On battlefields and within organizations, a fog obscures subordinate activity from superior observation, producing an information asymmetry endemic to most superior-subordinate relationships. A superior’s ability to observe, to peer through this fog, distinguishes different types of organizations, largely determining what tasks an organization may accomplish and how superior control is balanced against subordinate autonomy (James Wilson, 2000). Yet modern technology is lifting this fog, with each day increasing the detail and depth of what superiors may observe. This thesis explores superior control with modern technology, by introducing and assessing a new term, nanomanagement—where superiors use technology to control, in ever-increasing detail, the actions of all of their subordinates. Through interviewing mid-level officers of the U.S. and British armies, who served in Iraq between 2003 and 2008, this qualitative study explores two questions. “Why nanomanagement?” seeks to understand the causes, or what may motivate nanomanagement. “How does nanomanagement influence superior control and subordinate autonomy?” seeks to understand the effects of nanomanagement. This thesis employs five factors—organizational culture, ex ante controls, ex post controls, hierarchical control and exogenous factors—as different theoretical frameworks to understand nanomanagement. Trackers, drones and long screwdrivers, modern variants of police patrols that reduce transaction costs and may reverse information asymmetry, are introduced. This thesis also suggests three terms to describe when nanomanaging superiors take action undermining traditional hierarchical control: shifting (focusing attention on subordinate levels), drifting (acting at subordinate levels), and grifting (cheating the hierarchy by controlling actions at levels beneath their immediate subordinates). These actions signal a new form of hierarchical control by exclusion—ex claudere control. By analyzing a case where much of the fog separating superior from subordinate thinned and lifted, this thesis assesses and updates the long fought battle between superior control and subordinate autonomy.

'To bewilder the enemy and mislead him continually as to our real positions and attentions is one of our most hopeful tasks and to do this ingenuity, imagination and daring are required.'(Ronald Penrose, 1941, Home Guard Manual of Camouflage, p.13) This thesis approaches the cultures and geographies of military conflict, charting the history of military camouflage through a multi-faceted biography of this technology’s life-path. By studying the scientific biography of Dr Hugh Cott (1900-1987), eminent zoologist and skilful artist turned camoufleur in WWII, entwined with the fragmentary mobile biographies of other camouflage practioners, including artists, animals and even a magician, the sites and spacings of camouflage’s life-path from the late-nineteenth century into the Desert War are traced. The military’s enrolment of diverse outside specialists practised in visual literacy is examined to reveal that technological development led to transformations, not only in military knowledge, but also in the militarism of knowledges such as science and art. Moving through the scientists’ fieldsite, the committee boardroom, the military training site and the soldiers’ battlefield, this thesis uncovers the history of a most ambiguous military invention, exposing its darker patterning and thus subverting a long-dominant narrative of camouflage as solely a protective technology. Furthermore, this camouflage biography is narrated from the perspective of the technology’s inventors and practioners as a means to encounter the situated and also embodied nature of technological innovation in military conflict. It demonstrates that, as camouflage transformed battlefields into unsettling theatres of war, there were lasting consequences not only for knowledge and technology, but also for both the ethics of battle and the individuals enrolled in this process. Overall, this geographically structured biography explores how camouflage is a jarring technology, combining aesthetic and artistic appreciation with complex scientific theory, to guileful and deadly effect.

Counter-insurgency assumed a status during the twentieth century as one of the British military‟s fortes. A wealth of asymmetric warfare experience was accumulated after World War Two, as the small wars of decolonisation offered the army of a fading imperial power the opportunity to regularly deploy against an irregular enemy. Yet this quantity of experience has been misguidedly conflated with quality. This thesis holds that the British, far from being the counter-insurgent exemplars that history has benevolently cast them, have in fact consistently proven to be slow learners and slow strategic burners in the realm of counter-insurgency warfare. The case study-based nature of this thesis, utilising the chronologically and geographically dispersed examples of Malaya (1948-60), Kenya (1952-60), South Yemen (1962-67), the first decade of the Northern Irish „Troubles‟ (1969-79), culminates with an analysis of the recent British counter-insurgency campaign in southern Iraq (2003-09). This thesis will blend historical narrative with critical analysis in order to establish a new paradigm through which to interpret and analyse British inertia in counter-insurgency and help unpack the mythology of inherent British competence in the realm of irregular warfare. Three major dimensions emerge. These elements constitute a „Tri-Partite Counter-Insurgency Model‟, and were carefully selected as comprising the major causal and impacting factors contributing to success or failure in counter-insurgency, and were settled upon after an exhaustive review of primary and secondary literature relating to counter-insurgency, both historical and doctrinal. The Tri-Partite Model is constructed by three interactive and interdependent factors: the counter-insurgent, the insurgent, and the international political context.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / This thesis develops a theory to determine the best execution time to conduct a hostage rescue attempt. It does so by explaining the phenomenon of a hostage crisis biorhythm and proposing four principles essential for success. The principles of hostage rescue operations presented in this thesis and used in the biorhythm model-surprise, intelligence, operator's skill, and deception-are derived from looking at numerous planning models from special operations, from personal experience, and the thorough analysis of six historical cases. The historical cases show that in every instance any one of these four principles was overlooked, the operation was doomed. These principles have been determined to be the most critical factors that change as the crisis develops throughout the hostage ordeal. A thorough understanding of this biorhythm will provide planning guidelines to assess the best windows of opportunity for a proposed rescue attempt. One main focus of this work will be an in-depth case study of the hostage rescue operation "CHAVIN DE HUANTAR". This case study will present compelling evidence to reinforce my hypothesis, and serves as a template model for successful rescue operations. The analysis of this single case will provide a wealth of information on the success of this remarkable operation. Another main focus of this thesis will be strategic thinking of a hostage crisis using game theory analysis. The findings of this thesis will enable decision-makers to plan and organize hostage rescue forces to act at the appropriate time (window of opportunity), maximizing their chances of success. Additionally, it will provide a useful planning model that can be implemented effectively and accurately, presenting a clear picture of possible outcomes throughout a hostage crisis. Furthermore, this thesis will help the reader become a better strategist during the planning, preparation, and execution of a hostage rescue operation. It will provide a thorough understanding of how these operations work, how to solve them successfully, and how to predict possible outcomes at different stages of the operation applying the principles of game theory. / Major, United States Army

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / This thesis analyzes engineering readiness and training onboard United States Navy surface ships. On the west coast, the major contributor to training is the Afloat Training Group, Pacific (ATGPAC). The primary objective is to determine whether the readiness standards provide pertinent insight to the surface force Commander and generate alternatives that may assist in better characterization of force-wide engineering readiness. The Type Commander has many questions that should be answered. Some of these are addressed with Poisson and binomial models. The results include: first, age of a ship has no association with performance of drills and that the number of discrepancies is associated with the performance of drills; second, drill performance decreased from the first initial assessment (IA) to the second IA; third, on average, the number of material discrepancies decreases from the IA to the underway demonstration (UD) for ships observed over two cycles; fourth, good ships do well on four programs; finally, training is effective. A table characterizing ships as above average, average, or below average in drill effectiveness at the IA and UD is supplied. / Lieutenant, United States Navy

This thesis discusses two emerging technologies and how their integration with UAVs can improve the situational awareness capability of the Expeditionary Strike Group. Shotspotter is an acoustic gunshot detection system and Cursor on Target is an XML based schema to enhance information exchanges. When integrated with UAVs, these two technologies will drastically improve an ESG's efficiency and lethality in combat.

This thesis explores the possible gains and discusses the constraints of a communications system that uses a ship to unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) radio frequency (RF) link paired with a UAV to satellite free space optic (FSO) link to accomplish satellite communications. Analysis shows that a data rate of 2 gigabits per second (Gbps) with a 1 . 10 probability of bit error can be attained by a shipboard system with a relatively small antenna and power supply if an FSO-enabled UAV is used. An experiment demonstrated that the addition of an FSO link and additional routing does not reduce the performance of a slower data rate RF link. The findings indicate that a composite RF and FSO ship-UAV-satellite system can be used within the Transformational Communications Architecture (TCA) and with the Navy's FORCEnet to enable network-centric operations (NCO).

U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) and the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) forces conduct numerous training missions within South America in support of SOCSOUTH's strategy. Additionally, the two services routinely conduct similar missions with similar Host Nation (HN) forces. Historically, Army SF and NSW have lacked a strong operational 'handshake' when transitions occur between these HN units. Often, the results are redundant training with HN forces, lack of overall training continuity, a high expenditure for the results obtained, and an inability to more rapidly progress forward with HN training. The lack of inter-service communication between the Army SF and the NSW forces becomes more significant when the number of SOF available in the AOR is reduced. By addressing these key issues through more efficient inter-service communication, the present forces can more adequately respond to the current and future threats in the AOR. This thesis presents ideas that may help curtail excessive spending while increasing the ability of the two Special Forces service components, SF and NSW, to collectively work together with a greater understanding of each others capabilities and mission directives. This thesis investigates several factors that affect the efficiency of U.S. forces conducting training with HN countries throughout South America and focuses specifically on the troubled areas of Colombia and the Tri-border region of Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina, and their political, economic, and demographic uniqueness. It also takes a look into how Special Operations forces should be and are currently employed in Operation Iraqi Freedom, their strategic utility and overall effectiveness. Through analyzing these factors, the thesis identifies key elements that contribute to the effectiveness of the Special Operations Forces tasked with working throughout South America and refocuses in on the operational requirements, specifically informational reporting and dissemination, which could better facilitate an inter-service handshake.

This thesis will examine the potential of the two competing designs for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), with regard to potential deployment of this vessel type by the Turkish Navy. The first design is by Lockheed Martin and has been designated the USS Freedom as the U.S. Navyâ s first LCS. The second design is by General Dynamics. This thesis will focus on the LCS usage concepts in Naval Capability Pillars and Information Operations. As a transformation platform, the LCS will be critical in implementing new operational concepts and in providing a focused, littoral mission platform for joint forces. Its superior speed and maneuverability; low radar, infrared, and acoustic signatures; and ability to lay distributed sensor fields are all fundamental to mission success. It will also carry a â squadronâ of unmanned vehicles (air, surface, and undersea) that will considerably extend its sensor and weapon coverage and provide substantial Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities. This thesis will also discuss present and future platforms and their concepts of operation in Turkish littoral waters (Aegean Sea, Black Sea, and Mediterranean Sea).

This thesis researches the elements of the art of influence in an unconventional warfare environment to develop a model of influence that can be utilized by Special Forces conducting unconventional warfare. The research was based on several premises: (1) the strategic utility of Special Forces (SF) lies in its ability to influence a target audience in an unconventional warfare (UW) environment; (2) the nature of UW necessitates a bottom up and nonkinetic approach to influence in order to have lasting effective results. Chapter II focuses on the elements of influence derived from the academic literature and from commercial and political applications of cognitive and social psychology. Chapter III examines key elements of influence derived from the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines and the Malayan Emergency. Chapter IV reviews several relevant models and uses them, along with the analysis of the key elements of influence identified in prior chapters, to develop a new grassroots influence model The results of the research are eight principles of grassroots psychological operations. The GRP model is intended to work in conjunction with or in support of other models that encompass the entire spectrum of activities in an UW conflict.