Submitted by Caio Teles (caio_act@hotmail.com) on 2013-09-26T18:52:08Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Caio.pdf: 249330 bytes, checksum: a3aa165cfa955b84e1621a3c404da19c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Janete de Oliveira Feitosa (janete.feitosa@fgv.br) on 2013-09-27T13:32:40Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Caio.pdf: 249330 bytes, checksum: a3aa165cfa955b84e1621a3c404da19c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2013-09-30T12:55:22Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Caio.pdf: 249330 bytes, checksum: a3aa165cfa955b84e1621a3c404da19c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-09-30T12:55:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Caio.pdf: 249330 bytes, checksum: a3aa165cfa955b84e1621a3c404da19c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-06-28 / This paper analyzes the distribution of money holdings in a commo dity money search-based mo del with intermediation. Intro ducing heterogeneity of costs to the Kiyotaki e Wright ( 1989 ) mo del, Cavalcanti e Puzzello ( 2010) gives rise to a non-degenerated distribution of money. We extend further this mo del intro ducing intermediation in the trading pro cess. We show that the distribution of money matters for savings decisions. This gives rises to a xed p oint problem for the saving function that di cults nding the optimal solution. Through some examples, we show that this friction shrinks the distribution of money. In contrast to the Cavalcanti e Puzzello ( 2010 ) mo del, the optimal solution may not present the entire surplus going to the consumer. At the end of the pap er, we present a strong result, for a su cient large numb er of intermediaries the distribution of money is degenerated.

Submitted by Cristiane Oliveira (cristiane.oliveira@fgv.br) on 2011-06-10T21:14:05Z No. of bitstreams: 1 61080200033.pdf: 1142896 bytes, checksum: d68a7268291f8dffb69301ecf4ccbc46 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Vera Lúcia Mourão(vera.mourao@fgv.br) on 2011-06-10T21:15:07Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 61080200033.pdf: 1142896 bytes, checksum: d68a7268291f8dffb69301ecf4ccbc46 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Vera Lúcia Mourão(vera.mourao@fgv.br) on 2011-06-10T21:16:20Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 61080200033.pdf: 1142896 bytes, checksum: d68a7268291f8dffb69301ecf4ccbc46 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2011-06-10T21:36:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 61080200033.pdf: 1142896 bytes, checksum: d68a7268291f8dffb69301ecf4ccbc46 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-02-02 / This paper paper analyzes the applicability of civil liability regimes to compensate investors for damages arising from violations of the lead underwriter of initial public offering. The accountability of this agent is based on the duty to act with high standards of care to: (i) ensure the quality of information, (ii) disclose information in a manner that allows the investor make an informed decision, and (iii) act in accordance with the principle of good faith. For this, we studied the regimes of liability subjective, based on the wrongful conduct of the lead underwriter, and strict liability based on the Consumer Protection Code and the risk of financial intermediation activity in public offerings. It is intended to eventually identify the most appropriate regime for compensate the investors damages. / O presente trabalho analisa a aplicabilidade dos regimes de responsabilidade civil para indenizar os investidores por danos decorrentes de infrações do coordenador líder de oferta pública de ações. A responsabilização desse agente tem por base o dever de agir com elevado padrão de diligência para: (i) assegurar a qualidade das informações; (ii) divulgar informações de forma que permita o investidor tomar uma decisão fundamentada; e (iii) atuar em conformidade com o princípio da boa-fé. Para tanto, serão estudados os regimes de responsabilidade civil subjetiva, fundado na conduta culposa do coordenador líder, e de responsabilidade objetiva, com base no Código de Defesa do Consumidor e no risco da atividade de intermediação financeira em ofertas públicas de ações. Pretende-se, por fim, identificar o regime mais apropriado para a reparação de danos dos investidores.