No description available.

It is widely agreed that some concepts can be possessed only by those who have undergone a certain type of phenomenal experience. The orthodox view among contemporary philosophers of mind that these phenomenal concepts provide the key to understanding the dispute between physicalists and their opponents. I reject the orthodox view; I defend an externalist conception of mental content according to which there are no phenomenal concepts. But the fact that there are no phenomenal concepts should not worry the physicalist: there are better accounts of the data that phenomenal concepts are used to explain. / text

The thesis is based on the assumption that reasoning functions in its context. The locus of this context is the subject-in-act. The subject-in-act observes, wonders, asks questions, judges and makes justifications. In the functioning of reasoning, she uses the basic set of these cognitional operations rather than pure logical form or the empirical content alone to reach conclusions. Our contention is that logic cannot function on its own without the subject-in-act. Hitherto, efforts have been made to show that any knowledge system is based on either purely axiomatic and mathematical formulations or deductive tautologies and inductive reasoning or empirical convictions based on probability. The thesis attempts to argue that reasoning is not possible without the interventions of the set of cognitional operations. In the thesis we take as an example the early Wittgenstein's attempt to give a foundation for our knowing or the identity of what can be known, using atomic or elementary propositions. Wittgenstein' s own later repudiation of this introduces the idea that logic, and language are relative to social context. In Wittgenstein's second phase, we focus on the analysis of understanding in terms of "following a rule." This idea is later taken up by Winch in relation to his point of inter-cultural learning but he does not give us the method of how to achieve that learning. Lonergan introduces the idea of "self-appropriation" which we interpret by the idea of the "subject-in-act." It is this subject-in-act that forms a foundation for all possible understanding, explaining and knowing. Barden picks up from Winch and addresses precisely the issue of traditions and cultural differences. We want to argue that traditions and context are important in a sense that they serve as a starting point in our search for knowledge but in themselves, are not ultimately foundational. What is ultimately foundational is not a set of propositions, or rules to be followed, or social practice, but the subject-in-act. / Thesis (Ph.D)-University of Durban-Westville, 2004.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2008. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1992. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [261]-267).

This dissertation explores one family's experience of a son's disclosure of homosexuality, through the use of a second-order cybernetic epistemology, and social constructionist theory. Second-order cybernetics enables a description of patterns and themes that recursively connect the family's ideas and behaviour. Social constructionism enables the family's reaction to disclosure to be recursively linked to their fit with wider society. By using semantic and political frames of reference to describe the family's narratives around disclosure, this study indicates that disclosure is a relational metaphor, dependent on the family's locally co-constructed and transgenerational meanings. It also shows that although the family change with disclosure, stability is regained in a way consistent with the family's rules and norms. This study therefore demystifies viewing disclosure in one way only and creates alternative ways of conceptualising it. / Psychology / M.A. (Clinical Psychology)

黃秉傑. / Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學硏究院哲學部. / Manuscript (cops. 2 & 3 reprint copies) / Includes bibliographical references: leaves 1-8 (5th group) / Huang Bingjie. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue yan jiu yuan zhe xue bu. / 序言 --- p.I-III / Chapter 第一章 --- 邏輯語意學的理論背景 / 本章大要 --- p.i-ii / Chapter §1 --- 卡納普與邏輯經驗論　 --- p.1-13 / Chapter §2 --- 卡納普的哲學發展 --- p.13-18 / Chapter §3 --- 卡納普的後設哲學與哲學方法 --- p.19-20 / Chapter §4 --- 卡納普的邏輯語法學 / Chapter 4.1 --- 邏輯法學之建構目的　 --- p.21-23 / Chapter 4.2 --- 邏輯語法學之性質與方法 --- p.24-28 / Chapter 4.3 --- 邏輯語法學之哲學應用　 --- p.28-38 / Chapter 4.4 --- 邏輯語法學之不足 --- p.38-47 / Chapter 第二章 --- 卡納普邏輯語意學的要素 / 本章大要 --- p.i-ix / Chapter §1 --- 邏輯語意學建構之目的及其主要工作 --- p.48-54 / Chapter §2 --- 記號學的基本概念 / Chapter 2.1 --- 研究語意的三種路伺 --- p.55-56 / Chapter 2.2 --- 描述語意學與純語意學之區分　 --- p.57-60 / Chapter 2.3 --- 對象語言與後設語言之區分　 --- p.60-61 / Chapter 2.4 --- 記號與表式之劃分 --- p.61-63 / Chapter §3 --- 語意系統之建構 / Chapter 3.1 --- 建構語意系統的兩種途徑´ؤ´ؤ語典系統S1與語言系統S2 --- p.63-70 / Chapter 3.2 --- 具有無限語句的語意系統S3 --- p.71-77 / Chapter 3.3 --- 具有變項的語意系統S6　 --- p.77-82 / Chapter §4 --- 定義「真」之適當性條件 --- p.83-86 / Chapter §5 --- 基概念 --- p.86-95 / Chapter §6 --- L－語意學 / Chapter 6.1 --- L－概念的重要性 --- p.96-101 / Chapter 6.2 --- 有關L－概念的公設與定理 --- p.101-113 / Chapter 6.3 --- 定義L－概念之適當性條件 --- p.114-120 / Chapter 6.4 --- 在特定的語意系統內定義L－概念 --- p.120-128 / Chapter 6.5 --- 「L－域」´ؤ´ؤ一個可作為L－語意學基礎的概念　 --- p.128-134 / Chapter 6.6 --- 有關「L－域」的公設與定理 --- p.135-138 / Chapter 6.7 --- 在外範語言內定義「L－域」´ؤ´ؤ程序19-E與程序19-F　 --- p.139-149 / Chapter 6.8 --- 擴大指謂關係的用法　 --- p.149-157 / Chapter 6.9 --- 絶對概念 --- p.157-162 / Chapter 6.10 --- 在內涵語言內定義「L－域」──程序18-A --- p.162-170 / Chapter 6.11 --- 以「L－域」為基始概念所建構的普遍語意學　 --- p.170-177 / Chapter 6.12 --- 同樣可作為L－語意學之基礎的L－內容」──有關的公設與定理 --- p.178-183 / Chapter 6.13 --- 在－外範語言內定義「L－內容」－程序23-F　 --- p.183-186 / Chapter §7 --- F－概念　 --- p.187-191 / Chapter §8 --- 意義公設 --- p.192-198 / Chapter §9 --- 演算系與̐ơÐ－概念　　 --- p.198-204 / Chapter §10 --- 語意學與語法學之關係──演算系及其解釋 --- p.204-211 / Chapter §11 --- 語言系統之建構 --- p.211-215 / Chapter §12 --- 邏輯究竟是約定的還是受限制 --- p.215-219 / Chapter §13 --- 語意學中的抽象實體　　 --- p.219-230 / Chapter 第三章 --- 對邏輯語意學的評鑑 / 本章大要　 --- p.i-ii / Chapter §1 --- 論邏輯語意學的哲學意義及其影響　 --- p.231-234 / Chapter §2 --- 評瑰英對「分析／綜合」的批評 --- p.234-261 / Chapter §3 --- 論史特勞遜對特構語言進路的批評　 --- p.262-273 / 結論 --- p.274-275 / 註目 --- p.1-24 / 參考書目 --- p.1-8

Thèse : ? : Indiana University : 1989. / Bibliogr. p. [143]-147.

Thesis (doctoral)--Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, München. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 131-146).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--York University, 2005. Graduate Programme in Philosophy. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 227-240). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pNR11615