Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / This thesis strives to shed light on the genuine significance of the current transformation of the U.S. foreign and strategic policy. In essence, this thesis concludes that the Bush doctrine of preemption is inconsistent with the American strategic culture and view of the use of force displayed throughout the American foreign policy ever since the Truman administration. Although not a revolution per se in the American goals, the new foreign policy represents a radical change in the manner to pursue them. While promoting a unilateralist foreign policy and revived "warfighting" strategies, the current administration takes old rationales a step further. By elevating preemption from the tactical to strategic level, the doctrine transforms a last resort policy option into a primary offensive strategy with destabilizing consequences for international relations. The analysis concludes that the increased authority of the hard-line approach in the American foreign and security policy is circumstantial, and the likelihood of its endurance is unrealistic. The international system comprises built-in constraints that raise the cost of isolationist and unilateralist impulses to unbearable levels in the long term. These constraints are the end result of the American national values' projection at international level. / Civilian, Romania Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The study is a descriptive analysis using a case-study methodology that identifies the critical elements (methods, tools, processes, personnel, and practices) of adversary analysis identified as a red team and red-teaming. A red team is the adversary element of the analytic method of red-teaming. The study incorporates interview data with organization leadership, subject matter experts, and red-team developers from Department of Defense (DoD), Intelligence Community (IC), and Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDC) organizations. The study also includes red-team governance documents, red-team briefings, and discussions to first identify the concepts, analyze the critical design elements of the concept(s), and develop a fundamental taxonomy or classification of red-team approaches based on these artifacts. The study compares and contrasts four red teams that utilize groups of adversary subject-matter experts for common themes, differences, and best practices. The data collection builds on grounded theory—i.e., identification of the methods, tools, processes, and personnel as the organizations understand and develop their red teams as part of their red-teaming analyses to address gaps in understanding possible adversaries. The four organizations studied are the U.S. Army, Training and Doctrine Command, University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies; a Department of Defense unified combatant command; the U.S. Naval War College (NWC) and its red-team detachment; and a Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Homeland Security and Defense, National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC). Two basic types of red teams are identified from the data with a hybrid between the two among the variations of the red-teaming concept. Some of the other findings from the four red teams include a need to develop common terms and standards; a need to explain the benefits of alternative analysis to decisionmakers; a need to develop trend analyses on types of red teams requested by sponsors; a need to design methods to capture non-state actors; a need to include more coalition and foreign partners; and a need to immerse red teams more fully into the culture to be understood. / Ph. D.

The purpose of the essay has been to analyze if the Swedish Army ground forces, can be looked upon as a learning organization as the doctrines declare. This in the perspective that a working, collective Lessons Learned-process does not exist in the Swedish Army with the possible long term effects of diminishing its war-fighting capabilities. The method is a qualitative text analysis of the recently published report from the Swedish Army Land Warfare Center. The report focuses on tactical experiences from the Swedish ground forces perspective through the years 2009-2012, in the over a decade long Afghanistan-operation. The result indicates that the specified organization, the Army and its ground forces, can be seen as a learning organization but with great flaws. The flaws can be seen in all chosen theoretical disciplines, but are the most palpable in the most important one - the system thinking - which is essential for long term learning. But the analysis also gives some good news. The discipline that embraces the most indications of learning is the personal mastery. The inner strength, will and skill sets of the personnel are striking. The analysis points out that a deep learning exists, specifically on individual and lower levels, but is hindered by the system. Hence, the organization is filled with tacit knowledge. The conclusion is that the war-fighting capabilities might actually have been strengthened, but mainly on individual and low level but not as the organization should have. It lacks a working system for it.

yes / Two recent detailed reports, by the U.K Northern Ireland Office (NIO) - January 2004 1 and the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) - February 2004 2, provide further insights into current policy and technology developments in the U.K. and U.S. The NIO report is the 4th and final report of a U.K wide Steering Group set up by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in Summer 2000, with the objective: To establish whether a less potentially lethal alternative to baton rounds is available; and to review the public order equipment which is presently available, or could be developed, in order to expand the range of tactical options available to operational commanders. 3 In her foreword to the report Jane Kennedy, Minister of State for Northern Ireland notes that: Despite a protracted and international search for a commercially available product, we have been unable to find anything that meets the criteria of an acceptable, potentially less lethal alternative to the baton round currently in service which provides an effective capability that does not expose officers and the public to greater risk in violent public disorder.4 The NIO Report has sections looking at the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) programme on the development of less lethal technologies (particularly the Attenuating Energy Projectile and the Discriminating Irritant Projectile); commercial off the shelf product evaluations and update (12 Gauge Sock Round Assessment); Water Cannon; the U.K. use of less lethal technologies (with a focus on L21A1 baton rounds, CS sprays and the Taser). The report also contains a section entitled `The Management of Conflict¿ which discusses the dynamics of crowd behaviour. For a critical response to the NIO report see that from Dr. Brian Rappert.5 The CFR report provides a strong endorsement for non-lethal weapons. A key finding states: Wider integration of nonlethal weapons into the U.S. Army and Marine Corps could have reduced damage, saved lives, and helped to limit the widespread looting and sabotage that occurred after the cessation of major conflict in Iraq. Incorporating NLW capabilities into the equipment, training and doctrine of the armed services could substantially improve U.S. effectiveness in conflict, post-conflict, and homeland defense. 6 Interestingly, in describing the nonlethal capability sets (NLCS) which have been deployed in Kosovo and Iraq, and which help to provide a continuum of force between ¿don¿t shoot¿ and ¿shoot¿ 7, the CFR seems to distinguish between NLWs (rubber balls [grenades and shotgun munitions], bean bags, riot shields, Tasers, net entanglers, and caltrops), and equipment such as flash-bang grenades, laser dazzlers, and bullhorns of which it states ¿It is important to note that these are not weapons but non-lethal capabilities¿ 8 The CFR recommends expanded deployment of NLWs in the armed services, longer ranges for non-lethal payloads using precision delivery and fusing systems, and further development of millimetre-wave area-denial system (HPM weapons such as VMADS) and the advanced tactical laser (ATL). The report also argues for the need to have a bigger Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) or a new Non-lethal Joint Program Office (NLJPO) and for Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project (BNLWRP) ¿ Research Report 5 (May 2004) 2 closer links with the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). In the opinion of the authors the JNLWD should also have more access into classified programmes throughout all branches of the armed services so as not to duplicate non-lethal development initiatives. To stimulate incorporation of NLWs throughout the U.S. Armed Services the CFR advocates two approaches: (1) top-down planning in the Defense department and (2) creation of demand for these [NLWs] weapons from the field as personnel gain experience with prototype equipment. 9 They argue there is a need for the top-level military and civilian leadership to be educated about NLW capabilities, not only for warfighting and peacekeeping, but also in `homeland defence in isolating a hot zone in the aftermath of a biological attack' 10. We will be referring again to both the NIO and CFR publications in other sections of this report.