Orientador: Prof. Dr. Daniel Pansarelli / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal do ABC, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciências Humanas e Sociais, 2017. / Em linhas gerais, pode-se afirmar que, em Heidegger, é a reflexão ontológica que se assume, enquanto essencialmente histórica e filosófica, ao passo que, para Dussel, antigo estudioso da obra heideggeriana, é a investigação essencialmente antropológica que se assume, enquanto histórica e filosófica. Trata-se de uma crítica hermenêutica, baseada numa leitura heideggeriana da filosofia proposta por Enrique Dussel, em que analisamos dois conceitos filosóficos: Mitsein (ser-com) do filósofo Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) e Alteridade, do filósofo Enrique Dussel (1934). A partir deste recorte, temos por objetivo central um debate sobre a possibilidade, ou condição do conceito da Alteridade, enquanto possível derivado do conceito de Mitsein, sendo este conceito, no limite, designado como condição muito mais ampla, a saber, a ontológica. Esta evidência não diminuirá a proposta dusseliana, mas apenas apresentará nossas reservas, quando verificamos Heidegger, classificado como um filósofo da totalidade. / In general terms, it is possible to state that, in Heidegger, it is the ontological reflection that assumes itself as essentially historical and philosophical, whereas, for Dussel, an ancient expert on Heidegger¿s work, it is the investigation essentially anthropological that assumes itself as historical and philosophical. It is a hermeneutic criticism, based on a heideggerian reading of the philosophy proposed by Enrique Dussel, in which we analyze two philosophical concepts: Mitsein (being-with) proposed by the philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and Otherness, by the philosopher Enrique Dussel (1934). From this perspective, we have as our main goal the debate about the possibility or condition of Otherness as a possible derivative from the Mitsein concept, regarding this concept on the threshold, designated to a broader condition, to be known, the ontological. This evidence will not reduce the dusselian propose, but it will only present our reserves when we verify Heidegger classified as a philosopher of the totality.

This essay aims to shed light upon the philosophical dignity of Edith Stein’s critique of the early Heideggerian conception of sociality in her text ”Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie”, from 1936. I will argue that Stein’s critique of Heidegger’s concept of sociality comes to be substantiated through her existential-philosophical approach to his understanding of the transcendent character of Dasein. By objecting to Heidegger’s definition of Dasein as ecstatic temporality, Stein points out his inattentiveness to authentic otherness in Being and Time, which reaches out into a problem surrounding Mitsein. I will further demonstrate how Stein, by ascribing to Dasein an enduring and sustaining quality in the midst of ecstasy, uses Heidegger’s concept of Dasein in order to formulate her own social ontology.

This essay tries to find a possible way for us to deal with the questions concerning climate change by looking into an alternative conception of being. One can speak of the ongoing climate change as a crisis that concerns all of human kind and all beings on earth, but how can we fight it together? The situation demands us to re-think how we humans exist together and among other beings. Despite that the situation calls for instant and radical action, we seem unwilling to do enough. We get stuck on questions about who should take action: is it the politicians or each one alone, or is there something in between? By looking more deeply into the concept of Mitsein as Martin Heidegger depicts it in Being and Time, Jean-Luc Nancy brings to light a possible way past the problematic thought of Heidegger. Nancy shows us in Being Singular Plural that Heideggers exposition on Mitsein is a mere sketch when considering the full potential of the concept. By determining Mitsein as being fundamentally-ontologically originary and anterior to the individuation of Dasein, Nancy opens up a whole new field of thought. According to Nancy, the existential analytic has to begin with something like a ”co-existential analytic”, which will draw the lines for how we exist being-with. With a concept like being singular plural and his way of conceptualizing meaning, Nancy might give us some possible tools to cope with our situation today. Nancys actuality is confirmed by the ecological philosopher Mick Smith, who emphasizes the demand for a new approach towards nature and what it means to be. Smith adds to the essay a glimpse of an emerging philosophical discourse about the thought of an ecological community, where the concept of being singular plural could possibly play a central part.