Assertions about metaphysical modality (hereafter modality) play central roles in philosophical theorizing. For example, when philosophers propose hypothetical counterexamples, they often are making a claim to the effect that some state of affairs is possible. Getting the epistemology of modality right is thus important. Debates have been preoccupied with assessing whether imaginability—or conceivability, insofar as it's different—is a guide to possibility, or whether it is rather intuitions of possibility—and modal intuitions more generally—that are evidence for possibility (modal) claims. The dissertation argues that the imagination plays a subtler role than the first view recognizes, and a more central one than the second view does. In particular, it defends an epistemology of metaphysical modality on which someone can acquire modal knowledge in virtue of having performed certain complex imaginative exercises.

abstract: The current study investigated how multimedia pacing (learner-control versus system-paced) and presentation styles (visual-only versus audio/visual) impact learning physics concept material, mental effort, and self-efficacy. This 2X2 factorial study randomly assigned participants into one of four conditions that manipulated presentation style (visual-only versus audio/visual) and pacing of the content (system-paced versus learning-controlled). Participant's learning was measured by recording their retention of information and ability to transfer information. Measures of perceived difficulty (mental effort) and perceived ability (self-efficacy) were also obtained. No significant effects were observed in this study which doesn’t support the existence of either the modality or reverse modality effect at least in these noisier online learning environments. In addition, the hypothesis that their effects could be an artifact of experimental design could not be proven as the learner control condition did not yield any significant results. / Dissertation/Thesis / Masters Thesis Human Systems Engineering 2018

Published Article / This paper outlines a haptic "construction" system as means of navigating an interactive design approach to sculpture. A user system applicable to haptic generated form is sought after by way of exploring 'construction' as 3-D modality comprised of an interrelated synthesized system. The paper schematically outlines technological and sensory user 'construction' modalities as elements towards an expanded 'synthesis', 'construction' and 'production' systemic structure as a way forward for haptic sculpting. 'Construction' modalities applied to the case study explore human and machine haptics where the PHANTOM® haptic device and FreeForm® Modeling™ CAD software developed by SensAble Technologies® are used to generate, manipulate and render the touch and feel of a virtual designed sculpture.

This thesis attempts to provide an encompassing account for the centuries-old question concerning how aspect and modality are grammaticalized in the verbal system in Biblical Hebrew. To this end, the semantics of the three verb forms qatal, yiqtol, and qotel are investigated by means of a theory-unbiased observation on the Biblical text. It is argued that Biblical Hebrew has an aspectual opposition of the perfective and the imperfective and that the two aspects are encoded by the verb forms qatal and qotel, respectively. Concerning the modal system in Biblical Hebrew, it is suggested that the Biblical Hebrew broadly distinguishes the realis and irrealis and that the irrealis is marked by a single verb form yiqtol. Finally, the verbs occasioned in the Book of Isaiah 52:13-53:12 are thoroughly examined in the light of the present study. The examination on the Isaiah passage consequently ascertains that the present study largely removes the existing obstacles in understanding Biblical Hebrew verb conjugations and lays the significant grounds toward the proper linguistic understanding of the Biblical text. / text

Ph.D. (Mathematics) / Algebraic methods have been largely ignored within the eld of hybrid logics. A main theme of this thesis is to illustrate the usefulness of algebraic methods in this eld. It is a well-known fact that certain properties of a logic correspond to properties of particular classes of algebras, and that we therefore can use these classes of algebras to answer questions about the logic. The rst aim of this thesis is to identify a class of algebras corresponding to hybrid logics. In particular, we introduce hybrid algebras as algebraic semantics for the better known hybrid languages in the literature. The second aim of this thesis is to use hybrid algebras to solve logical problems in the eld of hybrid logic. Specically, we will focus on proving general completeness results for some well-known hybrid logics with respect to hybrid algebras. Next, we study Sahlqvist theory for hybrid logics. We introduce syntactically de ned classes of hybrid formulas that have rst-order frame correspondents, which are preserved under taking Dedekind MacNeille completions of atomic hybrid algebras, and which are preserved under canonical extensions of permeated hybrid algebras. Finally, we investigate the nite model property (FMP) for several hybrid logics. In particular, we give analogues of Bull's theorem for the hybrid logics under consideration in this thesis. We also show that if certain syntactically de ned classes of hybrid formulas are added to the normal modal logic S4 as axioms, we obtain hybrid logics with the nite model property.

M.Sc.

Linguistic mood is a grammatical term as well as a morphological category of the verb. Due to its often philosophical implications it is challenging to find a definition or a common understanding of the notion; it has been proven historically and linguistically difficult to analyze. In this essay I aim to cast new light upon and interpret the concept of mood in extended, philosophical manners. The argument of the essay is that the traditional approach to the notion is done in ways that omit fundamental aspects of it, as well as puts it into a framework that tries to explain it in ways through which it cannot fully be explained. Thus the thesis is that there is more to the notion than what meets the eye. The idea is to find this through the work of phenomenologists. Alongside a linguistic use, the word mood [Modus/mode] is also being used in philosophy, most notably within a phenomenological discourse. Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty all use the word. By going through a close-reading of the concept, I argue for the proximity between the linguistic and the phenomenological adaption of mood and show how they are ontologically related; the objective is to suggest that there is more common ground between them than the mere (English) name. By concentrating on this term I want to further examine in what way a phenomenological understanding of language can challenge an overly narrow, one-dimensional understanding, which I see as a fault shared by the linguists.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the theoretical commitments informing W.V. Quine’s rejection of alethic modality and to advance a Quinean response to Saul Kripke’s arguments in support of modal metaphysics. The novelty of this thesis consists in it being the first detailed explanation of how Quine’s arguments against modality are situated within his system and informed by his epistemological and ontological views and the first adequate study of the epistemological and metaphysical criticisms Quine would advance against Kripke’s defence of modality. The Quinean response to Kripke presented here is guided by four tenets that Quine takes to be central to the current scientific worldview and which he consequently adopts as the guiding methodological constraints of his own project: empiricism, regimentation, physicalism and simplicity. I explain how Quine’s referential opacity and mathematician-cyclist arguments against modality hang together with the rest of his philosophical project; and I show that while these arguments may seem unpersuasive and easily refuted by Kripke when taken in isolation, they are quite powerful when understood within the context of Quine’s entire system and seen in light of his guiding methodological constraints. By the end of this thesis, it will be clear why Quine remains unconvinced by Kripke’s arguments in support of modal metaphysics and how his response to Kripke is grounded in his deepest methodological constraints. He ultimately rejects Kripke’s arguments because they conflict with the tenets he takes to be the deepest commitments of the scientific worldview. Quine’s arguments against modality must be understood within the context of his philosophical system as a whole and are best seen not as arguments to be met by Kripke on Kripke’s terms but as illustrations of why, from the standpoint of Quine’s project and the standards it adheres to (the standards of science, as Quine understands it), modality is a flawed and unnecessary addition to reconstructed scientific theory. While there may well be reasons for rejecting Quine’s views about modality – and even reasons that would compel Quine, on his own terms, to reject his views – I argue that Kripke does not provide them.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the theoretical commitments informing W.V. Quine’s rejection of alethic modality and to advance a Quinean response to Saul Kripke’s arguments in support of modal metaphysics. The novelty of this thesis consists in it being the first detailed explanation of how Quine’s arguments against modality are situated within his system and informed by his epistemological and ontological views and the first adequate study of the epistemological and metaphysical criticisms Quine would advance against Kripke’s defence of modality. The Quinean response to Kripke presented here is guided by four tenets that Quine takes to be central to the current scientific worldview and which he consequently adopts as the guiding methodological constraints of his own project: empiricism, regimentation, physicalism and simplicity. I explain how Quine’s referential opacity and mathematician-cyclist arguments against modality hang together with the rest of his philosophical project; and I show that while these arguments may seem unpersuasive and easily refuted by Kripke when taken in isolation, they are quite powerful when understood within the context of Quine’s entire system and seen in light of his guiding methodological constraints. By the end of this thesis, it will be clear why Quine remains unconvinced by Kripke’s arguments in support of modal metaphysics and how his response to Kripke is grounded in his deepest methodological constraints. He ultimately rejects Kripke’s arguments because they conflict with the tenets he takes to be the deepest commitments of the scientific worldview. Quine’s arguments against modality must be understood within the context of his philosophical system as a whole and are best seen not as arguments to be met by Kripke on Kripke’s terms but as illustrations of why, from the standpoint of Quine’s project and the standards it adheres to (the standards of science, as Quine understands it), modality is a flawed and unnecessary addition to reconstructed scientific theory. While there may well be reasons for rejecting Quine’s views about modality – and even reasons that would compel Quine, on his own terms, to reject his views – I argue that Kripke does not provide them.

In this paper, I begin to develop a theory called Paradise on the Cheap - in so doing, I intend to provide a rival to David Lewis' modal realism. Paradise on the Cheap grounds possibilia in the features of the actual world; and so, it does not require realist commitments to the existence of non-actual worlds and individuals. I explain modality, conterfactuals, content, and properties in terms of recombinations of actual-world features, second-order mathematical schemata, and the similarity relations which hold between these things and parts of the actual world. Because the ontology of Paradise on the Cheap promotes unity and economy of theory to a greater extent than does model realism's ontology, I argue that we should accept the former theory instead of the latter. Moreover, I address the question of whether inference to the best explanation is an argumentative strategy that is even available to modal realists. / vii, 141 leaves : ill. ; 28 cm.