Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 330-356). / Also available by subscription via World Wide Web / viii, 356 leaves, bound 29 cm

Thesis (LL.M.). / Written for the Faculty of Law. Title from title page of PDF (viewed 2008/12/04). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Defense Decision-Making and Planning)--Naval Postgraduate School, Sept. 2004. / Thesis advisor(s): David S. Yost. Includes bibliographical references (p. 88-96). Also available online.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Defense Decision-Making and Planning))--Naval Postgraduate School, Sept. 2004. / Thesis Advisor(s): Peter Lavoy, Jeff Knopf. Includes bibliographical references (p. 87-92). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, Sept. 2004. / Thesis advisor(s): Jeffrey W. Knopf. Includes bibliographical references (p. 101-107). Also available online.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--RAND Graduate School, 2009. / "This document was submitted as a dissertation in June 2009 in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the doctoral degree in public policy analysis at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. The faculty committee that supervised and approved the dissertation consisted of Gregory F. Treverton (Chair), Lynn E. Davis, David E. Mosher, and Walter L. Perry. Professor Kathryn Blackmond Laskey (George Mason University) was the external reader. Financial support for this dissertation was provided by RAND's National Defense Research Institute"--Cover. Title from title screen (viewed on Aug. 24, 2009). Includes bibliographical references: p. 100-105.

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in securitizing discourse of the USA and Russia: Role in the process of security policy formation of nuclear-armed states Abstract This master thesis deals with a political usage of securitization of weapons of mass destruction by presidents of the two most important nuclear powers - USA and Russian Federation. For this purpose, discursive analysis of speeches of both presidents during their first terms is performed, with a goal to identify and interpret the securitizational discourse. Result is the analysis of most common type of usage of WMD securitization for legitimization of foreign-political steps and goals of these states, and their comparison. Results of the analysis shows that in the case of the US, WMD securitization was being used mainly for legitimization of politics of active formation of international situation so it would fit the US interests. In the case of Russia on the other hand, analysed discourse was being used mainly for preservation of international status quo in as stable form as possible, due to priority of domestic situation. In both cases however, predominantly economical motivations for the use of analysed discourse can be argued.

The intelligence failure regarding the estimates of the Iraqi regime is often cited as the main reason for President George W. Bush to change the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. Between 2002 and 2003, the highest figures o George W. Bush's administration often used arguments of the intelligence community to justify their decision to overthrow Saddam's regime by force. Their arguments were based primarily on the information on Hussein's contacts with al-Qaeda and his continuing ability to produce weapons of mass destruction. After the war, these estimates were proven wrong and the intelligence community was marked as the force that triggered the invasion. In my master's thesis called Crisis of U.S. Intelligence? George W. Bush and the decision to invade Iraq, I put forward arguments contradicting this widespread idea. The goal of the thesis is to cast light on the fundaments of the intelligence failure regarding Hussein's alleged contacts with al- Qaeda and his capability to stockpile and produce weapons of mass destruction. I reveal the ideological and strategic reasons behind the Bush's decision to invade Iraq and the fact that the intelligence findings played only secondary role. The true reason of the intelligence failure wasn't only flawed manipulation with human intelligence (HUMINT) and...

This research investigates the strategic intentions behind the Iranian state's programs for acquiring nuclear weapons. Using Graham Allison's Rational Actor Model of national decision-making, this thesis investigates three questions: 1) Iran's motivations for obtaining nuclear weapons; 2) Iran's strategies for actual use of nuclear weapons; and, 3) alternative political frameworks for the U.S. to use with Iran to minimize the negative effects of a nuclearized Iran. This study asserts that Iran would most likely acquire nuclear weapons for the purposes of self-reliance, a greater international voice, to make up for deficiencies in conventional weapons, and for deterrence. Some scholars argue that since Iran should be designated a "rogue" state, it may become aggressive or hostile once obtaining nuclear weapons. Yet, Iran's political actions actually seem to have become increasingly pragmatic. Hence, it appears that Iran would use this arsenal to induce caution among its rivals to avoid major wars, as well as a tool for deterrence. While current political differences between Iran and America are considerable, this research recommends pursuing greater political engagement with Tehran, focusing on mutual benefits. American policymakers should implement policies which rely on positive inducements for change as well as sanctions for non-compliance. If no rapprochement takes place prior to Iran's nuclearization, however, the U.S. will need to employ tactics for minimizing the significance of Iran having nuclear weapons. This research suggests that Washington could begin by implementing economic, technical and material sanctions, establishing a Middle East missile defense system, and beefing-up U.S. coastal defenses. / Master of Arts

This project examines the elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons during the Syrian civil war in 2013 and places the disarmament process in the context of the international nonproliferation regime and the history of United States weapons of mass destruction (WMD) policy. Additionally, I argue that U.S. policy on WMDs does not operate by a fixed set of standards; rather, cultural assumptions about a state and its weapons (such as the USSR, Iraq, Israel and their WMDs) are used to justify nonproliferation action. I present weapons as a mode of Othering that the U.S. and the nonproliferation regime employ to justify the designation of an enemy state. This analysis also examines the “myth of neutrality” of humanitarian intervention and applies these concepts to nonproliferation intervention.