鄧小虎. / "2000年6月" / 論文 (哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2000. / 參考文獻 (leaves 104-109) / 附中英文摘要. / "2000 nian 6 yue" / Deng Xiaohu. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2000. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 104-109) / Fu Zhong Ying wen zhai yao. / Chapter 一. --- 緒論 --- p.1 / Chapter 二. --- 第一章 --- p.3 / Chapter 1.1 --- 啓蒙運動的失敗 --- p.4 / Chapter 1.2 --- 啓蒙運動爲何註定失敗？ --- p.8 / Chapter 1.3 --- 情感主義及其源起 --- p.11 / Chapter 1.4 --- 現代文化就是情感主義式的文化 --- p.15 / Chapter 1.5 --- 提出德性倫理學以回應情感主義的挑戰 --- p.19 / Chapter 三´Ø --- 第二章重建德性倫理學（一） --- p.22 / Chapter 2.1 --- 如何建構有理據的德性倫理學？ --- p.23 / Chapter 2.2 --- 重建德性的第一階段：實踐體系 --- p.24 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- 內在價値 --- p.25 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- 共同設立的合作性活動 --- p.30 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- 傑出標準 --- p.32 / Chapter 2.3 --- 對於德性的初步瞭解及其不足 --- p.34 / Chapter 四´Ø --- 第三章重建德性倫理學（二） --- p.36 / Chapter 3.1 --- 第二階段：有整體性的人生 --- p.36 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- 可理解性與敘述 --- p.36 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- 兩類背景：社會性場景與個人歷史 --- p.37 / Chapter 3.1.3 --- 人生有敘述的整體性？ --- p.43 / Chapter 3.1.4 --- 統一的自我 --- p.46 / Chapter 3.1.5 --- 有敘述整體性的人生 --- p.49 / Chapter 3.2 --- 人生的目的（telos)與德性 --- p.51 / Chapter 3.3 --- 第三階段：傳統 --- p.55 / Chapter 3.4 --- 小結 --- p.59 / Chapter 五´Ø --- 第四章德性倫理學成功嗎？ --- p.63 / Chapter 4.1 --- 重建德性倫理學所必須克服的三項困難 --- p.63 / Chapter 4.2 --- 社會目的論 --- p.65 / Chapter 4.3 --- 價値衝突的悲劇處境 --- p.67 / Chapter 4.4 --- 共同目的和社群 --- p.78 / Chapter 4.5 --- 傳統和理性 --- p.86 / Chapter 六´Ø --- 總結啓蒙運動與德性倫理學 --- p.96 / 書目 --- p.103

馬嘉域. / "2008年2月". / 論文(哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2008. / 參考文獻(leaves 116-118). / "2008 nian 2 yue". / Abstract also in English. / Ma Jiayu. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2008. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 116-118). / 緒論 --- p.5 / Chapter 第一章 --- 規則式道德爲道德建立基礎的嘗試及其失敗 --- p.10 / Chapter 1.1 --- 啓蒙運動的努力一一休謨的嘗試 --- p.10 / Chapter 1.2 --- 啓蒙運動的努力一一康德的嘗試 --- p.14 / Chapter 1.3 --- 爲何啓蒙運動以來的道德哲學必定失敗 --- p.19 / Chapter 1.4 --- 啓蒙運動後的努力一一效益主義及其他 --- p.21 / Chapter 1.5 --- 直覺主義與情感主義一一道德根據的徹底喪失 --- p.23 / Chapter 1.6 --- 小結道德衰退的三階段 --- p.26 / Chapter 第二章 --- 麥肯泰爾論德性的根據和基礎 --- p.28 / Chapter 2.1 --- 德性與實踐活動的關係 --- p.29 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- 內在價値與外在價値 --- p.30 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- 卓越標準 --- p.33 / Chapter 2.1.3 --- 必須依靠他人的協作性活動 --- p.36 / Chapter 2.1.4 --- 對德性初步理解的不足 --- p.39 / Chapter 2.2 --- 個人生活的敘述性整體 --- p.40 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- 個人主義式自我與整體性自我 --- p.41 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- 個別行爲的可理解性 --- p.43 / Chapter 2.3.3 --- 敘述、對話與個人身份 --- p.47 / Chapter 2.3.4 --- 個人生活的敘述式整體 --- p.50 / Chapter 2.3 --- 傳統的槪念 --- p.51 / Chapter 2.4 --- 小結德性論三階段的聯繫 --- p.55 / Chapter 第三章 --- 道德相對主義問題的消解及其困難 --- p.57 / Chapter 3.1 --- 傳統的合理性 --- p.57 / Chapter 3.2 --- 知識論危機 --- p.59 / Chapter 3.3 --- 不同傳統之間的互相了解及相對主義的超越 --- p.60 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- 真理的槪念 --- p.62 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- 可理解性的問題 --- p.64 / Chapter 3.4 --- 小結 --- p.68 / Chapter 第四章 --- 後期麥肯泰爾一一德性倫理學的社會生物學基礎 --- p.69 / Chapter 4.1 --- 人與動物相同的地方 --- p.70 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- 意圖的前語言認識 --- p.72 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- 行爲的理由 --- p.73 / Chapter 4.2 --- 我們如何由動物成長爲人類? --- p.75 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- 價値與成長的關係 --- p.75 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- 人類成長的三個階段 --- p.77 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- 成長三階段的關係 --- p.79 / Chapter 4.3 --- 個人成長的依賴性 --- p.80 / Chapter 4.4 --- 施予及受惠的社群關係 --- p.84 / Chapter 4.4.1 --- 施予及受惠的社群關係與權力分配 --- p.85 / Chapter 4.4.2 --- 施予受惠關係的具體運作 --- p.86 / Chapter 4.5 --- 維持社群關係的德性 --- p.88 / Chapter 4.5.1 --- 正直地慷慨的特徵 --- p.89 / Chapter 4.5.2 --- 德性根據的改變 --- p.90 / Chapter 4.6 --- 小結一一德性與成長的整體圖像 --- p.91 / Chapter 第五章 --- 麥肯泰爾德性論的一些問題 --- p.93 / Chapter 5.1 --- 對待有缺陷人士的應有態度 --- p.94 / Chapter 5.2 --- 德性根據轉變一一社群內親疏關係的問題 --- p.98 / Chapter 5.3 --- 價値衝突的處境 --- p.101 / Chapter 5.4 --- 社群建立的可能性 --- p.105 / 結語 --- p.109 / 參考書目 --- p.116

Revision of the author's thesis (doctoral)--Fudan da xue, 1993.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2000. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 396-400). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.

Zugl.: Oldenburg, Univ., Diss., 2005

Informe de Seminario para optar al grado de Licenciado en Filosofía / ¿Cuál es la relación entre dependencia y emotivismo con comunidad e individuo según el pensamiento de MacIntyre? Centrado en explicar dichos conceptos en el pensamiento del filósofo comunitarista Alasdair MacIntyre se dividirá en dos capítulos para dar un análisis profundo de cada uno en base a los textos del mismo autor para posteriormente presentar las conclusiones del mismo.

This thesis aims to provide a new definition for philosophy rooted in MacIntyre’s account of a “practice”. In the first chapter, I explain MacIntyre’s concept of a practice as it appears in After Virtue—including its critical components, namely, internal goods, standards of excellence, and the historical dimension of practices—through a consideration of the practice of guitar lutherie. I then use this account to build up an initial definition of philosophy as a practice, and briefly clarify two minor confusions that could easily arise regarding such an account. In my second chapter, I take up MacIntyre’s view that practices are always spatiotemporally situated in order to question whether or not my definition from Chapter One could include non-Western philosophy within it. I argue that this is possible within the peculiar epistemic conditions of modernity, based on a reading of MacIntyre’s paper “Relativism, Power and Philosophy”. In Chapter Three, I consider another key component of MacIntyre’s account—namely, that of institutions—and arrive at some extra qualifications regarding the concepts of both “external goods” and “corruption” to deepen the account, and then introduce my own concept of “institutional hegemony” to account for academia’s present status with regards to the practice of philosophy, which I use to explain a discordance between the present reality of philosophy as a discipline and the conclusions I draw in Chapter Two. I then extend this line of thought in the fourth chapter to look at some objections that could be made against a MacIntyrean view of philosophy-as-a-practice from a feminist and postcolonial lens. These objections are then addressed in the fifth chapter, where I show that the MacIntyrean ought to be in agreement with the feminist and postcolonial projects, and that the MacIntyrean framework can indeed accommodate them.

Knowledge of the responsibilities of engineers is key to answering ethical questions about the work of engineers, because the decisions made by engineers often have ethical dimensions and implications. Engineers develop and implement technologies that influence and shape the way we live, at times in manners unanticipated by those who develop such technologies. To be able to answer important ethical questions, it is essential first to define what the responsibilities of engineers are. This paper defines the responsibilities of engineers by considering what constitutes the nature of engineering as a particular form of activity. Specifically, this paper focuses on the responsibilities of engineers qua engineers, where that refers to the duties acquired in virtue of being a member of a group. In order to answer this question, this paper examines the practice of engineering, drawing on the idea of practices developed by philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre and showing how the elements of a practice are important for finding and justifying the responsibilities of engineers. To demonstrate the contribution that knowledge of the responsibilities of engineers makes to engineering ethics, a case study is discussed at the end of the paper which deals with ethical questions in the discipline of structural engineering. The circumstances surrounding the failure of the Sleipner A platform off the coast of Norway in 1991 will be discussed to demonstrate how the responsibilities of engineers can be derived from knowledge of the nature of engineering and its context.

This thesis outlines and defends a MacIntyrean account of contemporary work. MacIntyre's virtue ethics seems to entail a wholesale rejection of the modern order; throughout his writings MacIntyre is highly critical of capitalism, large-scale modern institutions, management, regulation, and indeed of our whole 'emotivistic' culture (as he sees it) which he regards as being inimical to our potential to virtuously flourish. MacIntyre's mature period, from After Virtue (2007, originally published 1981) contains much that is relevant to a philosophy of work. I will develop and update MacIntyre's own arguments and I will also argue that contemporary working life can be more MacIntyrean than MacIntyre himself realises. Because both work as a topic, and the relevant parts of MacIntyre's writings are extremely diverse, my strategy will be to examine the different key elements of a MacIntyrean philosophy of work without decontextualising the key notions of practices, virtues and institutions from MacIntyre's wider moral philosophy. I will argue that MacIntyre's key concept of a practice, the first stage in his definition of a virtue, is able to account for productive activities and can survive a variety of challenges. We are best able to make sense of the notion of the narrative unity of a whole life, the second stage in MacIntyre's definition of a virtue, if we distinguish between lived-narratives and the told-narratives that best allow us to understand our lives. Despite his broad endorsement of Marx's critique of capitalism, a MacIntyrean account of work differs from Marx's theory of alienation. I will argue that a fully MacIntyrean workplace will be small-scale, will not pressurise employees to identify with compartmentalised roles, and will allow trust to flourish. However, because MacIntyre overstates the extent to which people accept the definitions of ‘success’ that are dominant within modernity, he is unable to see the extent to which MacIntyrean communities can survive the threats posed by contemporary corporations. Another element of MacIntyre's account of work which needs modification is his critique of the character of the manager, and I will offer an emendation of this in order to make it applicable to contemporary forms of management. Finally I show that distinctively modern phenomena of workplace governance and regulation can serve MacIntyrean ends and can allow us to codify broadly MacIntyrean workplace initiatives. However, because of the deep context-sensitivity of the key MacIntyrean notions: practices, narrative-unity, and communities, such measures resist detailed and explicit formulation. My aim is to defend MacIntyre, to deepen our understanding of what a MacIntyrean philosophy of work entails, and to show that and how good work exists even within modernity.

嚴淑儀. / "2002年6月" / 論文 (哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2002. / 參考文獻 (leaves 197-205) / 附中英文摘要. / "2002 nian 6 yue" / Yan Shuyi. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2002. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 197-205) / Fu Zhong Ying wen zhai yao. / 麥金太爾著作縮寫表 --- p.VIII / 引言 --- p.IX / Chapter 第一章 --- 當代倫理學困境 --- p.1 / Chapter 第一節 --- 麥金太爾對當代道德困境的描述 --- p.1 / Chapter 第二節 --- 不可共量性與不相容性 --- p.10 / Chapter 第三節 --- 啓蒙運動以來的單一理性觀 --- p.24 / Chapter 第四節 --- 情感主義、相對主義與觀點主義 --- p.42 / Chapter 第二章 --- 麥金太爾對傳統之合理性的說明 --- p.55 / Chapter 第一節 --- 由傳統建構之理性觀的特色 --- p.55 / Chapter 第二節 --- 在傳統中體現的理性探究 --- p.71 / Chapter 第三節 --- 知識論危機 --- p.86 / Chapter 第四節 --- 與啓蒙運動理性觀的對比 --- p.100 / Chapter 第五節 --- 真理和理性證立 --- p.108 / Chapter 第六節 --- 理性探究傳統的理性證立 --- p.116 / Chapter 第七節 --- 道德困境的理性出路 --- p.124 / Chapter 第三章 --- 「傳統之合理性」觀點的理性證立 --- p.128 / Chapter 第一節 --- 對麥金太爾的批評(1) -傳統的理性比較涵蘊普遍主義？ --- p.133 / Chapter 第二節 --- 對麥金太爾的批評(2)- 歷史證立的原則是否自我指涉地不融貫？ --- p.138 / Chapter 第三節 --- 對麥金太爾的批評(3）- 跨傳統的解釋是否可能？ --- p.142 / Chapter 第四節 --- 對麥金太爾的批評(4）- ¯‘ة未效忠任何傳統的個人？ --- p.153 / Chapter 第五節 --- 對麥金太爾的批評(5)- 傳統之間的比較是否解決道德爭議的唯一方法？ --- p.161 / Chapter 第六節 --- 對麥金太爾的批評(6）- 多瑪斯主義包含不容質疑的信仰？ --- p.170 / Chapter 第七節 --- 對啓蒙運動理性探究觀與相對主義的批評 --- p.178 / 結語 --- p.191 / 參考書目 --- p.197