The study is a descriptive analysis using a case-study methodology that identifies the critical elements (methods, tools, processes, personnel, and practices) of adversary analysis identified as a red team and red-teaming. A red team is the adversary element of the analytic method of red-teaming. The study incorporates interview data with organization leadership, subject matter experts, and red-team developers from Department of Defense (DoD), Intelligence Community (IC), and Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDC) organizations. The study also includes red-team governance documents, red-team briefings, and discussions to first identify the concepts, analyze the critical design elements of the concept(s), and develop a fundamental taxonomy or classification of red-team approaches based on these artifacts. The study compares and contrasts four red teams that utilize groups of adversary subject-matter experts for common themes, differences, and best practices. The data collection builds on grounded theory—i.e., identification of the methods, tools, processes, and personnel as the organizations understand and develop their red teams as part of their red-teaming analyses to address gaps in understanding possible adversaries. The four organizations studied are the U.S. Army, Training and Doctrine Command, University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies; a Department of Defense unified combatant command; the U.S. Naval War College (NWC) and its red-team detachment; and a Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Homeland Security and Defense, National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC). Two basic types of red teams are identified from the data with a hybrid between the two among the variations of the red-teaming concept. Some of the other findings from the four red teams include a need to develop common terms and standards; a need to explain the benefits of alternative analysis to decisionmakers; a need to develop trend analyses on types of red teams requested by sponsors; a need to design methods to capture non-state actors; a need to include more coalition and foreign partners; and a need to immerse red teams more fully into the culture to be understood. / Ph. D.

兩岸在經歷數十年的和平演變之後，中共亦經歷數代領導人的軍事謀略轉化，為何中共會選擇在九五、九六年進行一連串的軍事演習與軍事事務革新動作？除了直接的政治目的之外，亦必有其內部的黨、政、軍之運作與領導人直接的軍事謀略思維有相當程度的互動與角力。若是單單從武器裝備的比較並不能看清中共對台軍演的目的，單從國際政治的角度也不易探求中共內部利益衝突的真相。 本論文先從謀略、軍事謀略及中共軍事謀略的基本認知和概念著手，進而與中共軍事演習的關係做一整理與分類，找出其間相互依存的關係，進而從較為宏觀的角度出發，依照本論文所發現之LIAR理論，從領導統御（Leadership）、智庫系統(Intelligence)、國家利益與安全觀(Aspect of Nation Security)、資源(Resources)等四個面向進行整理，從中外學者各項文獻的統整開始，到本人的觀察與心得作一綜整，探求中共軍事謀略的演變與內涵，以期為國內相關研究提供有益的貢獻。