Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Feb 9, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Feb 1, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Feb 2, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

The United States Marine Corps and the United States Navy developed during the interwar period a doctrine that addressed the problems inherent in the substitution of naval gunfire for artillery support in an amphibious assault. The invasion of Betio Islet, Tarawa Atoll, in November of 1943 was the first test of this doctrine. It has been said many times since the war that the doctrine basically passed this test and that lessons learned at Tarawa increased the efficiency with which the Marine Corps and Navy applied the prewar doctrine during the rest of the war. An analysis of the planning and execution of naval bombardments in the Central Pacific Campaign, after the invasion of the Gilberts, does not support this claim. This analysis leads the researcher to three conclusions. First, the Japanese developed defenses against many of the effects of the gunfire support doctrine that blunted much of the force of American firepower. American planners were slow to recognize the implications of these changes and, consequently, were slow to react to them. Second, many naval commanders responsible for providing naval gunfire support for Central Pacific operations still equated tonnage of ordnance to effectiveness of bombardment, regardless of their frequent references to "the lessons of Tarawa." Finally, strategic concerns and outright ignorance played a large part in determining the use of naval gunfire, the first taking precedence over the "lessons" and the second leading to the ignoring of the "lessons" all together.

In the United States of America (U.S.), institutional marginalization and racial discrimination remains an arguably difficult subject to understand, both conceptually and pragmatically. Regarding governmental sectors, U.S. Armed Forces are institutions where discrimination must be critically explored in an attempt to provide an understanding of the reality faced by those who actually serve. This study involved the examination into racism within a specific elite governmental sector that emphasizes a philosophy of a unified oneness of all its members. Using a phenomenological approach, the study delved into the actual impact of racism within the Marine Corps, on the lives of individual members of a historically marginalized populace, African American/Black. The research explored and analyzed the life stories of three male members of the aforementioned population group, hence seeking to answer the research question: How has Integrated Racial Diversity in the Armed Forces Impacted Experiences of Discrimination Antagonistic to Male African American/Black Marine Corps Officers as Members of a Population Historically Marginalized and Discriminated against in the United States of America? Theories incorporated in the research offered meaning to the experiences of the individual participants. Discoveries illustrated the necessity of adaptation by the individual in coping with the impact of racially charged hostilities in an environment supposedly operating with an objective of oneness of its members. Through the findings, a theory of socio-psycho-bio dissonance was developed by the researcher. This research provides recommendations on practical ways to transformatively address and seek probable resolution in conflict – institutionally.

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Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Dec 29, 2009). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Jan 12, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

<p>This project examines the events from 1866 to 1871 in Korea between the United States and Joseon, with a specific focus on the 1866 <i>General Sherman</i> Incident and the United States Expedition to Korea in 1871. The project also examines the present memory of those events in the United States and North and South Korea. This project shows that contemporary American reactions to the events in Korea from 1866 to 1871 were numerous and ambivalent in what the American role should be in Korea. In the present, American memory of 1866 to 1871 has largely been monopolized by the American military, with the greater American collective memory largely forgetting this period. </p> <p>In the Koreas, collective memory of the five-year crisis (1866 to 1871) is divided along ideological lines. In North Korea, the victories that Korea achieved against the United States are used as stories to reinforce the North Korean line on the United States, as well as reinforcing the legitimacy of the Kim family. In South Korea, the narrative focuses on the corruption of Joseon and the Daewongun and the triumph of a “modernizing” Korean state against anti-western hardliners, and is more diverse in how the narrative is told, ranging from newspapers to K-Dramas, leading to a more complicated collective memory in the South. </p> <p>This Thesis shows that understanding the impact that the first state-to-state encounters had on the American-Korean relationship not only at the time but also in the present, is key to analyzing the complicated history of the Korean-American relationship writ large.</p>

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.