Comparative constructions allow individuals to be compared according to different properties. Such comparisons form two classes, those that permit direct, comparisons (comparisons of measurements as in Seymour is taller than he is wide) and those that only allow indirect comparisons (comparisons of relative positions on separate scales as in Esme is more beautiful than Einstein is intelligent). Traditionally, these two types of comparisons have been associated with an ambiguity in the interpretations of the comparative and equative morphemes (see, Bartsch & Vennemann, 1972; Kennedy, 1999). In this thesis, I propose that there is no such ambiguity. The interpretations of the comparative and equative morphemes remain the same whether they appear in sentences that compare individuals directly or relative to two separate scales. To develop a unified account, I suggest that all comparisons involve a scale of universal degrees that are isomorphic to the rational (fractional) numbers between 0 and 1. All comparative and equative constructions are assigned an interpretation based on a comparison of such degrees. These degrees are associated with the two individuals being compared. Crucial to a unified treatment, the connection between individuals and universal degrees involves two steps. First individuals are mapped to a value on a primary scale that respects the ordering of such individuals according to the quality under consideration (whether it be height, beauty or intelligence). Second, this value on the primary scale is mapped to a universal degree that encodes the value's relative position with respect to other values. It is the ability of iv the universal degrees to encode positions on a primary scale that enables comparative and equative morphemes to either compare individuals directly or indirectly. A direct comparison results if measurements such as seven feet participate in the gradable property (as in Seven feet is tall). Such participation can sometimes result in an isomorphism between two primary scales and the ordering of measurements in a measurement system. When this occurs, comparing positions in the primary scales is equivalent to comparing measurements. If this type of isomorphism cannot be established then the sentence yields an indirect comparison.

Most linguists acknowledge, explicitly or implicitly, the relevance of epistemological questions in linguistics but relatively few have given more than a cursory, ad hoc or incomplete consideration to them. The work of one of those few, Jan Mulder, forms the starting point for much of the present discussion. Epistemological considerations arise in many contexts in linguistics and in many guises. It is an epistemological matter whenever we test the adequacy of a description or the acceptability of a theory. Epistemological considerations are latent whenever we discuss the form or the content of linguistic theories and descriptions or their interrelations. The comparison of different approaches to linguistics inevitably raises epistemological questions concerning our approach to linguistics or our presuppositions about it. These questions are of a general nature and transcend questions about particular linguistic theories and descriptions. These epistemological questions force us to consider what we take linguistics to be. In considering questions of the type mentioned we are forced, for example, to analyse what we mean by a "linguistic theory", a "linguistic description" and what phenomena we are aiming to understand. We are, furthermore, forced to analyse the constraints which a scientific attitude places upon linguistic theorising and description-building. It is these questions concerning the acceptability of linguistic theories and descriptions which we call linguistic meta-theory. This thesis falls into five main parts. Firstly, in Chapter One, we consider the nature and scope of linguistic meta-theory. Secondly, in Chapter Two, we look at a number of previous approaches to the subject. Other important contributions are discussed as they arise in the text. Thirdly, in Chapters Three and Four, we consider in detail the major meta-theoretical distinctions in linguistics and their consequences. In particular, we distinguish linguistic theories from linguistic descriptions and discuss the nature of linguistic phenomena. The view is put forward that linguistics is a scientific subject. The meaning of this assertion is analysed and the interrelations of linguistic theories, descriptions and phenomena are considered in the light of this analysis. The main epistemological requirement that is put forward and defended is that of the empiricism of linguistics. Certain changes in our view of the philosophy of science and in our view of the form of linguistic theories and descriptions follow from the conjunction of these major meta-theoretical positions. Fourthly, we consider the main meta-theoretical considerations concerning theories (Chapter Five) and reject a widespread view of linguistic theory as a non-empirical study (Chapter Six) and we consider the main meta-theoretical conditions relating to linguistic descriptions and some practical examples of description -building consonant with the general positions adopted in Chapter Seven. In Chapter Eight, we look at a concrete example of theory-building in the light of the meta-theoretical conditions of acceptability previously set up. We are especially concerned to show how a theory can meet the condition of being "applicable" or "indirectly scientific" through the establishment of acceptable empirical descriptions consonant with the meta-theoretical conditions on descriptions considered earlier. The view that linguistics is a science implies that we must be concerned with the empirical testing of descriptions and, so, the fifth part of the work is devoted to methodology. In Chapter Nine, we defend the role and necessity of methodology in linguistics and set up the logical framework of relations between the methodology and theory descriptions and phenomena. In Chapter Ten, we examine two of the known types of empirical testing and their shortcomings. Finally, in Chapter Eleven, we give an example of the successful and correct application of a methodology in order to bring out the nature of empirical testing and to demonstrate its feasibility within a scientific linguistics of the sort we imagine.

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

The philosophy of linguistics is a rich philosophical domain which encompasses various disciplines. One of the aims of this thesis is to unite theoretical linguistics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of science (particularly mathematics and modelling) and the ontology of language. Each part of the research presented here targets separate but related goals with the unified aim of bringing greater clarity to the foundations of linguistics from a philosophical perspective. Part I is devoted to the methodology of linguistics in terms of scientific modelling. I argue against both the Conceptualist and Platonist (as well as Pluralist) interpretations of linguistic theory by means of three grades of mathematical involvement for linguistic grammars. Part II explores the specific models of syntactic and semantics by an analogy with the harder sciences. In Part III, I develop a novel account of linguistic ontology and in the process comment on the type-token distinction, the role and connection with mathematics and the nature of linguistic objects. In this research, I offer a structural realist interpretation of linguistic methodology with a nuanced structuralist picture for its ontology. This proposal is informed by historical and current work in theoretical linguistics as well as philosophical views on ontology, scientific modelling and mathematics.

This thesis concerns the nature of knowledge-how, in particular the question of how we ought to combine philosophical and linguistic considerations to understand what it is to know how to do something. Part 1 concerns the significance of linguistic evidence. In chapter 1, I consider the range of linguistic arguments that have been used in favour of the Intellectualist claim that knowledge-how is a species of propositional knowledge. Chapter 2 considers the idea that sentences of the form ‘S knows how to V' involve a free relative complement, and the relation between this claim and the Objectualist claim that knowledge-how is a kind of objectual knowledge. Chapter 3 argues that Intellectualism about knowledge-how faces a problem of generality in accounting for the kinds of propositions that are known in knowledge-how, which is analogous to the generality problem for Reliabilism. Part 2 turns to philosophical considerations, offering an extended inquiry into the point of thinking and talking about knowledge-how. Chapter 4 considers why we should want to work with a concept of knowledge, isolating two hypotheses: i) that thinking and talking about knowledge-how helps us to pool skills, and ii) that thinking and talking about knowledge-how helps us to engage in responsible practices of co-operation. Chapter 5 criticises the former hypothesis by arguing against the suggestion that there is a knowledge-how norm on teaching. Chapter 6 offers an indirect argument for the latter hypothesis, arguing for a knowledge-how norm on intending. Part 3, which consists of chapter 7, offers a positive account of knowledge-how which takes into account both philosophical and linguistic considerations. According to what I will call the Interrogative Capacity view, knowing how to do something consists in a certain kind of ability to answer the question of how to do it.

This work's main thesis is that a theory of action provides a more appropriate framework than a theory of language for furthering the purpose of Austin's conception of speech acts. The main purpose of that conception was the elucidation of the species of language-use that is exemplified by illocutionary acts and is distinct from those species exemplified by locutionary and perlocutionary acts. Austin's conception of locutionary acts isolates those features of a speech act situation which are amenable to subsumption under a theory of language. This conception is expounded, developed and defended in Chapter One. The orthodox "reject-and-replace" view of the relationship between Austin's performative-constative distinction and his distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts threatens several of Austin's insights concerning the type of theory appropriate for developing his conception of speech acts. In Chapter Two the performative-constative distinction is expounded, the "reject-and-replace" is shown to be false, and an alternative view, which retrieves the threatened insights, is advanced. Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts, and his parallel distinction between locutionary meaning and illocutionary force, are also established in the course of defending them against objections. The terms in which Austin drew the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts - those of a conventional act distinct from its non-conventional outcomes indicate the theoretical framework required for a development of his conception. In Chapter Three this distinction is expounded and a partial analysis is made of the concepts of some outcomes of acts, viz., effects, consequences and results. Illocutionary acts are not constituted in toto by agents' bodily movements - a point captured in Austin's thesis that illocutionary acts are conventional acts. In Chapter Pour the interpretation customarily imposed on that thesis is discussed and shown to be unfaithful. An alternative interpretation is constructed from points in Austin's own lectures. The solution to the problem of the constitution of illocutionary acts provided by this interpretation is that such acts are constituted by the conventional procedures as part of which locutionary acts are performed. Some other suggested solutions are canvassed. In Chapter Five an account is given of the conventional procedures constitutive of illocutionary acts. In Chapter Six the claim embodied in the main thesis of this work is defended against the counter-claims implicit in Schiffer's, Strawson's and Searle's work. In the Appendix Austin's performative-constative distinction and his later views on truth are defended. An analytical table of contents is included.

Orientador: Nina Virgínia de Araujo Leite / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-26T21:08:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dias_CarlosEduardoBorges_D.pdf: 3673408 bytes, checksum: 2a85f64bf66d744e00c4019fc8e0d555 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015 / Resumo: Na contracorrente do enfoque hegemônico das pesquisas sobre o monitoramento da fala, nas quais predominam estudos pautados na neuropsicologia-cognitivista, esse trabalho representa uma alternativa para análise de fenômenos tais como a autocorreção (reparo) e a hesitação mediante uma proposta que inclui reflexões oriundas de certas vertentes da filosofia, da linguística e da psicanálise. As três partes que o integram se desenvolvem, por um lado, em uma relativa referência às três críticas kantianas no (quase) inexplorado terreno da filosofia da linguística, e, por outro, no território das discussões que relacionam a linguística e a psicanálise. Na primeira delas (I), tal qual se supõe em Kant uma epistemologia da física newtoniana, postula-se a atividade (dita) epilinguística do falante (manifesta no reparo) como condição transcendental (quid iuris) para a conduta metalinguística da linguística como ciência galileana. Através de um cotejo entre a literalisação especulativa do âmbito prosódico realizada pelas teorias gerativas e a análise de hesitações na atividade conversacional, demonstrou-se que, se a irrupção do equívoco sinaliza uma distinção radical entre a língua e a fala, por outro lado, pela força coercitiva da língua sobre a fala, a autocorreção sinaliza uma tendência dos falantes a reorganizarem-se pela gramática; na segunda parte (II), contra as abordagens que, focadas na neuropsicologia-cognitivista, tentam constituir uma `linguística da fala¿ ou `teoria do desempenho¿ como uma ciência objetiva, com base na clássica distinção entre a razão especulativa e prática, propõe-se que a divisão dos estudos da linguagem se estabeleça entre uma ciência da língua e uma ética da fala, essa última norteada pela correlação entre a incidência imperativa da lei sobre a ação e a incidência imperativa da língua sobre a fala ¿ e assim, subjacente ao `saber¿, `competência¿ ou, de maneira geral, ao factum grammaticae (de Milner), o julgamento negativo do equívoco na autocorreção revela um `dever¿ do falante para com a língua, o qual consiste na própria condição transcendental da ciência; na terceira parte (III) a autocorreção passa a ser vista como um processo constituído por dois enunciados, o segundo como julgamento negativo em relação ao primeiro (na estrutura de "isso que eu disse não é [bem] o que eu quis dizer"), através do qual o sujeito falante considera como equívoco algo de seu próprio dizer (erros ou lapsos) na tentativa de um apagamento de seu conflito (com relação à língua ou ao eu); A condenação do equívoco, manifesta na autocorreção, envolve assim um julgamento com o qual o falante busca conferir embargo à imputabilidade dos efeitos de lalangue em sua fala através da atribuição de uma univocidade idealizada à língua e/ou ao eu, como se fossem (ou devessem ser) os único(s) suposto(s) determinante(s) de seu dizer / Abstract: À contre-courant des approches hégémoniques dans la recherche sur le contrôle (monitoring) de la parole, guidées par la neuropsychologie-cognitiviste, ce travail représente une alternative théorique pour l'analyse de phénomènes tels que l'autocorrection (repair) et l'hésitation, dans une proposition qui comprend certains domaines de la philosophie, de la linguistique et de la psychanalyse. Les trois parties qui l'intègrent se développent, d'un côté, en corrélation (partielle) par rapport aux trois critiques kantiennes dans le terrain (presque) inexploré de la philosophie de la linguistique, et, d'un autre côté, sur le territoire des discussions qui établissent un lien entre la linguistique et la psychanalyse. Dans la première partie (I), de même qu'on suppose chez Kant une épistémologie de la physique newtonienne, l'activité (dite) épilinguistique du parlant (manifesté dans l'autocorrection) est conçue comme la condition transcendantale (quid iuris) de la conduite métalinguistique de la linguistique en tant que science galiléenne. Sur la base d'une confrontation entre la littéralisation du domaine prosodique effectuée par les théories génératives et l'analyse des hésitations dans l'activité conversationnelle, on a démontré que, si l'irruption de l'équivoque signale une distinction radicale entre langue et parole, d'autre part, l'autocorrection signale une tendance du parlant à se réorganiser à travers la force coercitive de la langue sur la parole; dans la deuxième (II), à partir de la distinction classique entre la raison spéculative et pratique et contre les approches que se basent sur la neuropsychologie-cognitive pour essayer de fonder une 'linguistique de la parole' ou une 'théorie de la performance' comme science objective, on propose que la division des études du langage soit établie entre la science de la langue et l'éthique de la parole, celle-ci fondée sur la corrélation entre l'incidence impérative de la loi sur l'action et l'incidence impérative de la langue sur la parole ¿ puisque dans l'autocorrection, le jugement négatif de l'équivoque révèle un devoir du parlant envers la langue, ce qui constitue la condition transcendantale de la science, puisque ce devoir est sous-jacent au savoir, à la compétence ou, en général, au factum grammaticae (de Milner) ; dans la troisième (III), l'autocorrection est considérée comme un processus constitué par deux énoncés, le deuxième comme un jugement négatif à l'égard du premier (dans la structure 'ce que j'ai dit n'est pas ce que j'ai voulu dire') et à travers lequel le parlant considère comme équivoque quelque chose de son propre dire (fautes ou lapsus) dans une tentative d'effacer son conflit (par rapport à la langue ou au moi). L'autocorrection, en tant que condamnation de l'équivoque, implique donc un jugement avec lequel le parlant essaye de mettre embargo sur l'imputabilité des effets de lalangue sur sa parole en attribuant à la langue et au moi une univocité idéalisée, comme s'ils étaient (ou s'ils devraient être) les seuls déterminants de son dire / Doutorado / Linguistica / Doutor em Linguística

It is a central claim of modern linguistic theory that linguists do not prescribe, but describe language as it is, without pronouncing on correctness or judging one variety better than another. This attempt to exclude evaluation is motivated by a desire to be ' politically correct', which hinders objective analysis of language, and by an ill-advised imitation of the natural sciences, which obstructs the discipline's progress towards becoming a science in its own right. It involves linguists, as users of a valued variety, in self-deception and disingenuousness, distances them from the concerns of the ordinary language user, and betrays a failure to understand the involvement of social values in language, the nature of language itself, and the limits of linguistic science. On a wider scale, linguistics reflects society's devaluing and mechanisation of language. Despite growing concern expressed in the literature, and the incoherence that becomes apparent when linguists attempt to address social problems using a theory that regards language as an autonomous object, newcomers to the discipline continue to be taught that anti-prescriptivism is the natural corollary of a scientific approach to language. This thesis suggests that the way out of these difficulties is to rethink the meaning of ' theory' in linguistics. If we take the reflexivity of language seriously, building on M.A.K. Halliday's notion of 'linguistics as metaphor', we are reminded that a linguistic theory is made of language. Metalanguage must use the experiential and interpersonal meaning-making resources of everyday language. It follows that a linguistic theory cannot escape being evaluative, because evaluation is an inherent part of interpersonal meaning. If we fail to notice our own metalinguistic evaluation, this is because language disguises its evaluative meanings, or perhaps we are just not used to thinking of them as part of the grammar. To achieve clarity about the involvement of value in language, we need to turn our metalanguage back on itself - 'using the grammar to think with about the grammar' . Some ways of doing this are demonstrated here, turning the resources of systemic functional linguistics on linguists' own language. The circularity of this process should be seen not as a drawback but as a salutary reminder that linguistics is an interpretive rather than a discovery process. This knowledge should help us revalue language and make a place for evaluation in linguistic theory, paving the way for a socially responsible and productive linguistics.

<p>This ethnographic project delves into the spheres of life of three autistic adults and their families. This thesis analyzes their experiences, current routines, and personal and family narratives about what it means to be an autistic adult across different identities and geographies. This thesis also identifies forms of knowledge that arise in these life experiences and shape strategies, decisions, or attitudes taken to navigate through life or overcome possible difficulties in their present and futures. This research takes place in Colombia, a diverse country and engages with anthropology of the everyday, sensory anthropology and disability studies.</p>