This thesis defends a conception of equality of opportunity. It comes in two parts. The first part elaborates the conception. It begins by clarifying the concept of equality of opportunity, showing it to be made up of four basic elements: a distributive pattern, a set of subjects, an opportunity obstacle and a distributive object. The conception I build from these elements explains the value of the distributive pattern, equality, in terms of a concern for fairness, takes persons as its subject and takes well-being as its object. The conception presented is partial, rather than comprehensive, in that it does not include a detailed account of an opportunity obstacle. The conception of equality of opportunity that I present can also be characterised as a luck egalitarian principle. My aim in elaborating the conception is to show that it has intuitive appeal; it constitutes a pro tanto moral principle. The second part of the thesis examines the implications of luck egalitarianism in two contexts. It begins by examining the context of gifts, arguing that although luck egalitarianism is highly restrictive with respect to the freedom to give this only confirms that it is a merely pro tanto moral principle. It continues by examining the context of markets, arguing that luck egalitarianism makes intuitively correct judgments in several specified cases. My aim in applying luck egalitarianism is to show that its implications do not give us reason to reject its initial intuitive appeal. I examine luck egalitarianism generally, rather then the partial conception I elaborate, to allow for the possibility that my earlier arguments are wrong in some respect. Overall, I hope the arguments presented provide reasons to accept the conception presented as morally valuable.

The problem of legitimate authority is widely regarded as fundamental to moral and political philosophy. This thesis aims to explain what the problem precisely is, and to offer a practical method for solving it. The starting point is a claim about the phenomenology of the person as an inherently authoritative agent: we are persons, as distinct from mere ‘things’, by virtue of the authority we possess over ourselves. This claim explains, I argue, why there is a problem of legitimate authority – why the exercise of state authority stands in need of justification – and what the problem precisely is: given the inherent tension between the authority of the state on the one hand, and the self-governing authority of persons on the other, the problem of legitimate authority is essentially that of creating the conditions for optimal reconciliation between them. The bulk of the thesis is devoted to a search for a solution to this problem. The ideal solution lies in developing a concept which I call the Authorization Principle. In its most basic form, the principle states that the exercise of state authority is legitimate only when it is exercised to enforce arrangements that all citizens authorize the state to enforce. The conclusion of the thesis is that the principle should be formulated as follows: The exercise of state authority is legitimate insofar as it is exercised within the provisions of a constitutional arrangement constructed through a process that gives equal weight to all the epistemically undefeated concerns in the society regarding the conditions necessary for persons to exercise personal authority. The solution proposed in the thesis for the problem of legitimate authority has three important implications. The first is that it is entirely within the capacity of ordinary democratic societies to solve the problem. The second is that there is no single legitimate way to govern a society. Standards for the legitimate use of state authority are in some way indexed to culture, ability and resources as well as to other aspects of a society’s unique circumstances. The third is that a society cannot settle the problem of legitimate authority once and for all. The state’s arrangement will require revision every so often in order to maintain the legitimacy of state authority.

This thesis in Educational Sciences consists of a narrative ideology-analysis of the Swedish school's fundamental values with perspectives from the philosophy of Nietzsche and Kant, which also analyzed the same way, with the aim to trace and problematize the ideological foundations of "our society's shared values" that teachers should convey to the students. Based on a theory that a humanism crisis occurs when important values are perceived as threatened, does the introduction of the basic values of the curriculum appear as a response tosocietal changes. Nietzsche and Kant represent completely different idea currents that both have been reflected in the curriculum in which basic values have different meanings. Nietzsche has inspired social criticism, postcolonial and postmodern thinkers to a critical constructivist approach that is an asset in the multicultural classroom to deconstruct stereotypes and prejudices. That culture, ethnicity, morality and religion do not have an objective essence, but seen as social constructions, using a critical approach is a way of thinking which was developed with inspiration from Nietzsche. The school shall strengthen the ability "to live with and realize the values inherent in cultural diversity" is the expression of a postmodern narrative, suggesting that there is not only a valid story, but several. In Nietzsche's perspective, the current standards, such as basic values, is an expression of power, but it is possible to become a superman that frees itself from the prevailing conventions and fulfilling herself, like the postmodern man, or the self-sufficient individual, while Kant rather believe that there are an objective morality that can be reversed by reason that people will follow. Democracy carries the fundamental values of the National Agency for Education. The curriculum values are based on political decision by the Swedish Riksdag and law, but the curriculum refers simultaneously to the ethics borne of humanism. Humanism as Enlightenment, where Kant seems one of the great philosophers of the Enlightenment, is the basis for the curriculum of values. The belief in human rights as a guiding principle and core values constitute a kind of ideology in the curriculum that can be defended by Kant's philosophy, but not with Nietzsche's philosophy. The Curriculum Committee also argues in the report, SOU 1992: 94 for the classic humanistic educational ideal, as both Nietzsche and Kant included, which was weak in Sweden during the post-war period.

The article develops a multidimensional scale that measures to what extent different moral philosophical dimensions influence auditors’ decision-making in their managerial role. An additional aim was to explore if auditors perceive differences in the ethical decision-making process as managers and as auditors. The scale was developed based on eight ethical dimensions from a priori theory. The scale was converted into a webbased questionnaire and sent to Swedish authorised auditors. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was used to test the scale, since it is a suitable method for scale development and early stages of research. The EFA indicates a five-dimensional scale; however, the eight-dimensional scale is to some extent supported, since two of the five dimensions, both connected to duties, are multidimensional in themselves. Hence, the study implies that the concept of duty is a wider concept in the auditing context than in moral philosophical theory, which could be explained by the nature of the profession and that auditors do not perceive a difference between the managerial and auditing role. However, since the study is limited to the Swedish auditing context, the scale needs to be tested in other geographical and cultural contexts. Other implications and suggestions for further research are also presented.

This thesis argues that virtue belongs in any framework of moral philosophy, and specifies this along several lines. In the first chapter I establish that virtue is a good, or a duty. I defend this against skeptical objections which argue that virtue is only an instrumental good. In Chapter 2 I specify some features of virtue. I argue that virtue is an attitude toward the good, and also is enhance by an inclination toward action and a stable disposition. Chapter 3 argues against certain meta-ethical objections that would question the veracity of the aspects of virtue discussed in Chapter 2. These objections draw from psychological studies about traits and the telos of a life. Chapter 4 suggests a hypothesis that eudaimonia, or human flourishing defined narrowly can provide the theoretical unification for virtue. / February 2016

Recently, Christopher Heath Wellman has proposed an innovative argument that appears to resolve, at least with respect to immigration, the tension between democratic autonomy (i.e. a people's right to self-determination) and human rights (i.e. respect for individual freedom and universal equality). Wellman argues, from a traditionally liberal point of view, that a legitimate state (i.e. a state that respects human rights) is entitled to self-determination and that part of the definition of being self-determined is having the presumptive right to unilaterally control immigration. In other words, Wellman claims that a state's unilateral right to control immigration can be made compatible with liberal commitments to individual freedom and universal equality. I aim to raise a novel objection against Wellman's argument, which I hope will also challenge philosophers to think differently about the immigration issue as a whole. My position is that even if Wellman's conclusion is correct, that a state's right to self-determination can be made compatible with human rights, the presumptive right that this generates for a legitimate state to unilaterally control immigration is, at best, limited only to admission and exclusion policies (i.e. to questions about who can be let in and who can be kept out). Wellman's conclusion, however, does not hold for strategies of immigration enforcement and expulsion (i.e. to the questions about how these policies may be enforced or what sort of deportation procedures a state is justified in using). And, in fact, I argue that under Wellman's account, a legitimate state would be restricted in deploying certain strategies of immigration enforcement and expulsion. My conclusion is that with respect to immigration enforcement and expulsion strategies, the presumptive right is on the side of the immigrant and not the state. This means that if a legitimate state wishes to control immigration, it is the state who holds the burden of proof to show that not only its immigration policies but also its enforcement and expulsion strategies do not violate prior commitments to individual liberty and universal equality. This, I contend, provides a moral and political baseline justification for immigrant rights, which I refer to as a minimalist defense of immigrant rights.

Thesis advisor: James Wallace / Thesis advisor: Christopher P. Wilson / This dissertation analyzes the way in which antebellum writers participated in and helped shape the tradition of political liberalism. Emphasizing the dynamics of moral deliberation that are central to democratic life, "The Vision of Principles" puts US literature into conversation with moral and political philosophers not routinely encountered in Americanist literary scholarship to reveal how antebellum US writers routinely responded to moments of profound political conflict by interrogating the nature of moral belief itself. By ranging not only between literature, history, and philosophy, but also across literary forms, from gothic, picaresque, and sentimental novels to slave narratives, essays, and political oratory, this dissertation argues that amidst such textual diversity, we nevertheless find a consistent preoccupation with the individual endeavor for perspective-for vision-into the realm of moral value and moral ideas. It traces that concern as writers responded to three important moments of political conflict in the antebellum era: the debates over the ratification of the Constitution, the "nullification" controversy of the 1830s, and the fallout over the "compromise" of 1850. In doing so, it reconsiders the emergence of American Romanticism and argues that the "inward" turn of U.S. literature towards the self during this era was not an evasion of political life, but an imaginative examination of how individuals come to understand the moral ideas and principles at the heart of political existence. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2018. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: English.

In 2008, Christopher Nolan's The Dark Knight became the most commercially successful comic book adaptation to date. His film, which highlights the humanity and fallibility of Batman, builds on a long character history while also functioning as an individual work. Nolan's depiction of Batman, which follows a long progression towards postmodernism in graphic novel versions of the character, is just one of multiple filmic superhero representations in recent years to depict a darker side of the "superhero" mythos. These films highlight the humanity and fallibility of these heroic figures and place their actions under scrutiny. In Nolan's two Batman films, this approach allows the central character to reflect the moral complexity of postmodern society. As a result of his humanity, Batman must sometimes choose between two negative outcomes; as he does so, he places various moral systems under pressure and tests them. When Batman makes decisions, he must discard some values in favor of others, and in the process, he reveals his personal priorities. Through the decisions he makes in critical moments in the films, Nolan's Batman acts against "traditional" Batman archetypes which suggest that the hero's actions consistently adhere to one of the following principles: a lust for revenge, a desire to prevent future harm, or a vow not to kill. What eventually emerges as Batman's guiding principle in these latest films is not an ethical system per se, but rather a simple desire to thwart the goals of his enemies. Through this oppositional morality, Batman has the moral flexibility to avoid the dangerous ethical extremes of his enemies. This approach to crime also places the superhero's morality in the hands of his enemies, leading Batman to make troubling decisions as he attempts to stop the villains. Because Batman follows no single moral code consistently, the only way he ultimately differentiates himself from the villains of Gotham is through his belief in the city's potential for good, a belief which all of his enemies have abandoned.

This dissertation explores visions of the good life in America through the lens of what middle-class parents from Liberal Protestant, Evangelical Protestant, Roman Catholic, Muslim, Hindu, and Atheist communities want for their children. In the book Habits of the Heart, Robert Bellah and associates famously posit that the dominant moral language of America today is one of utilitarian and expressive individualism. In this dissertation, I measure the degree to which parents in America are guided by that individualism and the degree to which they speak alternative languages that encourage concern for others and for the common good. Through participant observation, interviews, and a letter-writing task with eighty-three New England parents connected with particular congregations, as well as twelve comparable non-attending parents, I look at religious traditions, some of them with long histories in America, and others more recently prominent on the religious landscape, to see how religion shapes parental values. To what extent do parents from these traditions agree on what a good life looks like? And to what extent do we find divergence based on social location, ethnic background, and the beliefs and practices of their traditions? I find that parents across traditions hold five master values for their children--health, happiness (both in childhood and in adulthood), altruism, groundedness in identity, and autonomy. With a few important exceptions, parents see religion as having relatively little to do with the values of health and happiness, which turn out to be influenced more by social class. Religion plays a much greater role in parents' discussion of altruism, with various traditions expressing different forms of the Golden Rule. Parents from all groups also find that they cannot take for granted the transmission of religious identity within a materialistic, pluralistic, and increasingly secular culture. Religious identity is largely an achieved status, and all contemporary American religious communities are, to some degree, sectarian. Finally, parents want their children to be autonomous, but find that they often have to weigh this against other master values. These findings should encourage researchers to take more seriously both the contextual and the conflicting nature of human values.

A Critical Examination of A.J. Ayer's Moral Philosophy Ayer' s overall notion of ethics is that all normative ethical statements are cognitively meaningless. This thesis is an attempt to refute this claim. Ayer's notion is based, I think, on his following two convictions: ( i ) ethical statements are purely emotive, (ii) reasoning from factual premises to ethical conclusions is neither deductive nor inductive. Ethical statements are, according to Ayer, purely emotive because they are pure expressions of the feelings and emotions of the speaker. This means that ethical statements do not even report the speaker's mental state. I have shown that there are some voluntarily uttered ethical statements which are not expressive and hence that some ethical statements are not purely emotive. The controversy whether ethical statements can be deduced formally from factual statements is very old. I have switched the problem to a different direction by showing that the induction/deduction dichotomy is not adequate for reasoning. Other reasoning processes, like informal reasoning, allow one to deduce ethical conclusions from factual premises. It is also shown how Ayer's criterion of meaning, namely the verification principle, renders ethical statements meaningful. Finally, I have defended universalistic act-utilitarianism as a cognitive theory of ethics. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)