This dissertation explores the relationship between the ‘rise’ of the British novel and the critical changes happening in contemporary English marriage law from early eighteenth-century to the end of the nineteenth-century. While citing landmark legal treatises and acts and positioning these novels as the medium through which to see the way these legal moments significantly shaped British culture and society, equity is ultimately at the heart of this study, with equity functioning as part of law but a corrective to it. Running parallel to this protocol of reading through equity is a reading informed through moral philosophy, drawn predominantly from the work of Adam Smith and other thinkers from the Scottish Enlightenment. They encourage us to think about obligation, and the relationship between intentions, expectations, and consequences on the point of promise and contract. Beginning with Daniel Defoe’s Moll Flanders (1722), I show the moral and legal difficulties that arise when promises are based purely on verbal contracts. I then move to Samuel Richardson’s Pamela (1740) and Pamela in Her Exalted Condition (1741) to address the importance and utility of contract, but also the need to outline and endorse a system—introduced through Hardwicke’s Act (1753)—that would provide a more reliable structure for the marriage narrative. Mary Wollstonecraft’s Maria (1798) and Sir Walter Scott’s The Bride of Lammermoor (1819), both of which I call historical novels, pinpoint legal structures that are both oppressive and obsolete, and those who fall victim to the insufficient common law require a more equitable judgment. George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda (1876) encourages readers to think about the potency behind intentions, both expressed and implied, and how resulting consequences can often run counter to the original intentions and expectations. I posit each text as a ‘case’ warranting treatment and judgment in a court of equity, where the particular details are judged in and of themselves but then stand as an offering for ways to continue to think about the general pattern and evaluation of human nature and morals. / English

Despite its prominence as a pejorative term in moral and political philosophy, the phenomenon of ethnocentrism has escaped the focused attention of moral and political philosophers. Little sustained effort has been devoted to its in-depth analysis. This thesis attempts to fill in that gap in the philosophical literature, with a particular focus on the analysis of ethnocentrism as a problem, or rather a set of problems, facing the theory and practice of human rights. The thesis begins by drawing a core distinction between ethnocentrism as a moral phenomenon (i.e., a form of moral partiality), on the one hand, and as an epistemological phenomenon (i.e., a mode of judgment), on the other. After singling out the epistemological aspect of ethnocentrism as its main focus, the thesis argues for four interlocking claims. The first claim is that ethnocentrism represents an unwarranted mode of judgment, and thus an epistemic hazard that ought to be avoided if at all possible (Chapter One, §3). This claim is defended at length against the version of political constructivism advanced by John Rawls, which, by grounding political argument exclusively in ideas and values embedded in a common public culture, implicitly justifies a form of ethnocentrism (Chapter Two). The second claim is that moral argument cannot avoid ethnocentrism by grounding itself, as some have thought, in judgments upon which there is broad moral consensus, or rather by avoiding any appeal to judgments that are the subject of marked dissensus (Chapter Three and Chapter Four). Thirdly, the thesis argues that ethnocentrism is, if avoidable, only so to a limited extent (Chapter Six, §2). And fourthly, it offers an outline of how this limited form of avoidance might work (Chapter Five and Chapter Six, §3).

Rationality is very widely regarded as a normative notion, which underwrites various everyday normative practices of evaluation, criticism, and advice. When some agent behaves irrationally, she is likely to be critically evaluated, and advised to change her ways. Such practices seem to presuppose that agents ought to behave as rationality requires. But some philosophers question this thought. They argue that at least some requirements of rationality cannot be ones that we ought to comply with. This thesis aims to dispel such sceptical doubts over the normativity of rationality; it defends the idea that the requirements of rationality are indeed normative, in the sense that if one is rationally required to F, one ought to F because rationality requires one to F. The normativity of three requirements of practical rationality in particular is the main target for defense in the following pages. They are: [ENKRASIA] Rationality requires of A that, if A believes she ought to F, then A intends to F. [MEANS-ENDS] Rationality requires of A that, if A intends to E, and believes that she will not E unless she intends to M, then A intends to M. [INTENTION CONSISTENCY] Rationality requires of A that, if A intends to F, and believes that she cannot both F and G, then A does not intend to G. After presenting some of the grounds for scepticism about the normativity of these three requirements in chapter 1, the thesis goes on in chapters 2 & 3 to critically examine several different accounts of why rationality is normative, concluding that they are all unsuccessful; a novel account is called for. An account of this kind is offered over the course of the two following chapters, 4 & 5. Each requirement is shown to be constituted by a certain kind of ought, while at the same time corresponding to a rule of correct reasoning. Chapter 6 is devoted to answering an objection to that account, according to which the rules of reasoning are given by permissions rather than requirements. Chapter 7 offers a digression into a related issue in action theory: it unfavorably explores the idea that reasoning is a factor that can be used to analyse not only rational action, but also intentional action more broadly; the chapter suggests that treating intentional action as irreducible is the more fruitful approach. Finally, chapter 8 summarizes the main conclusions of the thesis and comments on some remaining questions.

This dissertation is a set of three essays connected by the common theme of our epistemic fragility: the way in which our knowledge – of our own minds, of whether we are in violation of the epistemic and ethical norms, and of the philosophical truths themselves – is hostage to forces outside our control. The first essay, “Are We Luminous?”, is a recasting and defence of Timothy Williamson’s argument that there are no non-trivial conditions such that we are in a position to know we are in them whenever we are in them. Crucial to seeing why Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument succeeds, pace various critics, is recognising that the issue is largely an empirical one. It is in part because of the kind of creatures we are – specifically, creatures with coarse-grained doxastic dispositions – that nothing of interest, for us, is luminous. In the second essay, “What’s in a Norm?”, I argue that such an Anti-Cartesian view in turn demands that epistemologists and ethicists accept the ubiquity of normative luck, the phenomenon whereby agents fail to do what they ought because of non-culpable ignorance. Those who find such a view intolerable – many epistemic internalists and ethical subjectivists – have the option of cleaving to the Cartesian orthodoxy by endorsing an anti-realist metanormativity. The third essay, “The Archimedean Urge”, is a critical discussion of genealogical scepticism about philosophical judgment, including evolutionary debunking arguments and experimentally-motivated attacks. Although such genealogical scepticism often purports to stand outside philosophy – in the neutral terrains of science or common sense – it tacitly relies on various first-order epistemic judgments. The upshot is two-fold. First, genealogical scepticism risks self-defeat, impugning commitment to its own premises. Second, philosophers have at their disposal epistemological resources to fend off genealogical scepticism: namely, an epistemology that takes seriously the role that luck plays in the acquisition of philosophical knowledge.

If we are interested in questions about how we ought to organize our political lives, what kind of weight, if any, should we give to evidence about what people actually think? The thesis explores this question about the role of public opinion in normative political theory. First, I disentangle a number of distinct justifications for taking account of public opinion. Specifically, the thesis evaluates four views of the status of public opinion: as an epistemic resource; a feasibility constraint; a means of democratizing political theory; or constitutive of moral and political ideals. I defend the epistemic argument, outlining two forms in which popular attitudes represent a valuable epistemic resource. The thesis criticizes the feasibility and democratic accounts of the role of public opinion as these are presented in the existing literature, but suggests more convincing ways of reconstructing these arguments. Finally, I reject the view that public opinion constitutes the ideal of justice, arguing that such an account is subject to a fundamental tension. As well as clarifying the status of popular attitudes, the thesis addresses the methodological difficulties that arise when we seek to bring public opinion to bear on ideas from political theory, whose meaning and status in everyday political thought and discourse is often limited or uncertain. I outline two approaches to integrating normative theory with the investigation of popular attitudes that mitigate the methodological problems that often confront such projects. The second major aim is to situate the question of the role of public opinion in the context of wider debates about the aims and methods of contemporary political theory. In particular, I address recent demands for greater ‘realism’ in political theory, distinguishing two main strands of realist critique and drawing out their contrasting implications for the role of public opinion.

At first glance, the project of moral enhancement (making people more moral) may appear uncontroversial and obviously worth supporting; surely it is a good idea to make people better. However, as the recent literature on moral enhancement demonstrates, the situation is not so simple – there is significant disagreement over the content of moral norms as well as appropriate means by which to manipulate them. This disagreement seriously threatens many proposals to improve society via moral enhancement. In my dissertation, I develop an understanding of how, exactly, disagreement poses problems for moral enhancement. However, I also argue that there is a way forward. It is possible to bring about moral improvement without commitment to particular and controversial moral norms, but instead relying on relatively uncontroversial ideas concerning morally reliable processes. The upshot is that, while attempting to directly manipulate people’s moral ideas is objectionable, it is relatively unproblematic to focus on helping people reason better and avoid akrasia, with the justified expectation that this will generally lead to moral improvement. We should, therefore, focus not on how to bring people in line with what we take to be the right ideas, motives or behaviors. Rather, we should look to helping people determine for themselves what being moral consists in, as well as help ensure that they act on those judgments. Traditional, non-moral education, it turns out, is actually one of the best moral enhancers we have. In fact, the tools of philosophy (which is, in many aspects, concerned with proper reasoning) are central to the project of indirect moral enhancement. Ultimately, one of the best ways to make people morally better may well be to make them better philosophers.

This is a study of love (erōs) in Plato’s Symposium. It’s a study undertaken over three chapters, each of which serves as a stepping stone for the following and addresses one of three primary aims. First: to provide an interpretation of Plato’s favored theory of erōs in the Symposium, or as it’s referred to here, a theory of Platonic love. This theory is understood to be ultimately concerned with a practice of living which, if developed correctly, may come to constitute the life most worth living for a human being. On this interpretation, Platonic love is the desire for Beauty, ultimately for the sake of eudaimonic immortality, manifested through productive activity. Second: to offer a reading of the Symposium which attends to the work’s literary elements, especially characterization and narrative structure, as partially constitutive of Plato’s philosophical thought on erōs. Here it’s suggested that Platonic love is concerned with seeking and producing truly virtuous action and true poetry. This reading positions us to see that a correctly progressing and well-practiced Platonic love is illustrated in the character of the philosopher Socrates, who is known and followed for his bizarre displays of virtue and whom Alcibiades crowns over either Aristophanes or Agathon as the wisest and most beautiful poet at the Symposium. Third: to account for how to love a person Platonically. Contra Gregory Vlastos’ influential critical interpretation, it’s here argued that the Platonic lover is able to really love a person: to really love a person Platonically is to seek jointly for Beauty; it is to work together as co-practitioners in the art of love. The art of Platonic love is set up in this way to be explored as a practice potentially constitutive of the life most worth living for a human being.

Thesis (MPhil (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study finds its roots in the ancient quarrel, as mentioned by Plato 400 BC, between poets (artists) and philosophers on the nature of our ethical existence. The ancient philosophers participating in the ancient quarrel, such as Plato, had a metaphysical understanding of our existence and they believed that we should communicate about our ethical existence through a style which acknowledges the transcendental nature of our human existence. The styles and language used by the philosophers of the ancient quarrel were therefore often very abstract, and mostly concerned with the rationality of human reasoning. The ancient poets participating in this quarrel, however, did not share the metaphysical worldview of their philosophical rivals. They denied the transcendental nature of our existence, and argued that our ethical existence should be portrayed and communicated through a style which acknowledges the fact that we are humans with a concrete existence. The poets of the ancient quarrel also promoted a style which acknowledges humans as beings with both rational and emotional faculties. It is for this reason that we find today in literature concerned with moral matters, both the abstract style of moral philosophy which is concerned with the rational aspects of our existence, and the concrete style of fictional literature which is concerned with the emotive aspects of our existence. The quarrel on how to communicate about the nature of our ethical existence is, however, an ongoing debate which is still prevalent in our modern times. This study turns to the modern argument of Martha Nussbaum on how to communicate about the nature of our ethical existence. Nussbaum argues that the abstract style of philosophical texts on morality acknowledges the abstract and rational aspects of our human nature and existence, but that it often fails to fully acknowledge the fact that we are concrete human beings for whom emotions play an integral part in our ethical existence. She therefore believes that moral philosophy should be presented in combination with fictional literature in order to give a true and complete picture of our ethical existence. This study thus enters into a critical dialogue with Nussbaum on her proposal to combine fictional literature with moral philosophy. Accordingly, this study focuses on three specific aspects of our ethical existence, which Nussbaum argues, are acknowledged through fictional literature such as novels, but not through the typical style of abstract moral philosophy. They are; 1) that human values are plural and often incommensurable; 2) that the particulars of situations play an important role in ethical deliberation; and 3) that human emotions and the imagination form a big part of our ethical existence. The fundamental aim of this study is thus to answer the question whether the style of fictional literature actually acknowledges the three above mentioned aspects of our ethical existence. The novel which is used to determine this is Alan Paton’s Cry the Beloved Country. Nussbaum classifies the three above mentioned aspects of our ethical existence as 1) The Non- Commensurability and Plurality of Values; 2) Priority of the Particular; and 3) Ethical Value of the Emotions and Imagination. These three aspects are, however, derived from Aristotle’s ethics and they form, as Nussbaum has argued, the bases of the Aristotelian ethical position – a position from which practical knowledge can be obtained. The aim of this study is therefore not only to determine whether certain fictional literature acknowledges the three fundamental aspects of the Aristotelian ethical position, but it also aims to answer the question whether the Aristotelian ethical position (and therefore practical wisdom) can be obtained through the reading of fictional literature such as novels. The study concludes that some fictional literature, such as the novel Cry, the Beloved Country, does in fact adequately portray the three fundamental features of the Aristotelian ethical position, and that Nussbaum’s proposal should receive serious consideration, since the inclusion of some fictional literature into moral philosophy my lead to deeper ethical understanding from which practical wisdom can be obtained. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie vind sy oorsprong in die eeue oue stryd, soos al reeds geïdentifiseer deur Plato 400 vC, tussen digters (kunstenaars) en filosowe oor die aard van ons etiese bestaan. Die antieke filosowe wat deelgeneem het aan hierdie eeue oue vete, soos byvoorbeeld Plato, het ‘n metafisiese verstaan van ons bestaan gehad, en het daarom geglo dat ons oor ons etiese bestaan moet kommunikeer deur middel van style wat erkenning gee aan die transendentale aard van ons menslike bestaan. Die style en taal wat deur die filosowe van hierdie eeue oue vete gebruik is, was dus dikwels baie abstrak en uiters bemoeid met die mens se rasionele denkvermoëns. Die antieke digters wat deelgeneem het aan hierdie vete het egter nie, soos die filosowe, ‘n metafisiese wêreldbeskouing van ons bestaan gehad nie. Hulle het die transendente aard van ons bestaan ontken, en het daarom daarop aangedring dat ons etiese bestaan voorgestel en oor gekommunikeer moet word deur style wat erkenning gee aan die feit dat ons mense is met ‘n konkrete bestaan. Hulle het egter ook aangedring op ‘n styl wat erkenning gee dat mense beide rasionele en emosionele wesens is. Dit is weens hierdie rede dat ons vandag, in literatuur aangaande morele kwessies, die abstrakte en meer rasioneel geöriënteerde styl van morele filosofie, sowel as die konkrete en meer emosioneel geöriënteerde styl van fiktiewe literatuur aantref. Daar is egter vandag steeds nie klaarheid oor hoe daar oor ons etiese bestaan gekommunikeer moet word nie, en onenigheid is dus steeds te bespeur in huidige debatte oor hierdie tema. Hierdie studie ondersoek ‘n moderne argument, soos voortgestaan deur Martha Nussbaum, oor die wyse waarop daar oor die aard van ons etiese bestaan gekommunikeer moet word. Nussbaum neem die standpunt in dat die abstrakte styl van morele filosofiese tekste erkenning gee aan die abstrakte en rasionele aard van ons menslike aard en bestaan, maar dat dit nie altyd daarin slaag om erkenning te gee dat ons mense is met ‘n konkrete etiese bestaan waarin emosies (eerder as net rasionele denke) ook ‘n baie belangrike rol speel nie. Hierdie studie neem dus die vorm aan van ‘n kritiese dialoog met Nussbaum aangaande haar voorstel om fiktiewe literatuur te kombineer met morele filosofie. Gevolglik fokus hierdie studie op drie spesifieke aspekte van ons etiese bestaan, wat Nussbaum glo wel deur fiktiewe literatuur aangespreek word maar nie altyd deur tekste van morele filosofie nie. Hierdie drie aspekte is 1) dat menslike waardes uiteenlopend en dikwels onversoenbaar is; 2) dat die partikuliere elemente van situasies ’n belangrike rol speel in etiese besluitneming; en 3) dat ons menslike emosies en verbeelding ’n groot deel uitmaak van ons etiese bestaan. Die fundamentele doel van hierdie studie is dus om te bepaal of die styl van fiktiewe literatuur wel erkenning gee aan die drie bogenoemde aspekte van ons etiese bestaan. Die fiktiewe werk wat gebruik is om dit te bepaal, is Alan Paton se Cry, the Beloved Country. Nussbaum klassifiseer die drie bogenoemde aspekte van ons etiese bestaan as 1) Onversoenbaarheid and Pluraliteit van Waardes; 2) Prioriteit van die Partikuliere; en 3) Etiese Waarde van die Emosies en Verbeelding. Hierdie klassifikasie vind egter sy oorsprong in die etiek van Aristoteles, en vorm dus volgens Nussbaum die basis van die Aristoteliaanse etiese posisie – ‘n posisie van waaruit praktiese wysheid geput kan word. Die doel van hierdie studie is dus nie net om te bepaal of fiktiewe literatuur erkenning gee aan die drie fundamentele aspekte van die Aristoteliaanse etiese posisie nie, maar die doel is ook om te bepaal of die Aristoteliaanse etiese posisie (en dus praktiese wysheid) bekom kan word deur die lees van fiktiewe literatuur. Die studie kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat sekere fiktiewe literatuur, soos die werk Cry, the Beloved Country, inderdaad wel bevredigende erkenning gee aan die drie eienskappe van ons etiese bestaan, soos veronderstel deur die Aristoteliaanse etiese posisie, en dat Nussbaum se voorstel ernstige aandag behoort te geniet, aangesien die insluiting van sekere fiktiewe literatuur in morele filosofie ‘n dieper etiese verstaan teweeg kan bring, waaruit praktiese wysheid geput kan word.

When an act is right or wrong, there may be an explanation why. Different moral theories recognize different moral facts and offer different explanations of them, but they offer no account of moral explanation itself. What, then, is its nature? This thesis seeks a systematic account of moral explanation within a framework of moral realism. In Chapter 1, I develop a pluralist theory of explanation. I argue that there is a prima facie distinctive normative mode of explanation that is essential to moral theory. In Chapter 2, I characterize normative explanation through its formal properties. I then draw on John Mackie’s claim that moral explanations are queer to develop a powerful form of moral scepticism. In Chapters 3–4, I reject attempts to reduce normative explanation to logical necessity, metaphysical necessity, or conceptual (analytic) necessity. The failure of these accounts is taken to reinforce Mackie’s scepticism. In Chapter 5, I defend a partial analysis of normative explanation in terms of irreducible normative laws. I argue that irreducible normative laws offer a realist, though non-naturalist, answer to Mackie’s scepticism. The existence of irreducible normative laws then is defended as offering the best realist explanation of why rightness and wrongness supervene on descriptive properties. In Appendix A, I discuss the claim the normative explanation has an essential connection to the motivation of virtuous agents. I defend this claim from certain difficulties posed by Jonathan Dancy’s recent work.

Adam Ferguson (1723-1816) was one of the leading figures of the Scottish Enlightenment, an influential eighteenth-century moral and political philosopher, as well as a professor of ethics at the University of Edinburgh from 1764 to 1785. There has been a wealth of scholarship on Ferguson in which central themes include his role as a political theorist, sociologist, moral philosopher, and as an Enlightenment thinker. One of the most frequent topics addressed by scholars is his relationship to ancient philosophy, particularly Stoicism. The ease with which scholars identify Ferguson as a Stoic, however, is problematic because of the significant differences between Ferguson‟s ideas and those of the „schools‟ of classical antiquity, especially Stoicism. Some scholars interpret Ferguson‟s philosophy as a derivative, unsystematic „patchwork‟ because he drew on various ancient sources, but, it is argued, did not adhere to any particular system. The aim of my thesis is to suggest an alternative interpretation of Ferguson‟s relationship to ancient philosophy, particularly to Stoicism, by placing Ferguson in the context of the intellectual history of the eighteenth century. The first section of this thesis is an examination of Ferguson‟s response to the Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns, modern eclecticism and the experimental method to demonstrate how Ferguson‟s approach to and engagement with ancient philosophy is informed by these intellectual contexts. The second section is a close analysis of the role that ancient schools play in his discussion of the history of philosophy as well as the didactic purpose found in his lectures and published works thereby determining the function of ancient thought in his philosophy. The third section is a re-examination of Ferguson‟s concept of Stoicism and his engagement with Stoic ethics in his moral philosophy re-interpreting his relationship to the ancient school. With a combination of a new understanding of Ferguson‟s methodology and new assessment of his engagement with ancient thought, a new interpretation of Ferguson‟s moral philosophy demonstrates his unique contribution to eighteenth-century thought.