Thesis (Ed. D.)--Teachers College, Columbia University. / Typescript; issued also on microfilm. Sponsor: Maxine Greene. Dissertation Committee: Dwayne Huebner. Bibliography: leaves 265-269.

Th. Ph. D.--School of communication--Edwardsville--Southern Illinois University, 1969.

Texte remanié de: Diss.--Philosophische Fakultät--Münster--Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität, 1989.

Thesis (M.A..)--Stony Brook University, 2008. / This official electronic copy is part of the DSpace Stony Brook theses & dissertations collection maintained by the University Libraries, Special Collections & University Archives on behalf of the Stony Brook Graduate School. It is stored in the SUNY Digital Institutional Repository and can be accessed through the website. Presented to the Stony Brook University Graduate School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy; as recommended and accepted by the candidate's degree sponsor, the Dept. of Philosophy. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duquesne University, 2009. / Title from document title page. Abstract included in electronic submission form. Includes bibliographical references (p. 284-294) and index.

Diss. / Bibliogr. p. 167-172.

This dissertation explores the significance of figurative art for contemporary cultural life. It is motivated by the fact that such art is often regarded as a thing of the past and largely replaced by works born of more recent movements. I argue that figurative art bears possibilities that are not yet exhausted, and moreover that there is something about our age that calls for the creation of figurative works. The first part addresses a diagnosis of modernity offered by Gregg Horowitz. For him, the triumphant attitude of the age hides our inability to digest a series of traumatic losses - the loss of nature's normativity, of art's significance for cross-generational transmission of values, and of history's demand to carry forward the values of previous generations. He sees in art the opportunity to bring such traumatic loss to reflection, and calls for the aesthetics of mourning as art's contemporary vocation. In order to demonstrate the importance of an element of mourning, the discussion of Horowitz is followed by an account of Gianni Vattimo's attempt to retrieve art from a position of inessentiality. The lack of a tragic moment in his project highlights some of the drawbacks connected to such an omission. In the second part of the project I insist that, though the element of mourning is necessary, we should not stop there in the search for art's contemporary vocation. Using the phenomenology of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty I sustain the hope that we may recover some form of continuity without disregarding the trauma of loss. Figurative art is particularly suitable for this task because it is more likely to preserve the integrity of its subject matter rather than breaking it down into its constitutive parts, potentially carrying forward elements of past modes of relating to our world.

Despite the burgeoning field of Contemporary Continental Philosophy of Religion and the surfeit of literature on the philosophy of the body, little discusses the connections between the religious practice and the body in any phenomenologically rigorous way. However, one might argue that the phenomenology of incarnation serves as an excellent example of the ways in which the phenomenological innovations achieved by French phenomenologists Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, Michel Henry, and Jean-Luc Marion allow for the study of both the body and the religious to be furthered. Given that the field of French phenomenology is vast, it is essential that we limit our study to but a few phenomenologists whose work is most substantially involved with the problem of incarnate experience, religious experience, embodiment, and the relation to the transcendent. Therefore, this project will proceed by way of working through phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Marion, and Michel Henry in order to explore the resources these four thinkers have for our investigation into incarnate experience. Afterwards, I will attempt to construct a phenomenology of incarnate experience, drawing from their resources and insights into potential problems in hopes of being able to move beyond the problems of "doctrinal importation" and "allusory ambiguity" and further the discourse of philosophy's encounter with religious experience.

Orientadores: Eduardo Sebastiani Ferreira, Maria Aparecida Viggiani Bicudo / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Faculdade de Educação / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-25T15:45:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Anastacio_MariaQueirogaAmoroso_D.pdf: 883084 bytes, checksum: 823a87de036716ac9826c7f22f6404e7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 1999 / Doutorado

Notre mémoire vise à mettre en lumière le rôle crucial que joue le thème de la nature dans l'œuvre de Merleau-Ponty. Nous y défendons une lecture continuiste de son corpus, situant, à la jointure de ses différentes phases, la persistance de l'interrogation sur la nature et sur le monde naturel. De ses premiers écrits sur la psychologie du comportement à son projet ontologique tardif - culminant dans son ouvrage inachevé Le visible et l'invisible - Merleau-Ponty cherche avec insistance à se frayer un chemin vers le versant inarticulé du monde vécu, à poser le regard sur ce qui précède et sous-tend la solidité et la cohérence du réel. Une telle entreprise, visant le « naturel » comme ce qui se trouve en dehors de nos réseaux humains de signification, doit se déployer à rebours des positivismes traditionnels qui tendent à introniser un seul pôle de l'expérience - le sujet ou l'objet - au statut de fondement du réel. Ce qui singularise le concept merleau-pontien de nature, c'est qu'il est avant tout le lieu où tente de s'exprimer un paradoxe irrésolu : la nature est ce qui résiste pleinement à notre humanité sans pouvoir être envisagé en dehors de celle-ci. Notre mémoire cherche à comprendre la genèse proprement phénoménologique de ce paradoxe de la nature, en mettant en lumière l'apport crucial des textes de Husserl à la critique merleau-pontienne des différents positivismes, critique qui reprend l'idée de « monde vécu » pour rompre définitivement avec l'idée d'une nature comprise comme théâtre objectif sur lequel se déploieraient une productivité humaine, une histoire, des vies subjectives et une culture intersubjective. Nous suggérons que la reprise que fait Merleau-Ponty des écrits de Husserl le pousse à envisager le questionnement sur la nature non-humaine comme une interrogation du versant « sauvage » de l'expérience qui, plutôt que de se trouver figé en dessous de l'histoire humaine, est à comprendre comme une productivité dynamique toujours à l'œuvre dans l'expérience vécue, une pré-objectivité aux avatars multiples qui participe à la détermination ouverte du réel. / This thesis is an attempt to shed light on the crucial role that the notion of nature plays in Merleau-Ponty's work. By approaching the philosopher's corpus as a unified movement built of several phases, we argue that his persistent interrogating of nature and the natural world can be understood as the hinge that articulates together all of its different moments. From his early writings on behavioral psychology to his late ontology - which culminates in his unfinished work The Visible and the Invisible - Merleau-Ponty consistently seeks a way to grasp the dimensions of lived experience which have not already been articulated, to thematize what precedes and subtends the solidity and coherence of the reality that we experience. Such an endeavor, seeking nature as what lies outside and beyond our human networks of signification, unfolds in contradistinction with the classical positivist ontologies that tend to elevate a single pole of lived experience - either the subject or the object - as the founding term of reality. What characterizes Merleau-Ponty's concept of nature is that it resists such hypostases by remaining the locus of an unresolved paradox: nature is what fully resists our humanity without being conceivable outside of the boundaries of our humanity. This master's thesis seeks to unfold the phenomenological genesis of this paradoxical view of nature by highlighting the crucial contribution of Husserl's writings to the Merleau-Pontian critique of positivism, a critique that takes the idea of "perceived world" to definitely divorce the traditional conceptions of nature as an objective theatre stage upon which unfolds a human productivity, a history, a multiplicity of subjective lives, and an intersubjective culture. I suggest that Merleau-Ponty's taking up of Husserl's writings brings him to comprehend the interrogation of non-human nature as an investigation of the "wild" aspect of experience. The latter, instead of being conceived as a fixated entity that lies underneath human history, is to be envisaged as a dynamic productivity that is always at work across lived experience, a pre-objectivity which takes various shapes, and which participates in the open-ended determination of reality.