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This paper examines the role and significance of kinesthetic empathy through a framework modeled in Dance/Movement Therapy. With the innate capacity to connect with others, understand ourselves in greater depth, and learn about the world around us, this paper argues for the human importance of creating empathy in intersubjective dynamics and relations, for the betterment of all parties involved. A system of phases is proposed which includes biological and psychological factors to create a model for intentional kinesthetic empathy. The model looks at empathy through the lens of kinesthesia, as the most authentic way to create this empathic potential to be used as a learning tool.

Thesis advisor: Paul Kline / This three paper dissertation considers whether yoga--a popular mind-body practice combining physical postures and movement, mindfulness, and breath exercises--may be a useful component of treatment for adult trauma survivors. The first paper involves a systematic review and meta-analyses of the current evidence base for yoga in the treatment of anxiety, depression, and PTSD among trauma survivors. The second and third papers are grounded in a single, mixed-methods multi-wave data source aimed at examining yoga's contribution to recovery for adult women who have complex trauma histories (i.e., sustained and/or multiple traumatic experiences such as recurring physical or sexual abuse). The second paper is a quantitative study employing hierarchical linear and logistic regression to examine associations between yoga practice and reductions in traumatic symptomology over time. The third paper is a hermeneutic phenomenological study exploring how women with complex trauma histories experience practicing yoga and its potential role in their coping and healing processes over time. Taken together, these three papers offer insights into the complex healing needs of adult survivors suffering from the effects of traumatization, and the promising role of yoga within their recovery processes. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2014. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Social Work. / Discipline: Social Work.

It is proposed that there exist unmistakable resonances of the Hermetic world-view in much of the science of the modern period. Hermes Recidivus examines key figurations operating within both the imaginaries of Hermeticism and modern(ist) science with a view to developing a postmodern critical position in regard to the discourse of the modernist scientific project. It is proposed that a re-examination of the notions surrounding these key figurations may provide new hermeneutical tools, and that the imaginary of Hermeticism represents a potentially rich resource from which to develop alternative modes of critical enquiry. It is furthermore proposed that the mechanism by which these Hermetic resonances are perpetuated within the discourse of modernist science takes the form of a logic of the imaginary associated with key figurations within Hermeticism. Certain figural elements associated with the Hermetic imaginary seem to possess a constancy that travels across temporal and disciplinary barriers, encouraging the assumption that these figures are central organising principles within both Hermeticism and modern science. Specifically these figurations are those of the anima mundi and the Gnostic 'alien light' or spintheros. It is proposed that these figurations take the form of 'ideal objects' within both the discourses of Hermeticism and modernist science. The individual chapters respectively examine the relevance of the Hermetic imaginary to Artificial Intelligence research and cybernetic theory; occidental and oriental traditions of the 'subtle body' and their relevance to developing a postmodern perspective on the question of mind-body dualism; the 'metaphysical geometry' of key figures within the Hermetic and Kabbalistic traditions and their resonances within mathematical 'catastrophe theory' as developed by Rene Thom; the Hermetic alchemy of Robbert Fludd as revealed in his text Truth's Golden Harrow, and its relevance in regard to the subject-object split of modern(ist) scientific consciousness and, finally, the influence of Kabbalistic and Hermetic figuration on the development of Leibniz's monadological philosophy and on the notion of the 'field' in contemporary physical theory / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

When considering the nature of the human being, Descartes holds two main claims: he believes that the human being is a genuine unity and he also holds that it is comprised of two distinct substances, mind and body. These claims appear to be at odds with one another; it is not clear how the human being can be simultaneously two things and one thing. The details of Descartes' metaphysics of substance exacerbates this problem. Because of various theological and epistemological commitments, Descartes frames his metaphysics of substance in a way that ensures mind and body's real distinction from one another. Articulated from this perspective, the problem becomes one wherein it is not clear that two completely separate substances can come together to form one entity. The aim of this thesis is to show how Descartes can hold real distinction and true union without contradiction. To this end, I will first detail the problem and outline a variety of solutions that have already been presented. Then I will outline important concepts relating to Descartes' metaphysics of substance and attributes. This not only reveals the depth of the problem but also lays the groundwork for my proposed solution. I argue that the key to understanding how these two claims are consistent and in accord with Descartes' philosophy is through a comment Descartes makes to his contemporary Henricus Regius where he urges that the union of mind and body is achieved through a "mode of union." I substantiate this claim by arguing for the intelligibility of understanding union as a modal attribute within Descartes' framework. Finally, I show how Descartes can hold real distinction and true union with consistency. When union is understood as a mode, mind and body are able to exist apart from one another, ensuring real distinction. Moreover, union construed as a mode does not allow the complete separability of mind and body. Thus, when united, mind and body achieve the kind of unity Descartes desires for the human being.

The purpose of this study was to analyze the effects of an 8-week judo program on self-competency, physical activity (PA) motivation, and enjoyment of PA in children diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). METHODS: The sample included 20 children (ages 8 – 17) with a primary diagnosis of ASD. The participants completed an 8-week judo program that occurred once a week for 45 minutes. Participants were instructed to complete a series of questionnaires that measured athletic self-competency, PA motivation, and PA enjoyment at baseline and at the end of the 8-week judo program. Paired t-tests were conducted to examine differences in psychosocial factors from baseline and post-judo. Additionally, correlational analyses were conducted to examine the association between the psychosocial variables and attendance during the 8-week program. RESULTS: Although increases in psychosocial factors were observed following the cessation of the judo program, these changes were not statistically significant for any of the psychosocial factors following the 8-week program. There was a significant, positive association between PA motivation and judo attendance (r=.43, p=.05), however, neither athletic competency nor PA enjoyment were correlated with judo attendance. CONCLUSION: Although not significant, improvement in psychosocial factors were observed post-judo program. Future studies should consider increasing the duration and frequency of the judo program to potentially elicit greater changes in psychosocial factors related to PA.

Chalmers (2007) has argued that any version of the phenomenal concept strategy will fail, given that phenomenal concepts will either fail to explain our epistemic situation, or fail to be physically explicable themselves. Carruthers and Veillet (2007) have offered a response, arguing that zombies do share our epistemic situation. In the following paper I aim to show that philosophical-zombies do not share our epistemic situation concerning phenomenal consciousness. I will begin with some background material regarding the general dialectic I am addressing in section (I) before outlining the debate between Chalmers (2007) and Carruthers and Veillet (2007) in more detail and its relevance for mind-body considerations in section (II). Next, in section (III) I will suggest a worry related to Carruthers and Veillet’s position: that phenomenal concepts fail to refer in zombie worlds in the first place. Finally, in section (IV) I will argue that even if a zombie’s phenomenal concepts successfully refer, there is still good reason to think that zombies will fail to share our epistemic situation. I will defend this claim by explaining three asymmetries between me and my zombie twin’s corresponding epistemic situations. / Master of Arts / In the following paper I defend the position that philosophical zombies don’t share our epistemic situation. Philosophical zombies are hypothetical creatures that are identical to humans concerning all physical and functional properties, yet lack any phenomenal experiences. While zombies have identical brain states compared to non-zombies, they lack any felt, private, and subjective experiences. Next, I understand epistemic situation in this paper as the justificatory status of one’s beliefs. So, I am arguing that the beliefs of a physical duplicate of me who lacked experiences would not be equally justified as mine. Specifically, I am responding to Carruthers and Veillet (2007) who argue that philosophical zombies do share our epistemic situation, so long as we allow the zombies’ beliefs to differ in content. That is to say, if we understand zombie beliefs to be about different states (other than phenomenal states), then there is an available physical referent for the zombie belief that will ensure all his beliefs are as equally justified as their non-zombie twin. I suggest a difficulty for the existence of such a referent, and point to a collection of asymmetries in justificatory status between the beliefs of zombies and non-zombies to argue that the Carruthers and Veillet (2007) strategy is unavailable.

A test of standing broad jump ability was administered to ninety-three sixth grade boys to compare the kinesthetic and demonstration methods of instruction. The subjects were classified on the Neilson-Cozens Classification Index and divided into three groups. The first group received the kinesthetic method of instruction, the second group was instructed using the demonstration method, and the third group did not receive any formal instruction. The data were examined by computing the mean and standard deviation of each pre-test and post-test group. The mean and standard deviation of the pre-test scores were 60.61 and 7.589. The mean and standard deviation of the post-test scores were 61.31 and 7.397. When each pre-test score was subtracted from its corresponding post-test score it was revealed that the demonstration group showed an increase in performance of eighteen boys, the kinesthetic group increased by sixteen boys and the group receiving no formal instruction increased by seven boys. Analysis of variance of matched groups revealed an F ratio of 2.68 which was not significant at the .05 level. An alternate approach was attempted in which the effect of the pre-test scores were partialled out from the post-test scores. Subjected to matched group analysis of variance design indicated an F ratio of 2.68 which was not significant at the .05 level. The resu1ts of a randomized group analysis without matching revealed an F ratio of 2.68 which was quite similar to the previous results and also insignificant at the .05 level. Randomized group analysis without matching between post-test scores and the regression equation indicated an F ratio of 2.72 which again was found insignificant at the .05 level of significance. It was found that no statistically significant difference could be obtained by use of one instructional technique exclusively in preference to another.