No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

Through introspection we may gain insight into phenomenology and thereby learn about our own mental lives. One aspect of our phenomenology that we might wish to introspect is our experience of selfhood. In particular, Galen Strawson views phenomenology as particularly useful for reasoning about the self. He expresses this in what he calls the Equivalence Thesis, which states that there are selves if and only if there is something that has properties attributed to the self in every instance of self-experience, where self-experience refers to a phenomenological experience of selfhood. In order to arrive at a phenomenological characterization, any set of properties that characterizes the self via the Equivalence Thesis, one must examine the phenomenology of self-experience through introspection. The Equivalence Thesis can run into difficulties in at least two ways with respect to its reliance on introspection. If introspection is unreliable then the Equivalence Thesis fails as we cannot accurately examine our phenomenology. While some of the consequences of such unreliability will be explored this will not be the main focus. Instead I call into question whether or not introspection provides the information that Strawson says it does. The Equivalence Thesis depends on the ability of introspection to provide us with information about so called mental elements, which give structure to our overall phenomenology. However, this is implausible. When we introspect we can learn directly about the kind of experience we are having, but it will not allow us to form an acceptable phenomenological characterization. / Master of Arts / Throughout life we all have various phenomenological experiences. One may feel happy, see a familiar face, or think about solutions to a problem. Each one of these experiences has a first personal element to it. That is we perceive these as belonging to a singular entity, a self. In fact, we often think of ourselves as selves due at least in part to the fact that we are conscious. Some of our conscious experiences even contribute to the way we think about selves. Galen Strawson argues that these experiences, which he calls self-experiences, provide a suitable foundation for our metaphysical reasoning about the self in the Equivalence Thesis. I argue, however, that our phenomenological experiences should not be used to provide such a foundation.

In this paper, I argue that pluralism about material constitution (i.e., holding that the relata of constitution can be non-identical) is a theoretically useful notion. First, I propose a principle whose denial is sufficient and, to my knowledge, necessary for pluralism to be true. Then I formulate three metaphysical antinomies (the problem of material constitution, the problem of change, and the problem of many) in such a way as to reveal that the previous principle is involved in all three. Then I show that the denial of the principle resolves all three of these problems. Finally, I conclude that pluralism is indeed theoretically useful on the basis of the following three points: 1) denying the mentioned principle is sufficient for pluralism to be correct, 2) denying the principle resolves three problems, and 3) by a theoretically useful notion I mean that if it were true it would solve multiple problems. / Master of Arts / There is a debate in philosophy about whether or not objects are identical to what makes them up. This paper argues that if we are to assume objects are not identical to what makes them up then many problems that have be written about in the literature dissipate. Thus, it is useful to believe that objects are not identical to what makes them up.

In my thesis I will be proposing situationalism: a new theory of how it is that things change over time. It is B-theoretic, eternalist and endurantist. The central contention of the theory is that what is true can differ in a metaphysically significant way from time to time. The theory emerges as a solution to the problem of change. In my first chapter, I argue that change is genuinely problematic (contra some of the recent literature). There are at least three ways to generate problems from change, and I elucidate problems from the law of non-contradiction and the indiscernibility of identicals. In the second chapter, I examine the nature of change and contend that the current major solutions to the problem fail to uphold our intuitive notion of change. Chapter 3 introduces the idea of a situation; a part of reality. The fourth chapter applies situations to the problem of change and comes up with a new solution. The solution relies on a denial of universal persistence; the denial of the idea that what is true in a situation s is thereby true in every situation of which s is a part. Chapter 5 considers the infamous Ship of Theseus case, and concludes that situationalism can also solve this problem. The situationalist account of the Ship of Theseus puzzle enables us, in Chapter 6, to briefly demonstrate the analogous application of the solution to a series of other persistence puzzles. The seventh chapter discusses the metaphysical consequences of such a view. The core claim is of the primacy of parts of reality over reality as a whole. It is a position according to which truth in situations is fundamental and situations needn’t cohere. I hold that the theory has significant costs but also substantial benefits. For this reason it is worth serious consideration.

In this thesis, I use Kant's Transcendental Ideal and Fourth Antinomy in the Critique of Pure Reason as a bedrock to understand mistakes in popular spatio-temporal and transcendental proofs for the existence of God and develop a discussion of the necessity of the continued search for, and potential foundation of, an alternative proof of the existence of God. I will first attempt to instill the thought of the necessity of a commitment to the idea of the existence of God. I will then explain and clarify a) the three transcendental proofs for the existence of God and b) what I take to be Kant’s most relevant and substantive refutations of these proofs. After, I will explain and clarify Kant’s perceived failure of spatio-temporal proofs. I then summarize what I consider to be most grave failure of the transcendental proof. Finally, I will assume Kant’s refutation of the ontological proof to be a metaphysical failure and discuss potential solutions to the current issues of proofs for the existence of God.

Ordinary material objects, such as guitars and houses, do not seem to pose any serious philosophical problems. However, the nature of the material objects and their part-whole relation raises serious questions about fundamental ontologies. Furthermore, part-whole relations are not necessarily spatial; they can be temporal as well. My dissertation investigates the problems posed by ordinary material objects, and the different ontological views that attempt to provide answers to these problems. I then present a new and radical view, which I call Nihilist Perdurantism (NP). NP claims that objects have temporal parts, but not spatial parts. I arrive at this view by first exploring and arguing against different views on composition, with a focus on arguments against common sense ontologies of ordinary objects. I then discuss the nature of mereological simples and argue against several views that claim that qualitatively heterogeneous simples are possible (Markosian and McDaniel). Next, I present my arguments against perdurantist, endurantist, and presentist view of persistence. I especially focus on endurantism, and use the aforementioned argument against the possibility of qualitatively heterogeneous simples to construct a similar argument against endurantism. Finally, I argue in favor of my view, NP. This view combines a mereological nihilist view (defended at various times by Unger, Van Inwagen, Merricks, and Sider) about spatial parts with a perdurantist view (defended at various times by Lewis, Hawley, Heller, and Sider) of temporal parts. Therefore, according to NP, there are no guitars, trees, or houses. The only objects that exist are NP objects; these are line-shaped objects that extend through spacetime. With respect to the three spatial dimensions, these objects have no parts. However, with respect to the temporal dimension, NP objects do have parts in the form of points and line segments. My work shows that NP has better solutions to many of the puzzles and problems posed by material objects, such as the puzzle of change, over the three standard views. Hinchliff argues that change is puzzling because in order for there to be real change, then the following four intuitions must be true: (1) The candle persists through the change. It existed when it was straight, and it exists now when it is bent…(2) Shapes are properties not relations. They are one-placed, not many-placed…(3) The candle itself has the shapes. Not just a part but the candle itself was straight, and not just a part but the candle itself is bent…(4) The shapes are incompatible. If the shapes were compatible, there need not have been a change. The puzzle of change is the mutual inconsistency of these four intuitions. I argue that perdurantists must deny intuition (3), endurantists must deny intuition (2), and presentists must deny intuition (1). I then argue that only NP can accommodate all four intuitions about both macroscopic and microscopic change while resolving the inconsistency of the four intuitions. My dissertation presents a new view that provides a fresh perspective on the debate about the nature of material objects. My development of NP touches on a number of other philosophical problems. In Chapter One, I discuss the role of intuitions in metaphysics, and argue that many supposedly “common sense” intuitions are already philosophical positions. In Chapter 2, I argue against Korman’s and Markosian’s common sense ontologies of ordinary objects. In Chapter 3, I argue that the endurantist view of persistence is inconsistent and should be rejected. In addition to making the case for NP and its solution to the puzzle of change in Chapter 4, I also argue that NP can solve the problem of motion in a homogenous substance. Finally, in Chapter Five, I argue against the possibility of both gunky and junky material objects.