Since the first empirical paper on the topic more than two decades ago (Badgett, 1995), the common story in the literature on wages and sexual orientation has been that gay men face a wage penalty compared to heterosexual men while lesbians are paid the same as or more than heterosexual women. However, none of the papers in the literature have thoroughly addressed the role of marital status in these wage gaps. Using data from the 2013-2015 American Community Survey and OLS as well as selection-corrected estimators, we show that the gay male penalty exists only for the group of married men, while the lesbian wage premium persists across marital status but is smaller for married lesbians. / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. / This thesis investigates the effect of marital and family status on the performance and job productivity of male U.S. Marine Corps officers. The analysis includes evaluation of fitness reports, retention, and promotion to O-4 and O-5 ranks as performance measures. The primary goal is to examine the existence of any marriage premium on officers' performance and productivity and to investigate potential causal hypotheses. The personnel database used for the analysis includes more than 27,000 male Marine officers who entered the Marine Corps between FY 1980 and 1999. After controlling for selection, estimating fixed effects and using panel data in order to capture timely-varying effects, this study finds that there is a marriage premium for all performance measures. The thesis rejects the explanation that such premiums are due to supervisor favoritism. Moreover, married male officers obtain higher fitness report scores, higher promotion probabilities, and higher retention probabilities than single officers. Each additional year spent in marriage increases fitness report scores and retention probabilities. Having additional non-spousal dependents increase fitness report scores and retention probabilities. On the other hand, being a currently single but "to-be-married" officer yields higher premium, as married officers, for all productivity and performance indicators. This supports selectivity into marriage as a partial explanation of the source of the marriage premium. / Lieutenant Junior Grade, Turkish Navy / First Lieutenant, Turkish Army

My dissertation consists of three essays on the Korean labor market. The first essay studies how the extensive provision of maternity leave and childcare leave in Korea affects the employment and wages of young women. This reform is expected to increase the labor supply and decrease the labor demand for young women. As a result, the mean wage of young women should fall. But the direction of the change in their employment probability is hard to infer because it depends on the relative magnitudes of the shifts of the labor supply and demand curves. A difference-in-difference-in-differences model having older women, older men, and young men simultaneously as the control group suggests that neither the employment nor the hourly wages of young women are affected. The second essay explores why married men have higher hourly earnings and employment propensity than otherwise comparable single men. In a fixed effects regression, which controls for the selection of more productive men into marriage, married men do not experience faster growth in earnings and employment rate before marriage. Rather, when marriage takes place, the earnings of married men start increasing relative to those of single men. Also, that South Korean men have a greater earnings growth after marriage than U.S. men is consistent with the national difference in the degree of specialization within married households. Married men are more likely to work than single men only for the first few years of marriage, and single men outperform married men afterwards. The final essay studies why gender differences in earnings and earnings growth exist among new Korean college graduates before women take time off of work for marriage and motherhood. I find that women do not face an initial earnings gap after graduating college compared to men who finished military service. The lower earnings that women receive can be entirely explained by the difference in age at graduation between men and women. However, women's earnings grow slower than those of men who finished military service. This is partly because a greater percentage of women graduate from colleges of education, which provide slower earnings growth than other types of colleges. Most of the gender difference in earnings growth remains unexplained. / text