Cette thèse de doctorat étudie trois questions de recherche en matière de marchés publics et de politique de la concurrence. Le premier chapitre se concentre sur une analyse microéconométrique des relations stratégiques entre d’une part l’entreprise choisie pour l’attribution d’un marché public et d’autre part l’autorité publique chargée de la régulation d’un service public. Il exploite des données sur le transport public urbain en France pour étudier les déterminants de choix réglementaires qui impactent à leur tour la rentabilité des opérateurs de transport. Le deuxième chapitre explore une évaluation ex-post d’une fusion qui a eu lieu entre deux grands groupes de transport en France (Veolia Transport et Transdev), en se concentrant sur l’existence éventuelle de gains d’efficacité dans les fusions. Enfin, le troisième chapitre donne un aperçu de l’impact d’une fusion lorsque les entreprises se font concurrence pour la qualité et repositionnent leurs services en analysant l’industrie hospitalière française. / This PhD dissertation studies three research questions in public procurement and competition policy presented in the respective chapters and preceded by a general introduction. The first chapter focuses on a microeconometric analysis of the strategic relationships between a firm awarded a public contract and the public authority responsible for regulating a public service. It exploits data on the French urban public transport industry to study the determinants of regulatory contract choices which in turn impact the cost efficiency of transport operators. The second chapter explores an ex-post assessment of a merger which took place between two major transport groups in France (Veolia Transport and Transdev), focusing on the possible existence of merger efficiency gains. Finally, the third chapter provides insight on the impact of merger when firms compete in quality and reposition their services by analyzing the French hospital industry.

One of the recognised ways through which a firm may increase its market share or reorganise its presence in a market is through a merger. A merger occurs when independent firms combine their businesses. Section 12A of the Competition Act, 1998, provides two grounds in terms of which mergers must be evaluated by competition authorities. These are competition and public interest considerations. The Act is reticent on which, between the two considerations, should take precedence in the event that the two conflict. The anterior purpose of this study is therefore to provide an in-depth analysis on which consideration must take precedence in the event of conflict. On analysis, the majority of case law suggests that the competition considerations must take precedence. This observation is also buttressed by a significant amount of literature, which holds that in merger analysis, the public interests only play a secondary role to the competition inquiry. / Mercantile Law / LL.M. (Mercantile Law)