Fighting Power: Interpretive Issues The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, 1950 Hammes, Thomas Xavier Lincoln College Submitted for Doctor of Philosophy in History Trinity Term 2008 When the Korean War broke out on 25 June 1950, the Marine Corps was ordered to deploy an air-ground brigade from California in less than ten days. Due to five years of massive budget and manpower cuts, the Marine Corps did not have even a brigade immediately available. The only way to meet the sailing timeline was to organize, man and equip the force while actually embarking it. As it embarked, the brigade had to incorporate marines flown in from posts all over the western United States; draw equipment from war reserves held hundreds of miles away; reorganize many of the existing units under new tables of organization; and add an experimental helicopter detachment from the east coast of the United States. Despite these enormous handicaps and numerically superior enemy forces, the brigade won every engagement. This performance was in stark contrast to the performance of all other US forces at this stage of the war. The brigade’s brief existence (7 July to 6 Sept 1950), combined with its exceptional combat record under adverse conditions, provides the opportunity to study the impact of institutional culture, education, doctrine, organization, training and leadership on performance in combat. Research showed that a key element of the brigade’s success was the Marine Corps’ institutional culture. In particular, the culture of remembering ensured marines understood the unchanging aspects of war and provided its men with the education, training, doctrine and organization to cope with its enduring friction, fog and chance. At the same time, the culture of learning ensured the marines understood what was changing in the character and tools of war so the brigade was well adapted to the realities of modern war from its first day in combat.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / Recruiting is the most challenging peacetime assignment for any United States Marine. It involves many internal and external factors that are generally beyond the control of recruiting personnel. In particular, Recruiting Station (RS) Commanding Officers are subject to intense pressure to make their assigned recruiting goals or be relieved from duty. It is thus critical for the Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC) to select only the best-qualified officers to serve as recruiting commanders. This thesis has three main objectives: (1) analyze the current screening and selection process used by MCRC since fiscal 1996; (2) evaluate whether this process is more effective than the previous method; and (3) determine if the process can be improved. To accomplish these goals, the study reviews MCRC's responsibilities, policies, procedures, and rationale in determining the required characteristics of a successful RS Commanding Officer. The methodology relies on a literature review, personal interviews with individuals from all recruiting command levels, and descriptive data on RS Commanding Officers from fiscal 1990 through fiscal 2003. The results suggest that the current screening and selection process is effective and an improvement over the previous system. Recruiting commanders are more experienced, more diverse, and more suited to the task, based on several indicators. Recommendations are offered to change common perceptions of the current process as a "selection board." / Captain, United States Marine Corps

This study examines processes of military doctrinal change during periods of peace. Given the conventional wisdom of hidebound bureaucratic military organizations, why do these organizations innovate doctrinally? Rather than conduct competitive hypothesis testing between two or more theories of military innovation or pursue a heretofore undiscovered monocausal theory, I develop and test a theoretical framework that synthesizes more than one approach to military doctrinal innovation. I use this framework to conduct a structured, focused, case-study comparison of two military organizations - the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps - from the post-World War II period until 2001. The study yields seven findings. First, the systemic causes of military doctrinal innovation are best described by balance of threat theory. Second, contrary to the existing literature, civilian intervention is not a necessary or sufficient cause of doctrinal innovation. Third, militaries consistently strive to establish a monopoly over warfare in a particular jurisdictional domain. Fourth, the frequency of military doctrinal change is a function of the complexity of the strategic problem that doctrine is designed to solve. Fifth, the complexity of the cases studied supports the argument that monocausal explanations fail to account for the interaction of multiple variables that affect doctrinal innovation. Sixth, military doctrinal innovation during peacetime is not anomalous because military organizations constantly revise their theories of victory as threats change in the external environment. Finally, the existence of doctrinal institutions creates a norm for a reliance on military doctrine.

The U.S. Department of Defense spent $11 billion in enlistment and retention bonuses from 2006 to 2010, which had only a marginally positive effect on the enlistment rate for the Army. The case study addressed this business problem of recruiting by exploring marketing strategies successful recruiting professionals used to motivate individuals to join the military. The purpose of this study was to determine effective recruiting strategies. Therefore, it incorporated the conceptual framework of emergent strategy theory, which postulated the best strategies are neither completely planned nor completely random, but are rather an adaptation to changing dynamics and circumstances. The population consisted of 2 former recruiters, 1 from the Army and another from the Marine Corps, as well as 38 college students located in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. Data for the study morphed from face-to-face interviews and 3 focus groups comprised of 10 to 15 students each, for the purpose of addressing the research question. Data analysis occurred through a process of coding and theming. The 9 themes identified included tell the story, advertising strategies, and fit for duty. A lesson learned from these themes was that the key for successful recruiting strategies lies in aligning with the wants and needs of individuals in the target demographic. If senior leaders in the Department of Defense followed the recommendations provided, each of the branches of the military service could potentially achieve higher recruiting rates at a lower cost. The study could result in social change whereby eligible recruits could view the Army and Marine Corps as professions of arms in which individuals can live out their ideals of patriotism but also have a good quality of life due to the benefits of military service.

Generational differences directly impact the culture and discipline in the U.S. Marine Corps. Previous research suggests that Generation Y's characteristics do not align with traditional military service. The specific problem is that there is a gap in the research and scholarly literature on the level of commitment of Generation Y compared to Generation X Marines. The purpose of this nonexperimental, quantitative study was to examine the influence on Marine Corps culture due to the level of commitment of active duty, enlisted Generation Y Marines compared to active duty, enlisted Generation X Marines. The theoretical frameworks for this study were the theory of generations and the organizational culture theory. The central research question was focused on the influence of Generation Y's experiences, ideas, and opinions on Marine Corps culture. In order for Marine Corps leaders to be effective, they need a better understanding of the people who work for them. This quantitative, cross-sectional survey study used a sample of 264 active duty, enlisted Marines from the 1st Marine Logistics Group in Southern California. The t tests revealed that Generation X has a higher level of commitment than Generation Y. However, the t tests also revealed that Generation Y's commitment profile indicates that the generation continues to serve because they want to or desire to remain in the Marine Corps. Lastly, multiple linear regression analysis revealed that each type of commitment was affected differently by the independent variables (age, gender, generation, and pay grade). The results provide the Marine Corps with a better understanding of generational issues. The positive social change from this research is the ability to sustain an essential and successful military culture and as a consequence, to improve the combat capability of the Marine Corps and the Department of Defense.

This thesis explores and provides analysis on several areas of study related to the history of the Confederate States Marine Corps that have long been neglected. It examines the military and political processes that were instrumental in both creating and employing a Southern Marine Corps. It also investigates relationships between the U.S. and Confederate Marine Corps, particularly in light of how the experiences of former U.S. Marines shaped the growth of the Southern Corps. In particular, the thesis asserts that, despite shared origins, the CSMC seized on opportunities presented by the Civil War and became expert in new mission areas through the efforts of a core group of determined and experienced leaders. In the process, the CSMC came to eclipse its Northern cousin, becoming a valued and vital element of the Confederate Navy. The CSMC is examined in light of its national service, thereby affording fresh perspectives on the patterns formed by its actions as part of the Southern war effort. This new research framework supports a better understanding of the roles and missions expected by Southern leaders from their Corps, and more clearly illuminates the CSMC’s differences. In particular, this approach highlights the inherent strengths of the CSMC’s unique structure that lent itself to a more efficient concept of employment. Finally, this thesis asserts that the CSMC became, for its abbreviated history, the agile, innovative, and versatile fighting unit that, man-for-man, the U.S. Marine Corps would not achieve until some time late in the nineteenth century. However, the lessons of its service were not realized, in part because of its relative historical obscurity.

The title of The Edifice Complex presents two metaphors which combine to form the focus of this study's research. The first of these refers to the Oedipus Complex of Freudian psychology: metaphorically, Marine recruits fall in love with the folklore of the Marine Corps they wish to join, yet unwittingly change that Corps over time, thus figuratively killing the older generations of Marines--their forefathers in uniform. In the second metaphor, the edifice is the structure of informal folklore and recorded history; the complex is the rites of passage or maze traversed in time by Marines. As Marines are indoctrinated in the Marine Corps' culture, they internalize the meanings of the edifice's building blocks: its symbols, rituals and myths. Bit by bit, generations of Marines individually and collectively alter the shape of the metaphorical maze and change the meanings of some elements of folklore. The purpose of the study was to analyze the causes and effects of cultural change affecting Marines and the Marine Corps from the mid-1950s to the mid1980s. Using ethnographic field methods and content analysis, the researcher investigated internal and external planned and unplanned changes in the Marine Corps. Cultural data was collected during 1984 and 1985 from print, motion picture and other media, and through interviews with Marine infantrymen, recruiters, journalists, drill instructors, historians, musicians and others, in several cultural settings. The study focused on the cultural reality of primarily male, enlisted Marines. Findings support the working hypothesis that folklore is a behavior-shaping tool which the Marine Corps effectively uses to control the behavior of Marines. Findings reveal that cultural changes have allowed or caused some Marines to value the Marine Corps materially as a source of valuable competencies and material rewards rather than professionally or patriotically as the calling of the profession of arms. Conclusions of The Edifice Complex parallel conclusions in organizational change theory, in that changes in the symbolic realm of the organization's culture are most difficult to change but have significant impact upon members of the organization. Findings and conclusions are also mutually supported in the educational, social and behavioral psychologies.

This thesis explores and provides analysis on several areas of study related to the history of the Confederate States Marine Corps that have long been neglected. It examines the military and political processes that were instrumental in both creating and employing a Southern Marine Corps. It also investigates relationships between the U.S. and Confederate Marine Corps, particularly in light of how the experiences of former U.S. Marines shaped the growth of the Southern Corps. In particular, the thesis asserts that, despite shared origins, the CSMC seized on opportunities presented by the Civil War and became expert in new mission areas through the efforts of a core group of determined and experienced leaders. In the process, the CSMC came to eclipse its Northern cousin, becoming a valued and vital element of the Confederate Navy. The CSMC is examined in light of its national service, thereby affording fresh perspectives on the patterns formed by its actions as part of the Southern war effort. This new research framework supports a better understanding of the roles and missions expected by Southern leaders from their Corps, and more clearly illuminates the CSMC’s differences. In particular, this approach highlights the inherent strengths of the CSMC’s unique structure that lent itself to a more efficient concept of employment. Finally, this thesis asserts that the CSMC became, for its abbreviated history, the agile, innovative, and versatile fighting unit that, man-for-man, the U.S. Marine Corps would not achieve until some time late in the nineteenth century. However, the lessons of its service were not realized, in part because of its relative historical obscurity.

Thesis (Master').

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Feb 2, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.