Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Waikato, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 443-488) Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (MMil (Security and Africa Studies. Military History)--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / Henry Timson Lukin was born and educated in Britain. After completion of his schooling at the Merchant Taylor’s School in 1875 he had hoped to enter the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, but failed the entry examinations. However, seizing the moment of a war in South Africa, he left in 1879 for Natal, where he worked first as a road foreman, but soon, with the help of a cousin, Lieutenant Jack Spurgin, he was commissioned into the 77th Regiment and under the command of Major H.M. Bengough and saw service during the Anglo-Zulu War. Having distinguished himself in the field in Zululand, Lukin was commissioned as a lieutenant in the Cape Mounted Riflemen (CMR) and served with this outfit in the Basuto War (1881), the Langeberg campaign (1896-97) and the South African War (1899-1902). During the South African War he received the Distinguished Service Order (DSO) for the defence of Jammersbergdrift and played an important role in capturing key rebel commando leaders, including Commandant Johannes Lötter and Commandant Gideon Scheepers. After the war he received the Commander of the Order of St Michael & St George (CMG) and was appointed as the Commandant General of the Cape Colonial Forces. He played an important role in establishing the structures of the Union Defence Forces (UDF) and was appointed as Inspector General of the Permanent Force in 1912. He influenced the debate on colonial warfare with the writing of the maxim handbook and a training pamphlet, Savage Warfare: Hints on Tactics to be adopted and Precautions to be taken and during the First World War distinguished himself as commander of a force of the South African troops in German South-West Africa (1914-1915) and as commander of the South African Brigade in Egypt (1916) and in France (1916-17). He was promoted to Major General when he assumed the command the 9th Scottish Division in December 1916. In 1917 one of the highest honours was bestowed upon him when he was knighted. The illness of his wife, Annie Marie (Lily) necessitated a transfer to Britain, where he commanded the 64th Division until the end of the war. He retired from the military shortly after the Armistice and returned with his wife to South Africa, where he remained active in a variety of ex-servicemen’s organisations, including that of 1 South African Infantry Brigade. He was also a guest speaker at various functions, including the unveiling of monuments and memorials, and served on the Defence Commission of Enquiry (1924). Major General Sir Henry Timson Lukin died after a full, varied and distinguished military career in December 1925. Lukin and the Brigade had an enormous impact on the creation of a new South African identity during the First World War and period immediately after and played an important role in the formation of a new South African military organisation and culture.

Thesis (MMil (Security and Africa Studies))--University of Stellenbosch, 2006. / The purpose of this study is to investigate the cause(s), the nature, and characteristics of the conflict in Burundi, and 10 explore the conditions for sustainable peace and prospects for peace. The study is intended as a descriptive analysis of conflict and peace in a case study of Burundi. Since independence in 1962, intermittent conflict has characterised the state of Burundi. There are various accounts of the conflict, of which a popular, but superficial, relates an 'ethnic' conflict between Hutus and Tutsis. Equally disparate, is the prescription of solutions, the most dominant of which is power sharing based on ethnic quotas. The conflict is played out in the context of a failing state with sharp structural weaknesses. In addition, Burundi is mired in the wider instabilities of the Great Lakes region and the communicable effects thereof. The study breaks away from the tendency to analyse only the current (since 1993) bout of conflict. It is proposed that the various incidences of conflict mark different phases in the life cycle of a single conflict. The study also breaks away from the tendency to view the conflict as only opposing Hutus and Tutsis. These two tendencies in analysis generate serious distortions and omissions and may account for the wrong conclusions regarding the conflict in Burundi. Another contribution of the study resides with the proposal of the necessary and sufficient conditions for peace in Burundi. The contention brought forward by this study is that exclusion would appear to be the strongest theoretical approach to understand and describe the conflict in Burundi. In this regard, one particular contentious issue has remained constant throughout all the incidences of conflict involving different groups. The central issue has been about the political economy of Burundi that has systematically denied social mobility for the 'other'. The Burundian state is a repository of political, economic and social security where the 'other', defined in ethnic, intra-ethnic, clanic, regional, elitist (and historically dynastic) terms, is excluded and subordinated. Exclusion (and the consequent inequalities and injustices) is a source of acute grievance and motivation for collective violence. The resultant conflict has manifested in a struggle for the control of the state. Inter alia, the conflict has been pemicious, genocidal, protracted and intractable. The notion of institutionalised power sharing, based on ethnic quotas, has been put forward by the actors in the peace process as the fundamental principle guiding the search for a solution to the conflict in Burundi. The study concludes that power sharing may be necessary, as a confidence building measure, however, power Sharing in itself is not a sufficient condition for sustainable peace, and may well in fulure prove to be Ihe weakest link in the peace process. Inter alia, the conditions in Burundi are not amenable to institutionalised power sharing as such, e.g. the presence of an overwhelming majority, and deep socio-economic inequality along ethnic lines. Further, the current power sharing structure in Burundi tilts the democratic framework in favour of Tutsi participation and security, awards the Tutsi with a de facto veto power, fixes the ethnic balance of power, and thus perpetuates conflict generating Tutsi domination of the political economy of Burundi. This study proposes the reconstruction of the state (state building) as a necessary precondition for peace. II is concluded that political representation, economic opportunity and social mobility, must transcend social categories in Burundi. The continuing instabilities in the Great Lakes region are also a point of concem. Thus, peace in Burundi is also contingent upon greater efforts to curb the communicable conflicts in this region.

Thesis (MMil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2007. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT APPLICABLE TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY CAMOUFLAGE CLOTHING COMMODITY There are many reasons for the popularity of the supply chain or the supply chain management concept. Through globalisation, entities are forced to look for more effective ways to coordinate the flow of goods and material between facilities, into and out of the business. Customers are consistently demanding products that are delivered faster, exactly on time, and with no damage. Supply chain management is the systemic, strategic coordination of the traditional business functions and the tactics across these business functions within a particular entity and across businesses within the supply chain, for the purpose of improving the long-term performance of the individual entities and the supply chain as a whole. One key objective of supply chain management is to lower the costs required to provide the necessary level of customer service, in order to gain a competitive advantage within a market segment. To be fully effective in today’s competitive environment, entities must expand their integrated behaviour to incorporate customers and suppliers. Low cost and differentiated service help build a competitive advantage for the supply chain. When entities take up a supply chain management philosophy, they must determine and establish management practices that permit them to operate and behave consistent with this philosophy. Performance measurement provides the necessary assistance for performance improvement in pursuit of supply chain excellence. The efficient and effective management of this supply chain with performance measurement and internal controls establishes a solid base for competitive advantage. The SA Army camouflage clothing logistics reveals elements of improvement, as compared to supply chain management principles. Camouflage clothing forms an important element of the total supplies of a soldier in sustaining military and warfare capabilities. Camouflage clothing logistics in the SA Army is a complex mix of physical entities, processes and rules that is governed by mostly conceptual concepts and principles. The SA Army lacks an integrated supply chain philosophy and clear supply chain management principles. Supply chain management can enhance camouflage clothing logistics in the SA Army, if the principles are properly applied. The SA Army is a military institution with peacekeeping operations as their core function. The manufacturing and distribution of clothing is not a core function of the SA Army and can therefore be outsourced to address most of the concerns raised under the present system. Although it would be difficult and cumbersome to implement an integrated supply chain, with supply chain management philosophy and practices, the principle will enhance efficiency and effectiveness in today’s economic environment. The level of outsourcing and the effectiveness of control will determine the degree of success the SA Army will achieve. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: AANVOERKETTINGBESTUUR VAN TOEPASSING OP DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE LEëR KAMOEFLEERDRAG KOMMODITEIT Daar is verskeie redes vir die populariteit van die aanvoerketting of die aanvoerkettingbestuurskonsep. Globalisasie het entiteite gedwing om ondersoek in te stel na meer effektiewe maniere om die vloei van goedere en materiaal, tussen fasilitieite, asook in en uit die entiteit te koördineer. Kliënte eis gereeld produkte wat vinniger, presies op tyd en met geen skade afgelewer word. Aanvoerkettingbestuur is die sistemiese, strategiese koordinasie van al die tradisionele besigheidsfunksies, asook taktieke oor hierdie besigheidsfunksies, binne ‘n entiteit en oor besighede binne die aanvoerketting, met die doel om die langtermyn prestasie van die individuele entiteite en die aanvoerketting as geheel te verbeter. Een sleuteldoel van aanvoerkettingbestuur is om kostes te verminder. Hierdie kostes word geassosieer met ‘n sekere vlak van kliëntediens, wat voorsien moet word om ‘n kompeterende voordeel in die marksegment te verkry. Om in vandag se kompeterende omgewing ten volle effektief te wees moet entiteite hul geïntegreerde gedrag uitbrei om kliënte en verskaffers in te sluit. Lae koste en gedifferensieërde diens help om kompeterende voordeel binne die aanvoerketting te bou. Sodra entitieite ‘n aanvoerkettingfilosofie aanneem, moet hulle bestuurspraktyke bepaal en vastel hoe om in lyn met dié filosofie op te tree en te funksioneer. Prestasiemeting voorsien die nodige riglyn vir prestasieverbetering in die strewe na aanvoerketting uitnemendheid. Kamoefleerdrag vorm ‘n belangrike element in die uitrusting van die soldaat wanneer militêre- en oorlogsvermoë hanteer moet word. Kamoefleerdraglogistiek in die SA Leër is ‘n komplekse mengsel van fisiese entiteite, prosesse and reëls wat meestal deur konseptuele beginsels geregeer word. Die SA Leër kamoefleerdrag logistiek reflekteer elemente van verbetering, wanneer vergelyk word met aanvoerkettingbestuursbeginsels. Die SA Leër kort ‘n geïntegreerde aanvoerkettingfilosofie, asook duidelike aanvoerkettingbestuursbeginsels. Aanvoerkettingbestuur kan die kamoefleerdrag logistiek in die SA Leër verbeter, as die beginsels reg toegepas word. Die SA Leër is ‘n militêre instelling met vredesoperasies as primêre funksie. Die vervaardiging en verspreiding van klerasie is nie die SA Lëer se primêre funksie nie en kan daarom geprivatiseer word. Dit sal primêr die probleme wat onder die huidige stelsel voorkom, aanspreek. Al word dit voorsien dat dit moeilik en omslagtig sal wees om ‘n geïntegreerde aanvoerkettingfilosofie en -beginsel in die SA Leër te implimenteer, dit die doeltreffendheid en doelmatigheid van die huidige stelsel in vandag se ekonomie sal verbeter.

Chapter one adopts a systematic review methodology in order to identify relevant evidence concerning the clinical effectiveness of weight management programmes in the military. It explores the success of such programmes that adopt cognitive-behavioural components as part of their treatment approach as opposed to standard care offered by the military. The paper also offers areas for further research, particularly focused on the need for more longitudinal evidence of the success of these programmes and the longer term outcomes for an individual‟s career. Chapter two presents the empirical paper of the thesis. It describes a phenomenological qualitative study of UK army veterans‟ lived experiences of transition from military to civilian life. It explores how veterans have perceived the challenges of this transition and their experience of the support they have received from various services. Analysis revealed three major themes that captured the lived experiences of these veterans; centred on the consequences of leaving the army, surviving initial civilian life and reconstruction of an identity as a veteran. Chapter three presents a reflective paper that offers insights into the research journey of the main author and reflections of being on a clinical placement within a community mental health team for the Ministry of Defence. It was found that this was an asset in understanding the applicability of research findings to an everyday clinical setting. This paper also offers experiences and reflections of being a woman in a patriarchal multidisciplinary team; many of whom served in the British army themselves.

Non-compressible haemorrhage from within the torso and junctional regions constitutes the leading cause of potentially preventable death on the battlefield. It can be defined as haemorrhagic shock arising from injury to named torso vessels, pulmonary parenchyma, high grade solid organ injury and/or disruption of the bony pelvis. Data from the US Department of Defence Trauma Registry demonstrate a torso injury rate of 12.7% with 17.1% of casualties exhibiting torso injury and shock. The overall mortality is 18.7%, with major arterial injury and pulmonary injury identified as independent predictors of mortality on multivariate analysis. The UK Joint Theatre Trauma Registry reports similar findings with the greatest burden of mortality occurring prior to hospital admission (75.0%), a rate that has remained unchanged over a decade of war. Injury from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in particular are associated with non-compressible haemorrhage, frequently causing traumatic lower extremity amputation in combination with torso injury. Contemporary surgical strategy relates to early operative haemorrhage control in patients presenting with shock. In patients sustaining a circulatory arrest, resuscitative thoracotomy and aortic cross clamping can be used to control inflow and increase cardiac afterload. The UK experience over 5 years at Camp Bastion demonstrated a mortality of 78.5%, with greatest survival observed in patients with the shortest time to thoracotomy. In patients sustaining lower extremity amputation following IED injury, 1 in 5 require a laparotomy for proximal vascular control, with less than half requiring further intra-abdominal intervention. There is a pressing need for a haemorrhage control and resuscitation adjunct in non-compressible haemorrhage that can be deployed prior to or as an adjunct to operative haemorrhage control. Resuscitative endovascular balloon occlusion of the aorta (REBOA) is a technique that can occlude the aorta without the need for an operating theatre. It is an experimental technique, so its effect on survival and physiology is unknown. In a porcine model of uncontrolled pelvic haemorrhage, infra-renal REBOA was shown to be as effective as chitosan gauze in the setting of normal coagulation. However, REBOA was associated with a significantly greater survival in a coagulopathic setting. Similar results were obtained when using a porcine model of abdominal haemorrhage in conjunction with thoracic REBOA. In both studies, balloon occlusion demonstrated a significant improvement in systolic blood pressure and other haemodynamic measures compared to the no-occlusion control groups. Having demonstrated a survival and haemodynamic benefit in uncontrolled haemorrhage models, the metabolic and inflammatory consequences of thoracic REBOA were characterised in further detail using a porcine model of controlled hypovolaemic shock. Occlusion for 30 and 90 minutes was associated with a significant lactate burden when compared to animals undergoing shock alone. However, following resuscitation with blood and intravenous fluid, normal physiology was restored within 6 hours. The inflammatory sequelae were studied following 30, 60 and 90 minutes of shock and occlusion. Increasing occlusion time resulted in an escalating release of interleukin-6 which manifest clinically as an increase in ARDS and need for vassopressor support. In order to develop a fluoroscopy free REBOA system, a series of human studies were undertaken to examine the relationship between an external measure of torso height and aortic length in order to guide insertion length. A retrospective examination of computed tomography in male trauma patients demonstrated a correlation between torso height and aortic length. This was confirmed by a prospective study which was also used linear regression to develop equations predictive of insertion length. Finally, the UK Joint Theatre Trauma Registry was used to determine the need for REBOA in a population of UK military personnel injured over 10 years of conflict. Of 1317 severely injured patients 70.2% had no indication, 11.2% had a contra-indication and 18.5% had an injury pattern indication for REBOA. Of those with an indication for REBOA, 66 (27.0%) patients died en-route to hospital and 29 (11.9%) died in-hospital. In conclusion, non-compressible haemorrhage constitutes a significant burden of potentially preventable battlefield mortality. REBOA is a technique that can be used in the thoracic or infra-renal aorta as a haemorrhage control and resuscitation adjunct, prior to operative haemorrhage control. While associated with a significant survival advantage in models of uncontrolled haemorrhage, it is associated with a significant metabolic penalty, although with resuscitation this can be ameliorated successfully.

Thesis (PhD) -- Universiteit van Stellenbosch, 2000. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The South African Military Academy was established on 1 April 1950 with a view to placing candidate officer training in the Union Defence Force on par with standards abroad and at the same time to elevating it to the level of a university degree. In addition, the Minister of Defence, F.C. Erasmus, wanted to use the Academy as an instrument enabling Afrikaners to take up their rightful place alongside English-speaking citizens in the officer corps. In so doing, he hoped, eventually, to replace the predominant British character of the Union Defence Force with a unique South African, and more particularly an Afrikaner, character. Despite strong resistance to change from within the officer corps, motivated by political sentiment and more so by opposition to the novel idea of degree studies for officers, the Academy developed into a viable training institution. Broadly based on the training systems of Sandhurst and West Point, and following the example of the Indian National Defence Academy, the Military Academy became a joint training institution for all four arms of the service. Yet financial constraints, a lack of suitable candidates, as well as the conflicting sentiments and training needs of the arms of the service, prevented the formative training of all candidate officers from being assigned to the Academy. The absence of formative training, together with the admittance of junior officers, instead of solely candidate officers, resulted in the Academy gaining the character of a military university rather than a traditional military academy. The Academy was deprived of a distinct function in the overall officers' development system, which put its survival in the balance and triggered a series of investigations into its role and function. The opposing subcultures that developed between the Dean and the Faculty of Military Science on the one hand, and the Officer Commanding and the Military Training Branch on the other, formed part of the debate. Also in dispute, was the location of the Academy at Saldanha, rather than in the military heart-land in Pretoria. By interpreting the academic training needs of the Defence Force correctly and positioning itself accordingly, the Academy survived that crisis. Thereafter, the Academy time and again adapted to the changing military and socio-political environment and strove towards ever increasing relevance to the Defence Force. In this way female and non-European students were admitted to the Military Academy, whilst the way was also paved for the admittance of students from other African states. In anticipation of the new political dispensation in South Africa, a concerted effort was launched in 1990 to make the student body more representative of the South Africa population in terms of race and sex. The Military Academy has through the years established itself as a credible militaryacademic institution and has made a significant contribution towards military professionalism in South Africa. By 1990 it favourably positioned itself to continue that role in future. Though forming only a small percentage of the total officer corps, the Academy graduates have gradually been distributed at all levels of the officer corps and have dominated the top posts in the SA Defence Force since the early 1970's. They were consequently well placed in 1990 to playa significant role in preparing the Defence Force for the so-called "New South Africa". / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die Suid-Afrikaanse Militêre Akademie is op 1 April 1950 gestig met die doelom die militêrakademiese . opleiding van kandidaatoffisiere hier te lande op dieselfde peil as in die buiteland te bring en dit terselfdertyd tot universiteitsvlak te verhef. Die Minister van Verdediging, F.e. Erasmus, wou egter ook die Akademie gebruik as instrument om die Afrikaner sy regmatige plek, naas Engelssprekendes, in die offisierskorps te laat inneem en sodoende die oorwegend Britse karakter van die Unieverdedigingsmag met 'n eie, Suid- Afrikaanse karakter, en meer bepaald 'n Afrikaner-karakter, te vervang. Ondanks sterk weerstand teen verandering vanuit die offisierskorps, hetsy vanweë politieke sentimente, of, meer bepaald, teenkanting teen die idee van graadstudie vir offisiere, het die Akademie tot 'n lewensvatbare opleidingsinrigting ontwikkel. Breedweg geskoei op die opleidingsmodelle van Sand hurst en West Point, het die Militêre Akademie, na die voorbeeld van die Indiese National Defence Academy, 'n gesamentlike opleidingsinrigting vir al vier weermagsdele geword. Finansiële beperkings, 'n gebrek aan geskikte kandidate, asook die botsende opleidingsbehoeftes en sentimente van die onderskeie weermagsdele, het egter verhoed dat die vormingsopleiding van alle kandidaatoffisiere, met die uitsondering van die vroeë sewentigerjare, aan die Akademie toevertrou is. Die afwesigheid van vormingsopleiding, tesame met die toelating van junior offisiere, in stede van kandidaatoffisiere alleen, het daartoe gelei dat die Akademie mettertyd die karakter van 'n militêre universiteit, eerder as 'n tradisionele militêre akademie, aangeneem het. Die Akademie is in dié proses 'n duidelike rol in die totale offisiersontwikkelingsproses ontneem, wat sy voortbestaan ernstig in die weegskaal geplaas het en tot verskeie ondersoeke na sy rol en funksie gelei het. Deel van die debat, was die botsende subkulture wat deur die jare tussen die Dekaan en die Fakulteit Krygskunde aan die een kant, en die Bevelvoerder en die Tak Militêre Opleiding aan die ander kant, ontstaan het, asook die moontlike verskuiwing van die Akademie van Saldanha na die militêre hartland in Pretoria. Deur die akademiese opleidingsbehoeftes van die Weermag korrek te vertolk en hom dienooreenkomstig te posisioneer, het die Akademie egter dié krisis afgeweer. Hy het daarna telkens by die veranderende militêre en sosio-politieke omstandighede aangepas en immer groter diensbaarheid in die militêr-akademiese milieu nagestreef. Só het dames en anderskleuriges mettertyd hul pad na die Akademie gevind en is die weg ook vir die toelating van studente uit ander Afrikastate gebaan. In 1990, in afwagting van die nuwe politieke bedeling in Suid-Afrika, het die Akademie 'n doelgerigte poging van stapel gestuur om die studentekorps meer verteenwoordigend van die bevolkingsamestelling ten opsigte van ras en geslag te maak. Die Militêre Akademie het hom deur die jare as 'n geloofwaardige militêr-akademiese instelling gevestig en 'n betekenisvolle bydrae tot militêre professionalisme in Suid-Afrika gelewer. Teen 1990 was hy reeds besig om hom gunstig te posisioneer om ook in die toekoms dié rol te kon speel. Hoewel 'n klein persentasie van die totale offisiersterkte, het die Akademie-graduandi geleidelik alle vlakke van die offisierskorps deurspek en sedert die vroeg-sewentigerjare die topposte in die SA Weermag gedomineer. Teen 1990 was hulle dus goed geplaas om 'n betekenisvolle rol in die voorbereiding van die Weermag vir die sogenaamde "Nuwe Suid-Afrika" te speel.

The topic of my thesis is “The campaigns of the Norman dukes of southern Italy to Byzantium, in the years between 1071 and 1108 A.D.” As the title suggests, I am examining all the main campaigns conducted by the Normans against Byzantine provinces, in the period from the fall of Bari, the Byzantine capital of Apulia and the seat of the Byzantine governor (catepano) of Italy in 1071, to the Treaty of Devol that marked the end of Bohemond of Taranto’s Illyrian campaign in 1108. My thesis, however, aims to focus specifically on the military aspects of these confrontations, an area which for this period has been surprisingly neglected in the existing secondary literature. My intention is to give answers to a series of questions, of which only some of them are presented here: what was the Norman method of raising their armies and what was the connection of this particular system to that in Normandy and France in the same period (similarities, differences, if any)? Have the Normans been willing to adapt to the Mediterranean reality of warfare, meaning the adaptation of siege engines and the creation of a transport and fighting fleet? What was the composition of their armies, not only in numbers but also in the analogy of cavalry, infantry and supplementary units? While in the field of battle, what were the fighting tactics used by the Normans against the Byzantines and were they superior to their eastern opponents? However, as my study is in essence comparative, I will further compare the Norman and Byzantine military institutions, analyse the clash of these two different military cultures and distinguish any signs of adaptations in their practice of warfare. Also, I will attempt to set this enquiry in the light of new approaches to medieval military history visible in recent historiography by asking if any side had been familiar to the ideas of Vegetian strategy, and if so, whether we characterise any of these strategies as Vegetian?

This thesis examines the evidence for the involvement in warfare of clerks and religious in England between the beginning of the tenth century and the end of the twelfth. It focuses on bishops and abbots, whose military activities were recorded more frequently than lesser clergy, though these too are considered where appropriate. From the era of Christian conversion until long after the close of the middle ages, clergy were involved in the prosecution of warfare. In this period, they built fortresses and organised communities of warriors in time of peace and war. Some were slain in battle, while others were given promotion or lands for their martial exploits. A series of canonical pronouncements aimed to forbid or restrict the involvement of Christian clergy in organised bloodshed, and some writers branded militant clergy as corrupted by the lure of earthly power or even as having surrendered their sacerdotal status. This study therefore approaches the military practices of clergy alongside the legal and narrative treatments, and treats the latter as reactions to, not the background of, the former. This requires consideration of a wide range of narrative, diplomatic and legal source material. A broad approach shows that clerics’ military activities cannot be separated from their spiritual powers, that canonical treatment was more fragmented and less influential than has been assumed, and that the condemnations of some authors existed alongside others’ praise for clerics’ valour, loyalty, or commitment to defending their flocks. In consequence, the extended study of clerical participation in warfare is shown to have significant consequences for our conception of the bounds of military history, the construction of the licit and the illicit, and the nature of clerical identity itself.

The aim of this thesis is to evaluate the 51st (Highland) division over the course of the First World War. Underpinning the study is an analysis of both change and continuity, at home and overseas, and the performance of the division as a fighting unit. The key themes identified for study have been training, esprit de corps, recruitment and reinforcement, and battle performance. Through the investigation of the key themes, other important characteristics have been analysed, such as command and control, organisation, and the level of centralisation in both the formation and in the wider Army. Key questions in the research apply to both divisional study and to wider academic understanding of the First World War. The thesis considers a number of themes that have been neglected by historians old and new, and brings into sharp focus some areas of research that may have produced inaccurate assumptions. In addition, a substantial range and quantity of primary sources have been utilised, many unexplored until now. The selection of the 51st (Highland) Division for study was based on a number of criteria. (Highland) Division experiences were both unique and not unique. In some areas it was a very individual formation, but in other areas or at particular times of the war it was not.