This thesis is about the importance of nuclear weapons to Australian defence and strategic policy in Southeast Asia between 1953 and 1973. It argues that Australia's approach to nuclear issues during this period, and its attitude towards the development and acquisition of nuclear weapons in particular, was aimed exclusively at achieving narrowly defined political objectives. Australia was thus never interested in possessing nuclear weapons, and any moves seemingly taken along these lines were calculated to obtain political concessions - not as part of a 'bid' for their acquirement. This viewpoint sits at odds with the consensus position of several focused studies of Australian nuclear policy published in the past decade. Although in general these studies correctly argue that Australia maintained the 'nuclear weapons option' until the early 1970s, all have misrepresented the motivation for this by contending that the government viewed such weapons in exclusively military terms. The claim that Australia was interested only in the military aspect of nuclear weapons does not pay due attention to the fact that defence planning was based entirely on the provision of conventional forces to Southeast Asia. Accordingly, the military was interested first and foremost with issues arising from extant conventional planning concepts, and the government was chiefly concerned about obtaining allied assurances of support for established plans. The most pressing requirement for Australia therefore was gaining sway over allied countries. However, the Australian government was never in a position to overtly influence more powerful allies against an undertaking that could escalate into limited war, and was similarly incapable of inducing its allies to retain forces in the region in spite of competing pressures. It was for this reason that Australia would seek to manipulate the nuclear weapons option. Indeed, access to such weapons offered Australia the opportunity to achieve greater integration in formulating allied planning, while the threat to manufacture them provided a means of convincing regional partners to maintain a presence in the area. The thesis therefore concludes that Australia carefully presented its options for procuring nuclear weapons to gain influence over its allies in response to strategic developments in Southeast Asia.

D.Litt. et Phil. / If the hypothesis is correct, there will be a reciprocal effect between the military budget and the Gross Domestic Product. The higher the technological level of arms and arms production, the more this reciprocal effect will be interwoven with the process of economic growth. It is measured by input-output figures and the applicable industrial multiplier, calculated from them. Production of high technology arms stimulates growth, the higher the technology, the larger the miltary contribution to the GDP and to economic growth. From the resultant increase in in the GDP, the income of the State by way of taxes will also grow, subject tro a time lag. The increase in State revenue will return to the Treasury part of the State's original expenditure on defence. My study indicates that the applicable multiplier for defence spending is 3.70 and that the multiplier for arms production is above 4. The part of military expenditure returned to the State will therefore be sizable. Military expenditure is often viewed as competing with socially desirable civil expenditure, as a case of opportunity cost. I argue that oppotunity costs do not apply and that the stimulus economy derived from military expenditure via the multiplier, helps funding social projects along with other civil expenditure. The reasoning in this study can be extended to the funds invested in increasing the capital and technology intensity of the defence force, a modern trend which can be economically justified by the part of the investment that will be returned via the GDP. The way to escape the limitations imposed on defence strength by the availabiluity of manpower is exactly this modernisation of its technology. In this way a medium power can increase its relative strength to the leyel of the "strength threshold" at which an independent deterrent can be credibly presented. In these terms a critical value can be defined, expressed as a pecentage of GDP budgeted for defence, above which a country could be considered militarily safe.

Although the period between 1926 and 1934 was relatively peaceful, Imperial Defence policy-making in Britain focused on threats along the periphery of the Empire. This included a short-lived, but serious concern over Communist expansion in China and Afghanistan and a fear that American naval construction would undermine the Royal Navy's position in the world. The first threat receded by 1928 and the second was met by negotiating the highly successful London Naval Conference of 1930. Throughout these years, the need to reorient the Imperial Defence system to meet a perceived Japanese threat in the Far East, and the Treasury's opposition to the very idea, remained constants within policy-making circles. The world-wide depression led to serious defence cutbacks which the services met largely by cutting back even further on war reserves and mobilization potential. The Japanese assault on Manchuria in 1931, and then in Shanghai in 1932, exposed the inability of the Imperial Defence system to meet a Far Eastern threat. This led to pressure from the navy, in particular, for an increase in service estimates, but the economic situation and the World Disarmament Conference kept the government from agreeing to any significant change in policy. From 1931-193, Imperial Defence concerns were centred on the Far East, but Hitler‘s rise to power in March 1933 turned attention hack toward Europe. Nevertheless, the first large-scale review of Imperial defence deficiencies, the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee, presented a report which balanced the needs of European and Far Eastern defence. In the spring of l934. however, the Cabinet found itself unable to come to a consensus on the DRC's recommendations and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain, stepped forward with his own defence vision. He discounted the need for Far Eastern defence and re-oriented defence policy toward homeland defence. It was his intervention that set the tone for British rearmament in the 1930s.

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Thesis (MMil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: As South Africa entered the transitional period towards establishing a multi-party democracy, its defence policy changed fundamentally. The African National Congress (ANC) as the upcoming governing party established the Military Research Group (MRG), to help formulate its defence policy positions, which subsequently largely determined South African defence policy. Through this think-tank the ANC leadership became interested in and supported the idea of non-offensive defence (NOD). NOD is a European idea of the Cold War era, which was aimed at preventing the security dilemma, arms races and accidental war between states. The aim of this study is to describe the nature of defence policy-making in South Africa since 1994, by describing how NOD became prominent. Non-offensive defence ideas influenced South African defence policy significantly and appeared in all legislation and policies pertaining to defence. NOD complemented the ANC’s domestic policy goals with the new security paradigm, which like NOD, originate from the Peace Research school of thought. As a defensive idea, NOD emphasised South Africa’s intention to improve relations with Southern African states, as well as its strategic defensiveness, which determined the military doctrine of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The ANC used NOD to transform the SANDF, especially to scale down its power projection capabilities. Two arguments are made in this study to describe the nature of defence policy-making in South Africa when the prominence of NOD is considered. Firstly, that South African defence policy-makers are open to ideas and models from industrialised states, despite the limited applicability and shortcomings of such models. Secondly, models can be used in various ways by interest groups to influence policy. NOD was used as a theoretical tool by the MRG and the military to influence defence policy according to their interests. Several characteristics of South African defence policy-making were also identified. Firstly, that the Constitution does not prioritise state or individual security as more important. This makes conflicting world-views of realism and idealism about defence possible. Defence policy therefore often has to involve a compromise between these views. Secondly, although the Constitution makes provision for public participation in defence policy-making, there is no equal distribution of power for interest groups to influence policy. In this regard the legislature and parliamentary defence committees are also weak compared to the executive authority. Thirdly, the use of non-governmental organisations in defence policy-making has created a form of direct and unrestricted lobbying, as well as the privatisation of policy-making. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Tydens die politieke oorgangsperiode en die aanloop tot die vestiging van ‘n veelparty demokrasie, het Suid-Afrika se verdedigingsbeleid wesenlike veranderinge ondergaan. As opkomende regerende party het die African National Congress (ANC), die Military Research Group (MRG) gestig om díe party se standpunte rondom verdedigingsbeleid te formuleer. Sedertdien het die MRG, Suid-Afrika se verdedigingsbeleid grootliks omskrywe. Die MRG het ANC leiers aan die term non-offensive defence (NOD), wat ‘n Europese idee uit die Koue Oorlog-era is, bekendgestel. NOD is daarop gemik om die veiligheidsdilemma, wapenwedlope en toevallige oorlog te verhoed. Die ANC het NOD ondersteun en bevorder. Die doel van hierdie studie is om die aard van Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsbeleidmaking sedert 1994 te beskryf aan die hand van NOD se prominensie. Non-offensive defence idees het Suid-Afrika se verdedigingsbeleid beduidend beïnvloed en verskyn in alle wetgewing en beleid wat verband hou met verdediging. NOD het die ANC se plaaslike beleidsdoelwitte binne die nuwe veiligheidsparadigma ondersteun. Soos NOD, is díe paradigma ‘n produk van die Peace Research denkskool. As ‘n defensiewe idee het NOD, Suid-Afrika se oogmerk om betrekkinge met state in Suider-Afrika te verbeter, benadruk. NOD het verder ook SA se strategiese defensiewe postuur en gepaardgaande militêre doktrine bepaal en beklemtoon. Die ANC het NOD gebruik om die Suid Afrikaanse Nasionale Weermag (SANW) te transformeer en magsprojeksievermoëns af te skaal. Twee argumente word in hierdie studie benut om die aard van verdedigingsbeleidmaking in Suid-Afrika te beskryf, met die inagneming van die belangrikheid van NOD. Eerstens, dat beleidmakers ontvanklik is vir idees en modelle van nywerheidslande, ten spyte van die beperkte toepaslikheid en tekortkomings van sulke modelle. Tweedens, dat modelle deur verskeie belangegroepe gebruik kan word om beleid te beïnvloed. Die MRG en die SANW het NOD as ‘n teoretiese instrument benut om verdedigingsbeleid tot die bevordering van eie belange te beïnvloed. Verskeie eienskappe van Suid-Afrikaanse verdedigingsbeleidmaking is geïdentifiseer in die studie. Eerstens, dat die Grondwet nie die staat of die individu se veiligheid bo die ander stel nie. Dit veroorsaak botsende wêreldbeskouings van realisme en idealisme oor verdediging. Beleid behels dus dikwels kompromieë tussen die twee uitgangspunte. Tweedens, alhoewel die Grondwet voorsiening maak vir openbare deelname in beleidmaking, is daar nie gelyke ‘n verspreiding van mag tussen belangegroepe om beleid te beïnvloed nie. In die opsig is die wetgewende gesag en parlementêre komitees aansienlik swakker as die uitvoerende gesag.

Naval history,like military history, has until recently concerned itself largely with battles, or at least with wars. The implicit assumption was presumably that the key to history was to be found in these turning-points, rather than in the piping times of peace. A fighting service was only really of interest when fighting. In recent years this approach has been largely abandoned, and it is now recognized that warfare is an extension, not only of politics, but of most other activities of man; that it is in itself one of his most characteristic activities, and may be studied to reveal most of his characteristics. The present study falls into this pattern. In that it traces the progress of warship design, it may be taken as a traditional technical study. In that it covers the formation of grand strategy and naval policy it may be thought of as an essay in the moulding of government decisions. As a survey of the administrative development of the Admiralty, it falls into another possible category. Finally, in charting the rise of professional studies and the intellectual growth of the Victorian naval officer it touches directly on social history. It is the writer's belief that a fighting service, especially one with so distinct and independent a character as the Navy, may be studied as a society in itself, or as a microcosm of society in general. It was with these considerations in mind that the years 1865 to 1890 were chosen. Paradoxically enough from the viewpoint of the old approach to naval history,they were years of general peace; it is contended that they were not the less interesting for that,but rather the more. One may almost say that the absence of major naval battles or campaigns allowed naval development to proceed along a steady course,undisturbed by adventitious factors. The influences at work upon the Navy and its policy are the more easily discerned without the distractions of actual operational experience. It is this which lends peculiar interest to the period; in no other age of British history were naval officers more remote from the experience of naval war. Of the thirty or so officers who sat at the Board of Admiralty "between 1866 and 1890,none had ever fought in a naval battle of any importance. They had "been present at numerous "bombardments,they had led landing parties and boat actions,stormed cities and stockades, fought in river,swamp and jungle, against pirates, savages, and slavers; but they had no experience of naval warfare on the high seas. This gives a unique quality to the age; to borrow a metaphor from medicine, it was sterile, uncontaminated with reality. [Continued in text ...]

Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-21T14:42:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 AlfredoNetto.pdf: 18534989 bytes, checksum: c34b879de095b568295379822bc30650 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-02-26 / During many years the sportive events had been left of side for the social scientists, however, the sport/soccer blunt as one of the biggest social phenomena of the present time, involving in its bigger public events each time, which if they leave to take for the emotions, being generated innumerable acts of violence. In this context some studies concerning the violence of the twisted ones organized in soccer sta-diums are had, however this research retakes this quarrel under a new prism, that is, under the point of view of the military policemen. Being the generating problem of this study centered in the understanding that the military policemen possess of the vi-olence generated for the Twisted ones Organized. In the construction of the research proper methods to a qualitative research of exploratory matrix had been used. To reach the objective considered initially it was looked to understand the violence meaning, the violence in the sport and more specifically in the soccer, and for this a bibliographical research was carried through . After that, basing in the theoretical re-ferential of Elias, categories had been arisen that could support the quarrel with the collected data, in the objective to arrive at the understanding that the military police-men possess on the violence of the Twisted ones Organized, being raised the follow-ing categories: psycho genesis, socio genesis, to be able, outsiders and the control of the violence. Searching to deepen the thematic one of the violence of the twisted ones organized in soccer stadiums a study of case on the classic Atletiba was carried through (game between the Coritiba Foot Ball Club e the Club Athletic Paranaense) carried through in the seventeenth day of October of a thousand nine hundred and ninety and nine, in the stadium Major Antonio Couto Pereira, in the city of Curitiba, game this considered one of the most violent occurrences in the state of the Paraná. For this study initially one searched to rescue the history and origin of the Twisted ones Organized of the Coritiba Foot Ball Club and the Athletic Club Paranaense and the legality of the action of the Military Policy in sport's squares (stadiums), beyond portraying under the different perspectives the facts of occurred violence in this clas-sic. On the basis of the raised theory was become fulfilled interviews, half-structuralized, applied the five military policemen, who were working in that game specify, with the objective to verify the perception that they possess concerning the categories in relation to the described environment. After he analyzes of the data concluded that the military policemen possess knowledge who are the state repre-sentatives detainer of the monopoly of the violence, that they possess the knowledge of the use of the legal violence and the abuse, however in certain confrontations they finish if exceeding, and that they possess a preconception on the twisted ones orga-nized, seeing them as, people wilderness, riotous that goes to stadiums with the ob-jective to provoke tumults, fight. Being many times the favor of the extinguishing of these twisted ones. / Durante muitos anos, os eventos esportivos foram deixados de lado pelos cientistas sociais, no entanto, o esporte/futebol desponta como um dos maiores fenômenos sociais da atualidade, envolvendo em seus eventos públicos cada vez maiores, os quais se deixam levar pelas emoções, gerando inúmeros atos de violência. Neste contexto, têm-se vários estudos acerca da violência das torcidas organizadas nos estádios de futebol, entretanto esta pesquisa retoma a discussão sob um novo pris-ma, ou seja, sob o ponto de vista dos policiais militares. Estando o problema gerador deste estudo centrado na compreensão que os policiais militares envolvidos no con-flito entre as Torcidas Organizadas no Atletiba de outubro de 1999 possuem da vio-lência gerada pelas Torcidas Organizadas. Na construção da pesquisa foram utiliza-dos métodos próprios a uma pesquisa qualitativa de cunho exploratório. Para alcan-çar o objetivo proposto, inicialmente procurou-se entender o significado de violência, a violência no esporte e mais especificamente no futebol, e para isso foi realizada uma pesquisa bibliográfica. Em seguida, embasando no referencial teórico de Nor-bert Elias, levantaram-se categorias que pudessem sustentar a discussão com os dados coletados, no objetivo de chegar à compreensão que os policiais militares possuem sobre a violência das Torcidas Organizadas, sendo levantadas as seguin-tes categorias: psicogênese, sociogênese, poder, outsiders e o controle da violência. Buscando aprofundar a temática da violência das torcidas organizadas nos estádios de futebol foi realizado um estudo de caso sobre o clássico Atletiba (partida entre o Coritiba Foot Ball Club e o Clube Atlético Paranaense) realizado no dia dezessete de outubro de mil novecentos e noventa e nove, no estádio Major Antonio Couto Pe-reira, na cidade de Curitiba, jogo este considerado um dos mais violentos ocorridos no estado do Paraná. Para este estudo inicialmente buscou-se resgatar a história e origem das Torcidas Organizadas do Coritiba Foot Ball Club e do Clube Atlético Pa-ranaense e a legalidade da ação da Polícia Militar em praças desportivas (estádios), além de retratar sob as diferentes perspectivas os fatos de violência ocorrida neste clássico. Com base na teoria levantada realizaram-se entrevistas, semi-estruturadas, aplicadas a cinco policiais militares, que estavam trabalhando naquele jogo específi-co, com o objetivo de verificar a percepção que eles possuem acerca das categorias em relação ao ambiente descrito. Após análise dos dados concluiu-se que os polici-ais militares envolvidos neste estudo possuem conhecimento que são os represen-tantes estatais detentores do monopólio da violência, que possuem o conhecimento do uso da violência legal e do abuso, no entanto em certos confrontos acabam se excedendo, e que possuem um conceito sobre as Torcidas Organizadas, vendo-os como baderneiros, arruaceiros, pessoas que vão aos estádios com o objetivo de provocar tumultos, brigas, sendo muitas vezes a favor da extinção dessas torcidas.

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