The minimum wage is a tool of public policy which despite being in favor of politics tends to be in displeasure of economists. Recent consensus study shows (Alston, 1992; Fuller, 2003) that consensus on minimum wage among economists has a tendency for weakening. The goal of my thesis was to map the consensus of economists on minimum wage in the course of the 20th century and to help to answer the question how the view of economists has changed on this topic and which events were of greatest influence. As a way of measuring the consensus I chose the studying of academic articles because it is the direct output of academic community. My study shows that from the 1930s we can see a constant strengthening of ideas that a minimum wage has a negative effect on economy.

Recently the European Union proposed a “Fair minimum wage initiative”. The proposal is to create a common framework across the EU 28 member countries. However, the Nordic countries have rejected the proposal. We investigate this issue through a literature review. We start with a presentation of empirical research on the effects of a minimum wage. In the theoretical analysis we use the simple classical monopsony model and the model with frictions in our examination of minimum wage effect on welfare and labour market participation. The conclusion is mixed concerning effects from an introduction of minimum wage, depending on how the countries adopt and implement the minimum wage. If the countries government implemented minimum wage correctly using specific industry minimum wage, there is clear evidence for a positive effect.

Cette thèse étudie les effets de mobilité des capitaux sur les politiques publiques dans une situation de sous-emploi. Nous traitons cette question selon trois axes. D'abord, nous introduisons le chômage dans le cadre d'analyse usuel de la concurrence fiscale afin d'étudier l'effet de mobilité du capital sur l'offre de biens publics pour établir que le résultat classique de sous-provision de biens publics est remis en question dès qu'on lève l'hypothèse de plein emploi. Nous menons ensuite une étude de la politique du salaire minimum sous la contrainte de mobilité des capitaux lorsque son rôle est de corriger la répartition des revenus. Nous montrons que la mobilité du capital conduit à la fixation d'un salaire minimum trop faible lorsque les Gouvernements ne sont pas capables de coopération. Enfin, nous analysons dans un troisième axe, l'effet de la mobilité des capitaux sur les politiques publiques en terme d'efficacité lorsque le marché du travail est soumis à des friction. A cet effet, nous utilisons un modèle d'appariement où le stock du capital est exogène. Deux résultats principaux émergent. Le premier résultat montre que le salaire minimum est un moyen d'améliorer l'efficacité du marché du travail en économie fermée; le second est que la mobilité du capital n'affecte pas l'efficacité de la politique du salaire minimum (ainsi conçue) en économie ouverte. / This thesis studies the influence of capital mobility on public policies in an imperfect labor market. We present three contributions to provide some insights on this issue. Firstly, we introduce unemployment into the capital tax competition literature to study the effect of capital mobility on the provision of public goods. Our analysis shows that the usual result of underprovision of public goods is not always preserved in the presence of unemployment. We then investigate the minimum wage policy under the constraint of capital mobility when its role is to adjust the distribution of incomes. We find that, in a non-cooperative context, capital mobility would constrain governments to set lower minimum wages.Finally, we study the influence of capital mobility on the efficiency of labor market policies when governments cannot cooperate. Using a search-matching model with an exogenous stock of capital, we find that implementing a minimum wage can make the decentralized equilibrium coincide with a social optimum in a closed economy. Next we extend the analysis to an n-country economy, the most surprising result being that capital mobility does not affect the efficiency of public policy.

This dissertation consists of three chapters. First two chapters examines how nonprofit organizations (NPOs) react to the state level minimum wage increases, and the third chapter studies the effect of board interlock on the diffusion of innovation.In the first chapter, I investigate the impact of minimum wage increases on employment. I extend the literature by hypothesizing and showing a differential impact of state-level minimum wage increases on nonprofit organizations relative to for-profit organizations. While I find that increases in minimum wages reduce employment growth in both types of organizations, this decrease is substantially larger for nonprofit organizations. I also find that investment in automation, i.e., information technology, rises in nonprofits post minimum wage increase, consistent with the substitution of capital for labor. Minimum wage increases also increase the likelihood of nonprofit exit. In the second chapter, I investigate how CEO pay in nonprofit organizations responds to an exogeneous increase in labor cost resulting from state-level minimum wage hikes. I find that these increases in labor cost, which constrain budgets, are followed by declines in the total pay of NPO CEOs. In contrast, I do not find an impact on CEO pay in for-profit companies. I attribute the differential response between NPO and for-profit organizations to NPO CEOs acting as stewards of the NPO, whereby they are willing to take less to ensure the continued existence of the enterprise, as well as fulfillment of its mission. This phenomenon has previously been observed in the nonprofit sector and termed labor donation, whereby individuals who work for NPOs are intrinsically motivated and consequently, are willing to work for less money. Cross-sectionally I find the declines in compensation are larger in NPOs headquartered in smaller counties, in counties with higher levels of religiosity, and in counties with greater levels of social capital, and in NPOs that are run by their founders. In the last chapter, I propose that board interlocks can act as a channel of information transmission and social learning, hence enhancing the diffusion of innovation among firms. I find that a firm’s patents are more likely to be cited by patents from firms that have common directors (i.e., interlocked firm). The result is robust under a difference-in-differences setting, where the death or retirement of interlocking directors is used as an exogeneous shock to board interlock. The effect is more pronounced for interlocking directors who have longer experience in R&D-intensive industries, have a larger network, and have a higher compensation delta. While I find that board interlock enhances the diffusion of innovation across industries, it has no effect on within-industry knowledge diffusion. Finally, I document that board interlock enhances firms’ overall innovation output, measured by patent counts and citation counts per patent. The paper sheds light on an important role played by board of directors in promoting knowledge spillover and innovation. / Business Administration/Finance

Politics has often been conceptualized as a conflict between political parties that represent the economic interests of different groups in society. This conception of politics has, however, been considerably weakened by the economic and social transformations of the last decades and by the rise of post-materialist values among newer generations of electors. Indeed, the vote of manual workers for left-wing parties has declined significantly in recent decades as did the impact of left-wing parties on social spending. At the same time, the issue of low-wage work has become prominent in the partisan debates of several countries such as the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom following the mobilization of low-paid workers, unions and community associations. Low-wage workers who mainly work in the service sector have often precarious work and living conditions following decades of labor markets deregulation and are highly dependent on governmental policies to insure decent living and work conditions. One of these policies, the minimum wage, has been at the center of the electoral campaigns of many left-wing parties in recent years. However, the issue of low-wage work has rarely been studied in political science. This thesis seeks to explain the partisan dynamics surrounding the issue of low-wage work. My main argument is that low-wage workers tend to vote for left-wing parties in accordance with their economic interests, especially in countries with a weak degree of corporatism such as the United States and the United Kingdom. In those countries, left-wing parties have strong incentives to make pledges related to low-wage work like increasing the minimum wage in their electoral manifesto, because unions are unable to negotiate decent working conditions for the majority of workers. Indeed, in countries with weak corporatism, low-wage workers are very dependent on governmental interventions to ensure minimum working standards and improve their living conditions. In countries with strong corporatism, however, unions negotiate collective agreements that ensure minimum working conditions for the majority of workers, workers with weaker bargaining power are thus less dependent on government policies to insure decent working conditions. Therefore, left-wing parties should be able to consolidate their vote among low-wage workers in countries with a weak degree of corporatism. Once in power, left-wing parties should also increase the minimum wage and the direct cash transfers to low-income families more than governments led by right-wing parties, especially when corporatism is weak. The emphasis on policies targeted to low-wage workers by left-wing parties in countries with a weak degree of corporatism could also limit the capacity of radical parties to attract the vote of low-wage workers. This thesis is composed of 4 articles, one on electoral pledges related to low-wage work, one on the vote of low-wage workers, one on the impact of left-wing parties on minimum wages and one on the impact of left-wing parties on direct cash transfers received by low-income families. These four articles demonstrate the relevance of a materialist conception of politics and the role of institutions regulating the labor market on partisan dynamics.

No description available.

No description available.

Yes / Ireland’s selective system of collective agreed minimum wages has come under significant pressure in recent years. A new fast-food employer body took a constitutional challenge against the system of Joint Labour Committees (JLCs) and this was strengthened by the discourse on the negative effects of minimum wages as Ireland’s economic crisis worsened. Taking a historical institutional approach, the article examines the critical juncture for the JLC system and the factors which led to the subsequent government decision to retain but reform the system. The article argues that the improved enforcement of minimum wages was a key factor in the employers’ push for abolition of the system but that the legacy of a collapsed social partnership system prevented the system’s abolition.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY <p><p>This thesis aims to give a contribution to the academic debate on three specific issues related to institutions and heterogeneity in the labour market. In the first part it analyses the effect of employment protection legislation on worker flows, i.e. the rate of worker reallocation, in OECD countries. The second part revisits the debate on minimum wages in Europe bringing new evidence on systems without a statutory minimum wage and comparing them with countries with a statutory one. The third part delves in a relatively newer debate, about the pros and cons of workforce diversity for firms, bringing some evidence on the effect of diversity on firm productivity and wages in Belgium and France.<p><p>Chapter 1 exploits a unique dataset including cross-country comparable hiring and separation rates by type of transition for 24 OECD countries, 23 business-sector industries and 13 years to study the effect of dismissal regulations on different types of gross worker flows, defined as one-year transitions. Chapter 1 uses both a difference-in-difference approach – in which the impact of regulations is identified by exploiting likely cross-industry differences in their impact – and standard time-series analysis – in which the effect of regulations is identified through regulatory changes over time. Findings suggest that the more restrictive the regulation, the smaller is the rate of within-industry job-to-job transitions, in particular towards permanent jobs. By contrast, it finds no significant effect as regards separations involving an industry change or leading to non-employment. The extent of reinstatement in the case of unfair dismissal appears to be the most important regulatory determinant of gross worker flows. The chapter also present a large battery of robustness checks that suggest that our findings are robust.<p><p>The second part brings new evidence to the debate on minimum wages in Europe by collecting data on systems without a statutory minimum wage and comparing them with countries with a statutory one. Since the mid-2000s, academics, trade unionists and policymakers have been involved in controversial debates about the need for a harmonised European minimum wage policy. <p><p>Chapter 2 provides a description of minimum wage systems in Europe.<p><p>Chapter 3 explores the link between different institutional features of minimum wage systems and the minimum wage bite. It notably addresses the striking absence of studies on sectoral-level minima and exploit unique data covering 17 European countries and information from more than 1,100 collective bargaining agreements. Results provide evidence for a neglected trade-off: systems with bargained sectoral-level minima are associated with higher Kaitz indices than systems with statutory floors, but also with more individuals actually paid below prevailing minima. Higher collective bargaining coverage can to some extent reduce this trade-off between high wage floors and non-compliance or non-coverage. <p>Chapter 4 builds on the previous ones and explores how the diversity of minimum wage systems affects earnings inequalities within European countries. Empirical results confirm the intuition of many practitioners that the combination of sectoral minima and high collective bargaining coverage can be regarded as a functional equivalent of a binding statutory minimum wage, at least for earnings inequalities. Regression results suggest indeed that both a national statutory minimum and, in countries with sectoral minima, higher collective bargaining coverage is significantly associated with lower levels of (overall and inter-industry) wage inequalities and a smaller fraction of workers paid below prevailing minima. Several robustness checks confirm these findings.<p><p>The third part of the thesis does not study a labour market institution as such but the effect of workers diversity, a feature that might prompt some kind of regulations in the future but it is already strongly affecting firms which need to balance their public image and corporate social responsibility practices with internal organisation and profit maximisation.<p><p>Chapter 5 estimates the impact of workforce diversity on productivity, wages, and productivity–wage gaps (i.e. profits) using detailed Belgian linked employer–employee panel data and different econometric tools to solve for endogeneity and heterogeneity issues. Findings show that educational diversity is beneficial for firm productivity and wages while age diversity is harmful. While gender diversity is found to generate significant gains in high-tech/knowledge-intensive sectors, the opposite result is obtained in more traditional industries. Estimates neither vary substantially with firm size nor point to sizeable productivity–wage gaps except for age diversity.<p>Chapter 6 extends the analysis of workforce diversity to the French case using data from a comprehensive establishment-level survey (REPONSE) for 2011 matched with companies’ balance sheet data. Controlling for a wide set of workers’ and firms’ characteristics, findings suggest that, very much in line with previous studies, demographic diversity (age and gender) has a negative effect on productivity and wages while educational diversity has a positive effect. Contrary to some widespread beliefs, the chapter finds no differential effect according to manager characteristics (gender, age, tenure) but some heterogeneity according to the type of proprietary structures of the firms (family firms vs. firms quoted in the stock exchange vs. foreign owner vs. workers among shareholders).<p><p>RESUME<p>Cette thèse vise à apporter une contribution originale au débat académique sur trois questions spécifiques liées aux institutions et à l'hétérogénéité dans le marché du travail. Dans la première partie, la thèse analyse l'effet de la législation relative à la protection de l'emploi sur les flux de travailleurs (embauches, licenciements, démissions, changements d’emploi) dans les pays de l'OCDE. La deuxième partie contribue au débat sur le salaire minimum en Europe en apportant de nouvelles données sur les pays systèmes où les salaires sont fixés au niveau sectoriel en les comparant avec les pays où le salaire minimum est fixé au niveau national. La troisième partie aborde la question relativement récente du rôle de la diversité de la main-d'œuvre pour les entreprises, et estime l'effet de la diversité sur la productivité et les salaires en Belgique et en France.<p><p>La première partie (chapitre 1) analyse une base de données qui comprend les flux d’entrées (embauches) et de sorties (démissions et licenciements) du marché du travail pour 24 pays de l'OCDE et 23 industries sur une période de 13 ans pour étudier l'effet de la réglementation relative au licenciement sur les différents types de flux de travailleurs (mesurés en termes de transitions annuelles). Le chapitre utilise à la fois une approche en double différence - dans laquelle l'impact de la régulation est identifié par l'analyse des différents besoins de réallocation selon les industries (l’hôtellerie a un taux de réallocation beaucoup plus élevé que la chimie par exemple) à travers les pays– et d'analyse de séries temporelles - dans laquelle l'effet de la régulation est identifié par des changements réglementaires au cours du temps. Les résultats suggèrent qu’une régulation plus contraignante diminue le taux de réallocation au sein du même secteur et les transitions d'un emploi à un autre, en particulier vers des emplois permanents. En revanche, une régulation plus restrictive n’a pas d'effet significatif sur les séparations impliquant un changement de secteur ou une perte d’emploi. La possibilité de réintégration en cas de licenciement abusif semble être le déterminant le plus important des flux de travailleurs.<p><p>La deuxième partie de la thèse (chapitres 2, 3 et 4) apporte un regard nouveau sur le débat sur les salaires minima en Europe, en particulier par la collecte de données sur les pays avec des minima sectoriels et la comparaison avec les pays avec un salaire fixé au niveau national. Le second chapitre fournit une description détaillée des différents systèmes de salaire minimum en vigueur en Europe. Le troisième chapitre étudie le lien entre les différentes caractéristiques institutionnelles des systèmes de salaire minimum et leur niveau par rapport au salaire médian. L’analyse pallie notamment l'absence frappante d'études sur les minima au niveau sectoriel en examinant des données couvrant 17 pays européens et plus de 1100 conventions collectives. Les résultats montrent un arbitrage jusqu’ici négligé: les systèmes avec des minima négociés au niveau sectoriel sont associés à un salaire minimum relativement plus élevé que les systèmes dotés de salaire minimum national, mais cela va de pair avec davantage de travailleurs rémunérés en dessous des minima en vigueur. Une meilleure couverture de la négociation collective peut, dans une certaine mesure, réduire cet arbitrage entre salaires minima relativement plus élevés et leur non-respect ou non-couverture. Le quatrième chapitre explore l’impact de la diversité des systèmes de salaire minimum sur l’inégalité salariale au sein des pays européens. Les résultats empiriques confirment l'intuition que la combinaison de minima sectoriels et de couverture élevée de la négociation collective peut être considérée comme l’équivalent fonctionnel d'un salaire minimum légal national. Les résultats suggèrent en effet que, dans les pays avec des minima sectoriels, une plus grande couverture de la négociation collective est associée à des niveaux inférieurs d’inégalités, globales et intersectorielles, et à une plus petite fraction des travailleurs rémunérés en dessous des minima en vigueur.<p><p>La troisième partie de la thèse (chapitres 5 et 6) n’étudie pas une institution du marché du travail en tant que telle, mais la diversité des travailleurs. Il s’agit d’un phénomène qui pourrait inspirer un certain type de régulation à l'avenir, mais qui affecte déjà fortement les entreprises qui ont besoin de trouver un équilibre entre leur image publique et la responsabilité sociale avec l'organisation des ressources humaines et la maximisation du profit. Le cinquième chapitre estime l'impact de la diversité de la main-d'œuvre sur la productivité, les salaires, et l’écart productivité-salaire. Pour ce faire, nous utilisons des données belges de panel appariées employeur-employé entre 1999 et 2006 et différents outils économétriques pour résoudre les questions d'endogénéité et d'hétérogénéité. Les résultats montrent que la diversité en termes d’années d'éducation est bénéfique pour la productivité et les salaires alors que la diversité d’âge est nuisible. Bien que la diversité de genre génère des gains importants dans les secteurs à forte intensité technologique ou de connaissance, le résultat inverse est obtenu dans les industries plus traditionnelles. Les résultats ne varient pas avec la taille des entreprises et ne mettent aucun écart important entre productivité et salaires en évidence à l'exception de la diversité d’âge. Le sixième chapitre étend l'analyse de la diversité de la main-d'œuvre au cas français. Nous utilisons les données de l’enquête REPONSE qui permettent, entre autres, une analyse approfondie, autour du thème des liens entre politiques de gestion du personnel, stratégies économiques et performances des entreprises. Tout en prenant en considération un large éventail de caractéristiques des travailleurs et des entreprises, les résultats suggèrent que la diversité démographique (âge et genre) a un effet négatif sur la productivité et les salaires tandis que la diversité d'éducation a un effet positif. Contrairement à une idée assez répandue, les caractéristiques des dirigeants (genre, âge, ancienneté) n’ont aucun effet sur la diversité. En revanche le type de structure de propriété des entreprises (entreprises familiales, entreprises cotées en bourse, propriétaire étranger ou participation des travailleurs dans l’actionnariat) implique une certaine hétérogénéité de l’effet de la diversité (firmes familiales plus favorable à la diversité de genre, firmes cotées en bourse plus favorable à la diversité d’éducation) / Doctorat en sciences économiques, Orientation économie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

As an economically as well as politically sensitive topic, labor market interventions stir up discussions among professionals as well as general public. Most economists take negative stance against minimum wage policies providing arguments backed by theoretical reasoning rather then sound empirical evidence. Knowledge of labor market outcomes and their transmission channel to other segments of the economy are till nowadays limited and inconsistent. Neither empirical research in the field contributes to a uniform consent on the impact of minimum wage hikes on the price level. Moreover, the reported estimates display large heterogeneity and after a brief inspection reveal that the field is infested with publication selectivity. A uniquely constructed dataset consisting of 469 estimates of the price effect of minimum wage changes and their associated characteristics is analyzed using a set of statistical tools generally known as meta-analysis. The method is a powerful tool nowadays widely used in empirical research to synthesize and systematically evaluate sometimes inconsistent research results. While the study finds no consistent evidence of an actual link between minimum wage hikes and inflationary pressures, the empirical results show strong presence of publication selectivity. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)