Extrait de : Thèse doctorat : Littérature française : Paris III-Sorbonne nouvelle : 2000. / Bibliogr. p. [353]-382. Notes bibliogr. Index.

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The purpose of the research paper is to study and analyze the criticism expressed by Montaigne on different doxic themes that pervade the social discourse of his time. To do so, we consider two problems connected and coextensive to the second part of the XVI century. / The first one that extends over the first two chapters analyzes the way by which the religious wars of the era have found their justification in God. In the first chapter, we try to analyze the discursive vector of the divine ire whereas in the second chapter, we investigate the relationship between the tide of a battle and the elect sign that is supposed to give to the winner. / The second problem, that deals with various attempts of pacification, forms the third chapter of this paper. It focuses on the efforts undertaken by some "well intentioned" jurists to end "fratricidal" wars by royal by-laws (edits) whose unfortunate results are to stir up hatred among different ideological factions. / The fourth chapter is a reflection on some criticism stated by XVI century thinkers who perceived actual wars as lacking religious foundation, and even as a carnage where nobody really knew why the fighting was going on. / Finally, we put forward some hypotheses on the specificity of the Essais in the sociodiscursive context of this age.

Author's Thesis (doctoral)--Université Bordeaux III, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [382]-413) and index.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1957. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Bibliography, leaves [271]-285.

Diss.--Philosophischen Fakultät IV Sprach-und Literaturwissenschaften--Universität Regensburg, 1992. / Bibliogr. p. 261-284. Notes bibliogr. Index.

Resumo: Examinamos como Montaigne, no ensaio intitulado Da Arte da Conversação, fornece um instrumento para instaurar uma filosofia moral compatível com o ceticismo pirrônico, tal como apresentado por Sexto Empírico, em suas Hipotiposes Pirronianas. O primeiro capítulo possui caráter introdutório ao tema. Ou seja, nele desenvolvemos uma apresentação geral da filosofia cética e seus principais aspectos que nos conduzem à formulação do problema relativo à instauração de uma moralidade no seio desta filosofia. Assim sendo, apresentaremos a noção geral da filosófica cética, assim como sua relação com outras filosofias antigas que, por sua vez, apresentam caráter moral, como por exemplo, o estoicismo e epicurismo. Como são poucos os dizeres de Sexto Empírico sobre o problema que envolve uma moralidade cética, o que não nos permite resolver o problema com muita clareza, nosso próximo passo, no segundo capítulo, será o exame da filosofia montaigneana, cujo caráter é estritamente moral. Sabe-se que Montaigne não apenas foi leitor assíduo das Hipotiposes Pirronianas, como retomou a filosofia cética. Portanto, examinaremos em que medida sua filosofia moral seria compatível com o ceticismo, oferecendo, por assim dizer, acréscimos a esta filosofia. "Conversação" como um modelo de investigação filosófico, não apenas aperfeiçoa o modelo cético, como também nos auxilia na própria compreensão desta filosofia. Desenvolveremos, portanto, uma discussão sobre a relação entre o ceticismo e a filosofia dos Ensaios. Assim como o modo como será possível conciliar o modo de racionar cético à esfera moral.

The purpose of this dissertation is two-fold. First of all it aims at finding a unified philosophical basis for The Tempest. Commentators have widely acknowledged the diversity of the moral and political discourses present in this play: there is the idea of divine providence; there is the Stoic discourse about restraining one’s anger and desire for revenge; there is the Machiavellian teaching which lays strong emphasis on power and illusion as the only means to make men obedient; there is a deep concern with the question of whether virtue is teachable or not and how it should be taught; and there is also a preoccupation with the golden world and the ideal commonwealth. But is there a unity to be found amid this diversity? My answer to this question is that there indeed is an integrated philosophical framework in which all these discourses can find their proper places and reinforce one another in a way that contributes, together with the strictly observed unity of action, place and time, to the overall coherence of the play. This underlying basis, I will try to demonstrate, has a close affinity with Plato’s moral and political thought which centers around the question of teaching virtue; meanwhile, it could also be shown that, either historically or conceptually, the discourses identifiable in the play are all closely related to Plato’s philosophy. The examination of this basis will allow us to better appreciate the depth and nuances of The Tempest, but it will also shed some new light—hence the second task of this research—on the meaning of five other Shakespearean plays starting from Hamlet, As You Like It, Measure for Measure, to Timon of Athens and Coriolanus. In my dissertation, all these works (and Timon of Athens in especial, which, I believe, is a play where all the philosophical themes I will explore in this dissertation converge) will be treated at some length, with emphasis laid respectively on the use of power, the taming of anger, and Shakespeare’s idea about the golden world. Though a considerable part of my dissertation will be devoted to the tracing of this intellectual basis with reference to the template of ideas provided by Plato’s philosophy, I do not mean to suggest that it is through reading Plato directly that Shakespeare consciously develops a philosophy. My point is rather that all the discourses he makes use of in these plays could lead him of their own accord to the Platonic template. In this sense, what Shakespeare did is no more than just to allow the philosophical potentials of his motifs to work out themselves and meanwhile faithfully register their intricate interaction. In accordance with this assumption, my study will be half speculative rather than stringently historical in nature. I will proceed, though, strictly on an empirical line, that is, to presume nothing about the existence of philosophical patterns, and base my conclusion as much as possible on close readings of the text.

The aim of this dissertation is to provide a critique of the idea that skepticism was the driving force in the development of early modern thought. Historian of philosophy Richard Popkin introduced this thesis in the 1950s and elaborated on it over the next five decades, and recent scholarship shows that it has become an increasingly accepted interpretation. I begin with a study of the relevant historical antecedents—the ancient skeptical traditions of which early modern thinkers were aware—Pyrrhonism and Academicism. Then I discuss the influence of skepticism on three pre-Cartesians: Francisco Sanches, Michel de Montaigne, and Pierre Charron. Basing my arguments on an informed understanding of both ancient Greek skepticism and some of the writings of these philosophers, I contend that it is inaccurate to predominantly characterize Sanches, Montaigne, and Charron as skeptics. To support his thesis about the singular influence of skepticism on early modern thought, Popkin says that René Descartes’ metaphysical philosophy was formed as a response to a skeptical threat and that Descartes ultimately conceded to the force of skepticism. He also argues that David Hume was a Pyrrhonist par excellence. I disagree with Popkin’s claims. I argue that Descartes was not as deeply affected by skepticism as Popkin suggests and that it is inaccurate to characterize Hume as a Pyrrhonist. By offering this critique, I hope to make clear to the readers two things: first, that Popkin’s thesis, though it is both enticing and generally accepted by many scholars, is questionable with regard to its plausibility; second, that the arguments I present in this dissertation reveal that further research into the role of skepticism in early modern philosophy is in order.