NY, Columbia Univ., Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Diss.--New York, 2004. / Kopie, ersch. im Verl. UMI, Ann Arbor, Mich.

[pt] Este trabalho estuda o problema de um regulador que enfrenta um monopolista sem observar seus custos. Diferente de estudos anteriores, deixamos o pressuposto forte de que o regulador conhece a verdadeira distribuição de probabilidade de custos do monopolista. Em vez disso, vamos supor que o regulador tém uma distribuição prior e sua incerteza é representada pelo conjunto de distribuições mean preserving spread da sua prior. Regulador é avesso a incerteza, ou seja, ele maximiza o bem-estar social esperado sob a pior distribuição neste conjunto. Regulação ótima depende do estado da natureza e garante que o bem-estar social esperado não é afetado pela incerteza do regulador. Regulador não pode dar incentivos tão forte como os dados quando a distribuição é conhecida, o que significa que a robustez reduz o poder dos contratos. / [en] This work studies the problem of a regulator who faces a monopolist with unknown costs. Different to previous studies, we depart from the strong assumption that regulator knows the true probability distribution of monopolist costs. Instead, we assume that regulator holds a prior distribution and his uncertainty is represented by the set of mean preserving spread distributions of this prior. Regulator is uncertainty averse, i.e., he maximizes expected social welfare under the worst distribution in this set. Optimal regulation is state dependent and guarantees that expected social welfare is not affected by regulator uncertainty. Regulator can not give such strong incentive as those given when distribution is known, which means that concern for robustness reduces the power of contracts.

Submitted by Fernando Antônio de Barros Júnior (fernando.junior@fgvmail.br) on 2014-03-17T14:31:41Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_final.pdf: 416302 bytes, checksum: 42bb00304953a814c57d6ada5116013d (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by ÁUREA CORRÊA DA FONSECA CORRÊA DA FONSECA (aurea.fonseca@fgv.br) on 2014-04-04T19:26:45Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_final.pdf: 416302 bytes, checksum: 42bb00304953a814c57d6ada5116013d (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Maria Almeida (maria.socorro@fgv.br) on 2014-04-09T14:53:57Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_final.pdf: 416302 bytes, checksum: 42bb00304953a814c57d6ada5116013d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-04-09T14:54:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_final.pdf: 416302 bytes, checksum: 42bb00304953a814c57d6ada5116013d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-03-12 / I study optima in a random-matching model of outside money. The examples in this paper show a conflict between private and collective interests. While the planner worry about the extensive and intensive margin effects of trades in a steady state, people want the exhaust the gains from trades immediately, i.e., once in a meeting, consumers prefer spend more for a better output than take the risk of saving money and wait for good meetings in the future. Thus, the conflict can force the planner to choose allocations with a more disperse money distribution, mainly if people are im- patient. When the patient rate is low enough, the planner uses a expansionary policy to generate a better distribution of money for future trades.

abstract: Agricultural supply chains are complex systems which pose significant challenges beyond those of traditional supply chains. These challenges include: long lead times, stochastic yields, short shelf lives and a highly distributed supply base. This complexity makes coordination critical to prevent food waste and other inefficiencies. Yet, supply chains of fresh produce suffer from high levels of food waste; moreover, their high fragmentation places a great economic burden on small and medium sized farms. This research develops planning tools tailored to the production/consolidation level in the supply chain, taking the perspective of an agricultural cooperative—a business model which presents unique coordination challenges. These institutions are prone to internal conflict brought about by strategic behavior, internal competition and the distributed nature of production information, which members keep private. A mechanism is designed to coordinate agricultural production in a distributed manner with asymmetrically distributed information. Coordination is achieved by varying the prices of goods in an auction like format and allowing participants to choose their supply quantities; the auction terminates when production commitments match desired supply. In order to prevent participants from misrepresenting their information, strategic bidding is formulated from the farmer’s perspective as an optimization problem; thereafter, optimal bidding strategies are formulated to refine the structure of the coordination mechanism in order to minimize the negative impact of strategic bidding. The coordination mechanism is shown to be robust against strategic behavior and to provide solutions with a small optimality gap. Additional information and managerial insights are obtained from bidding data collected throughout the mechanism. It is shown that, through hierarchical clustering, farmers can be effectively classified according to their cost structures. Finally, considerations of stochastic yields as they pertain to coordination are addressed. Here, the farmer’s decision of how much to plant in order to meet contracted supply is modeled as a newsvendor with stochastic yields; furthermore, options contracts are made available to the farmer as tools for enhancing coordination. It is shown that the use of option contracts reduces the gap between expected harvest quantities and the contracted supply, thus facilitating coordination. / Dissertation/Thesis / Dissertation Appendices A-M / Doctoral Dissertation Industrial Engineering 2015

Submitted by Caio Teles (caio_act@hotmail.com) on 2013-09-26T18:52:08Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Caio.pdf: 249330 bytes, checksum: a3aa165cfa955b84e1621a3c404da19c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Janete de Oliveira Feitosa (janete.feitosa@fgv.br) on 2013-09-27T13:32:40Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Caio.pdf: 249330 bytes, checksum: a3aa165cfa955b84e1621a3c404da19c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2013-09-30T12:55:22Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Caio.pdf: 249330 bytes, checksum: a3aa165cfa955b84e1621a3c404da19c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-09-30T12:55:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Caio.pdf: 249330 bytes, checksum: a3aa165cfa955b84e1621a3c404da19c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-06-28 / This paper analyzes the distribution of money holdings in a commo dity money search-based mo del with intermediation. Intro ducing heterogeneity of costs to the Kiyotaki e Wright ( 1989 ) mo del, Cavalcanti e Puzzello ( 2010) gives rise to a non-degenerated distribution of money. We extend further this mo del intro ducing intermediation in the trading pro cess. We show that the distribution of money matters for savings decisions. This gives rises to a xed p oint problem for the saving function that di cults nding the optimal solution. Through some examples, we show that this friction shrinks the distribution of money. In contrast to the Cavalcanti e Puzzello ( 2010 ) mo del, the optimal solution may not present the entire surplus going to the consumer. At the end of the pap er, we present a strong result, for a su cient large numb er of intermediaries the distribution of money is degenerated.

The combination or integration of locomotion modes, is analyzed through the design, development, and verification of a miniature integrated jumping and gliding robot, the MultiMo-Bat, which is inspired by the locomotion strategies of vampire bats, locusts, and pelicans. This robot has a mass of between 100 and 162 grams and exhibits high jumping and gliding performance, reaching heights of over 4.5 meters, to overcome obstacles in the environment. Integration results in a smaller, lighter robot with high cooperation between the modes. This thesis presents a previously unstudied robot design concept and highlights the understudied evolutionary concept within organism mobility of integration of locomotion modes. High performance locomotion modes also require high energy density actuators. To this end, a design methodology is developed for tailoring magnetic springs to the characteristics of shape memory alloy-actuated mechanisms, which allow the MultiMo-Bat to reach jumping heights of 3.5 m with active wing deployment and full controller. Through a combinations of permanent magnets, a magnetic spring can be customized to desired characteristics; theoretically any welldefined function of force vs. displacement can be created. The methodology is not limited to SMA but can be adapted to any smart actuator, joint, or situation which requires a fixed complex force-displacement relationship with extension other interactions and magnetic field design. Robotic locomotion is also much more idealized than that of their biological counter parts. This thesis serves to highlight just how non-ideal, yet robust, biological locomotion can inspire concepts for enhancing the robustness of robot locomotion. We studied the desert locust (Schistocerca gregaria), which is adapted for jumping at the extreme limits of its surface friction, as evident by its morphological adaptations for not only jumping, but slipping. Analysis of both foot morphology and jumping behavior are used to understand how the feet interact with different surfaces, including hydrophobic glass, hydrophilic glass, wood, sandstone, and mesh. The results demonstrate a complex interplay of embodied mechanical intelligence, allowing the foot to interact and adapt passively to different surfaces without burdening the organism with additional tasks. The key morphological and dynamical features are extracted to create a concept for developing multi-Surface Locust Inspired Passively-adaptable (SLIP) feet. A simple interpretation of the concepts are then used to construct a SLIP foot for the MultiMo-Bat. These feet allow the MultiMo-Bat to reach jumping heights of well over 4 m, greater than any other electrically powered robot, and this is achieved on a 45 degree angled surface while slipping. The SLIP foot concept can be directly applied to a wide range of robot size scales, thus enhancing their dynamic terrestrial locomotion on variable surfaces.

One important issue in mechanism design theory is to model agents’ behaviors under uncertainty. The classical approach assumes that agents hold commonly known probability assessments towards uncertainty, which has been challenged by economists in many fields. My thesis adopts alternative methods to model agents’ behaviors. The new findings contribute to understanding how the mechanism designer can benefit from agents’ uncertainty aversion and how she should respond to the lack of information on agents’ probability assessments. Chapter 1 of this thesis allows the mechanism designer to introduce ambiguity to the mechanism. Instead of informing agents of the precise payment rule that she commits to, the mechanism designer can tell agents multiple payment rules that she may have committed to. The multiple payment rules are called ambiguous transfers. As agents do not know which rule is chosen by the designer, they are assumed to make decisions based on the worst-case scenario. Under this assumption, this chapter characterizes when the mechanism designer can obtain the first-best outcomes by introducing ambiguous transfers. Compared to the standard approach where the payment rule is unambiguous, first-best mechanism design becomes possible under a broader information structure. Hence, there are cases when the mechanism designer can benefit from introducing ambiguity. Chapter 2 assumes that the mechanism designer does not know agents’ probability assessments about others’ private information. The mechanisms designed to implement the social choice function thus should not depend on the probability assessments, which are called robust mechanisms. Different from the existing robust mechanism design literature where agents are always assumed to act non-cooperatively, this chapter allows them to communicate and form coalitions. This chapter provides necessary and almost sufficient conditions for robustly implementing a social choice function as an equilibrium that is immune to all coalitional deviations. As there are social choice functions that are only implementable with coalitional structures, this chapter provides insights on when agents should be allowed to communicate. As an extension, when the mechanism designer has no information on which coalitions can be formed, this chapter also provides conditions for robust implementation under all coalition patterns. Chapter 3 assumes that agents are not probabilistic about others’ private information. Instead, when they hold ambiguous assessments about others’ information, they make decisions based on the worst-case belief. This chapter provides necessary and almost sufficient conditions on when a social choice goal is implementable under such a behavioral assumption. As there are social choice goals that are only implementable under ambiguous assessments, this chapter provides insights on what information structure is desirable to the mechanism designer.

Thesis advisor: Utku Unver / My doctoral research focuses on the matching theory and its market design application. Specifically, I work on matching with property rights, where property rights not only mean the ownership, but also refer to the ability to determine how the good is used. In the matching with property rights model, an agent who owns a resource can claim how her resource is offered, depending on what she gets from the system. For example, in a housing exchange for vacation, an agent who gets a house with a car will offer her house also with a car. However, if she is assigned only a house without a car, she might refuse to offer a car. This restriction can be thought as a matching with externality, as someone's consuming my resource in certain way affects my utility. With property rights present, it is not clear how we can achieve a desirable outcome while satisfying the rights. I am currently pursuing two main lines of research in this topic that constitute the two chapters dissertation. In Matching with Property Rights: an Application to a Parking Space Assignment Problem, I introduce parking in urban areas as a matching problem. First, I model the street-parking market as a strategic game and show that the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes is equivalent to the set of stable allocations. However, it is not reasonable to expect drivers to reach a Nash equilibrium in the decentralized system due to lack of information and coordination failure. Therefore, I suggest a centralized mechanism that would enable a parking authority to assign available spaces to drivers in a stable way. The model incorporates resident parking spaces, such that visitors could access vacant resident spaces. To use the resident parking spaces, the system needs to protect exclusive property rights over their parking spaces. I show that, however, there is no mechanism that is stable and protects residents' rights. To resolve this issue, I introduce a new concept, a claim contract, and suggest a mechanism that protects property rights, is strategy proof for the drivers, and approximates a stable matching. Besides its market-design focus, this paper handles both priority-based and property right-based assignment, which considered separately in the matching theory literature. In Housing Market with Contracts, I study matching with property rights problem in the housing market framework. To introduce property rights in housing market, I assume the house can be offered in two contractual terms. Property rights requires that when an agent gets a house in a certain term, her house should also be offered as the same term. Moreover, when every agent owns a house, property rights reduces to an equal-term matching. After defining efficiency and core in equal-term domain, I show that, in a housing market with contracts problem, core may be empty. However, there always exists an efficient, individually rational, and equal-term matching in every housing market with contracts problem. Then I present a mechanism that always produces an efficient, individually rational, and equal-term matching. This is the first attempt to model a matching with contract in a exchange economy. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2018. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics.

We discuss a model of a virtual power plant (VPP) that provides market access to privately-owned distributed generations (DGs). The VPP serves passive loads, processes bids from generators, and trades in the wholesale market. The generators can be renewable or thermal, and they act strategically to maximize their own profit. The VPP establishes the rules of the internal market to minimize the cost of energy and the cost of balancing while ensuring generator participation and load balancing. We derive a heuristic mechanism for internal market and propose a dynamic programming approach for minimizing the VPP cost. We present illustrative simulations for both single and multistage market bidding and then compare the resulting performance to the centralized VPP model, where the DGs are assumed to be owned by the VPP. We show that the proposed design incentivizes the DG agents to behave the same as in the centralized case, but the optimal cost paid by VPP is higher due to the payments to the DG owners.

This thesis presents three chapters. In Chapter 1, I propose a simple one-to-one matching model, where individuals on one side have private information that affects the preferences of the individuals on the other side. I show the existence of the stable and strategy-proof mechanism in this environment. I present an algorithm that defines this mechanism - the Serial Dictatorship algorithm with cutoffs. I also consider the concept of obvious strategy-proofness. I first consider the case where only preferences, but not experience levels, are sellers' private information. For this case, Serial Dictatorship with cutoffs elicits preferences in an obviously strategy-proof way. On the other hand, when only experience levels, but not preferences are private information, I show that there is no obviously strategy-proof and stable mechanism. A consequence of the latter result is that obvious strategy-proofness is incompatible with stability. Chapter 2 considers settings with rich private information - an agent's type may include private information other than just his preferences. In such settings, I identify a necessary condition for obviously strategy-proof implementation of social choice rules. I consider applications to strict preferences, matching and object allocation. The main assumption behind the obvious dominance is that agents might be cognitively limited and can not engage in contingent reasoning at all. This assumption is unreasonably weak compared to the standard assumption that agents can perfectly distinguish contingencies. In Chapter 3, I strengthen it slightly by assuming that agents are able to do at least some contingent reasoning. I define what it means for the strategy to be obviously dominant with respect to a partition of the state space. I call such strategies partition dominant strategies. A strategy is an almost obviously dominant if, for all possible partitions, but not for the coarsest, it can be identified as being partition dominant. My hypothesis is that even though some agents can not do state-by-state reasoning as rational players do, they are able to do at least some partitioning of the other player’s actions and regardless of how the partitioning is done, the agents can identify an almost obviously dominant strategy.