This thesis is an exploration of several themes in the work of Aristotle and Hegel concerning the nature of action and ethics, and discusses the issues raised in relation to modern moral philosophy. The thesis takes as its starting point both Aristotle's and Hegel's conception of rational, purposive human action as being central to ethics and morality. This is carried out in contrast to influential trends in modern moral philosophy regarding the nature of reason and desire. Part one considers Hegel's view of the task of philosophy, i. e. the assimilation and reflection of the particular subject matter of which it speaks, rather than abstract theoretical thinking. The discussion will highlight that many of the problems raised in the rationalist/empiricist debates of the 17th and 18th Centuries are due to the abstract nature of those discussions, and to attempts to assimilate the subject matter to primary assumptions about reason, experience and the individual. In particular, the metaphysics of mind and the epistemology that the debate involved, it will be claimed, draws a hard and fast distinction between reason and desire. This has led to abstract theories of reasoning and motivation. One particular consequence of abstract, theoretical thinking is that the conceptual language of debate becomes divorced from the subject matter under discussion. In particular, the cluster of concepts that form the basis of the philosophy of mind, action, ethics - reason, desire, motive, intention, purpose, etc. - become refined and specialised to a degree that they come to bear only a vague resemblance to the reasons, etc. that are features of actual (as opposed to theoretical) human conduct. In Part Two of the thesis, I will offer a contrasting perspective, discussing Aristotle's and Hegel's treatment of these concepts without the theoretical framework inherited from 17th and 18th Century metaphysics and epistemology.

The aim of Paul’s letter to the Philippians has been understood in various ways: e.g. reassurance, consolation, advance of the gospel. This thesis presents a new analysis of Philippians that challenges these proposals and offers a new way of thinking about Paul’s overarching argumentative aim in this letter. After demonstrating the need to examine three areas (viz. moral philosophy, athletics, and vivid speech) in an historical analysis of Philippians and addressing methodological issues pertinent to this investigation (Part I), I turn to map out the historical context relevant for this project (Part II): viz. the broad structure of thought in ancient moral philosophy, ancient athletics and its association with virtue, and the use of vivid description to persuade an audience. The final part of this thesis (Part III) is an exegetical analysis of Philippians that interprets the letter in light of the contextual material discussed in Part II, exploring how this contextual material contributes to and is interrelated in Paul’s persuasive appeal to morally form the Philippian Christians in a particular way. In this analysis I argue that Paul’s pattern of thought in Philippians is structured similarly to the broad structure of thought in ancient moral philosophy, which is oriented toward an ultimate τέλος and views the virtues as necessary in attaining this goal. Paul’s use of athletic language, framing his argument in the letter (1:27–30; 4:3), fills out this perspective on life by presenting the nature of Christian existence in terms of a contest of virtue, which is similar to how moral philosophers used this language. This perspective on life is vividly depicted and summed up in the image of the runner in Phil 3:13–14. As a vivid description this imagery would have had a powerfully persuasive effect and rhetorically plays a significant role in Paul’s argument. With this imagery, Paul is presenting himself as striving toward Christ, the τέλος of life, which entails thinking and living in a particular way to make progress toward this goal—the final attainment of which is complete transformation to become like Christ. It is this vivid description of the runner that encapsulates Paul’s overarching argumentative aim in the letter, persuading the Philippians to pursue Christ as the τέλος of life.

This thesis sets out an argument against the present interpretation of the concept of autonomy under the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR) Article 8 jurisprudence and proposes a new reading of the concept that is rooted in an acknowledgment and appreciation of human interdependence. Following the prevailing political, legal and socio-cultural ideas and ideals about autonomy, the ECtHR has chosen to furnish its recent Article 8 case law according to the values characteristic of the notion of individual autonomy – independence, selfsufficiency, and the ability to conduct one’s life in a manner of one’s own choosing. Adopting this individualistic view on autonomy, the ECtHR sets normative standards for behaviour that the thesis challenges as being detrimental for the quality of interpersonal relationships. The work draws on sociological theory to argue that in modern individualised societies people are increasingly tied to each other – one has to be socially sensitive and to be able to relate to others and to obligate oneself, in order to manage and organise the complexities of everyday life. This also means that there are attendant obligations between individuals to be sensitive towards, and care for, each other. It is argued that an effective exercise of one’s autonomy becomes necessarily dependent on the existence of caring and trusting relationships. This in turn requires the ECtHR to adopt an appropriate conceptualisation of autonomy that embraces this knowledge and gives full effect to it. The concept of caring autonomy is proposed as a replacement for an individualistic concept of autonomy. It will be argued that this concept captures better the essentiality of human interdependence and the morality it calls for. The implications of this for the future direction of the ECtHR jurisprudence are also considered.

My dissertation defends a modern version of Role Ethics modeled on the functioning of human moral psychology, and proposes a novel method for identifying the institutional roles of a well-ordered collective. In particular, I defend the view that our duties are determined by the social roles we incur in the communities we inhabit. The companion project extends Role Ethics into the political domain. I argue that we can identify the well-ordered collective in roughly the same way we identify the good individual, by discerning the dispositions in the relevant agent that are conducive to its well-being. By scaling up, we shift attention from the moral dispositions of individuals to the moral dispositions of collectives -- the institutions that determine the moral character of a population. While philosophers have tended to focus on the formal institutions of the state, this research is largely concerned with the 'informal institutions' of a collective, the implicit social roles/practices constructed and enforced endogenously, such as those involved in structuring human friendships. What I call 'Collective Eudaimonism' is a kind of virtue ethics writ large, a normative theory tasked with identifying correlations between a set of informal institutions and the indicators of flourishing human collectives. / text

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The main object of this thesis is to explain in a systematic fashion Francis Hutcheson's moral theory. Such an attempt will necessarily involve a discussion of the various philosophical problems which are inherent in his theory. For example, I discuss the issue of whether Hutcheson's theory of the moral sense is to be interpreted in an intuitionist or an emotivist fashion. It is argued that some aspects of his moral sense theory favour the former and some the latter interpretation. Hutcheson's theory of benevolence is outlined and his arguments against the psychological egoists are discussed. Perhaps the most important problem with Hutchesoh's moral sence theory is the problem of motivation. Any moral theory which locates the virtue of virtuous actions in the motive from which they are done, as Hutcheson's does, will encounter problems in explaining how knowledge of right and wrong can influence us to be virtuous. Hutcheson's ingenious solution to this problem and his theory of moral motivation, which I suggest have not been adequately discussed previously to this thesis, are explicated at length. Hutcheson's criticisms of the moral rationalists are considered, as are Price's criticisms of Hutcheson. A final chapter attempts to show how the development of Hutcheson's thinking was the result of his realizing the implications of his own theories, especially his theory of moral motivation.

The central premise of this enquiry is that the International Baccalaureate (IB) model of education fails to deliver the humanitarian values that its literature claims describe. Its curriculum lacks the moral authority of a coherent philosophical foundation, and this promotes 'emotivism,' which reinforces contradictory ‘neoliberal’ values. Accordingly, this undermines the basic aim of an IB education and leaves its teachers prone to the subjectivism of emotivist morality. The proposal is that a process of reflexive practice can create an Aristotelian alternative to emotivism that revitalises the IB’s values-based model. Furthermore, it will argue that technology can build this practice into a 'social ontology’ that challenges the ‘governmentality’ of contemporary international education. To test the premise, an isolated ‘classic’ type of international IB school is considered because it reveals how a teacher’s cultural displacement shows the ontological significance of difference. This is followed by an evaluation of the ontological impact of international education’s governmentality. Subsequently, Alasdair MacIntyre's virtue theory is combined with Michel Foucault's ‘care of the self,’ to build a framework for reflective teacher practice. Then, an argument is made to use technology to connect these individuals and form a reflexive social ontology. To conclude, the enquiry argues that technology represents an objective rationality that challenges emotivism by removing subjectivism from the moral issues of difference facing an IB teacher.

Kant’s idea of the person and its place within his so-called “Formula of Humanity” has taken on an important role in contemporary discussions of normative ethics. Yet, despite its popularity, confusion remains as to what Kant really means by person and personality in his exposition of the moral imperative. This confusion has led to the attribution of positions to Kant that he clearly does not hold. My concern in this thesis is to engage the texts of Kant’s moral philosophy in an effort to clarify his idea of person/personality. Accordingly, my concerns are primarily exegetical, though I do engage some contemporary trends in Kant scholarship and Kantian ethics. I have divided the thesis into three main sections, which comprise Sections II, III, IV. In Section II, I look to Kant’s precritical ethics, examining his initial discovery of the formal and material principles of morality and his interest in the role feeling plays in the moral life. Of particular interest is Kant’s first introduction of a connection between the feeling of respect for persons and moral duties. In Section III, I suggest that reading Kant’s critical moral philosophy in continuity with the precritical ethics brings into relief Kant’s move from popular morality to an analytic demonstration of the connection of the moral imperative to the will of a rational being. I argue that respecting Kant’s analytic move helps to prevent us from (i) conflating the idea of humanity and personality, which is commonly done in contemporary Kant scholarship and (ii) attributing a strict “two-world” ontology to Kant’s moral philosophy. Finally, in Section IV, I return to Kant’s conception of moral feeling as respect for persons, and I briefly discuss its motivating force in the fulfillment of the demands of morality. Together, these three sections display the importance of understanding Kant’s idea of personality for any project aiming to faithfully interpret his moral thought.

The central doctrine of sufficientarianism is that there is a certain threshold below which people are said to be objectively "badly-off," and that providing benefits to people who fall into this category has a special moral urgency. A big part of sufficientarianism's success as a theory, then, relies on the ability to define the threshold in a manner that is non-arbitrary and that justifies a large difference in moral consideration between people who are on opposite sides of the threshold. This thesis examines some attempts to define such a threshold, and eventually concludes that no such threshold is available to us. However, while sufficientarianism may not work as a theory, sufficiency thresholds remain useful due to their practical ability to give useful instruction to policy makers in order to assist in resource distribution and the promotion of social justice. / Graduate

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