This thesis provides a detailed analysis of the so-called `house money' or windfall endowment effect and its main determinants. Chapter 1 provides a detailed survey on the literature related to the house money effect. This effect according to Thaler and Johnson (1990) - refers to the situation where prior gains mitigate the influence of loss aversion and facilitate risk-seeking. The concept borrows its name from the expression employed in the gambling parlance of "playing with the house money", which is used when people gamble while ahead. As the literature has used a variety of concepts and ideas to describe the house money effect, this chapter presents and discusses them within the environment and the related literature that they have emerged. This is done in order to highlight the predominant answers to the main research questions raised in the various strands of the literature, namely: (i) whether people treat money differently depending on its origin; and (ii) the implications of the house money effect for the experimental methodology in economics. The literature is organised and presented according to the context in which the above two research questions have been examined. By presenting results in each particular context, we pin down the contextual differences that might be responsible for the presence (or absence) of the house money effect, and lay the initial ground work to answer a third research question: What drives the house money effect? In this regard, after we demonstrate the context-dependency of the house money effect we present the two main interpretations that it has received, namely that the house money effect is a result of different mental accounting over windfall gains (`windfall effect') or a result of fairness or deservingness concerns ('Lockean desert effect'). Chapter 2 re-examines the house money effect and explores its main driving forces. For that, we employ a novel experimental design utilising a within-subject approach, coupled with the use of three different contexts of economic decisions (a trust game, a set of lotteries and a public good game). Both the within-subject experimental design and the three contexts of economic decisions allow us to better test the two main interpretations of the house money effect. Our experimental data confirm the presence of the house money effect both in the decision to trust (but not in the decision of trustworthiness) in the trust game and in the decision to contribute in the public account of the public good game. However, our findings do not support the hypothesis that changes in risk behaviour of participants are due to different sources of money, suggesting that risk attitudes are robust and independent of the origin of money along the experiment. Therefore, our findings seem to favour interpretations of the house money effect as a result of 'just desert' or fairness preferences rather than the result of different mental accounting over windfall gains. Chapter 3 combines two branches of experimental literature, namely the house money effect and the literature on individual differences in social preferences. Both the house money effect and individual differences have been used extensively to explain cooperation in social dilemmas (and its decline over time). Here, we test the implications of house money on reciprocal behaviour, that is, whether participants in economic experiments are less likely to reciprocate when earned money rather than windfall money is at stake. Using the innovative experimental design of Fischbacher et al. (2001) with strategy method, we classify participants according to their behaviour in a linear public good game, and by adding the within-subject element in our experimental design we test the robustness of this classification across the different origin of endowments. Our results indicate that the types' classification is robust across the origin of money. Contrary to Harrison (2007), we find that participants' decision to free ride or not (contribute or not) is independent of the origin of money, but given that the decision to contribute has been made, contribution levels may vary -actually be lower- when money is earned rather than windfall endowed. We also elicit beliefs about others' contributions and test how these beliefs affected by the "house money" and in turn how they affect the decision to contribute. This discussion relates to what the literature has characterised so far as "anticipatory reciprocity".

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O objetivo dessa dissertação é realizar uma análise crítica da teoria que intenta explicar a natureza e a evidência da identidade pessoal através da memória. A primeira versão dessa teoria foi proposta por John Locke, a qual, devido à sua distinção entre pessoa, homem e substância, traçou os parâmetros fundamentais das discussões posteriores acerca da natureza da identidade pessoal. No entanto, essa proposta apresenta sérias fragilidades e inconsistências, apontadas de forma vigorosa principalmente por Joseph Butler e Thomas Reid. Posteriormente, autores como Parfit, Shoemaker e Grice realizaram reformulações na teoria lockeana com o objetivo de sanar suas inconsistências e assim responder à suas principais objeções, sem com isso perder seu aspecto central e característico, que é conceber a memória como elemento fundamental para o entendimento da identidade pessoal. Esse processo envolvendo a teoria lockeana, suas objeções e reformulações terá como resultado final a noção de identidade pessoal como continuidade psicológica não-ramificada. / The aim of this dissertation is to realize a critical analysis of the theory that intends to explain the nature and the evidence of personal identity through memory. The first version of this theory was proposed by John Locke, which due to its distinction between person, man and substance, sketched the fundamental parameters of the following discussions about the nature of personal identity. However, this proposal presents serious weakness and inconsistencies, indicated in a vigorous way principally by Joseph Butler and Thomas Reid. Later, writers as Parfit, Shoemaker and Grice implemented reformulations in the Lockean theory with the aim to reply its main objections, without losing its central and characteristic aspect, which is to conceive memory as a fundamental element for the understanding of personal identity. This process involving the Lockean theory, its objections and reformulations will have as final result the notion of personal identity as a non-branched psychological continuity.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O objetivo dessa dissertação é realizar uma análise crítica da teoria que intenta explicar a natureza e a evidência da identidade pessoal através da memória. A primeira versão dessa teoria foi proposta por John Locke, a qual, devido à sua distinção entre pessoa, homem e substância, traçou os parâmetros fundamentais das discussões posteriores acerca da natureza da identidade pessoal. No entanto, essa proposta apresenta sérias fragilidades e inconsistências, apontadas de forma vigorosa principalmente por Joseph Butler e Thomas Reid. Posteriormente, autores como Parfit, Shoemaker e Grice realizaram reformulações na teoria lockeana com o objetivo de sanar suas inconsistências e assim responder à suas principais objeções, sem com isso perder seu aspecto central e característico, que é conceber a memória como elemento fundamental para o entendimento da identidade pessoal. Esse processo envolvendo a teoria lockeana, suas objeções e reformulações terá como resultado final a noção de identidade pessoal como continuidade psicológica não-ramificada. / The aim of this dissertation is to realize a critical analysis of the theory that intends to explain the nature and the evidence of personal identity through memory. The first version of this theory was proposed by John Locke, which due to its distinction between person, man and substance, sketched the fundamental parameters of the following discussions about the nature of personal identity. However, this proposal presents serious weakness and inconsistencies, indicated in a vigorous way principally by Joseph Butler and Thomas Reid. Later, writers as Parfit, Shoemaker and Grice implemented reformulations in the Lockean theory with the aim to reply its main objections, without losing its central and characteristic aspect, which is to conceive memory as a fundamental element for the understanding of personal identity. This process involving the Lockean theory, its objections and reformulations will have as final result the notion of personal identity as a non-branched psychological continuity.

“Liberal Democracy” is a common term in political theory, and it is used as if it had a commonly accepted referent, with both normative and descriptive content. This is certainly the case in democratic theory, where it on the one hand seems to refer to a normative democratic model; on the other hand it is used descriptively, to refer to real-life democracies. The deliberative democratic sub-field is not an exception; on the contrary, the term is frequently used albeit rarely defined; yet the concept it refers to is supposedly developed enough to allow detailed propositions about its citizens’s political behaviour. This essay is an attempt to analyze how Liberal Democracy is used by three deliberative democrats (Jürgen Habermas, John Dryzek and Stephen Elstub), in order to understand the democratic model (or models), whether normative or descriptive, they refer to. It is an analysis of how the term is used in some of the authors’ texts, what it denotes and connotes. This is done against the backdrop of their respective deliberative theories; Habermas, Dryzek and Elstub were chosen qua Deliberative Democratic theorists, not just democratic theorists. Habermas’s usage of Liberal Democracy is inconsistent. On the one hand it is a rather “open” democracy (i.e., more Dahl than Madison) dependent on active citizens in the public sphere; on the other hand it is a rights-based society where the market forum serves as an imperative, where isolated individuals make political choices as if they where choices at the market forum and even the social interactions are market-structured. My conclusion is that the latter model takes precedence. The following chapter analyzes John Dryzek’s usage of the term. The democratic model Dryzek calls Liberal Democracy shares some similarities with Habermas’s model – the market forum serves as a model for the citizens’ political behaviour. Following Horkheimer and Adorno, Dryzek connects Liberal Democracy to an instrumental rationality considered to be repressive. The instrumental rationality (and the behaviour it creates) leads to a political strait jacket – the citizens’ preferences get reduced to their interests, and politics is nothing but a battle of the interests. Dryzek’s usage of the term is more consistent than Habermas’s. For Stephen Elstub, upholding autonomy is the telos of democracy, irrespective of model. In his discussions of liberal democracy he equates liberal theory (J.S. Mill and John Locke) with liberal democratic theory, and sees the real-life democracies as realizations of the theory. Elstub's discussions of liberal democracy focus primarily on the demos, citizens with endogenous preferences. Contra Habermas and Dryzek, Elstub’s model lacks the behavioural model based on the market forum. An important inconsistency in Elstub’s model is the State’s capacity for institutional changes; the “representative structures” are incapable of the changes necessary to deal with social pluralism, but at the same time the Liberal Democratic system is flexible enough to accommodate his dualist model of democracy. The last chapter sums up the results and places the liberal democratic model in a taxonomy of democratic theories. I argue that in spite of the differences of the authors’ models, they are basically one and the same, normatively and descriptively. It is not primarily a model of democratic institutions – more than anything it is a conception of demos. The demos consist of citizens focused on their self-interest as a basis for their political actions. The democratic taxonomy used in the essay is fairly inclusive, but I conclude that Liberal Democracy does not fit in; it is not so much a theory of institutionalised democracy as a psychological theory.