Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / The purpose of this thesis is to answer the question of how effective are current theater engagement / security cooperation plans at supporting US national interests. The examination of effectiveness focused on two theaters as case studies during the years 1998 through September 2001. This examination divided effectiveness down into two parts. The first part was consistency. Consistency was investigated by a comparison of the national priorities to completed engagement activities. The second part of effectiveness attempted to measure gains produced through the executed engagement missions. Following the case study analysis, key principles for effectiveness are identified and a modified engagement planning process proposed. The key elements of the modified process are integrated interagency planning, objective based engagement activities, and synchronization of all the elements of statecraft. This framework is tested by applying the modified TEP process to a sub-region of Africa. The significance for this test is not only to demonstrate the capability of the proposed TEP process. This test demonstrates the potential for effective engagement to assist in prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). In conclusion, this thesis provides an understanding of what engagement is today, and what engagement should be in the future. / Major, United States Army

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / In response to the 9/11 attacks and continuing threats of mass-casualty terrorism, the United States has adopted a new security strategy that emphasizes anticipatory actions including preventive war. Prevention, undertaken in the absence of an act of aggression or an imminent threat, is prohibited by modern conceptions of just war and international law. Many critics of the strategy fear that any legitimization of preventive war would endanger international stability. But an examination of the relevant ethical issues from the perspective of just war doctrine reveals contradictions within a blanket prohibition of preventive war. Preventive "strategic interventions" against illiberal regimes-states that correlate with the threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction-parallel humanitarian interventions in that they have an ethical basis in the relationship between human rights and the right of state sovereignty. A widely-accepted minimum standard of human rights, incorporated into new international institutions and/or an explicit revision of the definition of just war, could serve as an ethical boundary for both preventive wars and humanitarian interventions. The formal qualification of prevention and its merger with humanitarian goals could bring enhanced international legitimacy and support to preventive actions by the United States and its allies. / Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy

This thesis examines the British Commonwealth and Allied Naval forces operation on the west coast during the final two and a half years of the Korean War, particularly focused on their co-operation with the anti-Communist guerrillas. The purpose of this study is to present a more realistic picture of the United Nations (UN) naval forces operation in the west, which has been largely neglected, by analysing their activities in relation to the large number of irregular forces. This thesis shows that, even though it was often difficult and frustrating, working with the irregular groups was both strategically and operationally essential to the conduct of the war, and this naval-guerrilla relationship was of major importance during the latter part of the naval campaign. It concludes that, to the British Commonwealth Commanders and Allied Naval forces on the west coast, a large part of the relationship with the guerrillas during the Korean War could be explained as that involving a compelled co-operation with unreliable partners.

This thesis examines the development of RAF high command of the Metropolitan Air Force (MAF) during the Second World War (SWW). It sheds new light on the re-organisations of the Air Ministry in 1934, the RAF Command structure in 1936, and the tri-service debate in 1937 concerning the RAF proposal to establish a Supreme Air Commander (SAC). It reveals that while frontline expansion created an impetus for re-organisation, it was operational readiness that was the dominant factor in the re-structuring of the RAF. It examines the transition in RAF frontline organization from the mono-functional command system of 1936 to the multi-functional organisation that emerged after 1943 by looking at command structure and practice, personalities, and operational thinking. This study builds on the established historiography but challenges the accepted explanation of RAF reforms in the 1930s. It addresses a significant gap in the literature concerning the way the frontline was directed by the War Cabinet and the Air Ministry. In doing so it seeks to establish a new starting point for the analysis of RAF high command by providing an assessment of how effective were the RAF reforms of the 1930s to the higher command of MAF operations during the SWW.

Learning is critical to battlefield success. \(Ceteris\) \(paribus\), victory becomes more likely when militaries adapt faster and more effectively than their opponents. This thesis examines the effectiveness of the British army’s process for learning and adaptation across six different operational theatres during the First World War. Using a series of case studies, it considers how the army shared knowledge, responded to change, and integrated newcomers. It finds that the army’s attitudes towards learning were more thoroughgoing than hitherto thought. With its pre-war ethos and increased fluidity in wartime, the army displayed organisational and cultural flexibility across all theatres, encouraging a culture of innovation through the promotion of informal learning and tactical diversity. In a broader sense, the thesis does three things. First, it moves beyond the standard Western Front narrative of learning in the First World War, offering a more rounded examination of the army’s experience. Secondly, it highlights the complexity of military learning, considering that which occurs institutionally, between formations, and between theatres. Finally, it reflects on the importance of an organisation’s ethos when faced with uncertainty. This thesis, therefore, offers a point of departure for future studies of traditionally bureaucratic institutions and their ability to learn and innovate.

Conflict archaeology is a popular subject of academic research. Within the topic of British Second World War archaeology there are few studies examining anti-invasion defences, and none relating to the evidence or its use. This research was influenced by concepts in historical and conflict archaeology and the archaeologies of the recent and contemporary past. It was undertaken to determine the extent of survival of archaeological, documentary, aerial photographic and cartographic evidence for three cases in south and south-west Wales. Case study method was used to identify, select and analyse evidence. Grounded theory was used to induce meaning. The evidence was given equal primacy, assessed critically and analysed for its role, value and contribution. Official sources were used for their unique, informed and authoritative content. Knowledge of military organisational practices and formation/unit identities were required to use the evidence effectively. A rich but incomplete evidence base of a complex character was identified. Evidence was found to be complementary and inter-dependent, representing aspects of a common shared phenomenon. The diverse sources could be used to induce meaningful narratives. The research suggested that an archaeological approach was a valid and effective form of inquiry when applied to cross-disciplinary evidence from the recent past.

The evolution of British airborne warfare cannot be fully appreciated without reference to the technological development required to convert the detail contained in the doctrine and concept into operational reality. My original contribution to knowledge is the detailed investigation of the British technological investment in an airborne capability in order to determine whether the development of new technology was justifiable, or indeed, entirely achievable. The thesis combines the detail contained in the original policy for airborne warfare and the subsequent technological investigations to determine whether sufficient strategic requirement had been demonstrated and how policy impacted upon the research programme. Without clear research parameters technological investment could not achieve maximum efficiency and consequent military effectiveness. The allocation of resources was a crucial factor in the technological development and the fact that aircraft suitability and availability remained unresolved throughout the duration of the war would suggest that the development of airborne forces was much less of a strategic priority for the British than has previously been suggested. Ultimately, despite the creation of a dedicated research institution in 1942 (Airborne Forces Experimental Establishment), and the development of specialist hardware such as the assault glider, the British did not possess the material resources required for the large-scale deployment of airborne troops. Analysis of the technology has revealed that the development of airborne warfare was as much for the purpose of psychological warfare and British morale as it was for offensive operations.

The idea of a learning process has become broadly accepted among military historians of the First World War, but explanations for how and why this occurred remain limited. This thesis uses a number of different disciplines alongside more orthodox historical analysis of what the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) did at the divisional level to learn the lessons from combat in an uncompromising operational environment. At the beginning of 1916 the BEF was predominantly a citizen army lacking experience. This marked a low-point in the BEF's fighting capabilities. This thesis charts the development from 1916 to the Armistice in 1918 using the British 32nd Division as a case study. The division participated in a number of major operations including the Battle of the Somme, the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line, the Battles of Nieuport, Passchendaele, Amiens and the Hundred Days. They experienced both success and failure ensuring they are a representative case from which to draw broader conclusions. This thesis argues that the BEF's learning process developed as structural improvement occurred, battle experience was gained and leadership improved.

Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Ernest William Turner served Canada admirably in two wars and played an instrumental role in unifying veterans’ groups in the post-war period. His experience was unique in the Canadian Expeditionary Force; in that, it included senior command in both the combat and administrative aspects of the Canadian war effort. This thesis, based on new primary research and interpretations, revises the prevalent view of Turner. The thesis recasts five key criticisms of Turner and presents a more balanced and informed assessment of Turner. His appointments were not the result of his political affiliation but because of his courage and capability. Rather than an incompetent field commander, Turner developed from a middling combat general to an effective division commander by late 1916. His transfer to England was the result of the need for a proficient field commander to reform the administration. Turner proved to be an excellent administrator, a strong nationalist, and was crucially responsible for improvements in administration and training in England. Finally, the conflict with Sir Arthur Currie, the commander of the Canadian Corps, rather than being motivated by obstructionist jealousy was the outcome of competing institutional imperatives and Currie’s challenging personality.

The history of the British Army in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars is generally associated with stories of British military victory and the campaigns of the Duke of Wellington. An intrinsic aspect of the historiography is the argument that, following British defeat in the Low Countries in 1795, the Army was transformed by the military reforms of His Royal Highness, Frederick Duke of York. This thesis provides a critical appraisal of the reform process with reference to the organisation, structure, ethos and learning capabilities of the British Army and evaluates the impact of the reforms upon British military performance in the Low Countries, in the period 1793 to 1814, via a series of narrative reconstructions. This thesis directly challenges the transformation argument and provides a re-evaluation of British military competency in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.