In previous research, measurement of deontological and utilitarian beliefs relied on responses to classic moral dilemmas. While use of these dilemmas has proven fruitful they are fraught with potential confounds. This thesis describes the construction and validation of the Consequentialist scale, a tool designed to directly measure the endorsement of both utilitarian and deontological beliefs. The Consequentialist scale was tested against variables previously associated with moral judgments, namely emotional reactivity, Machiavellianism, intrinsic religiosity, and political conservatism. Results indicate that the Consequentialist scale provides added explanatory power that helps to elucidate cornerstone processes involved in moral judgments.

Thesis--Catholic University of America. / Vita. Bibliography: p. 131-134.

Thesis--Wisconsin. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 107-115).

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:24:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2011-08-22Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T19:10:51Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 baldovinotti_am_me_rcla.pdf: 2056289 bytes, checksum: 55321ea35c0017581919a6111508a122 (MD5) / No contexto brasileiro atual há diversas manifestações desastrosas de ações impulsivas, violência e injustiça. Diante de todo esse quadro, o que fazer? Na tentativa de responder a tal indagação, direcionamo-nos aos valores subjacentes em determinados contextos. Partindo do pressuposto de que os valores morais são construídos e não ensinados, salientamos a relevância de práticas educativas, as quais busquem mediar a questão da moralidade, bem como, investigar o que está implícito às tomadas de decisão. É evidente que a escola não é o único ambiente formador, todavia, trata-se de um espaço enriquecedor e marcante na vida de toda criança ou adolescente. Tendo em vista a relevância da educação escolar, faz-se urgente e necessário direcionar um trabalho, o qual denote oportunidades, gerando reflexão em sala de aula e que, dessa forma, propicie meios para o processo de construção da autonomia dos alunos, evidenciando um direcionamento coerente aos meandros de uma formação cidadã, expressa nos documentos oficiais da educação. Sob a referida lógica, este estudo foi elaborado, buscando investigar os valores dos adolescentes perante a sociedade atual e ao mesmo tempo, verificar se a técnica de heterônimo – inspirada nas obras do poeta português Fernando Pessoa (1888-1935) –, com fundamentação teórica de Piaget (1896-1980) e Kohlberg (1927-1987), possibilita o trabalho com a discussão moral e a construção de princípios éticos. Os participantes são alunos de uma escola pública, na faixa etária de 14/15 anos, cursando o último ano do Ensino Fundamental. Com tal abordagem, os sujeitos tiveram oportunidade de criar o seu heterônimo, isto é, um “outro eu”. Os resultados inferem que os adolescentes, do estudo em questão, ao construir um perfil (heterônimo), respaldaram-se... / In the Brazilian current context there are several disastrous manifestations of impulsive actions, violence and injustice. Facing this whole picture, what is there to do? In the attempt of answering such inquiry, we directed into the underlying values inside some determined contexts. Starting from the assumption that the moral values are built and not taught, we stress the relevance of educational practices, which aim not only to mediate the morality question but also to investigate what is implicit in the making decision process. It is evident that the school is not the only educational environment, however, it is an enriching and remarkable place in the life of every child or teenage. Considering the relevance of the school education, it is urgent and necessary to create a kind of work which denotes opportunities generating reflection inside the classroom and, this way, it could propitiate means for the process of building the students´ autonomy, highlighting a coherent guide to the meanders of a citizenship formation expressed in the official documents of education. Under the referred logic, this study was elaborated trying to investigate the teenage values before the current society and, at the same time, to verify if the technique of heteronym – inspired by the works of the Portuguese poet Fernando Pessoa (1888- 1935) and under the theoretical fundaments from Piaget (1896-1980) and Kohlberg (1927-1987) enables the work with moral discussion and the construction of ethical principles. The participants are students of a public school aging 14/15 years old and studying in the last grade of elementary school. Based on this approach the subjects had the chance of creating their own heteronym, that is, “another me”, experiencing a new perspective, which means another view of a hypothetical situation... (Complete abstract click electronic acess below)

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-12T15:02:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 arquivo1013_1.pdf: 1739426 bytes, checksum: 7e8cd8da4e52b4eafc12154f3cab0f9d (MD5) license.txt: 1748 bytes, checksum: 8a4605be74aa9ea9d79846c1fba20a33 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 / Faculdade de Amparo à Ciência e Tecnologia do Estado de Pernambuco / O presente estudo tem como objetivo identificar quais as organizações atuantes e quais suas ações de conscientização, prevenção e intervenção no processo de combate do assédio moral/organizacional no setor bancário do Recife-PE. Com essa finalidade, foi utilizado como base conceitual para tratar do fenômeno assédio moral os estudos de autores como da francesa Marie-France Hirigoyen (2006, 2007), Barreto (2003), Heloani (2004). E, Soboll (2008), que destrinchou um pouco mais este conceito, considerando-o como uma prática organizacional, definindo-o como assédio moral/organizacional. Sendo o assédio moral um fenômeno recente no mundo do trabalho, uma prática que começou a ser estudada no Brasil apenas no ano de 2000, existem poucos estudos sobre o assunto. Além da pesquisa bibliográfica foi realizado o estudo de caso qualitativo, utilizando-se dos seguintes instrumentos: pesquisa documental e entrevista por pauta, sendo a coleta de dados realizada no período de Maio a Novembro de 2008. Posteriormente, os dados foram analisados utilizando como método principal a análise de conteúdo e como técnica para tratamento dos dados a análise da enunciação. Quanto aos resultados da pesquisa destaca-se que ainda são poucas as ações para prevenção e combate do assédio moral/organizacional, estando ainda às organizações envolvidas nesse processo, em período de conhecimento, de troca de informações e procurando uma maior integração

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-12T18:03:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 arquivo6757_1.pdf: 1054906 bytes, checksum: 3712c6bd55df5410b85125343719d196 (MD5) license.txt: 1748 bytes, checksum: 8a4605be74aa9ea9d79846c1fba20a33 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005 / A presente pesquisa objetiva descrever e analisar as posturas filosóficas de Kant e Nietzsche no tocante ao significado do empenho crítico e ao tratamento conferido à moral, intentando demonstrar não somente uma acentuada disparidade entre suas argumentações, mas a reapropriação nietzschiana do referido empenho herdado da filosofia crítica. Dessa perspectiva, aduziremos a iniciativa nietzschiana como uma retomada da crítica que, uma vez radicalizada pelo próprio Nietzsche, é concomitantemente redimensionada em seu foco de atuação: ao invés do tribunal imanente da razão à lá Kant, os valores e as avaliações criadoras de valores. É nesse sentido que enfatizaremos um redimensionamento da crítica (crítica enquanto atitude filosófica patenteada por Kant), imputado a Nietzsche. Por meio dessa constatação, denotamos os motivos de Nietzsche para uma recusa declarada à doutrina moral kantiana, e mais especificamente, à fundamentação da moralidade derivada desta, remetendo-nos ao enquadramento da mesma na engrenagem histórica do niilismo. Em detrimento da formulação metafísica de postulados nos quais devam assentar a moral, Nietzsche aduz uma desconstrução de seus valores constitutivos, descortinando-os como produções humanas, sintomas eclodidos de um típico modo de avaliar que ascende e se exerce. Assim sendo, a fundamentação da moral kantiana deve ser interpretada a partir de seus sintomas, e estes sob a ótica da vida. É justamente por essa via que preconizamos fortes indícios levantados por Nietzsche contra Kant, os quais denunciam uma desvalorização da vida, uma interpretação niilista da vida em sua moral. Portanto, Adentraremos então numa análise da afirmação nietzschiana da vida como tentativa de transvaloração e desvinculação da modernidade, inclusive de sua parcela kantiana

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In this essay, I examine the interplay between history, progress, and morality, as it is discussed explicitly or implicitly in the metaethical literature. At first sight, it is perhaps intuitive that these three are necessarily intertwined and mutually dependent, as if they were casually connected. For instance, few would deny that moral progress has occurred throughout history. The abolishment of slavery and the political emancipation of certain groups are seen as obvious signs that morality does indeed progress. Those who believe in de facto moral progress would point to such 'facts' by comparing two states of affairs according to their moral status. Moral progress thus occurs when we move from a "worse" state of affairs to a "better". However, this simple algorithm becomes increasingly untenable once we ask what it means for something to be "better". Better by what measure, better according to whom, better in what sense? Some – moral realists– will argue that as we become increasingly aware of moral truths and as these truths steadily accumulate, progress occurs. Others will argue that there are no moral truths and no moral facts, and a comparison between different states of affairs is impossible because it involves a sort of moral 'historical imperialism' in which we assert our convictions and prejudices upon a time and culture with completely different beliefs. Taken to the extreme, this view gives rise to the idea that moral progress is nothing but a mirage, a psychological necessity without justification. I conclude the essay by arguing that several positions fall short when addressing questions regarding moral progress, and that there are other ways of discussing it which might be more fruitful.

Thesis (MA)--Stellembosch University, 2015. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The aim of this thesis is to argue for a new metric for determining the moral status of another being. Determining this status is of foundational importance in a number of legal, political, and ethical concerns, including but not limited to animal rights, the treatment of criminals, and the treatment of the psychologically afflicted. This metric will be based upon one’s capacity to morally consider others. In other words, in order to have full moral status, one must be able to have moral concern for others and act upon this concern to even a minimal degree. In doing so, one will be considered to belong to a “moral community”, which affords the member a certain set of rights, privileges, and duties towards other community members. Arguing for the existence of such a community achieves the pragmatic aspect of this thesis. I argue that morality is geared towards group-survival strategies which have been evolutionarily selected for, and thus by organizing societal structures towards the tools which nature has armed us with, we may maximize the powers and capacities of the community members. In order to achieve these aims, I defend a concept of morality as based in emotion, requiring certain neurological structures, which gives the first set of criteria for identifying potential members of the moral community. I then discuss the issue of identifying the capacity for morality in non-human minds, arguing that we may infer moral capacities from behaviourism. In summary, the findings of this paper are that first, morality is essentially emotional in nature and is a product of the nature of our neurological system, although rational processes and enculturation shape particular moral sensitivities and priorities. Second, one can infer the existence of moral capacities in animals from their behaviour, and, at risk of engaging in anthropomorphism, to deny these capacities completely entails solipsism. Thirdly, and most importantly, those who are capable of morally considering others ought to be afforded full moral status themselves and be brought into a “moral community” wherein special rights, freedoms, and privileges allow the members to most efficiently contribute to the community, maximizing the powers and benefits of the community. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die doel van hierdie tesis is om ’n nuwe maatstaf voor te hou waarvolgens die morele status van ’n ander wese bepaal kan word. Die bepaling van hierdie status is van fundamentele belang vir ’n hele aantal regs-, politiese en etiese aangeleenthede. Dit sluit, onder andere, diereregte, die behandeling van misdadigers en die behandeling van diegene met sielkundige probleme in. Hierdie maatstaf sal gebaseer word op die vermoë van die individuele wese om ander moreel in ag te neem. Met ander woorde om volle morele status te hê, moet 'n wese daartoe in staat wees om moreel besorg te wees oor ander en om, ten minste tot ’n minimale mate, na gelang van hierdie besorgheid op te tree. Op grond hiervan kan daar aanvaar word dat daardie wese tot ’n “morele gemeenskap” behoort, wat ook aan hom ’n stel regte, voordele en pligte teenoor ander gemeenskapslede sal besorg. Om ’n argument vir die bestaan van só ’n gemeenskap te maak sal die pragmatiese doelwit van hierdie tesis bereik. Ek argumenteer dat moraliteit ingestel is op groepsoorlewingstrategieë wat evolusionêr geselekteer is. Dit wil sê deur samelewingstrukture op só ’n wyse te organiseer dat dit gebruik maak van die gereedskap waarmee die natuur ons bewapen het, sal ons die bevoegdhede en die vermoëns van gemeenskapslede kan maksimaliseer. Om hierdie doelwitte te bereik, verdedig ek ’n verstaan van moraliteit as gebaseer in emosies wat sekere neurologiese strukture benodig. Dít verskaf die eerste stel kriteria waarvolgens potensiële lede van die morele gemeenskap geïdentifiseer kan word. Ek bespreek vervolgens die moontlikheid om die vermoë tot moraliteit in nie-menslike verstande te identifiseer en argumenteer dat morele vermoëns vanuit gedragsleer afgelei kan word. Ter opsomming is die bevindinge van hierdie tesis, eerstens, dat moraliteit wesenlik emosioneel van aard en ’n produk van ons neurologiese sisteem is, alhoewel rasionele prosesse en verkulturering spesifieke morele sensitiwiteite en prioriteite vorm. Tweedens kan die bestaan van morele vermoëns in diere afgelei word vanuit hulle optrede, en, alhoewel ons hier die risiko van antropomorfisme loop, behels die ontkenning van hierdie vermoëns solipsisme. Derdens, en die belangrikste, diegene wat daartoe in staat is om ander moreel in ag te neem behoort self volledig morele status toegeken te word. Hulle word sodoende in die “morele gemeenskap” betrek waar spesiale regte, vryhede en voordele gemeenskapslede sal toelaat om op die mees effektiewe wyse tot die gemeenskap by te dra om sodoende die bevoegdhede en voordele van die gemeenskap te maksimaliseer.

The thesis is an attempt to find a satisfactorv grounding for universal moral rights. It attempts to ground universal moral rights in a revised version of the framework of moral reasons offered by T.M. Scanlon in What We Owe to Each Oflzer. In doing so it takes on several related projects. It makes a case for why rights generally, and universal rights in particular, are an essential part of a proper moral theory. It then attempts an extended argument in support of why the method of grounding universal rights at which I eventuallv arrive is superior to competitors. The argument encompasses both why I believe that universal rights need to be grounded in an objective meta-ethcs, and why I take the sort of irrealist cognitivism advanced by Scanlon to be the most promising form of moral objectivism. The argument is admittedly defeasible: it is not so ambitious as to try to eliminate every competing rights theory, but it purports to be strong enough to show that my theory enjoys significant adivantages over manv others. In the course of making this argument I align myself with the natural law tradition, and claim that mv position is best understood as a new natural law theory. The thesis goes on to defend many elements of the Scanlonian picture of moral reasons, but also to revise that picture in important ways, particularly by arguing that Scanlon’s contractualism is best understood to be underpinned bv an account of the sacred offered by Ronald Dworkin, and that some moral reasons are reasons we all share. The final chapter of the thesis shows how rights are derived from Scanlonian reasons, and particularly how universal rights are derived from shared reasons.