In 1996, the South African government embarked on a process of land reform. The land reform programme has been driven by three pillars, namely: (i) Land Restitution, (ii) Land Tenure Reform and (iii) Land Redistribution. The two first pillars of land reform, as well as the first sub-programme (The SLAG) of the Land Redistribution programme delivered disappointing results. By December 2004, eight years since the programme was introduced, land reform had only transferred an area of 3.4% of white commercial agricultural land to Blacks, against a set target of 30% by 2014. Other disappointing results include: <ul> <li> Over-congestion of crowds on small sections of land</li> <li> Providing cash compensation as opposed to land itself</li> <li> Failure to ensure productivity among transferred farms</li> </ul> In 2001, Government introduced a new sub-programme under the Redistribution programme, called Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD). This programme was regarded as a flagship programme for the DLA; firstly for its flexible funding structure; secondly, for its focus on commercially orientated agricultural projects; and thirdly, for its perceived capacity to transfer land at a higher pace. Although the LRAD belonged to the Department of Land Affairs (now called the Department of Rural Development and Land Affair), in the initial stage of the programme, three institutions became involved in its implementation, namely: The Land and Agricultural Development of South Africa (referred to as the Land Bank), the provincial departments of Land Affairs, as well as the provincial departments of Agriculture. Just four years after its inception the LRAD programme received negative media coverage and this included the following: <ul> <li> The collapse and failure of some of LRAD projects;</li> <li> Lack of productivity among some of the already transferred LRAD projects;</li> <li> Conflict among LRAD beneficiaries, leading to the squandering and misappropriation of government resources on farms; <li> Problems of budget deficit; and the</li> <li> Collapse of the relationship between the Land Bank and the DLA.</li> </ul> The above signalled potential elements of failure on the part of LRAD programme. There is, however, a reality that the reasons for failure are not well-understood and that a study to analyse this in detail could assist in streamlining the delivery of this programme. The objectives of the study are threefold: <ul> <li> Firstly; as in line with the objectives of LRAD, to investigate if the already transferred LRAD farms are productive;</li> <li> Secondly; to establish the factors hampering productivity on the transferred farms; and</li> <li> Thirdly; by using the initial involvement of the Land Bank as a control, to assess if LRAD is well-placed within the DLA.</li> </ul> Two sets of methodologies have been used. The first method involved collecting files and records from the DLA and the Land Bank, and performing financial and descriptive analyses on LRAD beneficiaries. In the second approach, a survey was conducted among a sample of transferred LRAD farms, in order to assess the level of productivity on the farms, as well as to interview beneficiaries with regard to the challenges they are facing on the farms. The study established the main factors hampering productivity on the farms. Although many factors have been cited as factors hampering productivity, beneficiaries listed the following as the three most important factors hampering productivity on the farms: <ul> <li> Insufficient or no tractors and implements (16 projects out of 37, constituting 43%)</li> <li> Conflict among members (12 projects, 32%)</li> <li> Poor coordination between the DLA and the Land Bank (19 projects, 51%)</li> </ul> Comparison between the Land Bank and the DLA clients, points out that those of the Land Bank are performing better than those of the DLA. Financial and descriptive analysis carried out among 308 LRAD cases identified the Land Bank loan as an important proportion of funding towards the purchase of land. LRAD in its current institutional design (structure and policy) is not suitable for the poor. The objectives of the LRAD programme are too many where a significant number of them appear irrelevant. These objectives should be reviewed. While the DLA does not have the right capacity (experienced personnel, ITC systems for monitoring and evaluations, infrastructure etc) to run with LRAD, the Land Bank has been found to be unsuitable as its policies discriminates against the poor. Both the policies (selection and qualifying criteria, early and after care institutional support, own contribution and security, etc.) and implementation strategies of the Land Bank and the DLA must be reviewed to reflect a strategic intend that is geared towards sustaining agricultural development among black emerging farmers in South Africa. / Dissertation (MInstAgrar)--University of Pretoria, 2011. / Agricultural Economics, Extension and Rural Development / unrestricted

yes / The length of this Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project Report No.7 again reflects the interest related to non-lethal weapons from academics, research institutes, policy makers, the police and the military. A number of reports, particularly concerning the Taser electro-shock weapon, have been published from these sectors since our last BNLWRP Report No.6 in October 2004. Some, such as the Amnesty International (U.S. and Canada) have again raised, and stressed, the concerns about the safety of the weapon and the number of deaths associated with its use. Others, such as the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Human Effects Center of Excellence (HECOE), Human Effectiveness and Risk Characterization of the Electromuscular Incapacitation Device ¿ A Limited Analysis of the TASER. (March 2005) concluded that the Taser was relatively safe, but that further research was needed into potential bio-effects, and for continual development into a safer weapon. Reaction to these reports was mixed. Some US legislators called for limitations on the use of Tasers, more accountability, and the detailed recording of incidents in which they were used.1 Others called for a ban on their use until more testing was carried out regarding their potentially harmful effects. A number of US police forces stopped the use of Taser, slowed down the deployment and ordering of the weapons, reviewed their rules of engagement and reporting, and revisited their operational guidelines. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) published the Electro- Muscular Disruption Technology (EMDT). A Nine-Step Strategy For Effective Deployment. (April 2005) as a response to these growing concerns. Certain elements of the media, especially The Arizona Republic2 and others, took a hostile view of what they considered the scandal of the number of deaths and associated serious injuries caused by the Taser. Taser International challenged allegations that their weapon was directly responsible for these deaths and quoted reports, such as the Madison Police Department report (February 2005), the study by McDaniel, W & Stratbucker, R & Nerheim, M & Brewer, J. Cardiac Safety of Neuromuscular Incapacitating Defensive Devices (January 2005), and the U.K. DOMILL Statement (March 2005) to support their view. The controversy continues. Other than Tasers, there are still few reports of the newer non-lethal technologies actually being deployed in operations. The exception to this is the Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD), which is now in widespread use in Iraq. Little additional information has appeared regarding the `active denial¿ weapon we have described in previous reports.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / This thesis will address the planned configuration of Lockheed Martin's Flight Zero, Module Spiral Alpha Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and the ongoing development of the SPARTAN SCOUT, one of the Navy's Unmanned Surface Vessels (USV). Technology currently available as well as developmental technologies will be recommended for implementation in order to make the LCS and SCOUT assets to Information Operations (IO) objectives. Specific technology will include Outboard, TARBS, HPM, Loudspeakers, LRAD and Air Magnet. This thesis will include an evaluation of the current policy for authorizing Information Operations missions, specifically in the areas of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Electronic Warfare (EW). / Lieutenant, United States Navy

M.A. Faculty of Humanties, University of the Witwatersrand / The racial discrimination under colonialism and apartheid culminated to the dispossession of black people from their land, and to unequal land distribution between black and white people. Territorial segregation during this period was not only about the displacement of black people from their land and their deprivation to equal access to land compared to their white counterparts, it was also about economic deprivation, eradication of subsistence agriculture and the transformation of blacks into wage labourers (Hall, 2004; Walker, 2008).The post-apartheid land reform process was initiated to redress the injustices and inequalities of the past. It took a market-driven approach to blend the objectives of land reform with those of national reconciliation and maintenance of food security (DLA, 1997). The land reform process took a form of restoring land to its original owners who were forcefully removed from it after June 1913 or compensation if land could not be restored. It was also aimed at securing tenure rights for farm workers, labour tenants, farm dwellers and people residing in communal areas. The aims of the third part of the land reform programme was to redistribute 30% of commercial farms in white hands to black people with the view of redressing racial disparities in landholding. As early as in the initial stages of the development of South Africa’s land policy in the early 1990s, scholars and civil society groups warned about the ineffectiveness of the market to deliver on land reform objectives. This paper adopts a case study approach to study the South African land reform process in relation to the notion of empowerment. It focuses on the Land Reform for Agricultural Development (LRAD) sub-programme by looking at the intersection between race, gender and class. Bambanani Fruits (Pty) Ltd, an LRAD project based in the Gauteng province is used as a case study. This is an LRAD Equity Scheme project, meaning that its beneficiaries (who are former workers on the farm) acquired an LRAD grant to purchase equity shares to be co-owners of the project. Bambanani Fruits is a successful project considering its productivity and access to the market. This paper investigates how much LRAD beneficiaries are part of this success i.e. whether they have agency, whether they feel a sense of ownership and control of the project, and the extent at which they take part in decision making in the project. This task is carried out through the application of Kabeer’s (1999) instrumentalist model of measuring empowerment. Kabeer states that empowerment is measured by looking at three aspects, namely; resources, agency and achievement. Kabeer’s model is applied to the data which was collected through various means including in depth interviews with Bambanani LRAD beneficiaries and land officials from the province, document analysis and review of existing scholarly work on land reform. It is well documented that South Africa’s land reform process has been very slow in delivering to its objectives, and departmental reports used in this paper also confirm this assertion. The research results reveal that even though more land was transferred under LRAD, the sub-programme also encountered some of the challenges and hindrances faced by its predecessor Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG). It faced budgetary constraints, complexities of the land market such as price restrictions and resistance by land owners to cede land, and so on. Generally, it was found that LRAD tended to entrench race, gender and class disparities in landholding. At Bambanani, I discovered that LRAD has affected beneficiaries differently. The sub-programme has stratified these beneficiaries into competing class factions. Divergent interests have emerged to distort the actual meaning of empowerment. I have labelled this tension a ‘dichotomous factionalism’. The struggle and conflict is caught up between beneficiaries themselves, and their disunity has left the hegemony of the farm’s management unchallenged. I argue that, their empowerment is firstly condemned from within and this internal condemnation limits their negotiating power with the management. Secondly, their empowerment is curtailed by the farm’s management in such as way that it sometimes uses its majority shares to justify unilateral decision making. According to Kabeer, empowerment ought to encompass egalitarian decision making. Respondents have reported this is not always being the case at Bambanani. One group of participants complained about how things have remained the same on the farm despite the acquisition of LRAD shares to co-own the farm. Another group which is mostly comprised by trust members argued that things have changed for the better compared to the period prior to the attainment of these equity shares. In doing so, this group blames the discontent group for the lack of commitment to the project and for being after money over the interest of the project. The discontent group has also complained that the trust is not representing their interests to the management, and whenever they lay complaints there are often threats of expulsion. Apart from the above mentioned conflict of interests amongst Bambanani beneficiaries, positive elements were also discovered where beneficiaries agreed on some areas of dissatisfaction. I have labelled this a Collective Discontent Spectacle. The plight of beneficiaries is caused by the lack of adequate exposure to the business side of the farm’s operation and the lack of delivery on houses which were promised to them by the management as part of the shareholding package. Having considered the Bambanani case and other literature on LRAD, I concluded that LRAD has failed to fulfil empowerment requirements as per Kabeer’s model.

Thesis (MDF)--University of Stellenbosch, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The main purpose of this study was to develop a methodology to evaluate business plans which support governmental grants to emerging farmers in the Winelands area of the Western Cape. The study focuses primarily on two types of emerging farmer groups namely (i) farm equity groups and (ii) individual farmers (less than 10 members per farm). Empowering disadvantaged people is exceedingly complex, therefore it is of paramount importance to compile a detailed and comprehensive business plan based on a proper feasibility study. If a project is not feasible on paper it will rarely succeed in practice. Four LRAD business plans per group were evaluated and have been scored against a contents list, which was compiled from an ideal farm business plan. This was followed up with a questionnaire to evaluate the current situation on the farms and to test the understanding of the business plan and its elements with the beneficiaries. There is a clear distinction in the quality of business plans between the equity scheme land reform models and individual farmer’s business plans. The quality of the equity farmer’s business plan was in most cases around 25 percent better compared to those of the individual farmers. The result of the study shows that there is a direct link between the quality of the business plan and the sustainability of the projects. Lower scored individual farmer projects under review, struggle to stay afloat with a weak cash flow as their main drawback. On the other hand the better scored equity scheme projects are much more sustainable; however more focus needs to be placed on developing the shareholders in the understanding of the financial side and land ownership principals. The author is of the opinion that only feasible projects must receive grant funding and this should be supported by good mentorship policies from government. South Africa can no longer afford “social business plans” in the land reform process; there is a need for sound farm business plans as a very important first step to feasible and sustainable farming ventures. The methodology developed in this study could become a valuable tool for government departments for directly measuring the quality of business plans and thereby indirectly the feasibility of land reform projects. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die hoofdoel van hierdie studie was om 'n metodiek te ontwikkel waarmee plaas besigheidsplanne geёalueer kan word vir die aansoek van skenkings (“grant”) fondse vir opkomende boere in die Kaapse Wynlandarea. Die studie fokus hoofsaaklik op twee tipes groepe, naamlik (i) plaas aandele skema groepe en (ii) individuele boere (minder as 10 lede per plaas). Die bemagtiging van opkomende boere is baie kompleks, daarom is dit baie belangrik om 'n gedetailleerde en omvattende besigheidsplan, gegrond op' n behoorlike ondersoek na die haalbaarheid, daar te stel. As 'n projek op papier nie haalbaar is nie, gaan dit nie sommer suksesvol wees in die praktyk nie. Vier LRAD besigheidsplanne per groep is geëvalueer teen 'n inhoudslys wat vanaf ‘n ideale plaas besigheidsplan saamgestel is. Dit is opgevolg met 'n vraelys om die huidige situasie op die plase te evalueer en die begrip van die besigheidsplan en sy elemente te toets. ‘n Duidelike kwaliteits verskil kan gesien word tussen die aandeel skema boere -en individuele boere se besigheidsplanne. Die gehalte van die aandeel skema boere se planne was in die meeste gevalle ongeveer 25 persent beter as dié van die individuele boere. Die studie kan 'n direkte lyn trek tussen die besigheidsplan inligting en die volhoubaarheid van die projekte. Die individuele boere- projekte onder oorsig sukkel om kop bo water te hou met 'n swak kontantvloei as hulle belangrikste nadeel. Aan die ander kant, is die aandeleskema projekte baie meer volhoubaar, maar meer fokus moet geplaas word op die ontwikkeling van die aandeelhouers se begrip van die finansiële kant van die boerdery asook eienaarskap op die plaas. Die tyd het aangebreek dat slegs haalbare projekte befonds moet word en dat die regering hierdie projekte moet ondersteun met goeie mentorskap beleid. Daar is nie meer plek vir "sosiale besigheids planne" in die Suid-Afrikaanse grondhervormingsproses nie. Goeie werkbare plaas besigheidsplanne is nodig as 'n baie belangrike eerste stap om volhoubare boerdery ondernemings daar te stel. Hierdie studie is 'n waardevolle hulpmiddel in die regering se hand vir die evaluering van besigheidsplanne van grondhervormings projekte.

Thesis (M.Sc. (Environmental Science and Management)--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2008.

Thesis (M.Sc. (Environmental Science and Management)--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2008.

Thesis (M.Sc. (Environmental Science and Management)--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2008.