La victoire des Romains sur les Séleucides à Apamée en 188 av. J.-C. leur permet d'acquérir le statut de puissance dominante du bassin méditerranéen, au détriment des monarchies hellénistiques et des confédérations de cités grecques. Dans les livres XXII à XXIX des Histoires, dont les fragments qui nous sont parvenus proviennent des Excerpta Constantiniana, Polybe nous décrit les événements qui ont suivi, jusqu'à la victoire de Rome sur la Macédoine de Persée en 168. Il cherche à justifier l'attitude des Romains, rejetant la responsabilité du déclenchement de la troisième guerre de Macédoine sur Philippe V. Le récit de Polybe, bien que manquant parfois d'objectivité, est cependant très intéressant pour comprendre à la fois la diplomatie des Romains dans l'Orient méditerranéen et la politique menée par les Achéens, placés entre Rome et les monarchies hellénistiques. Il montre principalement que, comme les autres Grecs, il n'a pas perçu l'évolution de l'impérialisme romain, un impérialisme défensif qui n'accepte plus que l'on puisse nuire, même indirectement, à ses intérêts. Cette description des événements politiques et militaires s'accompagne d'un certain nombre de jugements et de leçons de Polybe. Ils nous permettent de mieux cerner sa vision de l'homme politique idéal et révèlent parfaitement la cohérence des livres XXII à XXIX avec le reste des Histoires, malgré le statut particulier de ces livres puisqu'ils correspondent à la totalité de la carrière politique de Polybe en Grèce, avant son exil à Rome de 168 à 151. / The Roman’s victory over the Seleucids at Apamea in 188 B.C. offers them the chance to become the most powerful force of the Mediterranean area, overtaking hellenistic monarchies and confederations of Greek cities domination. In the books XXII through XXIX of Histories, from which the fragments that remain today come from the Excerpta Constantiniana, Polybius describes the following events until the Roman victory over Perseus’ Macedonia in 168 B.C. He tries to justify the Roman behaviour and accuses Philippe V of being the one who pulled the trigger of the Third Macedonian War. Polybius’ story, although its lack of objectivity is sometimes obvious, is an interesting resource to understand both Roman diplomacy across the Oriental Mediterranean area and the Achean politic between Rome and the hellenistic monarchies. It mainly reveals that, as any other Greek, Polybius couldn’t detect the rise of the Roman imperialism, an defensive imperialism that does not accept, even indirectly, that its interests might be harmed. The description of these political and military events comes with a number of judgements and lessons from Polybius. Thanks to those, we can better understand his vision of the ideal political man. Moreover, they perfectly reveal the consistency between the books XXII through XXIX and the rest of Histories, despite the particular status of these books since they match Polybius’ entire political carreer in Greece, before his exile in Rome from 168 to 151 B.C.

This dissertation provides a comparative analysis of the foreign policies of the Arab Gulf monarchies during the period of 1971 to 1990, as examined through two case studies: (1) the Arab Gulf monarchies’ relations with Iran and Iraq and (2) the six states’ positions in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The dissertation argues that, in formulating their policies towards Iran and Iraq, the Arab Gulf monarchies aspired to realize four main objectives: external security and territorial integrity; domestic and regime stability; economic prosperity; and the attainment of a stable subregional balance of power without the emergence of Iran or Iraq as Gulf hegemon. Over the largest part of the period under review, the Arab Gulf monarchies managed to offset threats to these basic interests emanating from Iran and Iraq by alternately appeasing and balancing the source of the threat. The analysis reveals that the Arab Gulf monarchies’ individual bilateral relations with Iran and Iraq underwent considerable change over time and, particularly following the Iranian Revolution, displayed significant differences in comparison to one another. These developments are attributable to both disparities among Arab Gulf monarchies and change over time with respect to a variety of factors: geostrategic position, military strength, the existence of military aggression, territorial claims, subversive activities, or ideological challenges by either Iran or Iraq, the national and sectarian composition and ideological orientation of the population, and national economic orientation. The thesis reveals that the Arab Gulf monarchies’ policies in the Arab-Israeli conflict were mainly influenced by (1) identity/ideology, (2) religion, and (3) strategic considerations. In consequence, during the entire period under review, all Arab Gulf monarchies, although setting different priorities, shared an objective in the realization of following interests: the realization of Palestinian national rights, the return of occupied Arab lands, and the restoration of Muslim control over the holy places in Jerusalem; the guarantee of regime stability; the preservation of strategic relations with the United States; the containment of Soviet penetration into the Arab world; the maintenance of Arab unity dominated by moderate Arab forces; and the attainment of a holistic peace settlement supported by an Arab consensus. The analysis shows that the Arab Gulf monarchies succeeded in realizing most of these objectives. In addition, the thesis highlights a significant rapprochement in the Arab Gulf monarchies’ individual policies in the Arab-Israeli conflict, a development most visible in the 1980s. The dissertation identifies the Arab Gulf monarchies as a unit of state and regime entities with broadly similar interests and challenges and, despite a striking power disparity among themselves, inferiority in power status compared with and vulnerability to their neighbours. The similarity of both their objectives and constraints motivated and even required them to cooperate and coordinate in the foreign policy arena. As the analysis demonstrates, this cooperation and coordination increased during the timeframe under review, even when individual foreign policies diverged.

The literature on regime persistence in the Arab world, particularly when it comes to the monarchies, has missed many crucial elements. Specifically, the role of the military within the elite coalition and the factors that lead to variation on this variable have not been adequately studied. In this report, two cases of persistent monarchies – Morocco and Jordan - will be examined. This study will focus on the development of the military establishments in these two cases, as well as their current state of civil-military relations. Using an institutionalist approach, the study finds that civil-military relations in both regimes is a direct outcome of the monarchy’s role, which, in turn, rests on three factors: the historical legacy of the monarchy in state formation, the appeal of the monarch to a large proportion of the population, and the institutional mechanisms utilized by the monarchy to maintain control over their military establishments. The monarchical role in the development of the military subordinates the armed forces, as well as lessens their professionalization as they become less representative and more politicized institutions. Subordination of the military as a strategy of the monarchy is thus highlighted as an important variable in the persistence of this type of authoritarian regime. / text

Analyzing the various factors that strengthened the Hashemite regime's stability during the spread of chaos caused by the Arab Spring is deemed important; even though the wave of the Arab Spring has ended, Jordan's economy is still suffering and the public is still demanding reform nonetheless, the Hashemite regime is untouched. This research will analyze the regime-society bond in light of the Arab Uprising that has undoubtedly assisted in the survival of the kingdom by creating a framework by which protesters unconsciously adhered to that entailed calls for political and economic reform to be initiated by the existing regime. Furthermore, the Hashemite's most powerful allies made sure to provide military and financial assistance to ensure the regime and the kingdoms remain secure and stable. However, such aid did not come without a price; it was critical for the Hashemite regime to balance between maintaining its coordinated strategies with its allies to maintain the close relations and maintaining its sovereignty and the foreign policies that serve national interests.

Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) are changing the way people learn, do business, build relationships, and manage their lives. ICT allow easy and continuous access to open source intelligence (OSINT) that acts as force multipliers, enabling civilians to find new and more effective ways to participate in civil society and address disempowering strategies implemented by governments around the world to maintain stability. ICT and OSINT cultivate fluid intelligence and adaptive governance and can act as a catalyst to cultivate these capacities to transform conflict. The research question sought to determine whether fluid intelligence (cognitive ability to adapt and innovate) and adaptive governance (leadership and systems that work together with the governed to create favorable outcomes) are correlated with stability in gulf monarchies in the Middle East. This thesis examined the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the State of Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the Kingdom of Bahrain, the State of Kuwait, and the Sultanate of Oman using a complex adaptive systems analytic framework that drew upon the theories of adaptive governance and fluid and crystallized intelligence. Group grievance often indicates levels of stability in civilian populations. This study revealed a strong correlation between adaptive regimes with fluid populations and stability. Populations high in fluid intelligence in adaptive monarchical regimes had lower group grievance, but populations high in fluid intelligence in non-adaptive monarchical regimes had higher group grievance.

Arab Gulf monarchies including the constitutional monarchies of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman / and the absolutist monarchies of the Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, in general, have a poor record of political liberalization. Until the early 1990&rsquo / s, there have been attempts to implement political reforms, however even limited political reforms have been short-lived. Nevertheless, political liberalization in the Arab Gulf monarchies has accelerated particularly since the end of the Cold War, as most of the Arab Gulf ruling elites were then convinced of opening up their political systems. Yet, regardless of similarities in their domestic political contexts, the quality and the quantity of political reform implemented, differed from one Arab Gulf state to another. This study aims to examine, how the ruling regimes of the Arab Gulf have responded to changes in the international context along with the increasing demands for political reform. In addition, it aims to provide the reader with a detailed examination of political liberalization in two specific Arab Gulf states, namely the Kuwait and the Saudi Arabia. Throughout this study, overall performances of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in terms of political liberalization are compared and the reasons why Kuwait has been noticeably more successful than Saudi Arabia in this field are studied. It is the basic conclusion of this study that despite Arab Gulf regimes have been slow in taking steps towards political liberalization, they are not immune to political liberalization, and that even the most conservative Arab Gulf monarchy, the Saudi Arabia has not been able to remain indifferent to change and political reform.

The study then focuses on the Bernadotte candidacy as the practical expression of a Norwegian desire for a national monarchy. Reaction to the candidacy is analyzed and, although it proved unsuccessful, the strength of the idea is again evident when the government shifted its focus to the secondary candidacy of Denmark's Prince Carl. During the debate over the candidates for the throne, the underlying theme which developed was the question of Norway's form of government-- monarchy or republic.

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Imperial powers have employed a range of strategies to establish and then maintain control over foreign territories and communities. As deploying military forces from the home country is often costly – not to mention logistically stretching when long distances are involved – many imperial powers have used indigenous forces to extend control or protect influence in overseas territories. This study charts the extent to which Britain employed this method in its informal empire among the small states of Eastern Arabia: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the seven Trucial States (modern day UAE), and Oman before 1971. Resolved in the defence of its imperial lines of communication to India and the protection of mercantile shipping, Britain first organised and enforced a set of maritime truces with the local Arab coastal shaikhs of Eastern Arabia in order to maintain peace on the sea. Throughout the first part of the nineteenth century, the primary concern in the Gulf for the British, operating through the Government of India, was therefore the cessation of piracy and maritime warfare. Later, British interests were expanded to suppressing the activities of slave traders and arms traffickers. At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, Britain also sought to exclude foreign powers from gaining a foothold in the area. It was during this time that the British government assumed full responsibility for the external relations of these shaikhdoms and that Britain conferred the status of ‘protected state’ upon them. Up to this point, when Britain needed to protect these interests or use force to compel local rulers to comply with its wishes, naval power usually sufficed. By the midpoint of the twentieth century, Britain’s interests in the area had swelled and migrated inland – first because of the establishment of air stations servicing the imperial route to India, then as a result of oil exploration and production. At the same time, growing international opposition to colonialism and a steady reduction in Britain’s ability to project military power overseas made it more and more difficult for Britain to discharge it security duties in the Gulf. So how did Britain bridge this gap? Studies of British security policy towards the Gulf have focused almost exclusively on Britain’s formal military architecture. Using India Office records and British Government archival documents, this study provides a reinterpretation of the means by which Britain sought to maintain order, protect its interests in the region and discharge its defence obligations. The records, it will be shown, point to a broad British policy before 1971 of enhancing the coercive instruments available to the local rulers. Rather than having to revert to using its own military forces, Britain wanted the Gulf rulers to acquire a monopoly over the use of force within their territories and to be in a stronger position to defend their own domains against cross-border raiders and covetous neighbours. This policy was not always successful; Britain was progressively drawn into the internal security affairs of a number of ITS protégés, especially after the Second World War. The security forces that emerged – armed police forces, gendarmeries and militaries – varied considerably, as did Britain’s involvement in their establishment and running. Nevertheless, taken as whole, a trend emerges between 1921 and 1971 of Britain pushing the Gulf states to take over more and more of the security burden. Indeed, at a time when its traditional sources of global power were fading, indigenous security forces were an important tool in Britain’s pursuit of its interests before its military withdrawal from the Gulf in December 1971. This aspect of Britain’s approach to security in the Gulf has largely been overlooked.

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