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This thesis is a case study of the Solidarity Coalition, a social protest movement which united labour and community groups In opposition to right-wing restraint legislation. It considers why this unprecedented extra parliamentary force failed to persuade the government to withdraw the offending legislation and attempts to explain the dominance of the labour agenda in the modest successes it did achieve. Interviews with participants in the Coalition and other significant political actors provide the information used in the analysis of this protest phenomena. The thesis incorporates a detailed study of the evolution of the Coalition and its organizational structure and Internal processes within the context of the larger political system and with reference to theoretical literature concerning protest movements. I argue that the emergence of the Coalition as a diverse and broad based movement in reaction to a right wing attack on the social contract is predictable, however, the outcomes of the protest action are less so. Analysis of the Coalition suggests that organizational contradictions within its structure, external and unforseen circumstances, and the strength of government intransigence were influential factors shaping both the development of the protest movement and the outcomes of its actions. The commitment to common cause, fuelled by moral outrage and espoused by labour and community groups, was not sufficient to withstand the divisive tendencies inherent in the structure of the Coalition, or the Inertia that must be overcome by large groups to achieve collective goods. Labour proved to be the more powerful actor within the Coalition due to its financial and organizational resources and its significant noticeabilIty factor as a member of the CoalItion. I argue that consistent with the theory of the logic of collective action that the labour agenda eventually dominated within the Coalition, influencing the parameters of the settlement achieved, and in part, accounting for the failure of the Coalition to meet Its collective goal of withdrawal of the restraint legislation. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

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O primeiro presidente eleito diretamente após a promulgação da Constituição de 1988 lidou com uma série de informações institucionais novas, muitas das quais fundamentais para o processo de modificação do status quo com base no que se convencionou chamar de presidencialismo de coalizão. Partindo deste contexto político-institucional, o presente estudo tem por objetivo demonstrar a existência da ineficiência na absorção deste novo conjunto de informações, capaz de desviar as ações estratégicas dos atores racionais do que seria esperado em equilíbrio, durante o processo de formação de coalizões. Mobilizada em conjunto à literatura mais recente sobre o sistema político brasileiro, a hipótese da ineficiência informacional passa a ser uma explicação alternativa para os níveis relativamente mais baixos de coordenação política verificados durante o governo Collor (1990-92), o qual incorporou parte do modus operandi do sistema político brasileiro dali em diante, mas com diferenças marcantes na compatibilização dos poderes legislativos da presidência com o da maioria no legislativo, bem como na gestão do governo da coalizão. As evidências iniciais aqui apresentadas corroboram a existência da ineficiência informacional no processo de formação das diferentes coalizões dentro de uma mesma presidência, mas contingentes à qualidade dos modelos existentes para predizer seu resultado de equilíbrio, quando a hipótese da ineficiência é testada de uma presidência para a outra. / The first Brazilian President elected directly after the promulgation of the Constitution of 1988 has dealt with a series of new institutional information, many of which are fundamental to the process of modifying the status quo, based on the so-called coalition presidentialism. Given this political and institutional context, the present study aims to show the existence of inefficiency in the absorption of this new set of information, which led to different strategic actions by the rational actors than the results expected in equilibrium, during the process of forming coalitions. When jointly mobilized with explanations about Brazilian political system, the informational inefficiency hypothesis turns out as a reasonable explanation for the relatively lower levels of political coordination verified during Collors mandate as President (1990-92). By lacking important aspects of the Brazilian politics modus operandi, his government was unable to promote the compatibility of legislative powers of the Presidency and legislative majority as well as in important aspects of coalition Government management. The initial evidence presented here confirms the existence of the informational inefficiency in the making of different coalitions within the same Presidency, but has little to say about the inefficiency hypothesis when considering the passage from a Presidency to the next one, given the poor quality of existing models to determine equilibrium conditions in government making.

O primeiro presidente eleito diretamente após a promulgação da Constituição de 1988 lidou com uma série de informações institucionais novas, muitas das quais fundamentais para o processo de modificação do status quo com base no que se convencionou chamar de presidencialismo de coalizão. Partindo deste contexto político-institucional, o presente estudo tem por objetivo demonstrar a existência da ineficiência na absorção deste novo conjunto de informações, capaz de desviar as ações estratégicas dos atores racionais do que seria esperado em equilíbrio, durante o processo de formação de coalizões. Mobilizada em conjunto à literatura mais recente sobre o sistema político brasileiro, a hipótese da ineficiência informacional passa a ser uma explicação alternativa para os níveis relativamente mais baixos de coordenação política verificados durante o governo Collor (1990-92), o qual incorporou parte do modus operandi do sistema político brasileiro dali em diante, mas com diferenças marcantes na compatibilização dos poderes legislativos da presidência com o da maioria no legislativo, bem como na gestão do governo da coalizão. As evidências iniciais aqui apresentadas corroboram a existência da ineficiência informacional no processo de formação das diferentes coalizões dentro de uma mesma presidência, mas contingentes à qualidade dos modelos existentes para predizer seu resultado de equilíbrio, quando a hipótese da ineficiência é testada de uma presidência para a outra. / The first Brazilian President elected directly after the promulgation of the Constitution of 1988 has dealt with a series of new institutional information, many of which are fundamental to the process of modifying the status quo, based on the so-called coalition presidentialism. Given this political and institutional context, the present study aims to show the existence of inefficiency in the absorption of this new set of information, which led to different strategic actions by the rational actors than the results expected in equilibrium, during the process of forming coalitions. When jointly mobilized with explanations about Brazilian political system, the informational inefficiency hypothesis turns out as a reasonable explanation for the relatively lower levels of political coordination verified during Collors mandate as President (1990-92). By lacking important aspects of the Brazilian politics modus operandi, his government was unable to promote the compatibility of legislative powers of the Presidency and legislative majority as well as in important aspects of coalition Government management. The initial evidence presented here confirms the existence of the informational inefficiency in the making of different coalitions within the same Presidency, but has little to say about the inefficiency hypothesis when considering the passage from a Presidency to the next one, given the poor quality of existing models to determine equilibrium conditions in government making.

Dans cette thèse, nous avons étudié quelques problèmes qui émergent des interactions entre la théorie des jeux et la théorie des treillis. Nous avons introduit la nouvelle notion de jeu multicritère avec interactions entre critères et proposé comme solution pour ces jeux le concept d'équilibre de Choquet-Nash. Nous avons aussi étudié le calcul de la valeur de Shapley d'un jeu coopératif sur un treillis. Plusieurs algorithmes ont été proposés. Un cas polynomial a été mis en exergue : celui des jeux de graphe pondéré sur un produit de chaînes. Nous avons également introduit le modèle de jeu coopératif sur un ordre colore. / In this thesis, we have studied some problems that emerge from the interactions between game theory and lattice theory. We introduced the new notion of multi-criteria game with interactions between criteria and proposed as a solution for these games the concept of Choquet-Nash equilibrium. We studied the computation of the Shapley value of a cooperative game on a lattice. Several algorithms have been proposed for this purpose. A polynomial case was highlighted : that of weighted graph games on a product of chains. We have also introduced the notion of a cooperative game on a set-coloured poset.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2007. / Title from first page of PDF file (viewed June 21, 2007). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 172-183).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2004. / Document formatted into pages; contains 269 p. Includes bibliographical references. Abstract available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center; full text release delayed at author's request until 2009 June 1.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1970. / Typescript. Vita. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

The establishment of coalition governments by international accords as a means to end internationalized civil wars has not been sufficiently analyzed to date. At this time, this process is of particular importance since it has been proposed as a mechanism to end the internationalized war in Vietnam and Indochina. The purpose of this study is to examine whether, in fact, the establishment of a coalition government in South Vietnam is a likely possibility for the near future. The method used to consider this problem was to first isolate a group of general factors which appear supportive of the establishment of coalition governments by international accords utilizing the case studies of Cyprus and Laos. This list of factors also includes those factors which appear necessary for the successful operation of a coalition government. Thus Chapter I is devoted to a description of the factors which appeared pertinent to the establishment of the coalitions in Cyprus and Laos, and the development of a set of what the author has termed "coalition criteria." Chapter II then examines the particular internal and international environments surrounding the case of South Vietnam. The internal environment is described in terms of the division of forces in South Vietnam into major sociopolitical groups and the types of emerging relationships amongst these forces. The implications of the Vietnamese concept of coalition and accommodation are also considered. The international environment is analyzed in terms of the policies of the major external parties involved in Vietnam, and the effect of the changing relationships between the US and China and the US and Russia. The final chapter of this study examines the major factors impinging on the establishment of a coalition government in South Vietnam in terms of the general factors established in Chapter I as relevant to the creation of coalition governments by international accords, and the particularities of the South Vietnamese case discussed in Chapter II. The conclusion of the author is that the establishment of some form of coalition government in South Vietnam by international accords is a likely possibility and that such a coalition could be a satisfactory, though probably temporary, solution for ending the armed conflict in Indochina. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate