<p>The paper explores theoretical shortcomings in the egalitarian theory by John Rawls and provides a complementary view on the problem of morally arbitrary contingencies. The conception of natural lottery, which Rawls presents to signify the starting range of morally arbitrary inequalities, falls short in philosophical grounding. According to critics, the notion of natural lottery appeals to the philosophical conception of moral luck which undermines ascription of moral responsibility. Since moral responsibility is a basic prerequisite for egalitarian justice, the appeal to morally arbitrary contingencies of the natural lottery may be self-defeating for the theory.</p><p>Criticizing Rawls’s approach to morally arbitrary contingencies Susan Hurley investigates philosophical groundings for judgment of moral responsibility. Philosophical inquiries into moral luck differentiate four categories of luck and expose the difficulties of ascription of moral responsibility for it. The conception of moral luck implies epistemological shortcomings in the rational judgment of moral responsibility. Hurley claims that ascription of moral responsibility requires another logical strategy.</p><p>The critical discussion by Norman Daniels refers to another egalitarian theory by Ronald Dworkin which suggests ascription of moral responsibility on a gradual scale. The theory divides the naturally contingent recourses into categories of brute luck and option luck. This strategy stratifies normative standards of responsibility by the criteria of individual choice and circumstances.</p><p>Considering the strategy of gradual ascription of responsibility, I suggest to apply a moral developmental perspective as an additional outlook on the moral responsibility in egalitarian theory. The theory of moral development by Lawrence Kohlberg provides an explanation of a gradual development of moral responsibility through a natural order of developmental stages. It stratifies the moral responsibility into a hierarchical model of measurement and systematizes the order of normative standards.</p>

This doctoral thesis analyzes the systematic role of Kant's conception of happiness in his moral, legal and political theory. Although many of his conclusions and arguments are directly or indirectly influenced by his conception of human happiness, Kant's underlying assumptions are rarely overtly discussed or given much detail in his works. Kant also provides different and apparently incompatible definitions of happiness. This research explores the domains of Kant's practical philosophy in which his conception of happiness plays a systematic role: the relation between the natural need of human beings to pursue happiness and the ends-oriented structure of the human will; Kant's anti-eudaimonism in ethical theory; Kant's claim that we have an indirect duty to promote our own happiness and the problem that under certain circumstances, the indeterminacy of happiness makes it not irrational to choose short term satisfaction at the costs of one's overall, long term happiness, given Kant's conception of non-moral choice as expectation of pleasure; Kant's justification of the duty to adopt the happiness of others as our ends (the duty of beneficence) and the latitude and eventual demandingness of this duty; finally, since Kant also subsumes subsistence needs and welfare under the concept of happiness of individuals, I also engage with the question of state provision for the poor in the Kantian Rechtsstaat and explore Kant's conception of equity or fairness (Billigkeit) as an alternative to the traditional minimalist and the welfare interpretations of the Kantian state.

The paper explores theoretical shortcomings in the egalitarian theory by John Rawls and provides a complementary view on the problem of morally arbitrary contingencies. The conception of natural lottery, which Rawls presents to signify the starting range of morally arbitrary inequalities, falls short in philosophical grounding. According to critics, the notion of natural lottery appeals to the philosophical conception of moral luck which undermines ascription of moral responsibility. Since moral responsibility is a basic prerequisite for egalitarian justice, the appeal to morally arbitrary contingencies of the natural lottery may be self-defeating for the theory. Criticizing Rawls’s approach to morally arbitrary contingencies Susan Hurley investigates philosophical groundings for judgment of moral responsibility. Philosophical inquiries into moral luck differentiate four categories of luck and expose the difficulties of ascription of moral responsibility for it. The conception of moral luck implies epistemological shortcomings in the rational judgment of moral responsibility. Hurley claims that ascription of moral responsibility requires another logical strategy. The critical discussion by Norman Daniels refers to another egalitarian theory by Ronald Dworkin which suggests ascription of moral responsibility on a gradual scale. The theory divides the naturally contingent recourses into categories of brute luck and option luck. This strategy stratifies normative standards of responsibility by the criteria of individual choice and circumstances. Considering the strategy of gradual ascription of responsibility, I suggest to apply a moral developmental perspective as an additional outlook on the moral responsibility in egalitarian theory. The theory of moral development by Lawrence Kohlberg provides an explanation of a gradual development of moral responsibility through a natural order of developmental stages. It stratifies the moral responsibility into a hierarchical model of measurement and systematizes the order of normative standards.

This thesis examines the moral philosophical commitments that Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche advance in their respective oppositions to utilitarianism. Though not always under that title, all three reject the claim that promoting happiness is the ultimate end that we pursue, or ought to pursue, through moral principles and values. Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche see this rejection reflected in human nature itself. Each develops a distinctive conception of 'higher self,' or of higher purposes already belonging, in some sense, to each of us, in accordance with which we ought to shape our character. Self-formation, not the mere pursuit of happiness (whether our own or that of others), is thus our true moral project. I focus on each philosopher's account of agency and motivation as the locus in which this view of morality is developed, highlighting the differences that emerge from the details of their respective accounts. This thesis shows that a tight relation between cognition and motive feeling is central, though in different ways, for Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, to the motivational structure of those actions through which we develop moral character. According to Kant, recognition of being bound by the moral law (our 'practical cognition' of freedom) is indissolubly linked to the feeling of respect for it, which in turn is explicable only through such recognition. For Schopenhauer, the 'intuitive cognition' that our existence as distinct individuals is illusory is the feeling of compassion. Nietzsche radically expands this point, arguing that, in every act of will, the motive feeling and guiding cognition are uniquely linked. Only a superficial grasp of human motivation supports the idea that pleasure and pain are the common motive forces underlying all our actions. The inner conflict in human nature, the creative tension in self-formation, is not, for Nietzsche, that between a uniquely moral form of motivation and a 'lower' instrumental pursuit of pleasure. Rather, this inner tension, expressed most strikingly and distressingly in extreme ascetic and guilt-ridden strands of Christian morality, is the product of a complex historical conflict between two different modes of behavioural selection – our evolutionary development and the processes of socialization.

This thesis examines the moral philosophical commitments that Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche advance in their respective oppositions to utilitarianism. Though not always under that title, all three reject the claim that promoting happiness is the ultimate end that we pursue, or ought to pursue, through moral principles and values. Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche see this rejection reflected in human nature itself. Each develops a distinctive conception of 'higher self,' or of higher purposes already belonging, in some sense, to each of us, in accordance with which we ought to shape our character. Self-formation, not the mere pursuit of happiness (whether our own or that of others), is thus our true moral project. I focus on each philosopher's account of agency and motivation as the locus in which this view of morality is developed, highlighting the differences that emerge from the details of their respective accounts. This thesis shows that a tight relation between cognition and motive feeling is central, though in different ways, for Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, to the motivational structure of those actions through which we develop moral character. According to Kant, recognition of being bound by the moral law (our 'practical cognition' of freedom) is indissolubly linked to the feeling of respect for it, which in turn is explicable only through such recognition. For Schopenhauer, the 'intuitive cognition' that our existence as distinct individuals is illusory is the feeling of compassion. Nietzsche radically expands this point, arguing that, in every act of will, the motive feeling and guiding cognition are uniquely linked. Only a superficial grasp of human motivation supports the idea that pleasure and pain are the common motive forces underlying all our actions. The inner conflict in human nature, the creative tension in self-formation, is not, for Nietzsche, that between a uniquely moral form of motivation and a 'lower' instrumental pursuit of pleasure. Rather, this inner tension, expressed most strikingly and distressingly in extreme ascetic and guilt-ridden strands of Christian morality, is the product of a complex historical conflict between two different modes of behavioural selection – our evolutionary development and the processes of socialization.

La peine est une institution paradoxale des démocraties libérales contemporaines : les excès et les effets de sur-pénalisation qu’entraînent certaines politiques sécuritaires sont critiqués, mais l’impunité de certains crimes fait scandale et l’on appelle à ce que justice soit faite ; l’abolition de certaines peines (de prison par exemple) ou l’introduction de formes alternatives de régulation (telles les mesures de justice restaurative) sont revendiquées, mais l’on bute sur la difficulté à donner force au droit sans sanctions dissuasives. La présente thèse porte sur les raisons qui font passer l’institution pénale pour indépassable. Elle soutient qu’au-delà de son statut d’instrument afflictif ou de véhicule au ressentiment collectif, la justice pénale est investie d’un troisième rôle, que l’on propose de nommer la fonction normative de la peine. Cette fonction se manifeste à plusieurs égards : l’institution pénale affirme le caractère fondamental de certains interdits et participe à reconnaître les torts subis par les individus, parfois au rebours de la morale dominante ; elle contribue à déplacer les normes sociales et à distinguer les infractions qui importent à l’État et celles qui demeurent invisibles ; elle modèle le contenu et les formes de la conflictualité sociale en mettant en scène les demandes de justice face à l’autorité publique. L’examen de cette fonction normative et de ses répercussions sur la justification de la peine constitue les deux versants de ce travail. La première partie montre qu’au nom du rôle de reconnaissance des torts et des injustices dont l’institution pénale peut être investie, son emploi peut délibérément accroître la souffrance et l’exclusion sociale des condamnés. La deuxième partie cherche plus fondamentalement à comprendre si et comment l’État peut imposer des repères pratiques et des critères d’évaluation aux individus par la menace, malgré la généralité de la loi et le désaccord qui peut affecter les décisions des tribunaux. La troisième partie évalue les ambiguïtés de l’identification des condamnations à la reconnaissance d’un tort. Indexer la sévérité de la peine à la demande de la victime tout en tenant compte du châtiment mérité par le coupable revient à confier à la justice la tâche d’évaluer avec justesse les motifs des différends entre individus et groupes. Le problème est qu’elle le fait dans un cadre défini a priori par trois opérations : la qualification des infractions, l’imputation de la responsabilité et l’individualisation de la sentence. L’enquête conclut que la peine ne se réduit pas à un instrument auxiliaire de dissuasion ou de neutralisation. Elle contribue à trancher les conflits et à transformer la vie morale d’une société, ce qui explique en partie sa résistance face aux arguments de l’abolitionnisme ou de la justice restaurative. Elle demeure néanmoins une institution ambivalente, dont la justification est insatisfaisante : à la fois point d’appui à l’expression des demandes de justice, et, en raison de son caractère étatique, source de déception pour ces mêmes demandes. / Punishment is a paradoxical institution of contemporary democratic societies: the abuses and over-penalisation consequences of security policies are criticized, but the impunity of certain crimes remains scandalous and people urge for justice; the abolition of specific kinds of punishments (for instance prison) or the introduction of alternative forms of regulation (such as practices of restorative justice) are claimed, but the difficulty of enforcing law without deterrent sanctions seems inextricable. This dissertation deals with the reasons why such an institution as criminal justice is considered as unavoidable. It advocates that punishment assumes a third role in society, beyond its use as an afflictive instrument or as a vehicle for collective indignation. I call it the normative function of punishment. This function is manifested through various phenomena: penal institutions affirm the fundamental character of certain prohibitions and take part in recognizing wrongs suffered by individuals, even sometimes against the dominant morality; they help renew social norms and distinguish offenses that matter to the state from those that stay invisible; they shape the content and the forms of social conflictuality by raising demands for justice in front of the public authority. The study of this normative function and its consequences regarding the justification of punishment form the two sides of this dissertation. In the first part, I claim that in order to recognize wrongs and injustices, criminal justice can deliberately increase the social suffering and the exclusion of those who are punished. In the second part, I try to understand more fundamentally how penal institutions provide direct practical guides and evaluation criteria to individuals, despite the generality of legal norms and the disagreement that may affect courts’ decisions. In the third and final part, I assess the difficulty to identify criminal conviction with wrongs recognition. If the severity of sentences is indexed to the request of victims, and if judges still intend to limit deserved punishment to one’s culpability, criminal justice is entrusted with the task of accurately assessing the reasons of conflicts between individuals or groups. The problem is that it does so within a framework based (a priori) on three practices: the legal definition of offenses, the imputation of criminal responsibility and the individualization of sentence. This work concludes that punishment cannot be defined as a secondary instrument of deterrence or neutralization. Punishment contributes to resolve conflicts and transform societies’ moral life, which partly explains its resistance to claims of abolitionism or to restorative justice theory. However, criminal justice remains an ambivalent institution, of which justification is unsatisfactory: it is both a mean to express demands for justice and, as it remains in the hands of the state, a source of disappointment regarding these same demands.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:12:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 5426.pdf: 1013744 bytes, checksum: 6350ea5834b6c8fe2cc61aab33a30985 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-09-02 / The aim of this thesis is to show that Kant's moral philosophy, which finds its basis in the concept of freedom is established with absolute independence of any appreciable influence. Only when man is able to determine their willingness to unconditionally, ie, free from everything empirical effectively becomes free. Within this perspective, there is no room for exceptions to the duty claimed on the basis of empirical circumstances of the shares, as this would lead to a contradiction of pure practical reason with itself. This absoluteness of duty does V. Hösle criticize Kant's moral philosophy insensitivity. At first glance, a response to criticism of V. Hösle seems to be anticipated by Kant with the distinction between duties of strict obligation and duties of obligation can, but research has shown that Kant's moral philosophy remains unconditional and there is no room for exceptions to duty or under or in connection with legal ethics. Nevertheless, the moral philosophy of Kant touches indirectly sensitivity insofar as we are affected and feel the effects of the moral law within us, but this in no way contradicts the purity of his thought. / O objetivo da presente tese consiste em mostrar que a filosofia moral de Kant encontra seu fundamento na ideia de liberdade, que é estabelecida com absoluta independência de toda e qualquer influência sensível. Somente quando o homem é capaz determinar sua vontade de modo incondicional, isto é, livre de tudo o que é empírico, torna-se efetivamente livre. Dentro dessa perspectiva, não há espaço para exceções ao dever reclamadas em função das circunstâncias empíricas das ações, pois isso levaria a uma contradição da razão prática pura consigo mesma. Essa incondicionalidade do dever faz V. Hösle criticar a filosofia moral de Kant, acusandoa de insensibilidade. À primeira vista, uma resposta à crítica de V. Hösle parece ser antecipada pelo próprio Kant com a distinção entre deveres jurídicos, de obrigação estrita, e deveres de virtude, de obrigação lata. A investigação mostrou, porém, que o estabelecimento do fundamento da filosofia prática de Kant, o princípio supremo da moralidade, ou seja, o imperativo categórico, e os demais princípios a ele vinculados permanecem incondicionados e que não há espaço para exceções ao dever, nem no âmbito jurídico nem no âmbito da ética. Não obstante isso, a filosofia moral de Kant toca indiretamente a sensibilidade na medida em que somos afetados e sentimos os efeitos da lei moral em nós, o que fica claro quando trata das predisposições estéticas dos deveres de virtude n´A Metafísica dos Costumes, mas isso de modo algum se contrapõe à pureza de seu pensamento.

FundaÃÃo Cearense de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Cientifico e TecnolÃgico / Este trabalho pretende apresentar a filosofia moral de David Hume a partir da associaÃÃo entre razÃo e sentimento, a formarem um composto inseparÃvel na aÃÃo e na distinÃÃo morais. Para tanto, considero sua teoria no domÃnio mental e no social. O filÃsofo acreditava que a artificialidade das instituiÃÃes nÃo implicava a negaÃÃo da natureza, mas sua extensÃo. Assim, virtudes e vÃcios sÃo reconhecidos pelos seres humanos enquanto aÃÃes que, respectivamente, lhes agradam e desagradam. Isto porque compartilhamos uma mesma natureza que nos capacita discernirmos a utilidade das condutas para nossa sobrevivÃncia de acordo com as circunstÃncias de tempo e espaÃo. Recusa-se, entÃo, um objetivismo metafÃsico e uma autoridade religiosa como fundamento da moralidade. Hume entendia seu projeto como um complemento da RevoluÃÃo CientÃfica do sÃculo XVII, ao estender o uso do mÃtodo experimental no campo da moralidade. / This work is intended to show that David Hume&#8223;s moral philosophy associated reason to feeling, both in mental and social domains, like an inseparable compound in moral action and distinction. He believed that the artificiality of institutions did not implicate the negation of nature, but its extension. Thus, virtues and vices are recognized by humans as actions which respectively please and unplease them. This is because we share a nature in common that enables us to discern the utility of behavior for our survival according to the circumstances of time and space. Then, it means a refusal of the methaphysical objectivism and the religious authority as the foundation of morality. Hume understood his project as a complement to the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century, extending the use of experimental method in the field of morality.

Despite long-standing recognition that the constellation of ethical and political ideas developed by the seventeenth-century Natural Law School played an important part in the development of Enlightenment thought, the relationship between the two remains a fertile area of research in intellectual history. Filling a lacuna in existing scholarship, this thesis contends that central tenets of the ethical and political philosophies developed by the Natural Law School were appropriated by the more liberal and progressive contributors to the Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des Sciences, des Arts et des Métiers (1751-1772); which is frequently considered to be the summa of Enlightenment thought, and emblematic of the conflict between the new ‘philosophical spirit’ and the traditional hierarchies, institutions, and values of the ancien régime. It argues that by establishing the loi naturelle and natural rights of the individual as the foundation of both ethics and politics in many of its articles, the Encyclopédie questions the certainty and validity of Catholicism as the basis for both, and that it therefore played an important role in undermining the moral authority of the Church as well as the political authority of the State. In particular, it asserts that the more liberal and humanitarian contributors to the project put the central tenets of Natural Law thinking into practice, in order to tackle and propose reform of what they perceive to be some of the worst injustices in contemporary society, namely with regard to the related questions of slavery and luxury. For those encyclopédistes who believe in universal rights and the loi naturelle, both the slave trade and the attitude of their contemporaries to luxury seem to embody values very different to those they wanted to promote; in their eyes both are representative of a society in which self-interest and the satisfaction of individual passions are valued over and above any consideration for the needs, welfare, and rights of others.

This dissertation tackles the ageless human debate of the body versus the soul. Based on Kohlbergian theory, the multidisciplinary literature review advances the proposition that moral development proceeds in waves of referential egoism leading to nonreferential altruism that is couched in power--the apple of the eye. Many inter organizational studies using the Defining Issues Test have compared moral maturity levels coming from various academic backgrounds. Previous studies have purported that education is the chief moderating variable for moral maturity, with little regard for paradigmatic bases of power. Yet, in this study noncoercive power is carefully controlled because of the highly technical procurement process used in construction contracting. Coercive power and position in the food chain become the main moderators, because success is not measured by charm or wisdom or even social relations, but only by the low bid in accordance with the contractual specifications. The results from 93 respondents of the Iowa Architects Institute of America (n = 93) indicated that despite the higher education and aesthetic interests, the sample of architects ranked low on moral maturity level when compared to the average of the DIT data bank as a whole. Postconventional scores were 36.4 versus 39.1, respectively. Few intra organizational studies have been conducted examining moral maturity levels among groups in the same work setting. This research also compared the moral maturity of intra industry groups in marketing dyads consisting of architects, contractors, and suppliers using the Defining Issues Test and ANOVA. Again it was expected that architects with higher education and aesthetic interests would rank highest. So in addition to the architects, the members of the Iowa Associated General Contractors and Iowa Associated Builders and Contractors were solicited. This added 32 contractors (n = 32) and 27 suppliers (n = 27), to the total sample (n = 153). Findings showed significant differences among the groups (F (2, 150) = 3.64, p = .05). Yet post hoc comparisons revealed that there was no significant difference in moral maturity levels between architects and contractors engrossed in the same power paradigm (p = 1.00). However, a significant difference existed between architects and suppliers (p =.024). This implication is consistent with the teleological pattern that is prevalent in research studies of salespeople. In summary, performance-based organizations and theorists of stakeholder theory may expect no less than orthodox and opportunistic choices in the real world of business as long as performance remains the ultimate criterion of success.