Denna uppsats har ett särskilt fokus på Frankrikes förbud av ansiktstäckande plagg, såsom burkor, vilket är ett exempel på en grund för de konflikter som uppkommer vid Europas ökade religiösa mångfald. Av de cirka 15 miljoner muslimerna i Europa, bor 5 miljoner i Frankrike, vilket gör islam till den näst största religionen i landet. Genom att undersöka Frankrikes lagstiftning mot ansiktstäckande plagg på offentliga platser och deras senare prövning i Europadomstolen kan man påvisa ett betydelsefullt exempel på hur religiösa minoritetsgrupper behandlas i det moderna Europa.

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This thesis addresses numerous key points on the application of the margin of appreciation principle in relation to Article 9 (2) of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ('Convention').1 In general terms, the margin of appreciation doctrine means that the State is allowed a certain measure of discretion, subject to European supervision, when it takes legislative, administrative, or judicial action in the area of a Convention right.2 The margin of appreciation is given to Contracting States to allow variation amongst them in terms of interpretation of the rights guaranteed.

This thesis addresses numerous key points on the application of the margin of appreciation principle in relation to Article 9 (2) of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ('Convention').1 In general terms, the margin of appreciation doctrine means that the State is allowed a certain measure of discretion, subject to European supervision, when it takes legislative, administrative, or judicial action in the area of a Convention right.2 The margin of appreciation is given to Contracting States to allow variation amongst them in terms of interpretation of the rights guaranteed.

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This paper discusses if Margin of Appreciation is compatible with the idea of universal human rights. Through the case of Negative freedom of association in Sweden, it studies the phenomenon that Giorgio Agamben has called the State of exception. The questions that are discussed and answered are 1) How does the rights theories of Jack Donnelly and Ronald Dworkin relate to Margin of appreciation, and 2) How has Margin of appreciation been applied in cases concerning the negative freedom of association in Sweden, in the European court for human rights. These questions and answers are then used in the discussion on how Margin of appreciation affects the concept of universal human rights. / Denna uppsats diskuterar frågan om Margin of Appreciation är förenligt med tanken om universella mänskliga rättigheter. Genom studier av den negativa föreningsfriheten i Sverige, så undersöks doktrinen Margin of appreciation och hur den förhåller sig till tanken om universella rättigheter. Frågorna som diskuteras och besvaras är 1) hur förhåller sig Jack Donnellys respektive Ronald Dworkins rättighetsteorier till Margin of appreciation, samt 2) Hur har Margin of appreciation tolkats i europadomstolens i fall gällande den negativa föreningsfriheten i Sverige. Dessa frågor tas till hjälp i diskussionen kring hur Margin of appreciation påverkar tanken om universella mänskliga rättigheter.

Deference in international human rights law has provoked animated discussion, particularly the margin of appreciation doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights. Many commentators describe the practice of deference but do not explain how it affects judicial reasoning. Some approve characteristics of deference but do not provide a justification to defend the practice against criticism. Others regard deference as a danger to human rights because it betrays the universality of human rights or involves tribunals either failing to consider a case properly or missing an opportunity to set human rights standards. This thesis employs a different approach by focussing on deference as the practice of assigning weight to reasons for a decision on the basis of external factors. This approach draws on theories of second-order reasoning from the philosophy of practical reasoning. The thesis offers a conceptual account of deference that accords with the practice not only of the European Court of Human Rights, but also the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee. Additionally the thesis presents a normative account of deference, that the role of these tribunals entails permitting a measure of diversity as states implement international human rights standards. Deference in international human rights law then is the judicial practice of assigning weight to the respondent states’ reasoning in a case on the basis of three factors: democratic legitimacy, the common practice of states and expertise. This affects judicial reasoning by impacting the balance of reasons in the proportionality assessment. The account defended in this thesis dispels concerns that deference is a danger to human rights, whilst providing a theory that justifies the practice of the tribunals. The thesis thus provides the contours of a doctrine of deference in each of the three international human rights systems.

Le principe de subsidiarité, en droit de la Convention européenne, est un principe empreint d’ambiguïtés. D’origine prétorienne, il ne fait l’objet d’aucune définition formelle dans les textes ou la jurisprudence afférente et se voit ainsi marqué d’une indétermination sémantique et juridique certaine. Doté d’une double dimension à la fois procédurale et matérielle, il n’en reste pas moins un principe fondamental du droit européen, un principe qui structure, d’une part, l’organisation et le fonctionnement même du système et guide, d’autre part, l’interprétation et le contrôle du juge de Strasbourg. Parce que naturellement ambigu mais néanmoins directeur du droit européen, le principe de subsidiarité se présente donc comme un principe souple et malléable, par conséquent, adaptable. L’analyse de sa mise en oeuvre dans la jurisprudence européenne met ainsi en exergue l’inconstance et la variabilité d’application du principe, à la libre disposition du juge strasbourgeois. Mais analysée à la lumière du contexte actuel d’un engorgement sans précédent du système et donc d’une réaffirmation urgente de son caractère subsidiaire, l’utilisation fluctuante du principe s’apprécie sous un jour nouveau, visant à faire de la subsidiarité un principe non plus garant des libertés nationales mais désormais source d’un encadrement de celles-ci. Parce que moteur d’une responsabilisation accrue des Etats membres, le principe de subsidiarité apparaît donc comme une pièce maîtresse de la politique jurisprudentielle du juge européen. / As part of the European Convention, the principle of subsidiarity is marked by ambiguity. Originating from judges, it has not been formally defined in legal texts nor in any related jurisprudence and is therefore characterized by a semantic and legal indeterminacy. Featuring both a procedural and a tangible dimension, it remains a fundamental principle of European law. On the one hand, it structures, the system’s organization and operations. On the other hand, it guides the court of Strasbourg’s interpretation and review. Naturally ambiguous but still guiding European law, the principle of subsidiarity is presented as a flexible and malleable principle, and therefore adaptable. The analysis of its implementation in the European jurisprudence highlights its inconsistency and variability at the free disposal of the court of Strasbourg. However, in the light of the current context of an unprecedented saturation of the system and therefore of an urgent reassertion of its subsidiary nature, a fluctuating use of the principle is assessed differently to make it not a guarantee of national liberties, but a guide for them. As a driving force for increased accountability of member states, the principle of subsidiarity appears to be essential to the judicial policy of the European court.

Conformément à l’article 46 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, les États contractants s’engagent à se conformer aux arrêts définitifs de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme. Il ressort toutefois de la jurisprudence de la Cour que ses décisions sont « déclaratoires pour l’essentiel » et que, par cela, une liberté de choix des moyens à utiliser pour s’acquitter de l’obligation d’exécuter la décision, est laissée à l’État défendeur. En tout état de cause, le sens de l’exécution des arrêts de la Cour demeurerait paradoxal s’il fallait s’arrêter à accepter à la fois que l’État doive exécuter la décision européenne tout en ayant le choix libre de la manière d’y parvenir. Un tel raccourci aurait en effet pour conséquence que les décisions de la Cour soient imparfaitement ou seulement partiellement exécutées dans la mesure où, d’une part, le but consistant à l’exécution de la décision est vaguement précisé et où, d’autre part, la liberté de choix est, quant à elle, expresse. La doctrine de la marge d’appréciation de l’État apporte ainsi une flexibilité nécessaire dans la délimitation des rôles de la Cour et ceux de l’État défendeur pour une meilleure exécution des décisions européennes. A cet effet, le double effet de la décision européenne n’a de sens que s’il est admis que l’État dispose, certes, d’une marge d’appréciation dans l’exécution de la décision de la Cour, mais que les limites de cette marge sont posées par la Cour elle-même, dans sa décision. Il faut dès lors systématiquement partir de la décision de la Cour qui doit préciser ce en quoi consiste l’exécution de celle-ci, et donc ce en quoi consiste la réparation de la violation de la Convention, afin de déterminer si la marge d’appréciation de l’État, au stade de l’exécution de la décision, est plutôt large ou plutôt étroite. La liberté du choix de l’État défendeur en matière des mesures à prendre pour exécuter la décision selon les attentes de la Cour, se rapportera ainsi à une gamme de choix prédéfinie dans le cadre de la décision, et ce, dépendamment de la nature de la violation de la Convention ou encore de la gravité des conséquences de telle violation. En somme, plus la gamme de choix de mesures étatiques est précise, plus il y a de chances que la décision soit mieux exécutée. L’essentiel du travail consiste donc à essayer d’identifier les critères de détermination de l’étendue de la marge d’appréciation de l’État dans l’exécution de la décision de la Cour. Cependant, un tel exercice ne peut être mené à bien sans tout d’abord définir la notion même de « marge d’appréciation » qui, même si elle a déjà été employée par la Cour et par une partie de la doctrine, n’a pas reçu une définition convaincante, ou encore, a souvent été indistinctement associée à la notion de « marge de manœuvre », au « principe de subsidiarité », ou même à la souveraineté, alors qu’elle ne saurait s’y confondre. / In accordance with Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. It is however apparent from the Court’s case-law that its decisions are “essentially declaratory” and, by that, a freedom to choose the means to be used to fulfill the obligation to execute the decision is given to the respondent State. In any event, the sense of the execution of the Court’s decisions would remain paradoxical if we were to stop at accepting at the same time that a State must execute the European decision while having the free choice in the manner to achieve so. Such a shortcut would lead to a poor execution of the decisions of the Court in so far as, on one hand, the purpose of the enforcement of the decision is vaguely specified and, on the other hand, freedom of choice is expressly precise. The doctrine of the State's margin of appreciation thus gives the flexibility needed in delimiting the roles of the Court and those of the respondent State for the purpose of a better implementation of European decisions. To that end, the dual effect of the European decision only makes sense if it is accepted that the State indeed enjoys a margin of appreciation in the execution of the Court’s decision but that the limits of such margin are laid by the Court itself, in its decision. It is therefore necessary to systematically start from the decision of the Court which must specify what the expected execution is, and therefore what the compensation for the violation of the Convention should be, in order to determine whether the margin of appreciation of a State, at the stage of implementation of the decision, is rather broad or rather narrow. The freedom of choice of the respondent State as to the measures to be taken to implement the decision according to the expectations of the Court will thus relate to a range of choices predefined in the decision, depending on the nature of the violation of the Convention or the gravity of the consequences of such violation. In short, the more precise the ranges of choices of measures are, the more likely it is that the decision will be better executed. The essence of the work is therefore to try to identify the criteria for determining the extent of the State’s margin of appreciation in the execution of the Court’s decision. However, such an exercise cannot be carried out without first defining the very notion of “margin of appreciation” which, even if it has already been used by the Court and by a part of the doctrine, has not received a convincing definition, or has often been indistinctly associated with the notion of “margin of manoeuver”, the “principle of subsidiarity”, or even sovereignty, while it cannot be confused with them.

"The purpose of this study is to interrogate the doctrine of margin of appreciation as applied in the European Court of Human Rights and establish amenable lessos to the African human rights system. As such, the author will be able to draw appropriate and informed recommendations on the prospects of the doctrine in African context. In other words, the study proceeds from the approach that 'diversity' alone is not enough to guarantee application of margin of appreciation. Rather, a variety of factors come into consideration while weighing whether margin of appreciation should be granted to states. Indeed, such benchmarks will inform the discourse of this study, while at the same time acknowledging that a comparative study between European and African systems cannot be possible. The premise for disqualifying a comparison assumes that margin of appreciation presupposes a democratic society. Thus, while the member states of the ECHR have attained high levels of human rights records, some of their counterparts in Africa are still marred by embarrassing human rights records." -- Preamble. "Chapter one introduces the study and the context in which it is set. It highlights the basis and structure of the study. Chapter two makes reference to the connotation, origin and development of the doctrine of margin of appreciation. It discusses also contours and varying degrees of the doctrine's application with particular regard to respect of the rule of law. In addition, difficulties linked to the doctrine are highlighted. Chapter three highlights policy grounds underlying margin of appreciation in the European Court of Human Rights. It starts from most decisive policy grounds and moves to weaker ones. Chapter four examines the legal basis for application of the doctrine of margin of appreciation under the African Charter. It further notes the attitude of African states through their submissions claiming margin. The Prince case as the first of its kind to invoke margin of appreciation is discussed. Chapter five attempts to identify the defensibility and indefensibility of the doctrine in [the] African human rights system. Chapter six consists of a summary of the presentation and the conclusions drawn from the entire study." -- Introduction. / Prepared under the supervision of Prof. Gilles Cistac at the Faculty of Law, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo, Mocambique / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2006. / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/academic_pro/llm1/dissertations.html / Centre for Human Rights / LLM