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This thesis argues that much of the political historiography is mistaken in portraying the post-1960s United States as a nation moving inexorably to the right. It also argues that historians should not understand the Democratic Party as being in terminal decline between 1972 and 1984, marginalised by a coalescing conservative Republican majority. Indeed, taking as its focus the U.S. Congress, this thesis asks why the remarkable resilience of the congressional Democratic Party has been overlooked by historians. It further asks why that resilience did so little to help the party in subsequent years. The Democratic revival in the elections of 1974 and 1976, so often dismissed as a post-Watergate aberration, was in fact an authentic political opportunity that the party failed to exploit. Exploring various Democratic factions within Congress that competed to shape their party's public philosophy, this thesis seeks to show how grander liberal ambitions were often subordinated to the logic of legislative politics and policymaking. The underlying theme is the unsuitability of Congress as an arena for the discussion and refinement of post-Great Society liberalism. Again and again, the legislature displayed a remarkable facility for undermining iconoclasm and stalling policy experimentation. Institutional reforms in the early 1970s, supposed to reinvigorate the Congress and the congressional Democratic Party, actually succeeded only in intensifying the fragmentation of both. Congressional politics became more entrepreneurial and less party-oriented, leaving legislators with few incentives to look beyond their own political fortunes to the party's future prospects. Enduring Democratic strength in Congress meant that Capitol Hill remained at the centre of the party's efforts to reclaim its preeminent position in American politics. The fact that the Democrats never experienced a protracted period of minority status, as the Republicans did during much of the mid-twentieth century, left them ill-equipped and without a powerful incentive to think in broader terms about their party's mission.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 transformed the way in which Americans and their leaders viewed the world. The tragic events of that day helped give rise to a foreign policy strategy commonly referred to as the “Bush Doctrine.” At the heart of this doctrine lay a series of propositions about the need to foster liberal democracy as the antidote to terrorism. President George W. Bush proclaimed in a variety of addresses that democracy now represented the “single surviving model” of political life to which all people aspired. In the course of making this argument, President Bush seemed to relate his policies to an overarching “teleology” of progress. This discourse implied that the United States might use force to hasten the emergence of liberal norms and institutions in selected states. With a sense of irony, some commentators soon referred to the Bush administration’s position as “Leninist” because of its determination to bring about the so-called “end of history” today. Yet, surprisingly, these critics had little more to add. This thesis is an attempt to assess in greater depth the Bush administration’s claim to comprehend historical eschatology. Developing a concept termed “democratic vanguardism,” this study investigates the idea of liberal modernity, the role of the United States as a force for democracy, and the implications of using military intervention in the service of idealistic ends. It examines disputes among political theorists, public intellectuals and elected statesmen which help to enrich our understanding of the United States’ efforts under President Bush at bending history to its will.

This paper explores issues of civility in liberal democracy, and in particular, how civility and civic engagement must be regenerated in order to forward the democratic ideals of equal rights, citizen equality and collective self-government in a meaningful way. Liberal democracy presupposes a level of civility in order to uphold standards of individual liberty and freedom, however as a theory it fails to compel citizens to support levels of mutual respect. An etymological exploration of the term civility introduces the work of puritan theologian Roger Williams, whose early writings on individual liberty as well as the role of civility and civic engagement can inform popular conversations about civility in modern democracy. This leads to an analysis of Rawlsian liberalism, where Rawls seeks to construct a robust civil society by tying individual duty of civility to an idealization of citizenship. Final analysis explores the possibility of a modern civil liberalism, as influenced by Roger Williams. A liberal civil realm must recognize the mutual reliance between individual freedom and a collective common good; this will compel citizens to choose to preserve the freedom of all citizens through civil engagement and dialogue. This ideal shares important intersections with Jürgen Habermas’ theory of deliberative democracy, but Williams’ replaces Habermas’ notion of higher-level intersubjectivity with an appeal to individual freedom of conscience. By doing so, the preservation of individual freedom of conscience requires citizen-commitment to an active and engaged civil sphere, making the ideal of civility richer than that of Habermas’ theory. Replacing the duty of civility with a commitment to the preservation and protection of individual liberty through civil dialogue is the best way to rescue modern liberal democracy from its current state of incivility, which threatens the liberty and freedom of citizens and undermines the collective common good.