Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Department of political Science, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Committee on Social Thought, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis--Berlin. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 4-9).

Liberal neutrality is the idea that laws should not be based on religious or philosophical doctrines that not everyone accepts. The idea is closely related to the "liberal principle of legitimacy", which holds that laws are legitimate only if they are acceptable to people who are subject to them. In this thesis, I examine if the idea of neutrality meets liberalism's own requirements of legitimacy. To do so, I ask what arguments can be given to persuade evangelical Christians--a sizable minority of the U.S. population who are opposed to neutral policies on abortion, school prayer, etc.--to accept neutrality. First, I examine Ackerman and Rawls's "consensus-finding" argument, which claims generally that most comprehensive conceptions of the good are compatible with neutrality. Second, I examine Larmore, Dworkin, and Kymlicka's "consensus-building" arguments, which try to locate particular principles which non-neutralists (perfectionists) are likely to accept, and the acceptance of which is said to guarantee the acceptance of neutrality as well. I find both arguments unsatisfactory; neither is acceptable to a person who subscribes to the evangelical view of God and human nature. Third, I consider Rawls's proposal to exclude evangelicals and the like, based on the test of reasonableness which he believes is "freestanding". However, I find his test of reasonableness dependent on particular understandings of the terms "free and equal citizens", "common human reason", and "fair terms of cooperation". The test of reasonableness, I suggest, is not freestanding, and it is thus circular to use it as a criterion of exclusion. I conclude, therefore, that liberal neutrality fails to satisfy the liberal principle of legitimacy. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2007-09-22 16:42:44.821

Isaiah Berlin's idea of value pluralism has traditionally been seen as supportive to liberalism. Recently however, the idea of an implicit connection between pluralism and liberalism has been questioned by theorists arguing that there is no theoretical link between both, and that in fact, pluralism presents obstacles to liberalism. / In this thesis, I present pluralism as being a romantic response to Enlightenment-inspired liberal theory. My claim is that liberalism, even though it cannot be derived from a pluralist moral theory, provides strong support, both in practice and historically, to our pluralist moral condition. In chapter 1, I explain Berlin's conception of history and the importance of the context. I also contrast pluralism with other liberal theories to lay the foundation of my argument. In chapter 2, I present Berlin's highly original conception of human nature, and his defence of negative liberty. In chapter 3, I demonstrate how pluralism is a romantic response to traditional liberalism by exploring two liberal themes that were both redefined in new terms following the romantic revolt, namely rationality and tolerance. Finally, in chapter 4, I argue that pluralism does not entail liberalism, but that none the less a liberal society is the political arrangement best suited to the fact that human beings disagree about ends, and that values and ways of life are incompatible and incommensurable.

In this thesis, I claim that the Liberal Multiculturalist arguments for group rights, which would enable group autonomy, are problematic. Such claims are instrumentally justified by the value that groups have for their individual members. I claim that group autonomy and individual autonomy are incompatible. Concern for the freedom of individuals requires that there is a common Liberal legal framework covering all of the cultural groups that may exist within a state. I will argue for such a system, claiming that it must be substantive in scope, while also outlining how decisions on the common rules should be fairly deliberated before being resolved. Furthermore, I will defend my position from both Liberal Multiculturalist and Strong Multiculturalist objections.

With respect to its method, the dissertation has two key features: it proceeds through a closed reading of specific authors and it delves into epistemological and ontological questions (theories of society and the self) that bear profoundly on the conceptualisation of freedom.

This thesis assesses whether communitarian critique can still inform contemporary liberal political theory. The suggestion is that although liberalism has correctly rejected calls for a politics of 'community', it has ignored one important aspect of that critique, namely emphasis on the social embeddedness of the individual. Investigation of this hypothesis proceeds in two stages. The first involves reconsideration of the liberal-communitarian debate in the light of Charles Taylor's distinction between ontological and normative issues. This reveals how the arguments for social embeddedness (or ontological holism) fit in with more traditional appeals to community. Further analysis of the idea of ontological holism emphasises the potentially philosophical or empirical character of holist claims. The second stage of the argument ascertains whether liberal theory should heed communitarianism's recommendation of a more holist approach. Analysis of liberal texts reveals that liberal theorists already do adopt such an approach, however they do so in a piecemeal fashion, and generally without reference to supporting empirical evidence. Given the assumption that liberal theory is not expressly Utopian, some attention to limiting empirical factors would seem to be required. To back up this claim a case-study of liberal tolerance is undertaken, comparing the theoretical and social psychological accounts of inter-group toleration and its development. This comparison reveals that liberal tolerance is too narrow in scope, failing to absorb some of the most virulent forms of inter-group antagonism (such as gender- or race-based antipathy). Further, social psychological study shows that socially intolerant attitudes may be at least as harmful as, political ones, as they undermine the development of self-respect. Overall, important conclusions are reached as to the theoretical changes required of liberalism if it is to adopt a more thoroughly holist approach. Attention to the operation of factors at the localised rather than national level is vital, as is attention to empirical detail. Thus the 'politics of locality' complements traditional focus on the nation-state.

Michel Foucault???s and John Rawls??? respective contributions to political philosophy appear to have little in common. Foucault gives an insistently descriptive account of the reality of the political domain; Rawls focusses on normative questions of how it ideally might be. To the extent that the two thinkers are juxtaposed, such juxtaposition is generally used to highlight their differences. Foucault???s arguments are characteristically taken to show Rawls??? preoccupation with consensus and legitimacy to be politically problematic. This thesis pursues the suspicion that there is more positive ground for comparison between Rawls and Foucault than this prima facie assessment would allow. I claim that there are substantive and deep-seated congruences between Rawlsian and Foucaultian conceptual apparatuses. However, to vindicate this claim I take an indirect route. I start within the debates around Rawls??? later work. In this way I motivate a certain reading of this work which is justified in its own right, rather than being justified by the desire to force Rawls into Foucaultian categories. Having established this reading of Rawls with reference to immanent Rawlsian criteria, I develop the striking parallels which obtain between Rawls??? and Foucault???s historical conceptions of political normativity. In light of this commonality, it becomes possible to understand their respective practice as intellectuals in terms of a shared strategy to privilege democracy over truth.

xxxvii, 475 leaves / Title page, contents and abstract only. The complete thesis in print form is available from the University Library. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, Dept. of History, 1970?