Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin, 1964. / Abstracted in Dissertation abstracts, vol. 25 (1964) no. 6, p. 3618-9. Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliography.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Georgia State University, 2007. / Title from file title page. Ann Cale Kruger, committee chair; Laura D. Fredrick, Amy R. Lederberg, John Suarey, committee members. Electronic text (129 p. : col. ill.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Oct. 25, 2007. Includes bibliographical references.

Habili.-schr.--Universität Zürich, 1995. / Bibliogr. p. 395-402. Index.

No description available.

Tesis para optar al grado de Magíster en Filosofía / Autor no autoriza el acceso a texto completo de su documento. / La presente tesis trata de la construcción de una visión metaética que comprenda la diversidad de valores morales a lo largo de la historia y a lo ancho del espacio, es decir, de carácter relativista, pero que además permita la convergencia de los valores morales dentro de grupos socioculturales. Esto, con el objetivo de que la moral posea una flexibilidad tal que permita la diferencia de opiniones, pero que también permita la generación de normas morales que regulen la conducta de los miembros de los grupos sociales en su interacción con otros. Con vistas a este objetivo, se abordan las teorías metaéticas de los filósofos David Hume y Jesse Prinz, para establecer una forma de moral empirista, es decir, construida a partir de la experiencia y, por lo tanto, relativa a la misma. Además, se analiza la posibilidad de integrar la propuesta moral empirista al espectro de la realidad social pragmática de John Searle, de tal manera que al componente relativista del empirismo se sume la normatividad proveniente de los rasgos de la realidad social, cumpliendo así con el objetivo principal, en que se conjuga lo subjetivo individual y lo intersubjetivo.

The development of personal autonomy is often considered to be an important objective of education in general, and moral education in particular. This paper is an attempt to clarify what is meant by the concept of personal" autonomy, to justify its promotion as a personal and educational ideal, and to examine the connection between personal autonomy and moral agency. Four conditions are found to be necessary for the possession and exercise of personal autonomy: freedom of choice, authenticity, rational reflection and strength of will. The promotion of personal autonomy is justified on at least four kinds of grounds: for its extrinsic value, for its intrinsic worth, for its educational significance, and for its close conceptual connection with the notion of moral agency. The criterion of 'relating to other people's interests' is taken to be the most important factor in distinguishing between ordinary autonomous acts and acts of moral agency. / Education, Faculty of / Graduate

No description available.

No description available.

The aim of my thesis is to fill a gap in virtue ethics. I present an account of moral responsibility that is consistent with the core assumption of virtue ethics, that character and not action is the primary locus of ethical appraisal. Virtue ethics typically does not include a notion of moral responsibility. The reason for this omission is that traditionally attributions of moral responsibility are determined by the causal aetiology of our actions. Because virtue ethics is primarily concerned with our characters and not our actions, virtue ethicists typically assume that causal aetiology is irrelevant to ethics. So, in order to fill the gap in virtue ethics I need to show how the core assumption of virtue ethics does not require virtue ethicists to hold that causal aetiology is irrelevant to ethics. The project of filling this gap in virtue ethics is important because virtue ethics is a popular modern ethical theory and in order to fulfil this ·function it must say something about moral responsibility. It is a deficit of virtue ethics that it provides us with no basis for judgements about moral responsibility. It restricts the scope of ethics to simply grounding moral assessments of our characters. An ethical theory needs to provide a basis for making practical decisions in legal and political matters. My thesis is that by shifting the locus of moral responsibility from the notion of action to that of character, virtue ethics can include a notion of moral responsibility. I present an account of the notion of moral responsibility for character. It operates as an amendment to virtue ethics and is intended to demonstrate how differences in the causal aetiologies of our characters determine the extent to which we can be attributed moral responsibility for them. In contrast to, for example, Classical Utilitarianism ii which holds that being morally responsible is an all-or-nothing affair, my account explains how the differences among the causal aetiologies of our characters create a spectrum along which moral responsibility can be assigned to varying degrees. By focusing on the formation of character and not of action as the basis for attributions of moral responsibility we can make use of the notion of a causal aetiology without being forced to abandon the core assumption of virtue ethics. My method is a standard philosophical method of critical analysis and synthesis of philosophical literature. My account consists of two conditions that are both necessary and together sufficient for making attributions of moral responsibility for character. The first condition, which derives from Harry Frankfurt's theory of moral responsibility, is that we 'identify' with our characters. The second condition, which incorporates Daniel Dennett' s notion of a 'narrative self', is that we are to a significant extent 'morally responsible selves'. My conclusion is that we are morally responsible for our characters only if (1) we are to a significant extent morally responsible selves and (2) we identify with our characters. The extent of the attribution of moral responsibility is determined by the extent to which we identify with our characters.

In previous research, measurement of deontological and utilitarian beliefs relied on responses to classic moral dilemmas. While use of these dilemmas has proven fruitful they are fraught with potential confounds. This thesis describes the construction and validation of the Consequentialist scale, a tool designed to directly measure the endorsement of both utilitarian and deontological beliefs. The Consequentialist scale was tested against variables previously associated with moral judgments, namely emotional reactivity, Machiavellianism, intrinsic religiosity, and political conservatism. Results indicate that the Consequentialist scale provides added explanatory power that helps to elucidate cornerstone processes involved in moral judgments.