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"Some six months after the death of Margaret Wise Brown in November, 1952, Ellen Lewis Buell stated that she was the author of more than seventy books, and pointed out that with her passing the children's book publishing world had lost one of 'its most prolific writers.' An obituary notice gave the number of her publications as one hundred books 'under own name and pseudonyms.' The pseudonyms--Timothy Hay, Golden MacDonald, Juniper Sage--represented, according to Miss Brown, 'clear-cut writing personalities and distinct styles' differing from each other and from Margaret Wise Brown so greatly that, from the first draft of a book, it was perfectly clear to her just which one of her literary personalities was doing the writing. This remarkable statement, the discrepancy in the count of her books, and a curiosity about a writer who could produce in a life span of little more than forty years such a great number of books, be it seventy or one hundred, are the motivations for this paper. Its purpose is to compile from various sources a literary biography of Margaret Wise Brown and to establish the canon of her writing"--Introduction. / Typescript. / "August, 1959." / "Submitted to the Graduate School of Florida State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts." / Advisor: Robert Clapp, Professor Directing Paper. / Includes bibliographical references.

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Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

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Thèse numérisée par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

In this paper I present, and offer a solution to, a heretofore unacknowledged textual puzzle that arises from Margaret Cavendish's use of inconceivability to make claims about what is metaphysically impossible. On the one hand, Cavendish asserts that objects or events she cannot conceive of are impossible in nature (i.e., inconceivability entails impossibility in nature). On the other hand, she writes that there are some things that exist or occur in nature that are inconceivable to humans (i.e., inconceivability does not entail impossibility in nature). Put simply, Cavendish seemingly contradicts herself. This textual puzzle not only threatens to undermine Cavendish's philosophical method; it also calls her opposition to human exceptionalism into question. By asserting that what is inconceivable to her is impossible in nature, Cavendish implies by contraposition that she can conceive of everything that is metaphysically possible. In so doing, she seems to make an exception at least for herself: though she believes that other parts of nature cannot conceive of everything in nature, she implies that she can. Ultimately, I argue that Cavendish thinks we can sometimes tell why something is inconceivable. In some cases, something is inconceivable because it lies beyond the limits of humans' mental capacities. In other cases, something is inconceivable because it is contradictory. This interpretation solves the textual puzzle, as it is consistent for Cavendish to maintain that some objects and events in nature are beyond our mental limits and that we can derive the impossibility of some object or event in nature from its contradictoriness. My interpretation preserves Cavendish's opposition to human exceptionalism, moreover, as no part of nature can conceive of contradictions. That is, Cavendish's claim is not merely that what is inconceivable to her is impossible in nature, but rather that what is inconceivable to her and to every other part of nature is impossible in nature. / Master of Arts / Margaret Cavendish, a seventeenth century philosopher, makes two seemingly contradictory claims throughout her philosophical works. On the one hand, she implies that if something is inconceivable to her — that is, if she cannot form a mental picture of it — that thing is impossible in nature. On the other hand, she writes that there are plenty of things that exist or occur in nature which are inconceivable to humans. A textual puzzle therefore arises: Cavendish seems to simultaneously maintain (1) that something is impossible in nature if she cannot conceive of it, and (2) that something is not necessarily impossible in nature if she cannot conceive of it. In this paper, I propose that Cavendish believes humans can at least sometimes determine why something is inconceivable. That is, we can at least sometimes diagnose our inability to form a mental picture of something. In some cases, Cavendish thinks, we cannot form a mental picture of something because of our limited, human mental capacities. (We might think, for example, that this is why we cannot form a mental picture of all the colors butterflies see.) In other cases, we cannot form a mental picture of something because that thing is contradictory. (We might think, for instance, that this is why we cannot form a mental picture of an apple that is both red all over and not red all over.) I further argue that Cavendish only asserts that something is impossible in nature if it is inconceivable because it is contradictory. On my account, the textual puzzle I presented above is in fact not so puzzling. Cavendish thinks that if something is inconceivable because it is contradictory, then it is impossible in nature. She also thinks that there are plenty of things in nature that we cannot conceive of because of our limited human mental capacities. Thankfully, these two claims are not in tension.

During the 1980s, the government of Great Britain, led by Margaret Thatcher, promoted a political and economic ideology known in the demotic as the Thatcherite Enterprise Culture. This set of beliefs and actions included an encouragement of hard work, thrift, self-responsibility, and self-employment, as well as legislating for the support of small firms, privatisation, free markets and a strong - but minimal - central state. Behind the Enterprise Culture lay a religious paradigm, explicitly called upon by its chief creators, including Margaret Thatcher. The thesis builds an ideal-type of the Thatcherite Enterprise Culture, following a Weberian methodology, to form the major object of study. The work aims to discover whether the ideal-type under analysis is theologically coherent, and whether it can justifiably claim to be a continuation of Christian thought in this area. This thesis examines the development of Western European philosophy and theology as it relates to the key aspects of the Thatcherite Enterprise Culture, beginning with the Ancient Greeks and concluding with the Victorian Age of Enterprise. The historical review demonstrates that the Thatcherite Enterprise Culture is generally discontiguous with the tradition of religious thought, and in some instances is essentially in direct contradiction with important aspects of the tradition, such as the significance of the Incarnation. A review of the theological works of the Thatcherite Enterprise Culture and its critics adds to the findings of the historical examination, indicating further flaws and contradictions within Enterprise Theology. Critics of Enterprise Theology are found to be much more consistent with mainstream Christian Theology.