abstract: The controversy over law enforcement use of TASER devices and the potential for the devices to cause death has proliferated in recent years. In 2005 the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) and International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) published national-level policy guidelines for the use of TASER devices, with one of the goals being to reduce the occurrence of deaths proximal to their use. What remains unknown in regard to these guidelines is whether or not departments that adhere to these guidelines are experiencing fewer TASER-proximate arrest related deaths (ARDs) than departments who are not. This study seeks to determine preliminary answers to this question by conducting a comparison of the policies of departments with three or more TASER-proximate ARDs to a matched sample of police departments that deploy the TASER, but have no (or one to two) TASER-proximate ARDs. The departments were matched on the number of full time sworn officers, geography (region, division, or state), and department type. Once matched, all department policies were coded based on how closely they adhered to the following areas of PERF and IACP guidelines: use of force against vulnerable/at risk populations, policies governing the TASER device deployment, training, reporting, and post-exposure requirements. Study departments, when compared to matched departments, had a greater number of policy areas with higher failure to comply rates. The same was true when looking at the category totals, as well as the overall totals, with the difference in failure to comply rates being larger for PERF than IACP. These findings show an association between departments with three or more TASER-proximate ARDs and higher failure to comply rates with national model policies. Additionally, it appears that many departments are failing to heed research findings or advice from outside their department. Based on this, future research may want to address the ways in which greater compliance with national policies can be obtained nationwide. / Dissertation/Thesis / M.S. Criminology and Criminal Justice 2012

This thesis constitutes one of the first attempts to investigate police use of the electric-shock weapon the Taser in England and Wales, between 2004 – 2014. The research combines an inter-disciplinary approach—drawing on the criminology and policing literature, as well as on Science and Technology Studies (STS), Actor Network Theory (ANT) and Social Psychology—with mixed methods and novel data sources. It benefits from virtually unprecedented access to sources including internal police datasets, the College of Policing’s Lead Instructor Taser Training, Taser training in two forces, interviews with police officers and individuals subject to Taser. The thesis first explores how, and in what circumstances, Taser is used in selected forces in England and Wales, before looking at consequences of use for officers and subjects. It then discusses the broader legal, policy, training and accountability framework around the weapon, via an examination of three inter-related and widespread stories told about the weapon and its regulation: that Taser is a neutral tool, that appropriate use is a responsibility for, and at the discretion of, individual officers, and that it is subject to robust accountability mechanisms. It is argued that these stories, whilst not incorrect, are incomplete. Descriptions of the weapon as a neutral tool are understandable but not always convincing, decisions on its use are not just the preserve of individual officers, and accountability mechanisms are not always as robust as is claimed. The conclusions have implications for practitioners and for the literature on Taser. They also contribute to wider criminology debates around use of force, discretion and accountability, and to sociological debates about the relevance of STS and ANT approaches. Finally, the thesis not only highlights areas for future research, but also highlights some tentative recommendations for policy and practice.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of organizational policy changes within the Use-of-Force Continuum on taser usage and officer's perceptions of taser effectiveness. Tasers have been used by police since the 1970s and their use is increasing as the technology has improved. Data reveals that tasers are beneficial for controlling non-compliant suspects while preventing serious injuries and rarely has their use resulted in death. Much of the public controversy surrounding tasers centers on when and how often officers deploy them. Use of force data from 890 police citizen encounters during a two-year period was analyzed to examine how changes in organizational policy have affected taser deployments and how policy changes have affected taser use. The study's findings support that after the policy change, the frequency of taser use by officers decreased, while the levels of suspect resistance encountered by officers increased. The frequency and severity of suspect injuries did not change and the numbers of officers injured in use-of-force encounters also did not change. Survey response data from officers were compared to archival data, which revealed that while officers perceive an increased risk of harm to themselves as a result of the organizational policy change that was not supported in the findings. Officers did not perceive an increased risk of harm to suspects which was supported in the archival data findings. Officers also expressed a belief that the organizational change that placed the taser at a higher level on the Use-of-Force Continuum is appropriate for most use-of-force encounters. This study concludes with future directions and trends for taser use in law enforcement.

yes / The length of this Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project Report No.7 again reflects the interest related to non-lethal weapons from academics, research institutes, policy makers, the police and the military. A number of reports, particularly concerning the Taser electro-shock weapon, have been published from these sectors since our last BNLWRP Report No.6 in October 2004. Some, such as the Amnesty International (U.S. and Canada) have again raised, and stressed, the concerns about the safety of the weapon and the number of deaths associated with its use. Others, such as the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Human Effects Center of Excellence (HECOE), Human Effectiveness and Risk Characterization of the Electromuscular Incapacitation Device ¿ A Limited Analysis of the TASER. (March 2005) concluded that the Taser was relatively safe, but that further research was needed into potential bio-effects, and for continual development into a safer weapon. Reaction to these reports was mixed. Some US legislators called for limitations on the use of Tasers, more accountability, and the detailed recording of incidents in which they were used.1 Others called for a ban on their use until more testing was carried out regarding their potentially harmful effects. A number of US police forces stopped the use of Taser, slowed down the deployment and ordering of the weapons, reviewed their rules of engagement and reporting, and revisited their operational guidelines. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) published the Electro- Muscular Disruption Technology (EMDT). A Nine-Step Strategy For Effective Deployment. (April 2005) as a response to these growing concerns. Certain elements of the media, especially The Arizona Republic2 and others, took a hostile view of what they considered the scandal of the number of deaths and associated serious injuries caused by the Taser. Taser International challenged allegations that their weapon was directly responsible for these deaths and quoted reports, such as the Madison Police Department report (February 2005), the study by McDaniel, W & Stratbucker, R & Nerheim, M & Brewer, J. Cardiac Safety of Neuromuscular Incapacitating Defensive Devices (January 2005), and the U.K. DOMILL Statement (March 2005) to support their view. The controversy continues. Other than Tasers, there are still few reports of the newer non-lethal technologies actually being deployed in operations. The exception to this is the Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD), which is now in widespread use in Iraq. Little additional information has appeared regarding the `active denial¿ weapon we have described in previous reports.

yes / In the UK at present Taser electrical stun weapons can only be used by trained firearms officers in situations where the use of firearms is also authorised. But the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) is asking for these `non-lethal¿ weapons to be made more widely available to other police officers. If this is agreed there will be significant implications for the use of force by police in the UK. In July 2005 the Home Office Minister, Hazel Blears, had stated that the Taser was a dangerous weapon and not appropriate for wider use. The rationale behind the deployment of `non-lethal¿ or `less-lethal¿ weapons, such as the Taser, is to provide police officers with an alternative to lethal force for dangerous and lifethreatening situations they face. Wider availability of such weapons should, it is argued, further limit the need to resort to lethal firearms and thereby reduce incidence of serious injury and death. Over the past few months senior police officers have issued public statements that the Taser weapon should be made available to all officers on the beat. They argue that because police are facing dangerous individuals on an everyday basis, the Taser is required to protect their officers and deal with violent offenders without having to call in a firearms unit in certain situations. A crucial point about this proposal is that it would represent a scaling up in the `visible¿ arming of police officers in the UK. It is claimed by opponents that such an extended use of Taser would actually result in an increase in the level of force used by police in the UK, a concern also echoed by the Independent Police Complaints Committee (IPCC) in the minute of their 27 April 2005 `Casework and Investigations Committee¿ meeting.

No description available.

yes / Non-lethal weapons (NLWs) are explicitly designed and primarily employed to incapacitate personnel or material whilst minimising collateral damage to property and the environment. Existing NLWs include rubber and plastic bullets, entangling nets, chemical sprays such as OC and CS gas, and electrical stunning devices such as the `Taser¿ gun. New NLWs are on the way, which will include acoustic and microwave weapons, non-lethal landmines, malodorants, and sophisticated weapons developed through rapid advances in neuroscience and the genomics revolution. Most analysts would agree that there is a `legitimate¿ role for non-lethal weapons, both for civil and military applications. However there is considerable disagreement as to the operational effectiveness of NLWs, and the threat such weapons pose to arms conventions and international law. As usual, a balance has to be achieved where the benign advantages of developing and deploying non-lethal weapons are not outweighed by their more malign effects. In particular, emerging non-lethal technologies offer an increasing opportunity for the suppression of civil dissent and control of populations ¿ these are sometimes referred to as the `technologies of political control¿. There is a continuing need for sustained and informed commentary to such developments which highlights the impact and threats that these technologies pose to civil liberties and human rights. Because the last BNLWP Report was produced in August 2001, this edition is somewhat longer than usual so that key developments since then can be highlighted and summarised. Future BNLWRP reports will be published three times a year, and we welcome material to be considered for inclusion.

yes / Two recent detailed reports, by the U.K Northern Ireland Office (NIO) - January 2004 1 and the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) - February 2004 2, provide further insights into current policy and technology developments in the U.K. and U.S. The NIO report is the 4th and final report of a U.K wide Steering Group set up by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in Summer 2000, with the objective: To establish whether a less potentially lethal alternative to baton rounds is available; and to review the public order equipment which is presently available, or could be developed, in order to expand the range of tactical options available to operational commanders. 3 In her foreword to the report Jane Kennedy, Minister of State for Northern Ireland notes that: Despite a protracted and international search for a commercially available product, we have been unable to find anything that meets the criteria of an acceptable, potentially less lethal alternative to the baton round currently in service which provides an effective capability that does not expose officers and the public to greater risk in violent public disorder.4 The NIO Report has sections looking at the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) programme on the development of less lethal technologies (particularly the Attenuating Energy Projectile and the Discriminating Irritant Projectile); commercial off the shelf product evaluations and update (12 Gauge Sock Round Assessment); Water Cannon; the U.K. use of less lethal technologies (with a focus on L21A1 baton rounds, CS sprays and the Taser). The report also contains a section entitled `The Management of Conflict¿ which discusses the dynamics of crowd behaviour. For a critical response to the NIO report see that from Dr. Brian Rappert.5 The CFR report provides a strong endorsement for non-lethal weapons. A key finding states: Wider integration of nonlethal weapons into the U.S. Army and Marine Corps could have reduced damage, saved lives, and helped to limit the widespread looting and sabotage that occurred after the cessation of major conflict in Iraq. Incorporating NLW capabilities into the equipment, training and doctrine of the armed services could substantially improve U.S. effectiveness in conflict, post-conflict, and homeland defense. 6 Interestingly, in describing the nonlethal capability sets (NLCS) which have been deployed in Kosovo and Iraq, and which help to provide a continuum of force between ¿don¿t shoot¿ and ¿shoot¿ 7, the CFR seems to distinguish between NLWs (rubber balls [grenades and shotgun munitions], bean bags, riot shields, Tasers, net entanglers, and caltrops), and equipment such as flash-bang grenades, laser dazzlers, and bullhorns of which it states ¿It is important to note that these are not weapons but non-lethal capabilities¿ 8 The CFR recommends expanded deployment of NLWs in the armed services, longer ranges for non-lethal payloads using precision delivery and fusing systems, and further development of millimetre-wave area-denial system (HPM weapons such as VMADS) and the advanced tactical laser (ATL). The report also argues for the need to have a bigger Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) or a new Non-lethal Joint Program Office (NLJPO) and for Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project (BNLWRP) ¿ Research Report 5 (May 2004) 2 closer links with the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). In the opinion of the authors the JNLWD should also have more access into classified programmes throughout all branches of the armed services so as not to duplicate non-lethal development initiatives. To stimulate incorporation of NLWs throughout the U.S. Armed Services the CFR advocates two approaches: (1) top-down planning in the Defense department and (2) creation of demand for these [NLWs] weapons from the field as personnel gain experience with prototype equipment. 9 They argue there is a need for the top-level military and civilian leadership to be educated about NLW capabilities, not only for warfighting and peacekeeping, but also in `homeland defence in isolating a hot zone in the aftermath of a biological attack' 10. We will be referring again to both the NIO and CFR publications in other sections of this report.