Thesis (M.Ed.)--University of Hong Kong, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 92-98). Also available in print.

Call number: LD2668 .T4 1933 H83

D.Ed. (Psychology Of Education) / In this thesis an effort was made to propose a concept of the development of responsibility during adolescence. The intention, more specifically, was to describe the development of some aspects of responsibility in adolescents who have Afrikaans as mother tongue. The motivation for doing the research was: Firstly, it is an accepted fact that adolescents and youths receive less guidance today from home, church, and community than they did in the past, while guidance to reach adulthood also means guidance to accept responsibility. Secondly, to develop a sense of responsibility, and to fully accept responsibility, are seen as the ultimate aims of education. Thirdly, the different aspects of a sense of responsibility, and the influence of the community and the educational setting on the development of these aspects of responsibility, have not been established yet...

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This study investigates the problem of contemporary interpretations of the moral education question, as informed by rival moral-philosophical and epistemological traditions. In this study, the moral education question is taken to mean, ‘What educational form and content may best assist students in becoming ethically minded and morally good people?’ Accordingly, this necessitates a consideration of what is meant by morality and what are the central characteristics of the moral life (i.e. moral philosophical perspectives), as well as how such accounts of morality are seen to relate to the educational aims of knowledge and intellectual development (i.e. underlying epistemology).This study shows that current interpretations of moral education (as efforts to ‘teach values’) are predominantly informed by the ‘juridical ethical tradition,’which, in turn, is underpinned by a distinctive epistemology (or ‘Juridicalism’).The thesis proposes that Juridicalism is philosophically contestable because it leads to a partially distorted conception of the moral life and hence of moral education. Generally, by regarding the cognitive dimensions of moral thought and action as separate from and independent of the emotional-volitional dimensions, Juridicalism is an obstacle to understanding the proper moral educational task of schools. Notably, Juridicalism leads to a questionable emphasis on the importance of ‘values’, as expressed in generally agreed rules and principles, as opposed to particular and substantive moral judgements.A critique of Juridicalism is developed, focussing on its underlying conception of human reason as inspired by a distinctly Modern mind-body/world dualism argue that the fragmented and reductive epistemology of Juridicalism signals the need for a richer and more variegated theory of cognition, marked specifically by an integrated anthropology and substantive theory of reason. Further, such an epistemology is located in the realist philosophy of classical antiquity particularly within the Aristotelian tradition. I propose a defence of what I call ‘Classical Realism’, in contrast to Juridicalism, highlighting its distinctively integrated account of the mind/soul and body/world relationship, and substantive conception of practical rationality or moral understanding. Classical Realism also makes central the notion of knowledge as ‘vision’ in order to explain how the rational and affective dimensions of human nature come together in moral thought and action. Finally, the moral education question is reconsidered in light of the visional ethical perspective emerging from Classical Realism. In this light I interpret the moral education question as a matter of nurturing the (intellectual) capacity for and habit of correct vision and, relatedly, moral judgement. Further, this task is shown to be vitally connected with the school’s focus on developing knowledge and the intellect through the teaching of traditional academic and practical disciplines. Some initial comments are made concerning the pedagogical implications of such an interpretation, while some associated challenges and questions for further research are highlighted.

Thesis (M. A.)--University of Hong Kong, 2007. / Title proper from title frame. Also available in printed format.

Project (D. Min.)--Perkins School of Theology, Southern Methodist University, 1984. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 139-150).

I examine how Plato, in his early dialogues, tries to make good on Socrates' claims, in the Apology, about the value of his philosophical life and the benefits it provides his fellow citizens. Beginning with the Apology, I analyze how Socrates tries to exhort people to take care for or tend to virtue and the state of their souls. I argue that Socrates is challenging his fellow-citizens, and Plato his readers, not only to recognize their ignorance, but also to engage in active philosophical inquiry into ethical questions. This aspect of Socrates' mission--his quest to get people to live examined, philosophical lives--is sometimes called philosophical protreptic. In subsequent chapters, I analyze the arguments that Socrates employs in engaging interlocutors in philosophy in three dialogues, the Euthydemus, Lysis, and Alcibiades I. In the Euthydemus, Socrates argues that wisdom is necessary for happiness, but he and his interlocutor discover that they neither have nor understand the wisdom they need. In the Lysis, Socrates discusses friendship and love with two youths, and though their inquiry fails, their cooperative philosophical investigation exemplifies philosophical love and friendship. Finally, in the Alcibiades I, Socrates tries to convince an ambitious young Alcibiades that true power and happiness arise from self-knowledge, and he challenges the young man to seek self-knowledge by taking up a philosophical life under Socrates' guidance. What emerges in these dialogues is a radical and compelling picture of the good life. Socrates does not believe that he or any human fully understands virtue or happiness. His investigations end inconclusively, and indeed he has little hope that he or anyone else will discover final and complete answers about virtue or happiness. Nevertheless, each dialogue demonstrates both the nature and value of philosophical enquiry. We humans are limited and ignorant, and we need to examine ethical questions together in order to live well. By drawing others into the philosophical discussion--full though it is with problems, inconclusive results, and difficulties--Socrates believes that he is both himself living the best available human life and offering the greatest benefit any human can provide to those with whom he talks.

Education, especially moral education, is influenced by various factors. One of them is authority. Educational values and the educators themselves are very important for their pupils as they evoke their willingness to keep to certain rules and follow them. Otherwise, the efficiency of education becomes worse. Teachers play a great role in educational process. They not only organize the educational process but also conduct it and make influence on their students’ morals. The educators win their recognition from the pupils with their moral principles, competence in their subjects, attitude towards their work and teaching, communicative skills and students.

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