the Enskilda banks were characterized by unlimited owner liability. An examination of the ongoing political process from a rational choice perspective, indicates that initially the concept of note issuing Enskilda banks enjoyed wide spread support. They were considered to be a reasonable response to the problem of establishing a commercial banking system in an illiquid economy. The distribution of political and economic power in favor of the Crown and the Nobility included their control over the issuance of bank charters. The monopolistic policy they followed in this regard, however, resulted in growing hostility towards these. As a result, starting in the middle 1860's, a more liberal attitude towards the establishment of banks began to prevail. By the end of the nineteenth century, various political interest were able to engineer the revocation of the Enskilda banks’ note issuing rights. The special characteristics of the Enskilda banks, the right to issue bank notes and the unlimited liability of their owners, have caused them to be perceived as outdated, at least once Joint Stock banks were introduced. In contrast to the Enskilda banks, these were unable to issue notes but instead provided their owners with limited liability. The thesis demonstrates that, given the initial illiquidity of the Swedish economy, the Enskilda banks actually were the more efficient alternative. Indeed, the note issuing privileges of the Enskilda banks became one of the principal factors behind the development of liquid domestic capital markets. An empirical study that includes the most basic constraints faced by the nineteenth century Swedish economy, the demands of the specie standard and the general shortages of reliable means of payment and of credit, reveals that the Enskilda bank system can not, strictly speaking, be considered an example of free banking. Instead of holding specie reserves, the Enskilda banks backed their notes with central bank (Riksbank) notes. This was not because the public preferred Enskilda bank to Riksbank notes.  Rather it was the result of a monetary adverse selection process; Gresham’s Law.  Previously utilized, lower quality, means of payment were replaced by Enskilda bank notes. By accepting some of the discount costs, the Enskilda banks made their notes circulate at par with Riksbank notes. Thus a domestic specie exchange system was created. The note issuance of the Enskilda banks paved the way for the deposit based commercial banking system that followed, and it was essential for the monetization of the economy that occurred during the late 1860's. The long run expansion of the money supply was unrelated to growth in Riksbank reserves, specie holdings or the monetary base. Other countries operating under the specie standard also experienced monetary growth, indicating that the specie standard actually was a system of credit. Money supply, as measured in terms of Riksbank and Enskilda bank notes held by the public, eventually reflected the level of output (GDP).  VAR-tests indicated that annual changes in the level of Riksbank reserves preceded changes in the money supply which, in turn, preceded changes in the level of prices, thus supporting the price quantity theory. These results are summarized in a regression model that estimates domestic price movements as a function of current changes in international prices and GDP and of lagged changes in domestic prices and the money supply. The final chapter is an empirical analysis of the support provided to the Swedish banking system during the most severe financial crises of the nineteenth century.  Maintaining the specie standard was over riding goal of the Riksbank. In times of crises, this concern prevented the Bank from supporting the banking system in accord with the classical lender of last resort recipe; to inject liquidity and briefly suspend convertibility. The thesis argues that in a transitional economy, such as that of nineteenth century Sweden, the fixed exchange rate makes it impossible in times of crisis to support the banks at all costs. Doing so might well convert a banking crisis into a currency crisis. Indeed, this is exactly what has happened in various countries on several occasions during the late twentieth century. Instead the appropriate procedure for acting as lender of last resort in a transitional economy is to initially support the banks, but only as long as central bank reserves are not exhausted. Should the seriousness of the crisis make this insufficient, the authorities should then proceed to import high powered money as a way of supplementing their reserves. The possibility that such action will be needed makes it particularly important that the country’s public finances be kept in good order. / <p>Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2003. Sammanfattning på engelska</p>

The aim of this thesis is to document the importance of liquidity resources of central banks during banking panics and financial crises and analysis of the development of LLR function. We examined three historical examples: the banking panic of 1866, the Great Depression and the current financial crisis, and we focused on the interaction between the demand for liquidity on the one hand and the supply of liquidity by central banks on the other. On the wide historical background we also analysed the changes in the function of LLR. We present that a restrictive monetary policy during financial market distortions may lead to further disturbances and cause serious recession. The analysis of the BoE during 1866 and of the FED between 2007 and 2009, on the contrary shows that the expansionary stance and considerably endogenous liquidity supply are able to reduce financial market's distortions and mitigate possible recession. Analysis of FED's reaction also indicated that should the LLR remain efficient, central banks must expand their instruments portfolio.